Chapter M: De Calonne to M. De Lafayette (2)

Congress having vested me with the power of appointing clerks, I have appointed two gentlemen, in whose integrity and abilities I can confide. These are barely sufficient to do the running business of the office, which is much greater than I imagined it would be, five copies, besides the draft being necessary for every foreign letter or paper transmitted. To copy all the letters, which have hitherto been received, with the Secret Journals and other extracts from the books and files of Congress, though absolutely necessary, both for order and security, will be impossible, without further aid for at least one year. Congress have not, indeed, limited the number I may employ, nor have they fixed their salaries, upon both of which I could wish for their direction. An interpreter is so necessary, both for this Department and the Admiralty, that I cannot but recommend to Congress the appointment of one, from whom, if a man in whom I could confide, I might receive assistance as a Secretary when hurried with business.

It may possibly be expected, Sir, that I should close this long letter by a report on the matters it contains, but as it is a delicate subject to point out a mode for extending my own powers, I only beg leave to recommend the enclosed resolve.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

Office of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, }
January 31st, 1782. }

Dear Sir,

I was this day favored with yours of the 13th ultimo. I need not tell you, that the intelligence it conveyed, and the spirit in which it was written, afforded me the most sensible pleasure. The idea it holds forth of an attempt upon Charleston, and the prospect of success in it, is one that we dare not indulge here, more especially as troops have sailed from New York, and as we presume to Charleston, but you have taught us rather to measure your success by your genius than by your means.

I wish it were in my power to tell you, that our accounts from Europe were proportionate to our expectations. The combined fleets, as you know, have returned and separated, without having effected anything. The British are again masters of the ocean. Gibraltar is a rock, on which all the exertions of Spain seem to split, and the siege of fort St Philip seems to be carried on in the most energetic manner. We have no prospect of forming an alliance, either with Spain or Holland, who both appear to sigh for peace. Our loan on the guarantee of France with the last, is nearly completed. But what is not a little unsatisfactory, it is also nearly expended by advances, which France has made us on the credit of it. From Spain we are likely to get nothing.

The negotiations for a peace are entirely, at a stand; the mediating powers have no interest in wishing it, and the belligerent nations are neither of them sufficiently weakened to request their interposition. The Count de Vergennes assures us, that Britain will still make the most vigorous exertions. I mention these circumstances not only for your information, but that you may make the proper use of them in animating the exertions of the Southern States. It is the misfortune of America to presume too much upon each dawning of success, and to believe that peace must tread upon the heels of every little advantage, instead of being taught by her own struggles and difficulties, that every nation has resources, that surpass the expectations of its enemies.

Would to God that you could be enabled, by the animated efforts of the Southern States, to expel the enemy from them without the aid of our allies. This would re-establish our character for activity in Europe, where I am sorry to say, it has for some time past been upon the decline, and I do sincerely believe, that co-operating with the brilliant successes of the last fall, it would incline the enemy to peace, without which I have no expectations of it. But I fear this is rather to be wished for than expected.

Domestic news we have none, but what Colonel Ternant will give, or you may collect from the enclosed papers.

If anything turns up worth your notice, you shall hear from me. I flatter myself that you will think with me, that our distance is too great to wait for the ceremony of answer and reply, and favor me with a line as occasion offers.

I have the honor to be, Sir, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATES.

Philadelphia, February 18th, 1782.

Sir,

I do myself the honor to transmit to your Excellency several resolutions of Congress, which having a reference to the Department of Foreign Affairs, are in course to go through this office. The necessity of carrying them into effect is too obvious to need observations.

While we hold an intercourse with civilised nations, we must conform to laws, which humanity has established, and which custom has consecrated among them. On this the rights, which the United States or their citizens may claim in foreign countries must be founded.

One of the resolutions passed Congress in consequence of a convention about to be concluded between his Most Christian Majesty and the United States of America, which affords an additional reason for paying it the earliest attention. Your Excellency and the Legislature will see the propriety of rendering the laws on these subjects as simple, and the execution of them as expeditious, as possible, since foreigners, who are the great object of them, are easily disgusted at complex systems, which they find a difficulty in understanding, and the honor and peace of a nation are frequently as much wounded by a delay as by a denial of justice.

Another resolution relates to your boundaries, and is designed as one means of ascertaining the territorial rights of the United States collectively, which can only be accurately known by each State's exhibiting its claims, and the evidence on which they found them. Your Excellency will therefore be pleased to direct, authentic copies from your records of all grants, charters, maps, treaties with the natives, and other evidences, to be transmitted to this office, as soon as you can conveniently collect them. I could wish, that the copies might be proved, by having the great seal of your State annexed.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO GOVERNOR RUTLEGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

Office of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, }
February 19th, 1782. }

Dear Sir,

I wish to avail myself of the opportunity Colonel Ternant affords me, to convey the agreeable intelligence contained in the enclosed letter from Mr Harrison, our agent at Cadiz. Many other objects present themselves, on which I would write could I do it without detaining Colonel Ternant, who only waits for this.

