Chapter XVIII (1)

The Government determine to dissolve the Parliament--Apathy of the Country--Hopes and Fears as to the War--The Congress a Trick--Disraeli on the approaching Elections--War declared--Mr. Greville resigns the Clerkship of the Council--Result of the Elections--Mistakes of the Austrian Government--Policy of the Opposition--Reconciliation of Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell--The Reconciliation doubtful--Meeting of the Liberal Party--Resolution of the Meeting--Debate on the Resolution of Want of Confidence--Defeat of Ministers--Lord Derby resigns--Lord Granville sent for by the Queen--Lord Granville does not form a Government--Lord Palmerston sent for--Lord Palmerston's Second Administration--The Queen confers the Garter on Lord Derby--Successful Progress of the French in Italy--Causes of Lord Granville's Failure--Lord John claims the Foreign Office--Lord Clarendon declines to take Office--Lord Clarendon's Interview with the Queen--Mr. Cobden declines to take Office--The Armistice of Villafranca--Peace concluded--The Terms of Peace--Position of the Pope--Disappointment of Italy--Conference of the Emperors--Alleged Sensitiveness of the Emperor Napoleon--Details of the War--A Visit to Ireland--Irish National Education--Dublin--Howth Castle--Waterford--Killarney--Return from Ireland--Numerous Cabinets--A Dispute with China--Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell--Lord Clarendon at Osborne--Spain and Morocco--The Duc d'Aumale--Perplexity of the Emperor Napoleon--The Emperor Napoleon and the 'Times.'

[Sidenote: DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT.]

_April 7th_, 1859.--The determination of the Government, announced in both Houses on Monday evening, took the world by surprise. Nobody thought there would be a dissolution. Derby's speech was very bad, much below his usual level. The attack on John Russell which formed a chief part of it was merely a _réchauffé_ of that of Disraeli, but very inferior to it in every respect. Disraeli in the other House spoke much better, and with more taste and temper. The Opposition leaders are evidently much taken aback; the Derbyites assert that they have reason to expect a gain of forty votes, but nobody believes it. Many think a much more Radical and an angry Parliament will be returned, but there is no excitement, and it seems to me more probable that those are right who think the relative proportions will not be materially altered. The Whig chiefs are very angry with John Russell for committing himself as he did on Monday night by his speech and announcement of his own plan of Reform. Great attempts were made to dissuade him from doing this, but he would not listen to reason. Palmerston made a speech clearly indicative of disagreement with Lord John, though with a semblance of union. The Resolutions on one side and the Dissolution on the other have both been great faults, of which the mischievous consequences may be very serious, but which cannot be made manifest till we see the result of the election.

_April 15th._--I have been reading over to George Lewis my account of what took place about the Reform Bill of 1832, to assist him in reviewing that period of history, and in so doing it is impossible not to be struck with the contrast between the public excitement which prevailed then and the apathy and absence of interest which we witness now. At every general election there is a great deal of bustle, activity, party zeal, and contention, but there are not more of these now than on ordinary occasions, if anything less. Both parties are confident that they shall gain, and the Derbyites are making great efforts, and have collected a very large sum of money. Derby has given 20,000_l._ to the fund, but candidates are slack in coming forward with the prospect of the new Parliament not lasting many months. The question of peace or war is still in abeyance, but inclines rather towards war; the public securities oscillate like a barometer, and people are puzzled and unable to form any opinion.

_April 20th._--The long promised statements were made in both Houses on Monday night, but they told us nothing that was not already known, and merely expressed hopes that war might still be averted. Disraeli in the Commons was more sanguine than Malmesbury and Derby in the Lords. Clarendon and Derby both made excellent speeches, the former particularly; all he said was sound and true. The most striking thing in both Houses was the extreme caution and reserve of the speakers on both sides, and particularly their reticence and forbearance about France. Not one word of blame of the Emperor of the French; no more about him, his sayings and doings, than about the Emperor of Russia, or than if he had had nothing whatever to do with the present state of things. This was probably politic, but it was lamentable and disgraceful that we should be obliged, or think ourselves obliged, to abstain from speaking the truth, for fear of offending this rascally adventurer, who by the egregious folly and cowardice of the French nation has been invested with such an awful power of mischief, and whom neither fear nor shame deters from pursuing his own wicked ends at the expense of any amount of misery and desolation which he may inflict upon mankind. One cannot help contrasting the extreme delicacy and forbearance exhibited towards him with the violence and abuse which were directed against the Emperor Nicholas in 1854.

[Sidenote: MR. DISRAELI'S EXPECTATIONS.]

