Chapter VII: Spread of Disaffection in May (3)

Just at the time when the services of a military commander were most needed in the regions of which Agra is the centre, and when it was necessary to be in constant communication with the governor-general and authorities, General Anson could not be heard of; he was supposed at Calcutta to be somewhere between Simla and Delhi; but dâks and telegraphs had been interfered with, and all remained in mystery as to his movements. Lawrence at Lucknow, Ponsonby at Benares, Wheeler at Cawnpore, Colvin at Agra, Hewett at Meerut, other commanders at Allahabad, Dinapoor, and elsewhere—all said in effect: ‘We can hold our own for a time, but not unless Delhi be speedily recaptured. Where is the commander-in-chief?’ Viscount Canning sent messages in rapid succession, during the second half of the month of May, entreating General Anson to bring all his power to bear on Delhi as quickly as possible. Duplicate telegrams were sent by different routes, in hopes that one at least might reach its destination safely; and every telegram told the same story—that British India was in peril so long as Delhi was not in British hands, safe from murderers and marauders. Major-general Sir Henry Barnard, military commander of the Umballa district, received telegraphic news on the 11th of May of the outrages at Meerut and Delhi; and immediately sent an aid-de-camp to gallop off with the information to General Anson at Simla, seventy or eighty miles distant. The commander-in-chief at once hastened from his retirement among the hills. Simla, as was noticed in a former page, is one of the sanataria for the English in India, spots where pure air and moderate temperature restore to the jaded body some of the strength, and to the equally jaded spirits some of the elasticity, which are so readily lost in the burning plains further south. The poorer class among the Europeans cannot afford the indulgence, for the cost is too great; but the principal servants of the Company often take advantage of this health-restoring and invigorating climate—where the average temperature of the year is not above 55° F. The question has been frequently discussed, and is not without cogency, whether the commander-in-chief acted rightly in remaining at that remote spot during the first twenty weeks in the year, when so many suspicious symptoms were observable among the native troops at Calcutta, Dumdum, Barrackpore, Berhampore, Lucknow, Meerut, and Umballa. He could know nothing of the occurrences at those places but what the telegraphic wires and the postal dâks told him; nevertheless, if they told him the truth, and _all_ the truth, it seems difficult to understand, unless illness paralysed his efforts, why he, the chief of the army, remained quiescent at a spot more than a thousand miles from Calcutta.

Startled by the news, the commander-in-chief quitted Simla, and hastened to Umballa, the nearest military station on the great Indian highway. It then became sensibly felt, both by Anson and Barnard, how insufficient were the appliances at their disposal. The magazines at Umballa were nearly empty of stores and ammunition; the reserve artillery-wagons were at Phillour, eighty miles away; the native infantry were in a very disaffected state; the European troops were at various distances from Umballa; the commissariat officers declared it to be almost impossible to move any body of troops, in the absence of necessary supplies for a column in the field; and the medical officers dwelt on the danger of marching troops in the hot season, and on the want of conveyance for sick and wounded. In short, almost everything was wanting, necessary for the operations of an army. The generals set to work, however; they ordered the 2d European Fusiliers to hasten from Subathoo to Umballa; the Nusseree Battalion to escort a siege-train and ammunition from Phillour to Umballa; six companies of the Sappers and Miners to proceed from Roorkee to Meerut; and the 4th Irregular Cavalry to hold themselves in readiness at Hansi. Anson at the same time issued the general order, already adverted to, inviting the native regiments to remain true to their allegiance, explaining the real facts concerning the cartridges, and reiterating the assurances of non-intervention with the religious and caste scruples of the men. On the 17th there were more than seven regiments of troops at Umballa—namely, the Queen’s 9th Lancers, the 4th Light Cavalry Lancers, the Queen’s 75th foot, the 1st and 2d European Fusiliers, the 5th and 60th native infantry, and two troops of European horse-artillery; but the European regiments were all far short of their full strength. Symptoms soon appeared that the 5th and 60th native infantry were not to be relied upon for fidelity; and General Anson thereupon strengthened his force at Umballa with such European regiments as were obtainable. He was nevertheless in great perplexity how to shape his course; for so many wires had been cut and so many dâks stopped, that he knew little of the progress of events around Delhi and Agra. Being new to India and Indian warfare, also, and having received his appointment to that high command rather through political connections than in reference to any experience derived from Asiatic campaigning, he was dependent on those around him for suggestions concerning the best mode of grappling with the difficulties that were presented. These suggestions, in all probability, were not quite harmonious; for it has long been known that, in circumstances of emergency, the civil and military officers of the Company, viewing occurrences under different aspects or from different points of view, often arrived at different estimates as to the malady to be remedied, and at different suggestions as to the remedy to be applied. At the critical time in question, however, all the officers, civil as well as military, assented to the conclusion that Delhi must be taken at any cost; and on the 21st of May, the first division of a small but well-composed force set out from Umballa on the road to Delhi. General Anson left on the 25th, and arrived on the 26th at Kurnaul, to be nearer the scene of active operations; but there death carried him off. He died of cholera on the next day, the 27th of May.

