Chapter XV (2)

_February 14th._--Last week saw the debates in the House of Commons about the Conspiracy Bill, and the first act of the India Bill. The first is very unpopular, but it will be carried nevertheless. John Russell has taken it up with extraordinary vehemence and anger. His opposition to it is furious, on high constitutional grounds, which appear to me absurd and uncalled for. If I were in Parliament I should be puzzled how to vote, for there is much to be said against the Bill, and much against voting against it, particularly against leave to bring it in. Almost all the Tories voted with Government, and John Russell carried very few with him, and neither of his own nephews. He is more than ever exasperated against Palmerston for bringing it in. The apology tended by the Emperor, which was read to the House, reconciled a great many to the bill, but I have no notion that it will do any good, or that the French Government will be satisfied with it. After such a bill, which will certainly be carried, the British Lion must put his tail between his legs, and 'Civis Romanus' give up swaggering so loftily. If Aberdeen had attempted such a measure when Louis Philippe was King and Guizot minister, what would Palmerston have said, and what would not have been the indignant outcry throughout the country? The balance of opinion now seems to be that Government will carry their India Bill, and the report is that they are willing, if the second reading is carried, to consent to any alterations that may be pressed upon them in Committee. Lewis seems to have made a good speech on Friday, though rather of a didactic character.

[Sidenote: A CRITICAL SITUATION.]

_February 20th._[1]--Unless I were to write down day by day the events and the _impressions_ of each day I should fail in giving anything like a picture of the time, and I regret that my indolence or other occupations have prevented my doing this. I have each day promised myself I would not neglect it, and then, failing to keep that promise (to myself), I have found some fresh occurrence sweeping away the interest, and generally the accurate recollection, of what the preceding days have produced. The varieties of the aspects of public affairs have been like the figures in a kaleidoscope, and one ought to catch each fleeting symmetrical arrangement before it is changed into some other equally fleeting in order to comprehend the rapidity and importance of the changes which are going on. Not long ago (that is, not many weeks) a vague idea began to circulate that the Government would have difficulty in getting successfully through this session, and that their power had suffered some diminution. It was thought that the India Bill and the Reform Bill would be too much for them, and when a little later the events in France induced them to bring in the Conspiracy Bill, the excessive unpopularity of this last measure strengthened the impression of their instability. Everybody out of the pale of the Government itself admitted that Palmerston was not the man he was, and the diminution of his popularity was visible universally. This was attributed to several smaller causes, but the great one was the appointment of Clanricarde; which beyond all doubt has been regarded with a disgust and indignation to the last degree exaggerated and uncalled for. Such was the state of public feeling and opinion when the Parliamentary campaign opened with the discussions first of the Conspiracy Bill, and secondly of the Reform Bill. After a few days, however, a great change seemed to have taken place, though the country and the Press watched with great jealousy the progress of the Conspiracy Bill, keeping up a very loud growl of dislike to the Bill, and resentment against the French Government. In the division on the question of leave to bring in the bill the majority of the Conservatives came over to the Government, and they got a majority of the Conservatives of three to one. A few days after Palmerston brought in the India Bill, about which for a moment it was thought Baring with his amendment might run him hard, but after a very poor debate, in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer made a very good speech, and the President of the Board of Control made no speech at all, the Government got a majority of near 150. These two victories, though the first was obtained by the aid of opponents, raised the spirits of the Ministerialists, and were generally taken as indicative of more strength than they had been supposed to have, and as pretty clear proofs that Palmerston would at all events get unscathed through this session with not much diminished authority and influence.

But while they were triumphing in the fancied security which these divisions seemed to promise them, a storm was gathering, for the bursting of which, they were far from being prepared, nor did they estimate its importance. The public feeling had become more and more exasperated at the Conspiracy Bill, and at the conduct of France. The first reading of the bill would not have been carried as it was, perhaps not at all, but for the _apology_, as it was called, of the Emperor, and the soothing effect of Walewski's despatch carrying expressions of his master's regret and a sort of half disclaimer of the military addresses. But this soothing effect was very transitory. It was remarked that while the 'Moniteur' continued to insert fresh addresses of an offensive character, the apologetic despatch did not appear at all, and the original despatch of Walewski (January 20), which had excited so much indignation here, and which was not denied to have been the origin of the Conspiracy Bill, lay upon the table of the House of Commons unanswered by our Government. On this point a good deal of surprise and anger had been evinced in the Press and in society, and the discontent against the Government generally, and Palmerston in particular, was still spreading, when Milner Gibson took advantage of the prevailing temper, and moved a resolution in the shape of an amendment to the second reading of the bill, very skilfully concocted, but which was a direct vote of censure upon the Government (particularly of course directed against Palmerston and Clarendon) for not having answered that despatch.

[Sidenote: DEFEAT OF THE GOVERNMENT.]

