Chapter XII (2)

_October 3rd._--There appears to be a general feeling of uneasiness, almost of alarm, as if something was impending to disturb the peace of the world and interrupt the prosperity of nations, though nobody can very well tell what it is they dread. The apprehension is vague, but it is general. The only political question of any consequence in which we are concerned is that of Naples, and some fancy that the Russian manifesto prognosticates a renewal of the contest with that Empire. I have no such idea, but I am quite unable to comprehend what it is the different Powers are about; there is a general impression, probably not unfounded, that France and Russia are meditating a close alliance, and if this be the truth, it is not likely that Russia should have put forth a State paper offensive to France. It is by no means impossible that Gortschakoff may have ascertained that the declaration of his Emperor's opinion would not be distasteful to the Emperor Napoleon, who probably does not enter _con amore_ into this contest with Naples and merely does it to please us.[1]

When Baudin took leave of him at Paris the other day on his going to Russia, he said to him, 'Is it your Majesty's wish that I should cultivate the most friendly relations with the English Ministers at Moscow and Petersburg?' to which the Emperor replied 'Certainly,' and _'L'Angleterre avant tout.'_ In this there can be little doubt of his personal sincerity, but probably his personal disposition and the policy of his Government and the sentiments of the French people do not altogether coincide, and this places him in a somewhat false position, and will most likely lead to apparent vacillation and inconsistency in his conduct.

Madame de Lieven writes to me that the Neapolitan Minister at Paris affirms that his King will not give way at the dictation of the allied Powers. We do not, however, as yet know what it is that is required of him. If it be true that he should govern his people more mildly and liberally, nothing can be more vague, and our greatest difficulties would begin when we had extorted from him promises and engagements to act according to _our_ notions of justice and humanity. He would be more than mortal if he was disposed honestly to act up to engagements and promises extorted from him by fear, and it would be impossible for us to superintend and secure their due performance without taking upon ourselves virtually the government of his kingdom and superseding the King's authority. We never should get France to concur in this, and on the whole it appears more probable that differences will arise in the course of this joint action between us and France than that we should succeed in ameliorating the condition of Naples. I fear the rage for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries will never be extinguished here. I see in the papers to-day an address to Clarendon from the Protestant Society, requesting he will interpose with the Spanish Government in favour of some Spanish subject who has got into trouble in consequence of having turned Protestant, and being engaged in diffusing the Scriptures, and trying to convert others to Protestantism, which is an offence against the laws of Spain.

Footnote 1: [The British and French Governments had on more than one occasion remonstrated with the King of Naples on the cruel and arbitrary policy of his Government, which led eventually to his own destruction; but the King received these remonstrances very ill, and on October 28 the differences between these Courts had become so serious that the British and French Ministers were withdrawn from Naples, and a naval squadron appeared off the city. The Russian Government at this time issued a circular despatch complaining of these proceedings of the Western Powers, and denying their right to interfere for the purpose of extorting concessions from the King of Naples to his own subjects.]

_October 7th._--I have seen Clarendon and asked him about the affair of Naples. He was not very communicative, and I suspect he is not very easy about the course we are pursuing and the part he has to play. He first said that it was impossible for us to tolerate the conduct of the King to us, and the impertinence of his note. I asked what it was he said; Clarendon replied it amounted to this, 'Mind your own business.' Then he alluded to the atrocities of the Government, which ought not to be endured; that no man was safe for a minute, or could tell when he went to bed at night that he might not be arrested in the morning, all which was done by the King's personal orders; that there was continual danger of an outbreak or insurrection, particularly of a Muratist revolution. I told him my opinion of the very questionable policy of interference, either as a matter of right or of expediency, and nothing could be more lame than the case he made out. He said the ships were not to act any hostile part, or to coerce the King, which makes the case worse in my opinion. It is doing neither one thing nor the other, violating a sound principle, and incurring great future risks without any present object, or effecting any good, or benefiting the people in whom we take an interest. He says the Emperor Napoleon has a great horror of a Muratist movement, the Prince Murat, his cousin, being a most worthless blackguard; but his son, who married Berthier's granddaughter and heiress, is a young man full of merit of every sort.

[Sidenote: RUSSIAN INTRIGUE WITH FRANCE.]