With a governor-general a thousand miles away, the chief officers at and near Kurnaul settled among themselves as best they could, according to the rules of the service, the distribution of duties, until official appointments could be made from Calcutta. Major-general Sir Henry Barnard became temporary commander, and Major-general Reid second under him. When the governor-general received this news, he sent for Sir Patrick Grant, a former experienced adjutant-general of the Bengal army, from Madras, to assume the office of commander-in-chief; but the officers at that time westward of Delhi—Barnard, Reid, Wilson, and others—had still the responsibility of battling with the rebels. Sir Henry Barnard, as temporary chief, took charge of the expedition to Delhi—with what results will be shewn in the proper place.

The regions lying west, northwest, and southwest of Delhi have this peculiarity, that they are of easier access from Bombay or from Kurachee than from Calcutta. Out of this rose an important circumstance in connection with the Revolt—namely, the practicability of the employment of the Bombay native army to confront the mutinous regiments belonging to that of Bengal. It is difficult to overrate the value of the difference between the two armies. Had they been formed of like materials, organised on a like system, and officered in a like ratio, the probability is that the mutiny would have been greatly increased in extent—the same motives, be they reasonable or unreasonable, being alike applicable to both armies. Of the degree to which the Bombay regiments shewed fidelity, while those of Bengal unfurled the banner of rebellion, there will be frequent occasions to speak in future pages. The subject is only mentioned here to explain why the western parts of India are not treated in the present chapter. There were, it is true, disturbances at Neemuch and Nuseerabad, and at various places in Rajpootana, the Punjaub, and Sinde; but these will better be treated in later pages, in connection rather with Bombay than with Calcutta as head-quarters. Enough has been said to shew over how wide an area the taint of disaffection spread during the month of May—to break out into something much more terrible in the next following month.

Notes.

_Indian Railways._—An interesting question presents itself, in
connection with the subject of the present chapter—Whether the
Revolt would have been _possible_ had the railways been completed?
The rebels, it is true, might have forced up or dislocated the
rails, or might have tampered with the locomotives. They might, on
the other hand, if powerfully concentrated, have used the railways
for their own purposes, and thus made them am auxiliary to
rebellion. Nevertheless, the balance of probability is in favour of
the government—that is, the government would have derived more
advantage than the insurgents from the existence of railways between
the great towns of India. The difficulties, so great as to be almost
insuperable, in transporting troops from one place to another, have
been amply illustrated in this and the preceding chapters; we have
seen how dâk and palanquin bearers, bullocks and elephants, ekahs
and wagons, Ganges steamers and native boats, were brought into
requisition, and how painfully slow was the progress made. The 121
miles of railway from Calcutta to Raneegunge were found so useful,
in enabling the English soldiers to pass swiftly over the first part
of their journey, that there can hardly be a doubt of the important
results which would have followed an extension of the system. Even
if a less favourable view be taken in relation to Bengal and the
Northwest Provinces, the advantages would unquestionably have been
on the side of the government in the Bombay and Madras presidencies,
where disaffection was shewn only in a very slight degree; a few
days would have sufficed to send troops from the south of India by
rail, _viâ_ Bombay and Jubbulpoor to Mirzapore, in the immediate
vicinity of the regions where their services were most needed.