I propose to have the honor of writing more at large by the next safe conveyance. In the meanwhile, I should consider it as a favor, which might be rendered useful to the public, as well as agreeable to me, if your Excellency would open a correspondence with this office, in which an exact state of affairs in the government, over which you preside ought to be detailed, which could not fail to have some influence in the direction of our foreign affairs.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATES.

Philadelphia, February 19th, 1782.

Sir,

Where a Government is composed of independent States, united not by the power of a sovereign but by their common interest, the Executive Departments form a centre of communication between each State and their Chief Council, and are so far links of the chain, which should bind them together, as they render to each similar views of great national objects, and introduce uniformity in their measures for the establishment of general interests. A mistaken idea of our own importance to other nations, of their attachment to us, and of the weakness of our common enemy, having lulled us into a very imprudent security, I beg leave to state to your Excellency the information last received from Europe. Our success in this important war, under the favor of Heaven, must be built upon the weakness of our enemy, the strength and perseverance of her foes in Europe, and our own exertions.

It is an undeniable fact, that Britain has not, in the course of the last campaign, gained any advantage of her enemies, but, on the contrary, has seen their fleets ride triumphant in the seas, she proudly called her own, and an army, in which she placed her fondest hopes, made captive. But, on the other hand, we are compelled to admit, that she has met with no such reverse of fortune as materially to debilitate her, or weaken her resources for another campaign. Her trade has, for the most part, returned in safety. Her fleets have blocked up those of the Dutch, and, upon the separation of the combined fleets, recovered the superiority in the European seas. The army taken in America is only so far decidedly ruinous to her affairs here, as we know how to avail ourselves of the advantage it affords.

That her pride is not humbled, that she did not wish for peace prior to this advantage, is obvious, 1st. From her refusing to make a separate treaty with the Dutch, who, under the mediation of the Empress of Russia, seemed anxiously to wish it; 2dly. From her neglect to notice the last proposals of the mediating powers, which yet remain unanswered; so that if any alteration is made in their sentiments oh this subject, they must originate in their ill success in America, for in every other quarter their defensive war seems to have been supported with advantage. How far this will operate admits of a doubt, which prudence directs us not to rely upon. Money, the great support of modern wars, has been raised with more facility in England, than in any country in the world; and we find the minority last year censuring Lord North for giving the advantage of lending to his friends. Their losses may indeed render subscriptions more expensive to the public; but there is no well grounded room to suppose they will not fill up; and still less reason to believe, if the means for carrying on the war are attainable, that the vindictive spirit of the King and his ministry, and the overweening pride of the nation, will soon yield to make a peace, which involves their disgrace and humiliation. But as strength or weakness are mere comparative terms, we can form no judgment of the measures of Britain but by attending to the force and disposition of her enemies.

The United Provinces were evidently dragged into the war, and have prosecuted it as if they momentarily expected a peace. The Colonies in the West Indies have been taken, without being in a state to make the smallest resistance, and the active interposition of France alone saved those in the East from sharing the same fate. Our last letters from Holland place the distress of their commerce in a strong point of view. They are unhappily rent by parties, which clog the wheels of government; though it is said the party opposed to England are the most numerous and growing in strength, so that at some future day we may reasonably hope they will assume the entire ascendency; yet we can build very little on this, till the close of another year. This much is certain, they are not yet allied to us, nor have they given us reason to believe, that they intend to be so. They wish for peace, and will take no measures that can obstruct it. They have lent us no money, nor are they likely to do it; from whence we may presume, either that they doubt our success, or do not much interest themselves in it.

Our expectations from Spain are scarcely more flattering. Some little aids of money have been received after long solicitation, hardly so much as paid the expense of soliciting. We have reason to suppose that no more will be granted. They are still cold with regard to our alliance; nothing but brilliant success can bring it to a conclusion. Nor have we the smallest reason to expect any pecuniary aid from her, even if she should confederate with us in time to be of use for the next campaign. She has at this moment very many and very expensive operations on hand; and, till she has allied herself to us, we have no certainty that she will choose to continue the war for the attainment of our independence, if Britain should be sufficiently humbled to sacrifice to her the objects which led her into the war.