_London, October 10th._--I met Clarendon again at the Travellers', and had some conversation with him, but was interrupted by Azeglio, or I might probably have learnt more about the present state of affairs. He told me that we had been squabbling with the French Government, and that the persevering attempts of Russia to disturb the harmony between us and them had not been unsuccessful. Nothing in the way of cajolery had been omitted at Moscow to captivate the French, while on one occasion the Emperor had been so uncivil that Granville felt himself obliged to go to Gortschakoff and make a formal complaint, which was met by all sorts of assurances and protestations in order to mollify him, and after this everything went on smoothly. It is a curious state of things, for as far as I can make it out, the policy of the French Government appears to be to become intimate with Russia and to be cool with us; but all the time the Emperor (who is the Government) shrinks from anything like a breach with England, and clings to the intimacy established between the two Courts, and has a profound respect for the Queen and value for her good opinion. I asked him how he reconciled the offensive Circular of Gortschakoff with the anxiety of Russia to please France, when he said that he had no doubt they had told the French that it was aimed exclusively at _us_, and had come to an understanding with Morny about it, so that France was not to take offence at it. We are now, he said, on the best terms with Austria, and Austria on the worst with Russia. Russia knows that the article of the treaty compelling her to surrender a part of Bessarabia was the work of Austria, and this was an injury and an insult (for she had never before disgorged territory) which she never would forgive. The Russian Circular would have the effect of complicating the Neapolitan question, as it made the King more resolved not to yield to the demands of the two Powers. He told me that Palmerston had resolved to take up in earnest the question of Law Reform next year, and that he (Clarendon) had strongly urged him to do so as the best way of procuring both strength and credit for his Government; that Palmerston had readily come into it, and was resolved to carry out those measures which have so long been under discussion, and which for various reasons have hitherto failed of their accomplishment.

_November 10th._--I went to The Grove on Saturday and had a good deal of comfortable talk with Clarendon about foreign affairs, especially the Bolgrad question and Naples. He described the former very clearly, and satisfied me that we are entirely in the right. It was settled, he said, at Paris mainly between him and Orloff. He drew the line on the map as the boundary had been agreed upon, and as he was doing so, Orloff said, 'I wish you would draw it a little more to the south; it will make no sort of difference to you, and by this means it includes within our line a strip of territory which the Emperor wishes to retain because it forms a part of a military colony which he is anxious to keep intact;' and Clarendon agreed to draw the line accordingly and to accomplish the Emperor's wishes. They have since attempted to quibble about another Bolgrad which was not even marked at all on their map, and it turns out that the story of the military colony was a mere pretence, as they have themselves given that up without making any difficulty. The state of the case and the difference which has since arisen with Russia and with France is this: the Emperor Napoleon, who is very indolent and abhors the trouble of examining details, and consequently remains often ignorant of what it behoves him to know, suffered himself to be bamboozled by Brunnow and misled by Walewski into giving his assent to the Russian interpretation of the boundary line, and to giving a promise of his support in the controversy. Recently at Compiègne Cowley, in a long audience, went through the whole question with him and minutely explained the case against Russia. The Emperor said he had never really understood it before, acknowledged that our case was good, regretted that he had committed himself, but said that having pledged his word he did not know how to break that pledge and to withdraw the support he had promised to give to Russia in the dispute, and this is the fix in which the question now is. While the foolish and ignorant newspapers here (except the 'Times') are endeavouring to separate the Emperor from his ministers, and to make out that he is one with our Government, and that the difficulties and obstructions proceed from other parties, the truth is that they now proceed entirely from himself, worked upon and deceived certainly by Russian agents and pro-Russian ministers; but if he really was in the disposition which our press attributes to him, he might break through such obligations as he suffered himself to be entangled in and settle the question at once; nor is it very easy to see why he does not, for there is good reason to believe he is sincerely desirous of remaining on good terms with us. I asked Clarendon why the question could not be again referred to a Conference of the Powers parties to the Treaty, and he said we could not consent to this, because we should be in a minority, for Sardinia, partly cajoled by Russia and partly from antipathy to Austria, would go against us.

[Sidenote: DISMISSAL OF NEAPOLITAN MINISTER.]