I met Disraeli yesterday afternoon, when he told me they had got such satisfactory news from the Continent that he considered the affair as virtually settled and the danger at an end. God grant it may be so, but I am far from being satisfied that the danger is over. On the eve of great resolutions, and as the moment of taking an irrevocable step draws near, the actors in great events have generally some misgivings, and pause upon the brink, and so probably will these quasi-belligerents do now; but I believe the concessions which France expresses herself willing to make to our entreaties to be a part of her game. Clarendon or Derby said that if Cowley had been allowed to work out his purpose of mediation, probably all would have been settled, and that the proposition of Russia for a Congress had been mischievous, and only involved the question in fresh doubt and delay. But it appears evident that this was a French trick, and that Russia proposed the Congress at the instigation of France, who sought it for the purpose of delay, and most likely in order to extract from it a plausible cause of quarrel. Derby in his speech attributed a great deal to the menacing and disturbing speech of the King of Sardinia in opening his Chambers, but nobody said a word of Napoleon's _sortie_ to the Austrian Minister on the 1st January, nor was any allusion made to various important facts which were well known to many people in both Houses. No reproaches were cast upon Sardinia, but a good many upon Austria; no comment made upon the flagrant breach by Sardinia of the treaties existing between her and Austria, and of the forbearance of the latter in not making that breach a _casus belli_, as she might well have done.

I went to a Council on Monday for the prorogation, when I had some conversation with Disraeli, and asked him what his real belief was as to their prospects in the election. He said there was so much luck in these matters that it was difficult to speak positively, but that he had endeavoured to ascertain the true probabilities of the result, and his conclusion was that _if they had luck_ they should gain sixty votes; and what, I asked, if there was no luck on one side or the other? Then, he said, they should gain forty. I told him the Opposition calculators did not believe the Government would gain at all, or at most not above eight or ten, if so many, and asked if he was confident they should gain from twenty to thirty anyhow. He said from the day of their taking office they had looked forward to a dissolution, that their organisation was excellent, they had plenty of candidates and of money, and he was quite confident they should gain that number and more; he added that there was in no part of the country the slightest desire for Reform, and he had altered the address he had first intended to put forth, in consequence of finding what the prevailing sentiment was on that question. I suppose they hold this language to justify their dissolution, for it is difficult to believe they can really expect such results, or that their opponents, who tell such a different story, can be so completely mistaken.

_April 24th, Newmarket._--Disraeli's information on Tuesday last, when I met him at Lady Jersey's, might well have warranted me in believing that no war would take place, but I have never been able to persuade myself that this calamity would be averted, and it appears that my apprehensions were well founded, for now the die seems to be really cast, and at the moment when I am writing it is probably actually declared and begun. Though Austria is perfectly justified in declining to wait any longer while France is maturing her preparations, and cannot justly be blamed for bringing the affair to a crisis, she is certain to be exposed to every sort of obloquy and misrepresentations even in this country, and of course much more in France.

_April 27th._--On Monday we heard that the Austrians had sent their ultimatum to Sardinia, and there was a complete panic in the City. Yesterday we were informed that she had given fourteen days' grace to Sardinia, and everything was up again. But this morning we were undeceived, and found this latter report had no foundation. Meanwhile the clamour against Austria has been senseless and disgraceful; nothing could be more unworthy than Derby's allusion to her in his speech at the Mansion House dinner on Monday. It was a claptrap, and meant to obtain popularity and assist the Ministerial interest at the election. Nothing has ever disgusted me more than to see the readiness with which everybody finds fault with Austria, and the care with which they avoid any notice of France, not, however, that this can or will last. What sort of relations we shall continue to have with France I cannot imagine. We have been treated in a manner which puts an end to the possibility of any amicable feelings between the two countries. We can never trust the Emperor again, and must take measures for our own security as best we may; but unhappily the Indian war has so materially diminished our power and absorbed our resources, and France has so enormously gained upon us in point of naval strength, that we are not in a condition to hold the language and play the part that befit the dignity and the honour of the country. We can revile Austria with impunity, for we know that we are in no danger of an attack from her, but, on the contrary, that she has so much need of our good will that she will endure our taunts and reproaches, and not quarrel with us even in words. It was a prophetic saying of Mackintosh forty years ago at Roehampton that it remained to be proved whether the acquisition of our Indian Empire was in reality a gain to us, and we must hope that the remark will not be illustrated in our days by seeing England herself placed in danger by her exertions to retain or reconquer India, whose value is so problematical and of which nothing is certain but the immense labour and cost of her retention.

[Sidenote: WAR IN ITALY.]

_May 14th._--Another severe fit of the gout, principally in the right hand, has prevented my writing a line for the last fortnight, during which war has broken out, and the general election has been begun and ended, and, what is most important to myself, I have resigned my office. Hitherto the war and the election have equally disappointed the expectations they gave rise to. The Austrians committed a blunder in plunging into the war, and have not taken the only advantage such a measure seemed to promise, viz. that of overpowering the Sardinians before the French could join them, and now nobody can make out what their tactics are, or when and where the contest will begin in earnest. Meanwhile _we_ are taking an imposing attitude of armed and prepared neutrality. Disraeli's anticipated sixty votes have dwindled down to a gain of twenty, but Malmesbury told Cowley that they should have force sufficient to maintain their ground, which I see their opponents do not believe.