To France, then, we turn, as the only enemy of Great Britain, who is at the same time our ally, who will persevere in the war for the attainment of our independence. She has already done so much for us, in order to afford us the means of doing something for ourselves, that she may reasonably hope to find the effects of her benevolence. Her fleets have protected our coasts, her armies have fought our battles; she has made various efforts to restore our finances, by paying the interest of our loans, by obtaining credit in Europe on our account for clothing, arms, and necessaries; by advancing money, and by opening and guaranteeing a loan for us, to a considerable amount in Holland, when, by the abolition of paper, our finances were totally deranged. These sums are nearly expended, and another campaign is about to be opened. France assures, that it is not in her power to make us any further grants of money, her ministers repeat this to us in every letter, in a tone that persuades us of their determination on that point.

What then is to be done? Are we to relinquish the hopes, which the present debility of the enemy affords us of expelling them by one decided effort, and compensating all our losses by the enjoyment of an active commerce? Are we to return to the wretched, oppressive system we have quitted? Are we to carry on a weak defensive war with an unpaid army, whose precarious subsistence must depend upon what can be torn by violence from the industrious husbandman? Shall we vainly, and I think disgracefully, supplicate all the powers of Europe for those means, which we have in our own hands, if we dare call them forth, and which, after all, must be called forth if we continue the war, (and upon that subject there can be no doubt, till the end for which we took up arms is attained.) The only question is, whether each State shall fairly and regularly contribute its quota, or whether that which happens to be the seat of war shall (as has too often been the case) bear the whole burden, and suffer more from the necessities of our own troops, than the ravages of the enemy. Whether we shall drive the enemy from their posts with a strong body of regular troops, or whether we shall permit them to extend their devastations, while, with our battalions and fluctuating corps of militia, we protract a weak defensive war, till our allies are discouraged, and some unfavorable change takes place in the system of Europe.

Your Excellency, I am persuaded, will pardon the freedom with which I write. You see the necessity which dictates my letter, and were it in my power to communicate all that our friends in Europe think of our inactivity, I am persuaded you would urge your State to exertion in much stronger terms than I dare venture to use.

When Congress call upon a State for supplies, they are usually answered by pleas of disability, urged, too, by the State with good faith, and a firm persuasion that they speak their real situation, a recurrence to facts, that have passed under their own observation, will convince them that they are deceived.

From the time that the depreciation of the Continental bills of credit began, till they were no longer current, the States that received them paid a tax equal to all the expenditures of the army, and a very considerable one beyond it; for if we suppose ten millions of dollars, in specie, a year, to be necessary for their support, then the expense, till the close of the campaign of 1779, must have amounted to upwards of fifty millions, exclusive of the supplies from Europe; and yet, in March, 1780, the whole national debt contracted in America did not, in fact, amount to five millions; so that forty five millions were paid by the United States in those five years of the war, when they had the least commerce and agriculture, and when they were most distressed by the enemy; and this tax, too, was the most unjust and partial that can be conceived, unless we except that, by which we have since raised much more from the people, without giving so much to the public; I mean the laws for impressing, &c., which placed the greatest burden of the war upon the shoulders of a particular order of men in particular States only.

Now surely, if by partial and unjust measures, for which necessity alone can plead, we have been able to draw from every State, a tax more than equal to the present demand, no State can say, that it cannot afford its proportion of a more equitable tax. Those who have hitherto borne the weight of the war, must warmly espouse a measure, which is so greatly calculated for their relief. Those who have hitherto been eased from the burden, must be more able to take it up at this time, when they have the most promising expectation of relinquishing it soon.

It is certain, that if we put ourselves in a state to take advantage of circumstances early in the ensuing spring, we have the best grounded reason to hope, that a few months will remove the war from our doors. Whereas if we delay to enable Congress to say to their allies, "we are ready for an effectual co-operation with any force you may send," they will turn their attention to other objects, and leave us to lament in vain the opportunities we have lost. Every motive then, national honor, national interest, public economy, private ease, and that love of freedom, which pervades every Legislature on the Continent, call loudly not only for a compliance with the requisitions of Congress, but for so early a compliance as to render it effectual.

It is true we are at present in such a situation as to have no apprehensions for the final establishment of our independence; but surely it is a matter of some moment to us, whether we shall obtain it, or at least be freed from the ravages of the enemy and the burden of the war in the course of six months at the expense of eight millions of dollars, or whether we shall wait for it till a general and perhaps a distant peace, and be subject in the meanwhile to infinitely more expense, and all the distress that attends a country which is the seat of war.

But, Sir, it is time to dismiss a subject, which wants no arguments to illustrate it. I am confident that you will use every means to convince the State over which you preside, of the danger which will result from relying more upon the weakness of the enemy than their own strength, more upon the aid of their allies than their own exertions, more upon unjust, partial, hazardous, and expensive expedients, than upon an equal and regular support of the measures, which Congress, upon the most mature deliberation have recommended to their attention.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Office of Foreign Affairs, February 21st, 1782.