I asked him about Naples, of which affair he could give but a very unsatisfactory account and a lame story. He said France had acted with us very steadily, but that it was she who had started this hare, and he had engaged in it in the belief that the Emperor would never have mooted the question unless he had been assured that the King of Naples would yield to the remonstrances of the two Courts, and but for that conviction he would never have meddled in it, which he now very much regretted. He had given Carini notice to quit, and at their parting interview he had entreated him to persuade the King if possible to change his system, and, now that he was relieved from all interference, menace, or coercion, and his dignity could not suffer, to give satisfaction to all Europe by putting an end to the inhuman and impolitic system, which had occasioned our interference and had drawn upon him remonstrances and advice from every Sovereign in Europe. Very good advice, and I hope it may be followed, but it is a lame and impotent conclusion to the menacing demonstrations with which we began to quarrel. Clarendon talked of the various atrocities of the King of Naples, but with an evident consciousness that the fact, even if it be true, and not, as is probable, exaggerated, affords no excuse for our policy in the matter. As the subject could not be agreeable I did not press it, and abstained from telling him how general the opinion is that he has committed a great blunder. He will probably hear enough of it before the chapter is closed; even Granville, who never says much, said to me yesterday that 'it was a very foolish affair.'

Clarendon talked to me of Palmerston, and told me (what I think I had heard, and have very likely noted before) that on Aberdeen's fall Palmerston was quite ready to join Derby when Derby tried to form a Government, and that it was Clarendon's refusal which frustrated that attempt. Palmerston endeavoured to persuade Clarendon to join, but when Clarendon put to him all the reasons why they had both of them better refuse, Palmerston saw them all very clearly, and rather imprudently said on leaving him, 'We are _both_ agreed that it will not do to have anything to do with Derby and his Government.' When Clarendon went to the Queen and explained his own conduct to her, and she expressed to him the embarrassment which she felt, and asked him what she could do, he at once said, 'Send for Lord Palmerston, who is the only man, in the present temper of the people and state of affairs, who can form a Government that has a chance of standing. Send for him at once, place yourself entirely in his hands, give him your entire confidence, and I will answer for his conduct being all that you can desire.' The Queen took the advice, and has had no reason to repent of it, and Clarendon told me he had done everything in his power, and seized every available opportunity to reconcile them to each other, to promote a good feeling and understanding, and to soften any little asperities which might have made their intercourse less smooth, and the consequence is that Palmerston gets on with her very well, and his good sense as well as Clarendon's exhortations make him see of what importance it is to him for the easy working of his Government and his own ease to be on good and cordial terms with the Queen. It is therefore really to Clarendon that Palmerston is indebted in great measure, if not entirely, for being in his present position, but Clarendon has too much tact ever to remind him of it, or of what he was himself inclined to do in 1855.

[Sidenote: LEGAL APPOINTMENTS.]

_November 19th._--The death of Jervis made the office of Chief Justice of Common Pleas vacant.[1] According to established (but as I think bad) usage, the Attorney-General, Cockburn, had a right to take the place, and for the last fortnight nothing occupied public attention more than the question whether he would take it or not. He was much averse to take it, but everybody pressed him to accept it, and after much hesitation and consultation he agreed to be Chief Justice, and now it is said he regrets his determination and thinks he has made a mistake. He gives up Parliament, for which he is well adapted, where he acts a conspicuous part, being a capital speaker, and which he likes, and feels that it is his element. He gives up the highest place at the bar, where he is a successful advocate, and makes 15,000_l._ or 16,000_l._ a year, and he sees that he shall be obliged to give up in great measure his loose habits and assume more decorous behaviour, which will be a great sacrifice to him, and he becomes a judge with 6,000_l._ a year for life, not being a good lawyer, and conscious that he will be inferior to his colleagues and to the Puisne Judge in his own court. As soon as he had consented to the promotion a fresh difficulty presented itself as to the office of Solicitor-General, for such is the penury of legal ability at this time that Westminster Hall cannot furnish any men of unquestionable fitness for the office, and the difficulty is increased by the choice being necessarily restricted to men holding the opinions of the present Government, and being able to command a seat in Parliament. They have offered the place to the Recorder, James Wortley, but up to this moment I know not if it has been accepted.[2]

Footnote 1: [Right Hon. Sir John Jervis, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, died on November 1, 1856, at the age of fifty-four.]

Footnote 2: [Right Hon. James Stuart Wortley, a younger son of Lord Wharncliffe, who then filled the office of Recorder of London, which he surrendered for that of Solicitor-General.]