_May 17th._--The elections are nearly if not quite over, and, as well as can be collected from the conflicting calculations of the rival parties, they present a gain of nearly thirty for the Government. With this they evidently hope and their opponents fear they will be able to go on at least to the end of the session, and I incline to think so likewise. Their Government is miserably weak and incapable, their numbers respectable, but their staff deplorable. It is expected they will propose to Lord Elgin to take Lytton's place. The general election has been eminently satisfactory in this, that it has elicited the completely Conservative spirit of the country. Palmerston, who predicted that the consequence would be a large increase of Radical strength, has been altogether mistaken. It may be added (whether this is a good or an evil) that it has also manifested the indifference of the country to all parties and to all political ties and connexions. In the last general election the cry was all for Palmerston, in this there has been no cry for anybody, neither for Palmerston nor Derby, and less than all for John Russell or Bright. And yet John Russell is flattering himself he shall have an opportunity of forming a Government, and talks of his regret at being obliged to leave out so many of his friends. It is remarkable that the Catholics have supported the Government, and that they have done so under orders from Rome. Archbishop Cullen is there, and has signified to the priests the pleasure of the Pope that the Derby Government should be supported. Clarendon told me this yesterday, and that the reason is because they think this Government more favourably inclined to Austria than any other, especially than either Palmerston or John Russell would be. The Papal Government have never forgiven the Whigs for the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, and this accounts for the otherwise strange support given by the Catholics to those who have always been their bitterest enemies.

The war still languishes, and nobody can make out what the Austrian plans are. A great sensation has been made by the retirement of Buol and the appointment of Rechberg. The first report was that it was a sacrifice made to appease the resentment of Russia, but Clarendon told me yesterday he did not believe this, but that it was rather to satisfy some of the German Powers whom Buol had deeply offended. Nothing could have exceeded the stupid blundering and misconduct of the Austrian Government during the last few critical weeks, and their want of tact towards Prussia and the German Powers. The Archduke Albrecht was sent to Germany for the purpose of stirring up the German Powers, and professedly to procure such a demonstration as should be the means of preventing war, and then, while the Archduke was still at Berlin, they blurted out their ultimatum (which was a declaration of war) without letting Prussia know what they were about. The Archduke was obliged to declare his own ignorance of the intentions of his Government, and Prussia consequently to announce her disapprobation of the measure and to signify the same to France, which was just what suited the Emperor Louis Napoleon. I hear also that his departure from Paris was accelerated by the necessity of repairing as speedily as possible to the seat of war, in order to quiet the dissensions and quarrels which were already raging between the French generals. Not a very promising beginning of the campaign. This used to be the case formerly in the great Napoleon's time wherever he was not present. His presence silenced these quarrels, but it remains to be seen whether this man will have equal authority over unruly subordinates, who cannot possibly regard him with the same deference with which the old marshals looked up to their mighty master.

[Sidenote: RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS.]

_May 24th._--The elections are all over, and the Opposition leaders are already busy in devising the means of attacking the Government. On Friday Palmerston went to Pembroke Lodge, and had a long conference with John Russell. On Sunday there was a gathering there, attended by Granville, George Lewis, Charles Wood, and probably others. The question immediately to be decided is whether an Amendment shall or not be moved to the Address. A very nice point of political strategy. The Whig leaders are impatient to drive the Government to resignation, without, as I believe, knowing how they are to form a Government likely to be durable and strong. As matters stand, the Government appear to be too strong to be driven out, and not strong enough to count upon staying in. A greater fix can hardly be seen.

_May 26th._--Palmerston and John Russell have now made up all their differences, and have come to a complete understanding and agreement on all points, so that the schism may be considered at an end. Upon Reform, upon foreign policy, upon the mode of opposition, they are fully agreed, and even upon their respective personal pretensions. Both are resolved not to quit the House of Commons, and Lord John himself says that the question of the Primacy must be determined by the Queen herself, and that whomever she may send for and charge with the formation of a Government must necessarily be Premier. There is not much doubt that this will be Palmerston, but what post Lord John would require for himself I have not heard. It may possibly be the Foreign Office, which Palmerston could hardly refuse to him, particularly as they are agreed on foreign policy, and Clarendon is not inclined to share their opinion. This reconciliation will be very favourable to Granville's pretensions, and secure to him the lead of the House of Lords, and not improbably, at some not very distant day, lead to his being Prime Minister. In this age of political Methuselahs it is an enormous advantage to be little more than forty years old. This state of affairs I heard at Brooks's from the Duke of Bedford. It was Lord John who took the initiative in their approaches to each other. He wrote to Palmerston, on which Palmerston repaired to Pembroke Lodge, where they had a long conversation, with the result aforesaid. Soon afterwards I met Disraeli in the street. He did not appear to me to be in very high spirits, and talked of the position and chances of his Government without any expressions of confidence, though without despondence. He said he hoped that they would move an Amendment to the Address, as it was better to fight it out at once and bring the question of strength to a crisis.

[Sidenote: LORD PALMERSTON AND LORD JOHN RUSSELL.]