Sir,

I do myself the honor to lay before Congress the enclosed note from the Minister of France, a letter from the Marquis de Bouillé with translations of both, and the proceedings of the Council of Assembly of Dominique; all of which relate to the case of the ship Resolution's cargo, part of which was adjudged lawful prize by the sentence of the Court of Appeals; and the case of the brigantine Eeirsten and her cargo, which was also adjudged lawful prize by the said Court.[21]

The case of the ship Resolution, as far as I have been able to learn, was simply this, she was a Dutch vessel, freighted on account of capitulants at Dominique, and bound for Holland, agreeably to the seventh Article of the capitulation. She was taken by a British ship, retaken by one of our privateers, and condemned by the Court of Admiralty of this State, whose decree was reversed and the ship and cargo acquitted, except a small part of the latter, on the principle of its not being the property of capitulants, and because, as was alleged, it was not protected by the ordinances of Congress, approving the principles of the armed neutrality, Great Britain and Holland being at open war; from whence it was inferred by the Court, that the Dutch vessel could not be considered as sufficiently neutral to protect the property of an enemy. The papers referred to in the memorial of the Minister of France serve to show, that the whole cargo belonged to capitulants.

The other vessel, the Eeirsten, was purchased in London by a company of Imperial subjects residing at Ostend, freighted in England with British property for the use of the capitulants at Dominique. The vessel sailed from London, and on her way to Dominique touched at the port of Ostend, for the purpose of converting her English papers into German. In the passage from Ostend to Dominique, this brigantine was taken by an American privateer, carried into Boston and acquitted, with her cargo; but the Judges of Appeals have condemned as lawful prize, both vessel and cargo. They consider the cargo as unprotected by the capitulation of Dominique. They consider the vessel as carrying on a trade advantageous to the enemy, in contravention to the seventeenth Article of the capitulation; that she forfeited the right of neutrality by not showing an exact _impartiality_ to the belligerent powers; and because she had false and colorable papers on board, with a view to give the cargo the appearance of neutral property. They allow, that a vessel under their circumstances is to be considered as an enemy's, and that by the law of nations, they should be subject to seizure and confiscation. They consider the cargo as unprotected by the laws of Congress, because (as they affirm) this vessel cannot be thought to be strictly _neutral_, that Congress meant to pay a regard to _right_ of neutrality, that the _right of neutrality_ only extends _protection_ to the effects and goods of an enemy in neutral bottoms, not engaged in the violation of this right. I have sent the seventh and seventeenth Articles of the capitulation for the information of Congress.

From this statement Congress will judge of the expediency of directing a rehearing in both cases. In the first, it seems to be dictated by a regard for justice upon the new proofs. And in the second, the reasoning, which determined the Court, does not appear to be so conclusive as to render it improper in so intricate a case, more particularly as our situation with respect to the Emperor is peculiarly delicate; from which consideration, as well as from the respect which is due to the representation of the Minister of his Most Christian Majesty, I am humbly of opinion that a rehearing ought to be granted, and that in the meanwhile the officers of the Court should be directed to retain in their hands the proceeds of the vessel and cargo.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

FOOTNOTES:

[21] See an account of these ships in _M. de la Luzerne's Correspondence_, above, pp. 66-72.

* * * * *

REGULATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

In Congress, February 22d, 1782.

On the report of a committee, consisting of Mr Ellery, Mr Randolph, and Mr Eveleigh, to whom was referred a letter of the 25th of January, from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs respecting his department,

Resolved, that the Department of Foreign Affairs be under the direction of such officer as the United States, in Congress assembled, have already for that purpose appointed, or shall hereafter appoint, who shall be styled, "Secretary to the United States of America for the Department of Foreign Affairs," shall reside where Congress, or the Committee of the States, shall sit, and hold his office during the pleasure of Congress.

That the books, records, and other papers of the United States that relate to this department, be committed to his custody, to which, and all other papers of his office, any member of Congress shall have access; provided that no copy shall be taken of matters of a secret nature without the special leave of Congress.

That the correspondence and communications with the Ministers, Consuls, and Agents of the United States in foreign countries, and with the Ministers and other officers of foreign powers with Congress, be carried on through the office of foreign affairs by the said Secretary, who is also empowered to correspond with all other persons from whom he may expect to receive useful information relative to his department; provided always, that letters to Ministers of the United States, or Ministers of foreign powers, which have a direct reference to treaties or conventions proposed to be entered into, or instructions relative thereto, or other great national subjects, shall be submitted to the inspection, and receive the approbation of Congress before they shall be transmitted.