Although the Raneegunge branch of the East Indian Railway was the
only portion open in the north of India, there was a section of the
main line between Allahabad and Cawnpore nearly finished at the time
of the outbreak. This main line will nearly follow the course of the
Ganges, from Calcutta up to Allahabad; it will then pass through the
Doab, between the Ganges and the Jumna, to Agra; it will follow the
Jumna from Agra up to Delhi; and will then strike off northwestward
to Lahore—to be continued at some future time through the Punjaub to
Peshawur. During the summer of 1857, the East India Company
prepared, at the request of parliament, an exact enumeration of the
various railways for which engineering plans had been adopted, and
for the share-capital of which a minimum rate of interest had been
guaranteed by the government. The document gives the particulars of
about 3700 miles of railway in India; estimated to cost £30,231,000;
and for which a dividend is guaranteed to the extent of £20,314,000,
at a rate varying from 4½ to 5 per cent. The government also gives
the land, estimated to be worth about a million sterling. All the
works of construction are planned on a principle of solidity, not
cheapness; for it is expected they will all be remunerative.
Arrangements are everywhere made for a double line of rails—a single
line being alone laid down until the traffic is developed. The gauge
is nine inches wider than the ‘narrow gauge’ of English railways.
The estimated average cost is under £9000 per mile, about one-fourth
of the English average.

Leaving out of view, as an element impossible to be correctly
calculated, the amount of delay arising from the Revolt, the
government named the periods at which the several sections of
railway would probably be finished. Instead of shewing the
particular portions belonging respectively to the five railway
companies—the East Indian, the Great Indian Peninsula, the Bombay
and Central India, the Sinde, and the Madras—we shall simply arrange
the railways into two groups, north and south, and throw a few of
the particulars into a tabulated form.

NORTHERN INDIA.

_Railways._ _Lengths._ _Probable Time of Opening._
Miles.
Calcutta to 121 Opened in 1855.
Raneegunge,
Burdwan to 130 December 1859.
Rajmahal,
Rajmahal to 440 1860.
Allahabad,
Allahabad to 126 December 1857.
Cawnpore,
Cawnpore to Delhi, 260 October 1858 (excepting bridge at Agra
over the Jumna).
Mirzapore to 300 No date specified.
Jubbulpoor,
Jubbulpoor to 314 End of 1861.
Bhosawal,
Bhosawal to 125 December 1860.
Oomrawuttee,
Oomrawuttee to 138 March 1861.
Nagpoor,
Bhosawal to 241 October 1859.
Callian,
Callian to Bombay, 33 Opened in 1854.
Surat to 160 1858 and 1859.
Ahmedabad,
Kurachee to 120 October 1859.
Hydrabad,

SOUTHERN INDIA.

Bombay to Poonah, 124 February 1858.
Poonah to 165 1860.
Sholapore,
Sholapore to 101 End of 1861.
Kistnah,
Kistnah to Madras, 310 1861 and 1862.
Madras to Arcot, 65 Opened in 1856.
Arcot to 60 January 1858.
Variembaddy,
Madras to Beypore, 430 March 1859.

The plans for an Oude railway were drawn up, comprising three or
four lines radiating from Lucknow; but the project had not, at that
time, assumed a definite form.

* * * * *

_’Headman’ of a Village._—It frequently happened, in connection with
the events recorded in the present chapter, that the _headman_ of a
village either joined the mutineers against the British, or assisted
the latter in quelling the disturbances; according to the bias of
his inclination, or the view he took of his own interests. The
general nature of the village-system in India requires to be
understood before the significancy of the headman’s position can be
appreciated. Before the British entered India, private property in
land was unknown; the whole was considered to belong to the
sovereign. The country was divided, by the Mohammedan rulers, into
small holdings, cultivated each by a village community under a
headman; for which a rent was paid. For convenience of collecting
this rent or revenue, _zemindars_ were appointed, who either farmed
the revenues, or acted simply as agents for the ruling power. When
the Marquis of Cornwallis, as governor-general, made great changes
in the government of British India half a century ago, he modified,
among other matters, the zemindary; but the collection of revenue
remained.