_May 29th._--It seems not unlikely that the Government may be after all relieved from the immediate danger of an Amendment by the divisions amongst the Opposition, or rather between the rival leaders. After all I was told of the meeting between Palmerston and Lord John, and the agreement they had come to on all the important points, I was astonished at hearing on Friday evening that everything was again thrown into uncertainty because Lord John would not say what he intended to do. On the important question of who should be Premier he would make no frank statement. He had, indeed, before said that the Queen must decide it, and the man she sent for would naturally be at the head of the Government; but he refused to say whether, supposing Palmerston to be sent for, he would take office with and under him, or even whether he would sit in the House of Commons on or behind the Treasury Bench--in short he would give no clear and positive assurance of his intentions. This is naturally very disgusting to the Whigs, and throws everything into doubt and confusion. The Duke of Bedford is to go down to him and tell him the plain truth, which no one else would venture to do, pointing out to him the effect of his conduct on the sentiments of the Liberal party and on his own position, with regard to which his conduct is indefensible and suicidal. It remains to be seen whether any effect will be produced on his mind, but in any case nothing can look more hopeless than it does, or promise worse for the future. Even though Lord John should consent to act under Palmerston (and nobody expects that it is Lord John for whom the Queen would send), there seems little hope of any cordial or lasting union between them, or of his being satisfied with any position in which he might consent to place himself, for his mind is evidently in a sour and jaundiced state. The majority of the Whig and Liberal party who are come up full of resentment from the elections are certainly desirous of attacking the Government, but there is a considerable number of them who are averse to joining in any vote of want of confidence, or any other move which may turn the Government out without first being assured that another Government can be formed, and that the union is sufficiently complete to promise that such new Government would be strong enough to maintain itself when formed.

_June 6th._--As I was at Epsom every day this week, I have heard nothing of what has been going on, except the fact that there is to be a great meeting of the Liberals at Willis's Rooms this afternoon, called by a list of people which includes Palmerston and Lord John and Milner Gibson, whose signature betokens the assent of the Radicals to the object of it, which I conclude to be an agreement as to the attack to be made on the Government to-morrow, and certain explanations as to the intentions and sentiments of the Whig leaders. I see that there are many dissentients from the course that is going to be adopted, many who think this attempt to oust the Government at once neither patriotic nor politic. Without any very decided opinion, or the means of forming one, I am rather inclined to think that it would be better to leave them alone, and to trust to their furnishing good cause for turning them out, as they probably will do. The Government does not appear to be obnoxious to any serious reproach and objection, except about their mismanagement of foreign affairs. But it is very questionable whether another Government might not give us a policy equally or still more mischievous.

_June 7th._--The meeting of the Opposition yesterday at Willis's Rooms went off as well as they could expect or desire. The two leaders gave the required assurances that each would serve under the other, in the event of either being sent for. There was a general concurrence in the plan of attacking the Government at once, in which even Bright and Ellice joined, the former disclaiming any desire for office in his own person, but claiming it for his friends. The result promised is that with very few exceptions all the opponents or quasi-opponents of the Government will unite in supporting the vote of want of confidence, and they are very confident of success. On the other hand, the Derbyites do not despair of having a majority, and they comfort themselves with the certainty that the division must be so close, that the successful Whigs will be able to form no Government which will have a certain working majority, and, not impossibly, that the majority itself may be turned into a minority by the events of the re-elections. This is not very probable, and it is rather more likely that if Palmerston forms a Government, he will have the support of a good many of those who will vote with the Government, as long as they remain in. There were, however, some rather ominous manifestations made at this meeting. It seemed to be agreed that the new Government should embrace not only Whigs and Peelites, but 'advanced Liberals,' _i.e._ the followers of Bright, and this, besides introducing the seeds of disunion, will probably frighten away the Liberal Conservatives, who would like to support Palmerston, inasmuch as a Government so formed would afford little security for the maintenance of Conservative measures. Then Palmerston in no ambiguous terms announced his pro-Gallican sympathies, and the neutrality he declared for in every possible case which he could contemplate, together with his desire for a cordial union with France, can mean nothing but that under his rule England should look quietly on while France crushes Austria, and accomplishes all her ambitious and revolutionary objects. That this policy will be hateful to many who will be his colleagues cannot be doubted, but what is doubtful is whether those who will object to it will have virtue and firmness enough to decline office rather than be parties to such a policy.

_June 9th._--There is great excitement about this debate and the probable division, and equal confidence on both sides of a majority. The Opposition is the favourite, but their friends will not lay any odds. Everybody says it must be very close, and on either side the majority will not exceed ten. On the first night Disraeli made a capital speech, and nobody else on their side would speak at all. This was a sort of manoeuvre and attempt to bring about a division that night, for they found out that seventeen of the Opposition had not taken their seats, which would have secured a majority to the Government. The Whigs therefore refused to divide, and put up one man after another to keep the debate open, and eventually obtained an adjournment. Palmerston's speech was in accordance with his declaration at Willis's, and with his ancient practice; it was violently pro-French and anti-Austrian, and it was full of gross falsehoods and misrepresentations, which he well knew to be such. In his seventy-fifth year, and playing the last act of his political life, he is just what he always was.

[Sidenote: RESIGNATION OF LORD DERBY.]