That the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs correspond with the Governors or Presidents of all, or any of the United States, affording them such information from his department as may be useful to their States or to the United States, stating complaints that may have been urged against the government of any of the said States, or the subjects thereof, by the subjects of foreign powers, so that justice may be done agreeably to the laws of such state, or the charge proved to be groundless, and the honor of the government vindicated.

He shall receive the applications of all foreigners relative to his department, which are designed to be submitted to Congress, and advise the mode in which the memorials and evidence shall be stated, in order to afford Congress the most comprehensive view of the subject; and if he conceives it necessary, accompany such Memorial with his report thereon.

He may concert measures with the Ministers or officers of foreign powers, amicably to procure the redress of private injuries, which any citizen of the United States may have received from a foreign power, or the subjects thereof, making minutes of all his transactions relative thereto, which have passed on such occasions.

He shall report on all cases expressly referred to him for that purpose by Congress, and on all others touching his department, in which he may conceive it necessary. And that he may acquire that intimate knowledge of the sentiments of Congress, which is necessary for his direction, he may at all times attend upon Congress; and shall particularly attend when summoned or ordered by the President.

He may give information to Congress respecting his department, explain and answer objections to his reports when under consideration, if required by a member, and no objection be made by Congress.

He shall answer to such inquiries respecting his department as may be put from the chair by order of Congress, and to questions stated in writing about matters of fact, which lie within his knowledge, when put by the President at the request of a member, and not disapproved of by Congress. The answers to such questions may, at the option of the Secretary, be delivered by him in writing.

He shall have free access to the papers and records of the United States in the custody of their Secretary, or in the offices of finance and war and elsewhere. He may be furnished with copies, or take extracts therefrom, when he shall find it necessary.

He shall use means to obtain from the Ministers and agents of the United States in foreign countries, an abstract of their present state, their commerce, finances, naval and military strength, and the characters of Sovereigns and Ministers, and every other political information, which may be useful to the United States. All letters to sovereign powers, letters of credence, plans of treaties, conventions, manifestoes, instructions, passports, safe conducts, and other acts of Congress relative to the Department of Foreign Affairs, when the substance thereof shall have been previously agreed to in Congress, shall be reduced to form in the office of Foreign Affairs, and submitted to the opinion of Congress; and when passed, signed, and attested, sent to the office of Foreign Affairs, to be countersigned and forwarded. If an original paper is of such a nature as cannot be safely transmitted without cyphers, a copy in cyphers, signed by the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs, shall be considered as authentic, and the Ministers of the United States at foreign Courts may govern themselves thereby in the like manner as if the originals had been transmitted. And for the better execution of the duties hereby assigned him, he is authorised to appoint a Secretary, and one, or if necessary more clerks, to assist him in the business of his office.

Resolved, That the salaries annexed to this department shall be as follows;

To the Secretary of the United States for the Department of Foreign Affairs, the sum of four thousand dollars per annum, exclusive of office expenses, to commence from the first day of October last.

To the Secretary, one thousand dollars per annum.

To the clerks, each five hundred dollars per annum.

Resolved, That the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs, and each of the persons employed under him, shall take an oath before a Judge of the State where Congress shall sit, for the faithful discharge of their respective trusts, and an oath of fidelity to the United States, before they enter upon office.

Resolved, That the act of the 10th of January, 1781, respecting the Department of Foreign Affairs, be and hereby is repealed.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Office of Foreign Affairs, February 23d, 1782.

Sir,

The resolution passed by Congress on the 22d of February, for the more perfect organization of the Department of Foreign Affairs, having no reference to the time past in fixing the salaries of the secretaries or clerks, I am left without a rule for that purpose, but presume as I have had two gentlemen employed for some time, without any distinction of rank, that no objection will lie to my giving them orders for the time that they have served at the rate of seven hundred and fifty dollars a year each.

I am sorry to be the means of taking up a moment of the time of Congress, but find myself embarrassed by their present arrangement, which fixes one secretary, and reduces the other gentleman in the office to the rank of a common clerk. If no material objection should lie against the measure, I would propose, as the business of the office naturally divides itself into two branches, foreign and domestic, that instead of a secretary there should be two under secretaries, whose rank and pay shall be settled according to their merit and abilities by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, provided that the pay of both taken together shall not exceed the sum of fifteen hundred dollars; this will not only be an incitement to diligence and attention, but possibly enable me to procure two persons, in whose integrity and abilities I can confide, instead of a common clerk, without increasing the expense of the department.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Office of Foreign Affairs, February 26th, 1782.

Sir,

I am somewhat at a loss to determine upon what principle the petition of John Jordan and others, was referred to me, but presume, that it was with a view to obtain from me such information relative to the distribution of the prize money arising from the prizes taken by the Bon Homme Richard, as the papers in this office can afford.