Palmerston, I have been assured, when he saw the terms of this amendment, perceived that it might be dangerous, and that it was well calculated to get votes; but it is certain that the Government generally were in no apprehension, and that nobody of any party (I believe literally nobody) had the least idea that any vote of censure, which of course involved the existence of the Government, had the slightest chance of being carried. I met Sir Edward Lytton at the Athenæum on Friday, just as he was going to the House, and had some conversation with him. He treated Palmerston's position as impregnable, and said he would have a very large majority that evening. So confident were the Government whippers in that they made no exertions, and Hayter actually allowed some of his people to go away unpaired, telling them that they were quite safe, and their presence not necessary. I went to the House of Lords that evening to hear Macaulay, who was to have spoken but did not speak, and afterwards went home, hearing nothing more that night. Great was my astonishment when I read in the 'Times' this morning that Government had been beaten on Milner Gibson's motion by 19, and a few minutes after Granville came in and said that this defeat must be conclusive and nothing left for them but to resign. A Cabinet was held in the afternoon, at which it was decided that Palmerston should repair to Buckingham Palace with the resignations of himself and his colleagues.

Footnote 1: [On February 19 the Government were defeated on the Conspiracy Bill, in the House of Commons, by a majority of 234 to 215, Mr. Milner Gibson's amendment having been carried against them. The majority consisted of 146 Conservatives, 84 Liberals. Mr. Gladstone, Lord John Russell, Sir James Graham, Mr. Cardwell, and Mr. Sidney Herbert voted against the Bill. Lord Palmerston immediately resigned.]

_February 21st._--Nothing more was known last night, but it was evident that Derby had been sent for in preference to Lord John, whom I met at Brooks's in the morning, and who did not expect the Queen to send for him. He told me Gladstone, he believed, and Graham, he knew, would not join Derby, and he thought neither Sidney Herbert nor Cardwell would either. As to the future, there really are _quot homines tot sententiæ_. Some think Derby cannot form a Government, some that he will not try. The sanguine Palmerstonians think all other attempts will fail and Palmerston remain in power, as Lord Grey did in 1831, and some fancy he will endeavour to propitiate the House of Commons and public opinion by throwing overboard Clanricarde, to whose appointment the mischief is in great measure attributed. Such is at this moment the state of doubt and confusion which generally prevail.

_February 23rd._--Nothing is yet known of Derby's progress except that he tried the Peelites, not one of whom would join. He sent for Newcastle from Clumber, who came up, saw him, and declined. It is evident that they mean to act in concert, except probably Graham, who has espoused John Russell, and who will not separate himself from Lord John's fortunes. There was a prevailing expectation yesterday that Derby would abandon his attempt, and that Palmerston would come back, but Derby seems quite determined to go on. The Palmerstonians certainly expect their exclusion to be of short duration, and nobody thinks that any Government Derby can possibly make will last long.

Never was there a great catastrophe so totally unexpected. Within an hour of the beginning of the debate no one doubted that the Government would have a majority, but Milner Gibson's speech was not concluded before it was evident that his amendment would be carried, and Palmerston's conduct was very unaccountable. It was clear from the tone of his speech, which was as bad as possible, feeble and intemperate, that he was aware of what was going to happen, and yet when the true state of the case was urged upon him, and he was pressed to adjourn the debate till Monday, which could easily have been done, he obstinately refused. If he had done this, there is little doubt that he would have whipped up a majority by Monday. Certainly no people ever so mismanaged their affairs. There is no excuse for their having put on the table of the House of Commons such a despatch as Walewski's, without any reply being made to it. It required no great sagacity to anticipate that such a course of proceeding could not fail to throw the House of Commons into a flame, and exasperate the country, already much excited, and all the excuses they made only made their case worse, and were generally inconsistent with each other. George Grey's was the most pitiful, when he said that after the second reading an answer should be sent. Then they made shuffling statements: at one time that they had sent no answer, and that to have answered it as alone it could be answered must have increased the irritation. Then, that they had given a verbal answer, and at last it transpired that an answer had been sent in the shape of a _private_ letter from Clarendon to Cowley.

[Sidenote: MISMANAGEMENT.]