_June 12th._--After a not very remarkable debate, the division yesterday morning gave a majority of thirteen to the Opposition, which was more than either side expected.[1] Derby resigned at eleven o'clock, and the Queen immediately after marked her sense of his conduct by sending him an extra Garter in an autograph letter. Much to his own surprise she sent for Granville (and for nobody else) and charged him with the formation of a Government. What passed between Her Majesty and him I know not, but he accepted the commission and has been busy about it ever since. How he is to deal with Palmerston and Lord John, and to make such a project palatable to them I cannot imagine. What the Queen has done is a very significant notice to them of her great reluctance to have either of them at the head of affairs, and it cannot but be very mortifying to them to be invited to accept office under a man they have raised from the ranks, and who is young enough to be son to either, and almost to be grandson of the elder of the two. Nor will the mortification be less, after they have both so publicly avowed their expectations that one or other of them must be sent for, and their having, in what they consider a spirit of self-sacrifice, consented to serve under each other, but without ever saying or dreaming that it could be necessary to say they would take office under any third party. Nobody, indeed, has ever thought of the possibility of any but one of them being called upon by Her Majesty, and the only question has been which it would be.

Footnote 1: [The Amendment to the Address, implying a want of confidence in Ministers, was moved by the Marquis of Hartington. The votes on the division were: For the amendment 323, against it 310.]

[Sidenote: LORD PALMERSTON'S SECOND ADMINISTRATION.]

_June 13th._--Lord Granville told me yesterday evening what had passed, and that his mission was at an end, and Palmerston engaged in forming a Government. The account of it all appears in the 'Times' this morning quite correctly. Granville was rather disappointed, but took it gaily enough, and I think he must have been aware from the first of the extreme difficulty of his forming a Government which was to include these two old rival statesmen. Palmerston had the wisdom to accede at once to Granville's proposal, probably foreseeing that nothing would come of Granville's attempt, and that he would have all the credit of his complaisance and obtain the prize after all. The transaction has been a very advantageous one for Granville, and will inevitably lead sooner or later to his gaining the eminence which he has only just missed now, which would have been full of difficulties and future embarrassments at the present time, but will be comparatively easy hereafter. Lord John's conduct will not serve to ingratiate him with the Queen, nor increase his popularity with the country.[1]

Footnote 1: [It was the refusal of Lord John Russell to serve under Lord Granville which rendered the formation of a Cabinet by that statesman impossible. At the same time Lord John Russell expressed his willingness to serve under Lord Palmerston on condition of his taking the department of Foreign Affairs.]

_June 26th._--All the time that the formation of the new Government was going on I was at a cottage near Windsor for the Ascot races, and consequently I heard nothing of the secret proceedings connected with the selection of those who come in, and the exclusion of those who belonged to Palmerston's last Government, nor have I as yet heard what passed on the subject.[1] The most remarkable of the exclusions is Clarendon's, who I was sure, when the Foreign Office was seized by John Russell, would take nothing else; and of the admissions, Gladstone's, who has never shown any good will towards Palmerston, and voted with Derby in the last division. This Government in its composition is curiously, and may prove fatally, like that which Aberdeen formed in 1852, of a very Peelite complexion, and only with a larger proportion of Radicals, though not enough, it is said, to satisfy their organs, and Bright is displeased that he has not been more consulted, and probably at office not having been more pressed upon him. It is still very doubtful whether Cobden will accept the place offered to him.

The Tories are full of rancour, and express great confidence that this Government will not last, and that they shall all be recalled to power before the end of the year. Derby had a large gathering at Salisbury's house, when he made them a speech recommending union and moderation, the first of which recommendations they seem more likely to adopt than the second. The affair of his Garter was in this wise. On resigning he wrote to the Queen and besought her to bestow Red Ribands on Malmesbury and Pakington. She wrote him an answer acceding to his request, and adding that she could not allow him to retire a second time from her service without conferring upon him a mark of her sense of his services, and she therefore desired him to accept the Garter, though none was vacant. He told me this, and said it was the only way in which he could have taken it, as he never should have given it to himself, and I believe if a vacancy had occurred he meant to have given it to the Duke of Hamilton.

While we have been settling our Government for good or for evil, the war has continued to pursue its course of uninterrupted success of the Allies, and unless something almost miraculous should occur, the Austrian dominion in Italy may be considered as at an end. The sentiments of people here are of a very mixed and almost contradictory character, for they are on the whole anti-Austrian, anti-French, and though more indulgent than they deserve to the Sardinians, not favourable to them. The most earnest and general desire is that we should keep out of the _mêlée_, and any termination of the war would be hailed with gladness, because we should thereby be relieved from our apprehensions of being involved in it. We should not be sorry to see the Austrians driven out of Italy for good and all, though most people would regret that the Emperor Louis Napoleon should be triumphant, and that such a course of perfidy, falsehood, and selfish ambition should be crowned with success. The Austrians deserve their fate, for nothing can exceed the folly of their conduct, first in rushing into the war, and thereby playing the whole game of their adversaries, and secondly in placing in command men evidently incapable, and who have committed nothing but blunders since the first day of the campaign.