There were no papers relative to this transaction in this office; but among those of the Board of Admiralty, I find a letter from Dr Franklin to Francis Lewis, dated the 17th of March last, covering some inquiries on this subject, and a copy of a _Concordat_ entered into by John Paul Jones, commanding the Bon Homme Richard; Pierre Landais, captain of the Alliance; Dennis Nicolas Cottineau, captain of the Pallas; Joseph Varage, captain of the Cerf; and Philip Nicolas Ricot, captain of the Vengeance; by which, among other things, they agree to divide their prizes, agreeably to the American regulations, as they sailed under American colors and commissions; and constituted M. Chaumont their agent to receive and distribute the prize money in behalf of the crew of each ship, and to be answerable for it in his own private name.

From Dr Franklin's letter, it appears that the whole of the prizes belonged to the captors; that the King offered to purchase the ships of war they had taken, according to an established rate; that the seamen objected to it, and chose they should be sold at vendue; that this occasioned a delay in the sale; that he does not know the amount of the value of the prizes, nor whether they were distributed, which he considers as a private transaction between the officers and crews of the ships and M. Chaumont.

From this state of facts, Congress will judge if anything more can be done relative to the claim of three of the petitioners to their share of the value of the prizes, (the fourth being out of the question) than to assist them in the mode of authenticating the evidence of their being entitled thereto, and to forward it with powers of attorney to the Consul of the United States in France. This I will readily do for them, and write to Mr Barclay on the subject, without any express direction from Congress, when the petitioners shall call at this office.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT SMITH, COMMERCIAL AGENT AT HAVANA.

Philadelphia, February 26th, 1782.

Sir,

Your letter to the Superintendent of Finance was received, and referred by Congress to this office, when upon mature deliberation it was determined for various political reasons, not to recommend the issuing of any commissions for letters of marque, or reprisals from any of the Spanish Islands. Congress having considered these reasons, came into this view, and passed the resolution, which I enclose in pursuance of their orders.

It is expected, that the several Consuls and agents of Congress, wherever settled, will keep up a regular and constant correspondence with me, in order that the United States, in Congress, may have the fullest information of every transaction in which they may be materially concerned. This task I dare say you will readily impose upon yourself, when you reflect on the advantages that may result from it. The points on which I shall chiefly trouble you for information, are the naval and military strength of the Island at the time you write, not merely as to the number of ships and men, but their actual state of preparation for defensive or offensive operations, their stations, their prospects and designs, as far as you can learn them. At your leisure, I wish to have an account of the population, militia, commerce, husbandry, and revenue of the Island, the sentiments of the people with respect to this war, and everything else you may deem curious or interesting.

If a paper is printed at the Havana, you will be pleased to send it to me by every opportunity. I need not suggest to you the necessity of preparing your letters, so that they may be sunk in case of danger, when they contain anything which may be of use to the enemy.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO DON FRANCISCO RENDON.[22]

Philadelphia, March 6th, 1782.

Sir,

I will with pleasure give you such information on the subjects you write upon, as I can with propriety mention to a gentleman of whose attachment I entertain no doubt, but who has, nevertheless, given me no reason to think, that his inquiries have any farther object than his personal satisfaction.

1. In answer to the first question, I can only inform you, that Congress have voted thirtysix thousand infantry, which, with the cavalry and artillery, will amount to about forty thousand men. It is not probable, however, that the whole of this number will be raised; I think it would be prudent to make a deduction of about one fourth. But you have been too long in this country to form any judgment of the strength of our army from the regular establishment, since it has been, and always will be increased (more particularly in the Northern States) by large bodies of militia, when their apprehensions, or the hope of splendid advantages shall call them forth. Of this, the events of the year 1777, among others, afford the most striking evidence.

2. It is not expected, that in the present situation of the country, the whole sum of eight millions of dollars can be raised in time. What the deficiency will be, must depend on the motions and strength of our enemy early the next spring; the success of our commerce; the remittances that shall be made to this country by our allies, which, being expended here, may, by frequent taxes, be brought into the public treasury, and repeatedly applied to public use.

3. The resources of the next campaign lay in taxation, in the strictest economy, and in the assistance which we may reasonably hope to receive from the enemies of Great Britain, while we are making every exertion in the common cause. We flatter ourselves, that those powers who wish for peace, and who see America as the great object in Britain, in carrying on the war, will not suffer it to be lengthened out beyond the present year, when, by a moderate supply to us, they can terminate it in the course of one campaign. We form some expectations from the wisdom and generosity of Spain; and as we know she has the means, so we cannot suppose she can want the inclination to promote her own interests, and insure the esteem and gratitude of a rising nation, whose commerce and alliance cannot but be important from the situation of her Colonies.