_November 23rd._--After long delay and apparently much hesitation James Wortley has accepted the Solicitor-Generalship. He consulted Gladstone and Sidney Herbert, neither of them very eligible advisers on such a question. Gladstone is said to have replied that he would run a great risk as to his pecuniary interests, but if he could support the foreign policy of the Government, there was no reason why he should not accept. He retains his rank of Privy Councillor, of which I doubt the fitness, as it places him at all events in a very anomalous position, for the law officers are the official advisers of the Privy Council and are often called upon to sit there as assessors. However, the Judges are said to have pronounced an opinion that there is no reason why he should not plead in any of the courts. It is said, and I believe truly, that now Cockburn has taken the irretrievable step he is very sorry for it, and is more struck by the necessary consequences of his promotion than he was at first. He has all his life been a very debauched fellow, but he is clever, good-natured, and of a liberal disposition and much liked by his friends. A story is told of him that he was in the habit of going down on Sundays to Richmond or elsewhere with a woman, and generally with a different one, and the landlady of the inn he went to remembered that Sir A. Cockburn always brought Lady Cockburn with him, but that she never saw any woman who looked so different on different days, and this gave rise to another story. When Lord Campbell went to some such place with Lady Stratheden (who had been raised to the peerage before her husband), the mistress of the house said that Sir A. Cockburn always brought _Lady Cockburn_ with him, but that the Chief Justice brought another lady and not _Lady Campbell_.

While we have meetings perpetually held and innumerable writings put forth to promote education and raise the moral standard of the people, we are horrified and alarmed day after day by accounts of the most frightful murders, colossal frauds, and crimes of every description. War has ceased, though the Temple of Janus seems only to be ajar; but the world is still in commotion, in alarm, and visited by every sort of calamity, moral and material, in the midst of which it is difficult to discover any signs of the improvement of the human race, even of those portions of it which are supposed to be the most civilised and the most progressive.

[Sidenote: A DIPLOMATIC IMBROGLIO.]

_December 7th._--At Wrotham and at Ossington last week. The news of the day is that we are to have another 'Conference' at Paris, to settle the Bolgrad affair, our Government having given way to what Clarendon told me he certainly would not consent; but we had managed to get matters into such a fix, and it was so necessary to extricate all the several parties from the embarrassed positions in which they were placed by their own or by each other's faults, that no alternative remained. This arrangement, which is not very consistent with Palmerston's recent declarations at Manchester and in London, is proclaimed by the Government papers, and generally understood to be a means of enabling Russia to concede our demands with as little loss of dignity and credit as possible, and to terminate the difference between us and France by our making an apparent concession to France, while she makes a real one to us. Everything has evidently been carefully arranged for the playing out of this diplomatic farce, and Cowley, who is to be our sole representative, is to be accommodating and not quarrelsome; but _reste à savoir_ whether the manoeuvres of some of the others may not provoke his temper and bring about angry collisions. Between this matter and the _bévue_ we have made of our Neapolitan interference, never was there such a deplorable exhibition as our foreign policy displays; but nobody seems to care much about it, and though there will in all probability be a good deal of sparring, and taunts and sneers in Parliament, Palmerston's Government will incur no danger of any adverse vote, for everybody is conscious that in the actual state of parties and the dearth of parliamentary leaders, every man of sufficient ability being disqualified for one reason or another, no man but Palmerston can conduct a Government or command a majority in Parliament; nor does there appear in the distance any man likely to be able to fill his place in the event of his death or his breaking down, events which must be contemplated as not very remote when he is seventy-three years old, although his wonderful constitution and superhuman vigour of mind and body make everybody forget his age and regard the possibility of his demise with the sort of incredulity which made the courtier of Louis XIV. exclaim on the death of that monarch, _'Après la mort du Roi on peut tout croire.'_

Great astonishment has been excited by the appointment of a Mr. Bickersteth as Bishop of Ripon, against whom nothing can be said, nor anything for him, except that he is a very Low Churchman. All the vacant sees have now been filled with clergymen of this colour, which is not very fair or prudent, as it will exasperate the moderate High Churchmen and set them strongly against a Government which appears determined to shut the door of ecclesiastical preferment against all but the Lowest Churchmen, and such a policy will most likely have the effect of encouraging the advocates of those extreme measures of an anti-Catholic or a puritanical character which always give so much trouble and embarrassment when they are brought forward in Parliament.

_December 12th._--The Conference to which Clarendon told me he would not agree is going to take place after all, but everybody is ridiculing what is notoriously a got-up comedy with a foregone conclusion, devised to solve the difficulty into which all the great actors had got themselves, but it is not yet quite clear what the _modus operandi_ is to be. From what I have picked up here and there I gather that Sardinia is to be induced to give a casting vote against Russia, leaving France still at liberty to fulfil her original engagement and vote with her, while we obtain the object for which we have stood out, and by such a _dodge_ to bring the dispute to an end. When Parliament meets there will be plenty to be said about this affair and about Naples, and no doubt the Opposition or the malcontents will be able to bombard the Government and vent their spleen, but that will be all, for Palmerston is perfectly invulnerable and may commit any blunders with impunity.