Footnote 1: [Lord Palmerston's second Administration consisted of the following members:--

First Lord of the Treasury Viscount Palmerston
Lord Chancellor Lord Campbell
Lord President Earl Granville
Lord Privy Seal Duke of Argyll
Chancellor of the Exchequer Mr. Gladstone
Home Secretary Sir George C. Lewis
Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell
Colonial Secretary Duke of Newcastle
War Secretary Mr. Sidney Herbert
Indian Secretary Sir Charles Wood
Duchy of Lancaster Sir George Grey
Postmaster-General Earl of Elgin
Admiralty Duke of Somerset
Board of Trade Mr. Milner Gibson
Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland Earl of Carlisle
Irish Secretary Mr. Cardwell

This Administration lasted until the death of Lord Palmerston on October 18, 1865.]

_June 27th._--Yesterday I went to Kent House, where I found Clarendon and his sister alone, and we had a long talk, in the course of which he told me all that had passed (especially with regard to himself) about the formation of the Government. Although he spoke very good-naturedly about Granville and his abortive attempt, I saw clearly that he thought Granville had been in the wrong to undertake it, and that he ought at once to have told the Queen it was impossible, and have declined it. Though Palmerston had given a qualified consent to act with him, it was with evident reluctance, and he had guarded it by saying it must be subject to his approbation of the way in which the Government was composed. Lord John's consent was still more qualified, and he annexed to it a condition which at once put an end to the attempt. This was, as I had suspected, that he should be leader of the House of Commons. To this Palmerston refused to agree, and so the whole thing fell to the ground. Granville, by Clarendon's advice, at once reported his failure to the Queen, gave her no advice as to whom she should send for, and of her own accord she sent for Palmerston.

[Sidenote: LORD JOHN RUSSELL FOREIGN MINISTER.]

Previously to this, and I think before the vote, Palmerston and Clarendon had discussed the probability of Palmerston's forming a Government, when Palmerston told him he should expect him to return to the Foreign Office. As soon as Palmerston had been with Her Majesty, he went off to Pembroke Lodge, and saw Lord John; told him all that had happened, and that he would of course take any office he pleased. Lord John said, 'I take the Foreign Office.' Palmerston said he had contemplated putting Clarendon there again, enumerating his reasons and Clarendon's claims, but that if he insisted on the Foreign Office as a right, he must have it. Lord John said, 'I do insist on it,' and so it was settled.

I ought to have inserted that when Palmerston and Clarendon talked the matter over at first, Clarendon begged him not to think of him, and that if, as was probable, John Russell desired the Foreign Office, he _must_ give it him, for if he did not, or even made any difficulty, an immediate breach would be the consequence, and John Russell would get up a case against Palmerston which would be very embarrassing. Palmerston at first said he should certainly insist on Clarendon's not being put aside to please Lord John, but in the end Clarendon persuaded him not to adhere to that resolution. After all was settled there was a small gathering at Cambridge House, when Palmerston told Clarendon that he might have the choice of any other office, but Clarendon replied that he was not conversant with Colonial, Indian, or War affairs, and he would not take an office for which there would be many candidates, while he much preferred being out, and Palmerston would not have half offices enough to satisfy the demands for them. Palmerston said he would not take this as his last word, and the next day the Queen sent for Clarendon, by Palmerston's own desire, to try and persuade him to take office. He went to Buckingham Palace and had an audience, or rather interview, of three hours with Her Majesty and the Prince, in which she treated him with the most touching kindness and confidence, and exhausted all her powers of persuasion to induce him to join the Government, but he was firm and would not. She then said, in the event of a vacancy of the Foreign Office, 'You must promise me you will take it,' to which he replied, 'Your Majesty knows I would do anything in the world for your service; but you must allow me, in any case which may occur, to exercise my own discretion under the circumstances, and to rest assured that I shall in every case be actuated solely by a desire to do what is best for your Majesty, and most conducive to your pleasure and interest.' The Queen talked to Clarendon of the publication in the 'Times' with much indignation, and said, 'Whom am I to trust? These were my own very words.' Clarendon, however, endeavoured to convince her that the article had in fact (however indecorous it might appear) been eminently serviceable to her, inasmuch as it negatived any suspicion of intrigue or underhand dealing in any quarter, and represented her own conduct in a manner to excite universal approbation. He dilated on this in a way which made great impression both on the Prince and on her, and ultimately satisfied her that all had been for the best, thereby acting a very good-natured part and a very wise one.

[Sidenote: MR. COBDEN DECLINES OFFICE.]

_July 4th._--Cobden has declined to take office, though he was advised by his friends to accept, and he approves of Milner Gibson and Charles Villiers having joined the Government. The reasons he gives are that he has always been a strenuous opponent of Palmerston, and that his conduct will be liable to reproach in taking office under him, that he has been the advocate of economy and low establishments, and would find himself obliged to act very inconsistently, or to oppose his colleagues in a policy respecting which popular opinion would be against him; but he expresses great satisfaction with Palmerston, who he says is a much better fellow than he was aware of, and he means to give the Government all the support in his power. These reasons do not seem sufficient for his not joining, which he had better have done. Granville laments Clarendon's having declined to take office as a Secretary of State, and that he will not be in the Cabinet to throw into the scale of foreign policy his political weight. I said I knew nothing of his motives, but assuming that he did not see foreign affairs in the same light as Palmerston and John Russell, he would be placed in an awkward position before long. Granville said this might be true, but he thought before very long he would be at the Foreign Office again. What he meant by that I do not know.