There were two courses open to the Government, either of which might have been very naturally and not improperly taken. Palmerston might have announced that it was not his intention to produce any of the correspondence between the two Governments, and asked the House of Commons to place confidence in him, and allow him to take the steps he deemed best to satisfy the French Government, and at the same time vindicate the honour and dignity of this country, and if he had stated that he thought it would be injurious to the interests of peace and amity to produce any papers, it is perfectly certain he would have met with unanimous acquiescence. The only objection I have heard to this is that the French Government published the despatch in the 'Moniteur;' but if Palmerston had resolved upon silence here, he could have informed Cowley of his resolution, and instructed him to come to a common agreement with Walewski that they should publish nothing in the 'Moniteur,' and we should keep the correspondence from Parliament here. Not acting in this way, he ought to have sent an answer, and who can suppose that such men as Palmerston and Clarendon, whose lives have been passed in writing despatches, and who are both so remarkably expert at that work, should be unable to concoct a reply to Walewski which should be conciliatory in tone and matter, and at once suffice for the fears and exigencies of France and for the national pride and honour of England? Clarendon's private letter is said to have been excellent, and of course it must have been well adapted for its purposes. What difficulty could there have been, therefore, in converting the private into a public letter, which if it had accompanied the French letter would have pacified both the House of Commons and the country, for the Government ought not to have forgotten, as it seems they did, that the English and French Governments were not the only parties in this transaction, but there were the English Government and the House of Commons and the country, between whom accounts had to be settled. There are people who fancy that Palmerston was not sorry to be beaten on Milner Gibson's motion, thinking it better to go out upon that than upon the motion against Clanricarde on March 4 (the abolition of the Privy Seal), on which they think they certainly would have been defeated, and on which they must have resigned; but I don't think their defeat on the latter was so certain, and they might have been saved by Clanricarde's resignation before the debate came on. The conduct of those who brought forward and those who supported the vote of censure, and that of the Government in going out upon it, admits of much diversity of opinion. The friends of the Government, and those who were averse to a change, maintain that the amendment was inexcusable, and that the House of Commons had no business to meddle with the functions of the Executive, or to express any opinion as to the propriety of answering or not a despatch which ought to have been left to the discretion of the Minister, and the ex-Ministers say that the vote made it impossible for them to do anything but resign, and that their opponents must have been fully aware that this would be the consequence of their victory.

[Sidenote: DETERMINATION TO RESIGN.]

Their conduct is inexplicable to me, for I believe they were very sorry to go out, and yet if they had wished it they might have very well stayed in. According to ancient practice any vote of censure produced resignation as a matter of course, no matter what the subject of it, but it did so because a vote of censure, and indeed any adverse vote on any important measure, implied that the House of Commons had withdrawn its confidence from the Government, the fact of which rendered it impossible for them to carry on the affairs of the country, and obliged them to resign. But it is impossible to pretend that the late vote indicated the withdrawal of the confidence of the House of Commons generally. They had had two immense majorities a few days before, and they would have had another as large a few days after if they had gone on with the bill. If I had been able to advise the Queen, I would have recommended her to refuse Lord Palmerston's resignation, and have insisted on his testing the question of confidence on the Conspiracy Bill, or on some question in which the national passions were not concerned, and he could not have refused to take this course. Even after she had sent for Derby he gave her the opportunity (though not I suppose the advice to do so), for he said she had better take another day for consideration, and then if she decided on wishing him to form a Government, he would undertake it.

_February 26th._--I met George Lewis yesterday, and talked over with him the whole affair. He thinks that it has all been fearfully mismanaged, and that the catastrophe might have been avoided in many different ways: first, by answering the despatch; secondly, by doing what I have suggested, producing no papers and asking for confidence; then by the Speaker's declining to allow the amendment to be put, as he well might have done, and as a _strong_ Speaker would have done. Lord Eversley advised him to do this, and gave his strong opinion that the amendment was inadmissible. It is curious that Palmerston's overthrow should be the work of a Parliament elected expressly to support him, and immediately caused by the act of a Speaker whom he insisted upon putting in the chair, contrary to the advice of many others who thought he would prove inefficient.

I told Lewis I thought their resignation was not called for, and what I would have advised the Queen. He said the whole question was well and most calmly and dispassionately considered, and they were unanimous as to the necessity of resignation, with the sole exception of Vernon Smith, and that was without any _arrière pensée_ of returning on an anticipated failure of Derby; that the Queen had begged Palmerston not to resign upon this vote, and he had returned to the Cabinet, and reported what she said, but they were all without exception for adhering to their resignation. Derby, too, had evidently wished to afford Palmerston an opportunity of recalling it, for he had begged the Queen to take twenty-four hours to consider of it; but it is probable that Her Majesty, having failed to persuade Palmerston in the first instance, had thought it useless to make any further attempts.

Lewis gave me such strong reasons for their determination, that I confess they materially shook my opinion. He said there was no possibility of mistaking the feeling there was against Palmerston, which if I had been present and seen what passed in the House that night, I could not have doubted; that the only way in which they could have stayed in was by getting somebody to move a vote of confidence, which was too dangerous an experiment, as in the present state of the House of Commons it was at least an even chance that such a vote would not have been carried, and certain that they would have had all the great guns of all sides thundering against them. He thought Palmerston's speech had been very ill advised, and had done much harm, and that it was a mistake not to have adjourned the debate, when it was very probable that they might have had an opportunity of changing the fortune of it.