[Sidenote: LEADERSHIP OF THE OPPOSITION.]

A report has been lately current that Gladstone will become the leader of the Opposition _vice_ Disraeli, a report I thought quite wild and improbable, but I heard the other day something which looks as if it was not so much out of the question as I had imagined. George Byng told me he had met Sir William Jolliffe, who is the Derbyite whipper-in, at Wrotham, and having asked him whether there was any foundation for the above report, he replied that it certainly was not true at present, that he could not say what might or might not happen hereafter, but that he could not at once be accepted as _leader_, and must in any case first serve in the ranks. I do not know what may be the value of Jolliffe's opinions, or what he knows of the intentions of his chief, but he may probably be more or less acquainted with the sentiments of his party, and may be aware that their necessities have modified their extreme repugnance to Gladstone, and that they may now be willing to accept him as leader (eventually), though two years ago they so peremptorily insisted on his entire exclusion from their political society. Meanwhile there is no combination amongst them. Derby is at Knowsley amusing himself, and Disraeli at Paris, doing nobody knows what.

There is talk of Lord Granville's resigning the lead and his office and going to Ireland instead of Carlisle, or to Paris instead of Cowley, but he has never intimated the least intention of doing either. Ireland he certainly will not go to; Paris is not so impossible. There seems some doubt whether his health will admit of his going on in the House of Lords, and if they knew how to get Cowley away from Paris without doing him an injustice or an unkindness, I think they would not be sorry, for his position there is unsatisfactory. It is a serious inconvenience to be on such terms with Walewski that they never converse at all except when business obliges them to meet, and the consequence of their relations is that all affairs between the two countries are carried on between Clarendon and Persigny in London, and as little as possible at Paris, because the Emperor now fights rather shy of Cowley, and is by no means on the same terms with him as heretofore, though always very civil and cordial enough when they meet; and His Majesty will not part with Walewski, who, although of a moderate capacity, is clever enough to know how to deal with his master, and make himself agreeable to him, and the Emperor knows that if he were to change his Minister for Foreign Affairs, it would be attributed to the influence of England and be on that account unpopular. The English press has rendered Walewski the incalculable service of making him popular in France, and rendering it impossible for the Emperor to dismiss him, even if he had a mind to do so, which he has not.

[Sidenote: DICTATORIAL POLICY TO BRAZIL.]

_December 17th._--There was an article in the 'Times' the day before yesterday commenting in severe terms upon a transaction of our Foreign Office, as set forth in a Blue Book, in relation to Brazil. It was the old subject of the slave trade, and the old method of arrogant overbearing meddling and dictation, a case as odious and unjust as any one of those by which Palmerston's foreign administration has ever been disgraced. I really no longer recognise my old friend Clarendon, in whose good sense and moderation I used to place implicit confidence, and believed that he would inaugurate a system at the Foreign Office very different from that of Palmerston, and which would tend to relieve us from the excessive odium and universal unpopularity which Palmerston had drawn upon us. It appears that I was mistaken. I told Granville yesterday morning what I thought of this case, and asked him if it was correctly stated. He said he regarded it just as I did, and that it was quite true, every word of it. I then expressed my astonishment that Clarendon should have acted in this way, and he replied, 'The fault of Clarendon is that he is always thinking of the effect to be produced by Blue Books, and he looks after popularity, and is influenced by those he acts with. Under Aberdeen he was very moderate, but he saw that the moderation of Aberdeen made him unpopular, while Palmerston's popularity in great measure arose from his very different manner towards other Powers, so when Palmerston became Prime Minister instead of Aberdeen, he fell readily into the Palmerstonian method.' I dare say this is the truth, and besides the contagion of Palmerston himself, he is surrounded by men at the Foreign Office who are prodigious admirers of Palmerston and of his slashing ways, and who no doubt constantly urge Clarendon to adopt a similar style. All this is to me matter of great regret personally, and it is revolting as to good taste, and, as I believe, to our national interests. It is, however, a consolation to see that the most powerful and influential of our journals has the courage, independence, and good sense to protest publicly against such violent and unjustifiable proceedings.