4. This question is answered above, only it may be proper to observe, that if, in this reasonable expectation, America should be disappointed, she will still find resources in herself, not indeed to expel the enemy, but to preclude them from extending their conquests, and to compel them to offer her such terms as are necessary for her security, though perhaps short of her wishes.

5. The commercial connexion between the United States and Spain, will naturally be very extensive, if it meets with the least encouragement. The Spanish Islands will be supplied with provisions from them, at such easy rates as must give them great advantages in the cultivation of sugars, for which America will afford a considerable market; fish, lumber, and iron will also be exported to them if it should be permitted; and salt, as well as sugar, brought back in return, if the duties should be lowered, or a drawback allowed on the exportation. Our trade with Spain will consist chiefly in naval stores, masts, iron, furs, fish, and tobacco; in return for which we shall take the produce and manufactures of Spain of almost every kind.

6. It is impossible for the United States to use means to prevent an illicit commerce with the Spanish Colonies, without interfering in their internal regulations. All they can do, is, to consider the regulations made for that purpose as binding upon their subjects, and not to demand satisfaction if they suffer by the penalties, which the laws attempted to be infringed, may impose. To this they will not object, while the punishment is reasonable, and not confined to crimes committed within the jurisdiction of the power imposing it. If it is extended further, such further extension must depend upon treaties between the United States and Spain, and will be the subject of discussion whenever such treaty shall be set on foot.

7. Spain will be allowed, without the least difficulty, either to purchase vessels built in America, or to appoint agents of her own for building vessels of any kind, as well as for arming them, if she thinks proper, from the iron founderies, which are lately erected here, and which will continue to increase in proportion to the encouragement which shall be given them.

The last question must be referred to a general treaty, and is of such a nature as not to be properly answered here.[23]

I am, with great regard and esteem,

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

FOOTNOTES:

[22] A Spanish gentleman residing in Philadelphia, and apparently intrusted with some kind of agency by the Spanish government.

[23] The question here referred to is as follows; "In case that Spain succeeds in conquering East Florida, what will be the pretensions of Congress in regard to the Southern boundaries of Georgia?"

* * * * *

TO JOHN PAUL JONES.

Philadelphia, April 17th, 1782.

Sir,

I enclose an extract from a protest made by Captain A. de Neef, commanding the brigantine Berkenbosch, which has been transmitted to Congress, and by them to me, in order that I might inquire into the facts therein alleged. I must beg the favor of you to state them to me as far as they come within your knowledge, that measures may be taken to vindicate your reputation, and that of the American flag, if, as I presume, the charges are ill founded, or to repair any injury, which you may undesignedly have occasioned him.

Complaints have been made to Congress by officers and men, who formerly belonged to the crew of the Bon Homme Richard, and the Alliance frigate, of their not having yet been able to obtain the share of prize money due to them; in consequence of which Congress have directed me to draw a memorial to the Court of France, praying its interposition, in obtaining justice for them. As this whole business, as far as I can collect from the _Concordat_ entered into by you and the gentlemen commanding the other vessels under your command, appears to have been a private transaction, I am at a loss upon what to ground an application to the Court, more particularly as neither of the parties have as yet called upon this office with proof of their having applied to M. Chaumont, or been denied justice by him. You will oblige me by giving me all the light in your power upon this subject, if possible, by the next post.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

THOMAS S. LEE TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Annapolis, in Council, April 19th, 1782.

Sir,

We have been duly honored with your several letters of the 12th of November, 1781, and the 18th and 19th of February, 1782, which shall be laid before our Assembly, at their meeting the 25th of the present month, when, we doubt not, their very important contents will meet with the consideration they so well deserve.

Whenever we are possessed of anything, in which the United States are materially interested, we shall with great pleasure communicate it.

The document you require, in consequence of the resolution of Congress, enclosed in the letter of the 18th of February, shall be properly authenticated, and transmitted as soon as the whole can be collected.

We have the honor to be, &c.

THOMAS S. LEE.

* * * * *

ROBERT MORRIS TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Office of Finance, April 27th, 1782.

Sir,

His Excellency, the Minister of France, having informed on the part of his Court, that no extraordinary sums will be paid to the Ministers of the United States in Europe, I must request that you will furnish me with an account of their several salaries, payable to the foreign Ministers and their Secretaries, and I will make out bills in your favor on the banker of the United States in Paris for the last quarter, commencing with the present year. I must at the same time pray, you will require of those gentlemen, the state of their several accounts with the public for salaries, that the whole may be adjusted, and all future expenses of that sort be classed under the proper head of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

* * * * *

CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATES.

Office of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, May 2d, 1782.