Whether, as some think, villages were thus formed by the early
conquerors; or whether they were natural combinations of men for
mutual advantage—certain it is that the village-system in the plains
of Northern India was made dependent in a large degree on the
peculiar institution of caste. ‘To each man in a Hindoo village were
appointed particular duties which were exclusively his, and which
were in general transmitted to his descendants. The whole community
became one family, which lived together and prospered on their
public lands; whilst the private advantage of each particular member
was scarcely determinable. It became, then, the fairest as well as
the least troublesome method of collecting the revenue to assess the
whole village at a certain sum, agreed upon by the _tehsildar_
(native revenue collector) and the headman. This was exacted from
the latter, who, seated on the chabootra, in conjunction with the
chief men of the village, managed its affairs, and decided upon the
quota of each individual member. By this means, the exclusive
character of each village was further increased, until they have
become throughout nearly the whole of the Indian peninsula, little
republics; supplied, owing to the regulations of caste, with
artisans of nearly every craft, and almost independent of any
foreign relations.’[15]

Not only is the headman’s position and duties defined; but the whole
village may be said to be socially organised and parcelled out by
the singular operation of the caste principle. Each village manages
its internal affairs; taxes itself to provide funds for internal
expenses, as well as the revenue due to the state; decides disputes
in the first instance; and punishes minor offences. Officers are
selected for all these duties; and there is thus a local government
within the greater government of the paramount state. One man is the
scribe of the village; another, the constable or policeman; a third,
the schoolmaster; a fourth, the doctor; a fifth, the astrologer and
exorciser; and so of the musician, the carpenter, the smith, the
worker in gold or jewels, the tailor, the worker in leather, the
potter, the washerman—each considers that he has a prescriptive
right to the work in his branch done within the village, and to the
payment for that work; and each member of his family participates in
this prescriptive right. This village-system is so interwoven with
the habits and customs of the Hindoos, that it outlives all changes
going on around. Sir T. Metcalfe, who knew India well, said:
‘Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds to
revolution; Hindoo, Patan, Mogul, Mahratta, Sikh, English, are all
masters in turn; but the village community remains the same. In
times of trouble they arm and fortify themselves. If a hostile army
passes through the country, the village communities collect their
cattle within their walls, and let the enemy pass unprovoked. If
plunder and devastation be directed against themselves, and the
force employed be irresistible, they flee to friendly villages at a
distance; but when the storm has passed over, they return and resume
their occupations. If a country remain for a series of years the
scene of continued pillage and massacre, so that the village cannot
be inhabited, the scattered villages nevertheless return whenever
the power of peaceable possession revives. A generation may pass
away, but the succeeding generation will return. The sons will take
the places of their fathers; the same site for their village, the
same positions for the houses, the same lands will be reoccupied by
the descendants of those who were driven out when the village was
depopulated; and it is not a trifling matter that will drive them
out, for they will often maintain their post through times of
disturbance and convulsion, and acquire strength sufficient to
resist pillage and oppression with success. This union of the
village communities, each one forming a separate little state in
itself, has, I conceive, contributed more than any other cause to
the preservation of the people of India through all the revolutions
and changes which they have suffered.’[16]

It is easily comprehensible how, in village communities thus
compactly organised, the course of proceeding adopted by the headman
in any public exigency becomes of much importance; since it may be a
sort of official manifestation of the tendencies of the villagers
generally.

Palanquin.
]

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Footnote 13:

The initials N. I., B. N. I., M. N. I., &c., are frequently used in
official documents as abbreviations of ‘Native Infantry,’ ‘Bengal
Native Infantry,’ ‘Madras Native Infantry,’ &c.

Footnote 14:

Viscount Canning, in a letter written on the 7th of June to Lieutenant
do Kantzow, said: ‘I have read the account of your conduct with an
admiration and respect I cannot adequately describe. Young in years,
and at the outset of your career, you have given to your
brother-soldiers a noble example of courage, patience, good judgment,
and temper, from which many may profit. I beg you to believe that it
will never be forgotten by me. I write this at once, that there may be
no delay in making known to you that your conduct has not been
overlooked. You will, of course, receive a more formal acknowledgment,
through the military department of the government, of your admirable
service.’

Footnote 15:

Irving: _Theory and Practice of Caste_.

Parade-ground, Cawnpore.
]