_July 12th._--On Friday morning the world was electrified by reading in the 'Times' that an armistice had been agreed upon between the belligerent Emperors in Italy, and the subsequent announcement that they were to have a personal meeting yesterday morning, and the armistice to last for five weeks (till August 15), led to a pretty general conclusion that peace would be the result.[1] The Stock Exchange take the same view, for everywhere and in all securities there has been a great rise. I saw George Lewis on Sunday and asked him if the Government had any intelligence, when he told me that the only thing, besides what had appeared in the papers, was that France had proposed to us to interpose our mediation on the basis of Austria giving up everything, and Prussia had made the same proposal on the basis of Austria giving up nothing, both which proposals we had very naturally declined.

Footnote 1: [The battle of Solferino was fought on June 24, and an armistice between the Emperors of France and Austria was signed at Villafranca on July 7.]

[Sidenote: THE ARMISTICE OF VILLAFRANCA.]

_July 13th._--We had scarcely had time to begin discussing and speculating on the probable results of the armistice, before the news of peace being actually concluded burst upon us. As yet we have only the great fact itself and the skeleton of the arrangement, and we shall probably be for some time without materials for judging as to the merits of the Treaty of Peace and its probable consequences, but the first impressions and the first ideas that present themselves may be worth recording. There is no denying that the Emperor Napoleon has played a magnificent part, and whatever we may think of his conduct, and the springs of his actions, he appears before the world as a very great character.[1] Though he can lay no claim to the genius and intellectual powers of the first Napoleon, he is a wiser and a soberer man, with a command over himself and a power of self-restraint, and consequently of moderation in pursuit of objects, which the other did not possess, and therefore while the towering genius of the uncle led him on through magnificent achievements and stupendous vicissitudes to his ruin, it appears highly probable that the better regulated mind and the habitual prudence of the nephew will preserve him from the commission of similar errors, and render his career somewhat less splendid, but more durable and infinitely more beneficial to his country.

With regard to the present affair, the first thing we must be struck with is the way in which the King of Sardinia has been treated. Napoleon, indeed, tosses him a large share of the spoils, but not only was he not admitted to the Conference which led to peace, but he does not appear to have been consulted upon it any more than any of the French generals; the only notice that was taken of the King (so far as we know) being that he was ordered, upon the conclusion of the armistice, to desist from the siege of Peschiera. I had heard before that the Emperor was extremely disgusted with his ally and Cavour, and at all that the latter had said and done, at the proclamations and other documents he had put forth, and at the audacious manner in which that Government had annexed every scrap of territory they could lay their hands on, and assumed the government of every State that they could manage to revolutionise, and all without the sanction and concurrence of the Emperor. Nothing is more likely than that the Italian War will not be closed without much bickering and heartburning between the two allies, and that the King and his Cavour will find, in spite of all they are to obtain, that they will have no bed of roses to repose upon after their fatigues and labours.[2]

Then, so far as we can judge of the settlement, it seems one that is likely to give more offence and disappointment than satisfaction to the bulk of the Italian people, and to imagine that affairs will relapse or resolve themselves into a peaceable and quiescent state is a mere delusion. What passed between the two Emperors we may perhaps never know, though the effects of their interview may one day become dangerously apparent; but it is not unreasonable to conjecture that Napoleon exerted all his arts and blandishments to make a friend of Francis Joseph, and to persuade him that a cordial alliance with France would be more advantageous to him than one with England, and he might with every appearance and much of the reality of truth tell him that England had done nothing for him; that neither the Government nor the nation had any sympathies with Austria, whom, so far from assisting, they had gladly seen defeated in Italy; and that the forbearance of the Emperor in leaving Austria in possession of any part of Italy would be unpalateable to Palmerston and John Russell, and generally unpopular. One cannot but suspect that an alliance was at least projected, if not formed, between the three great despotic Powers, France, Austria, and Russia, for the purpose of domineering over Europe, and dealing with the several States according to their pleasure, or the pleasure of France, and with the ultimate object of attacking, weakening, and humbling England.

[Sidenote: THE CONFERENCE OF THE EMPERORS.]

Of all the provisions of this Treaty that which regards the sovereignty of the Pope is the most curious and seems the most difficult to carry out; it is indicative of the necessity under which the Emperor thinks he is placed of disarming the hostility and consulting the prejudices of the Catholic party and the Church in France. Whether the Pope will accept the temporal office assigned to him may be doubted, but it can hardly be doubted that his supremacy will not be willingly accepted and acknowledged by the Italians generally, to whom the Papal rule is already odious.[3] One cannot but feel glad at the deep mortification and disappointment which will overtake the Republicans and Socialists, the Mazzinis, Garibaldis, Kossuths, _et hoc genus omne_, at a pacification so ruinous to all their hopes and designs. Clarendon told me he believed the account in the 'Times' of the compact between the Emperor and Kossuth, and nothing is more likely than that at the beginning of the contest he employed Kossuth in the way stated, and gave him all sorts of promises, and when he found he could do everything _sine tali auxilio_, and that he had a stronger interest in making friends with Austria, he threw Kossuth over without scruple or hesitation. This is exactly the course he would be likely to follow.[4]