Sir,

The enclosed resolution of Congress will explain the cause of this letter. The information it refers to, is an assurance that Britain had absolutely declined any interference of the mediating powers between them and what they call their rebel subjects. They persist on every occasion in representing us as a divided people, who anxiously wish to return to our connexion with England. In this they have two objects equally important to them. 1st. They encourage England to continue a war, which they expect to see terminated by our own weariness and languor; and 2dly. They put such a face upon their affairs as will entitle them on a negotiation to make demands at our expense, which they would not presume to think of, if the mediators were acquainted with our firm resolution never to return to our obedience to their Government. Besides which, they cast a degree of odium upon the conduct of France, representing it as the support of a discontented faction, rather than as the generous ally of an oppressed nation.

There is reason to apprehend, that in order the better to secure the advantages of this deceitful policy to themselves, they will make proffers to each of the United States. If any of them should listen to them, (which cannot, however, be presumed,) they will urge this, as a proof of their assertions, even if they should decline receiving their proposals and refer them to Congress, as from the nature of our Union they undoubtedly must; still as the result of the experiment cannot be known for some time in Europe, they will avail themselves of it in part, if negotiations should open.

This artifice of the enemy may be counteracted in two ways, both of which deserve the serious attention of your Legislature. The first and most important is, by making such exertions to procure a respectable army early in the season, that the mediators casting their eyes upon the muster rolls, may there read a full refutation of all that British artifice can suggest. I need not observe, that this measure must go hand in hand with taxation, since an army without the means of supporting it, would only increase our evils. The second is to anticipate the attempt of Great Britain by such resolutions as the information contained in this letter suggests, resolutions which strongly mark a spirited determination in the Legislature of each State to listen to no negotiations, except through the intervention of Congress, which manifest their attachment to the independence of their country, and inviolable regard to the faith they have pledged to each other, and to their allies. These may either prevent the attempt I apprehend, or arrive in time to counteract this effect, which the false expectations built thereon might otherwise have in Europe.

I mention this to your Excellency without any express direction from Congress. It is more than probable, that your judgment, and the zeal and wisdom of the Legislature, may improve these loose hints to the general advantage of the United States. I have the pleasure of assuring your Excellency and the Legislature, that the fairest prospects are now before us of terminating the war by a single exertion, though I am not at liberty to say, that the plan of the ensuing campaign is absolutely determined on, yet I have great reason to believe, that we shall receive such powerful military aid, as, with becoming exertions on our part, will free every State in the Union from the grasp of the enemy.

Here, Sir, I might pause, and suffer my imagination to dwell upon the animating prospect before us; but reasoning from the past to the future, I dare not indulge the pleasing idea. We have at no period been in a situation to second fully the endeavors of our ally to serve us; we either neglected to assemble our army in time, or to provide the means for supporting or moving them; a feather would have turned the balance last year, notwithstanding the powerful aid we received from abroad. Providence blinded our adversaries; to their temerity we owe our success.

But, Sir, let me ask, whether any State did then, or has even now, done all in its power to enable our Generals to prosecute this victory? Or rather let me turn to what is more within our line, by observing, that the inferiority of our army in point of numbers to that of our ally while they acted at Yorktown, has been considered in Europe as a proof of the assertions of Britain, and has been urged as an argument of our weakness, our weariness of the war, or our internal divisions. A moment's reflection will show the advantages, that this affords our antagonist in a negotiation. How much it weakens the claims we make, and how many important benefits may be lost forever by our appearing in Europe to receive our independence rather as a gift, than to have established it by our exertions!

But, Sir, it is still in our power to repair these errors. Let us avail ourselves of this favorable moment for expelling the enemy, and recovering our diminished credit among the nations of the earth.

I make no apology for the liberty I take. Your Excellency, I am persuaded, is too sensible of the truth of these observations, to think they could be delivered with less earnestness by one, who feels their importance, and I am confident that you will bring them before the Legislature of your State in such manner as will best serve to ensure them their attention.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT MORRIS.

Philadelphia, May 8th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I enclose the list of salaries you requested. The charges of those who act as secretaries to Dr Franklin and Mr Adams are not yet settled. I shall lay the list before Congress and make them some propositions on the subject. It will be necessary to afford a small sum to each of the Ministers to enable them to defray contingent expenses, which are continually happening, particularly to Dr Franklin, who is at the centre of all our communications. I will converse with you on this subject, and endeavor to form an estimate of what this ought to be.

I am, Sir, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Office of Foreign Affairs, May 8th, 1782.

Sir,

The enclosed account of the annual expense of the Department of Foreign Affairs, exclusive of contingent expenses, was made out at the request of the Superintendent of Finance, that measures might be taken to discharge the salaries of the gentlemen in Europe, who express great uneasiness on the subject; but as it is incomplete till the allowance to the private secretaries of Dr Franklin and Mr Adams are ascertained, I have thought it proper to lay the whole before Congress, for their direction thereon.