Footnote 1: [The conclusion of the peace after the battle of Solferino was creditable to the Emperor Napoleon, but was no indication of a great character. His motives were that he had not the means of undertaking a siege of the great fortresses of the Quadrilateral, and that if the war had been prolonged it was not improbable that the forces of the Germanic Confederation, including Prussia, would have taken the field against France. He therefore acted wisely in terminating the war, and if the Austrians had withdrawn within the Quadrilateral and refused to treat, the Emperor Napoleon might have been placed in great difficulties. As it was, he broke his engagement to Cavour to liberate Italy from the Alps to the sea, and to Kossuth to support a Hungarian insurrection. Italy eventually owed the liberation of Venice, not to France, but to Prussia, as the reward for her combined action with that Power in the war of 1866.

Cf. the account of the manner in which the peace was concluded in Lord Malmesbury's 'Autobiography,' vol. ii p. 200.]

Footnote 2: [M. de Cavour bitterly resented the prompt conclusion of peace, and for a time quitted the Ministry of which he was the head.]

Footnote 3: [It was proposed by the Sovereigns to place the Pope at the head of an Italian Confederation--a wild scheme, which entirely failed.]

Footnote 4: [This was so. The details of Kossuth's negotiations with the Emperor have been published by Kossuth himself in his memoirs.]

_July 15th._--The news of the peace took everybody so much by surprise, that people had no time to arrange their thoughts upon it; but in the midst of the general satisfaction that the war is over, it is already apparent that there is an explosion of disappointment and resentment to come. All the Italian sympathisers here are in despair, Palmerston is much dissatisfied, and the anti-Austrian Press is indignant. The King of Sardinia has not openly testified any ill-humour, and has published an Address to his new Lombard subjects in a joyful style, but it is impossible he should not deeply feel and resent the contemptuous way in which he has been treated by his Imperial ally, and the resignation of Cavour is a clear manifestation of _his_ feelings on the subject.

When it was announced that an interview was to take place between the two Emperors, everybody predicted that the elder of the two would have as much success in diplomacy over his rival as he had already obtained in arms, but the result does not appear to bear out that expectation, though we do not yet know what the real motives of the Emperor Napoleon were in concluding such an extraordinary peace. Granville told me that at this interview the Austrian Emperor had taken a very high line, and shown little disposition to concession. He said to Napoleon, 'You have conquered Lombardy, and I do not contemplate making any attempt to recover it. I am therefore quite ready to cede it to _you_, and _you_ will deal with it as you please. I have nothing to say to the King of Sardinia, and make no concessions to him. With regard to Venetia, and the country of which I remain in possession, I have nothing to concede or to offer, _all that_ I mean to retain, but I have no objection to my Venetian dominions forming part of the Italian Confederation.' They appear to have had a vast deal of conversation and discussion, for they are said to have been together for above twelve hours. What they talked about it would be interesting to know, but which they will neither of them tell us. The field for speculation is as wide as can well be. How the settlement of Italy is to be accomplished, how the Italians are to be contented, and how peace in that country is to be permanently secured, are questions enough to puzzle the acutest politicians.

We congratulate ourselves at having kept entirely clear both of the war and the peace, but no doubt Palmerston is mortified, and I think England generally will be provoked that changes of such importance should have been made without any consultation or even communication with us.

The friends of the Emperor Napoleon say that they believe his motive for making peace on any terms he could get to have been principally that he was so shocked and disgusted at the fearful scenes of pain and misery that he had to behold after the battle of Solferino in addition to the other battle-fields, and at the spectacle of thousands of killed and wounded presented to his eyes, that his nerves could not bear it. Lady Cowley told me that he was so tenderhearted that he could not bear the sight of pain, much less being the cause of inflicting it, and she had seen him quite upset after visiting hospitals at the sufferings he had witnessed there, which of course are not to be compared with the horrible scene of a battle-field. It is impossible to say that this may not be true wholly or in part, it is impossible to account for human idiosyncrasies; but it is quite certain that the man who is said to shrink with horror from the sight of suffering does not scruple to inflict it in quite as bad a form when he does not himself witness the infliction. He has hundreds and thousands of people torn from their families, and without form of trial or the commission of any crime sends them to linger or perish in pestilential climates, when he fancies it his interest to do so, and for _their_ sufferings he evinces no pity or any nervous sensations.

_August 7th._--I have found it impossible to collect anything to record in this book for the last month almost. The session is drawing to a close, having glided on without difficulty for the Government, and almost without opposition. The Election Committees have made great havoc in Palmerston's small majority, having unseated no less than seven Liberal members. I am told, perhaps on no good authority, that Palmerston, John Russell, and Gladstone are anxious to join in a Congress to mix themselves up in the settlement of Italian affairs, but that they cannot have their way, the majority of the Cabinet being opposed to it, and the House of Commons and the country (as represented by the Press) being decidedly against any such interference.[1]

[Sidenote: THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.]