Chapter XXIX: Progress of Events in May (3)

‘5. That although the overland route may be advantageously employed
in times of emergency, it would not be advisable that it should be
relied upon as the ordinary route for the transmission of troops to
India.

‘6. That if steamers had been used in greater numbers, the
reinforcements would have reached India more quickly than they did
by sailing-vessels; but that no evidence has been laid before the
committee to shew that, at the time the emergency arose, a greater
amount of steam-transport was attainable; whilst it has been shewn
that grave doubts existed whether the supply of coal on the route
would have been sufficient for a larger number of steam-vessels than
were actually employed.

‘7. That steamers should for the future be always made use of, as
far as possible, in urgent cases; but that, for the transmission of
the ordinary reliefs, the committee would not recommend the adoption
of so costly a mode of transport.

‘8. That the governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius gave early and
valuable assistance to the government of India, and deserve great
praise for the zeal and promptitude with which they acted; that the
governor of the Cape, without loss of time, forwarded treasure and
horses, together with a portion of the troops at his disposal, but
that he did not send the whole amount of the force which he was
instructed by the home government to transmit to India; that the
committee have not the means of judging whether the circumstances of
the colony did or did not justify Sir George Grey in taking this
course.

‘9. That the committee observe with satisfaction that the people of
Canada displayed great readiness to afford assistance to the
mother-country, and that the committee are of opinion that it is
highly desirable to give every encouragement to such demonstrations
of loyalty on the part of the colonies.

‘10. That on the whole, considering the suddenness of the danger,
and the distance to which the troops were to be sent, the committee
are of opinion that great credit is due to the Court of Directors of
the East India Company for the promptitude and efficiency with which
they discharged the difficult task of transmitting reinforcements to
the army in India during the past year.’

From the tenor of this report, it is evident that the East India
directors were ready to adopt the overland route before the
government gave in their adhesion. The ‘political reasons’ for
avoiding that route were connected with the relations between Egypt
and various European countries: relations often involving jealousy
and diplomatic intrigue, and likely to be thrown into some
perplexity by the passage of troops belonging to another nation. The
ministers were unwilling to speak out plainly on this point,
possibly for fear of giving offence to France; and the committee,
though sorely against the wish of some of its members, refrained
from pressing them on this point; hence the cautious phraseology of
the report, throwing a sort of shield over the government.

In reference to the proceedings connected with the transport of
troops to India, it may be well to advert to a few dates. The home
government received, on the 9th of April, the first intimation that
a disaffected spirit had made its appearance among the native troops
at Barrackpore. On the 19th of May, Lord Ellenborough inquired in
the House of Lords whether reinforcements were being sent to India;
a reply in the affirmative was given, accompanied by an expression
of opinion that the disaffection was of very minor character.
Shortly afterwards, in the House of Commons, a similar belief was
expressed by members of the government that the occurrences at
Barrackpore were trifling, not likely to lead to serious results. At
that period, as we have already seen,[175] the Bengal presidency,
including the vast range of territory from Pegu to Peshawur,
contained about 23,000 European troops and 119,000 native; the
Madras presidency, 10,000 European and 50,000 native; the Bombay
presidency, 5000 European and 31,000 native—making a total of about
38,000 Company’s and Queen’s European troops, and 200,000 native.
These, the actual numbers, were exclusive of the large brigades of
the Bombay army at that time engaged in, or not yet returned from,
the Persian expedition. During May, the government and the East
India directors decided that more European troops ought to be in
India, in consideration both of the condition of India itself, and
of the incidence of war in Persia and China; and the early dispatch
of four regiments was decided on. At length, on the 27th of June,
arrived a telegram announcing the revolt at Meerut and the seizure
of Delhi by the mutineers. While Lord Elgin on the way to China,
Lord Harris at Madras, Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, Sir Henry Ward at
Ceylon, Sir James Higginson at Mauritius, and Sir George Grey at the
Cape of Good Hope, were using their best exertions to send troops to
aid Viscount Canning, the home authorities considered what best
could be done in furnishing reinforcements from England. There were
no less than 13,000 troops at the Cape of Good Hope at that time,
including ten regiments of Queen’s infantry; it was fully believed
in England that the governor might well have spared the greater
portion of these troops; and the smallness of the number really
contributed by him led to much disappointment in India, and much
adverse criticism in England.

When the authorities at the War-office commenced their arrangements
for despatching troops to India, they had to provide for a
sea-voyage of about fourteen thousand miles. A question arose
whether, without changing the route or shortening the distance, the
duration of the voyage might not be lessened by the employment of
steam-vessels instead of sailing-ships. The Admiralty, and most
members of the government, opposed this change on various grounds,
principally in relation to difficulties in the supply of fuel, but
partly in relation to monsoons and other winds. By the 10th of July,
out of 31 vessels chartered by the government and the Company for
conveying troops to India, nearly all were sailing-ships. A change
of feeling took place about that date; the nation estimated time to
be so valuable, that the authorities were almost coerced into the
chartering of some of the noble merchant-steamers, the rapid voyages
of which were already known. Between the 10th of July and the 1st of
December, 59 ships were chartered, of which 29 were screw-steamers.
The autumnal averages of passages to India were greatly in favour of
steamers. Within a certain number of weeks there were 62 troop-laden
ships despatched from England to one or other of the ports,
Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Kurachee; the average duration of all the
voyages was 120 days by sailing-vessels, and only 83 days by
steamers—a diminution of nearly one-third. Extending the list of
ships to a later date, so as to include a greater number, it was
found that 82 ships carried 30,378 troops from the United Kingdom to
India—thus divided: 66 sailing-ships carried 16,234 men, averaging
299 each; 27 steamers carried 14,144, averaging 522 each. It was
calculated that 14,000 of these British soldiers arrived in India
_five weeks earlier_, by the adoption of steam instead of
sailing-vessels. It is impossible to estimate what amount of change
might have been produced in the aspect of Indian affairs, had these
steam-voyages been made in the summer rather than in the autumn; it
might not have been permitted to the mutineers to rule triumphant at
Lucknow till the spring of the following year, or the fidelity of
wavering chieftains to give way under the long continuance of the
struggle.

Besides the two inquiries concerning the promptness with which
troops were sent, and the kind of vessels employed to convey them,
there was a third relating to the route adopted. From the earliest
news of the revolt at Meerut, many persons in and out of parliament
strenuously recommended the use of the overland route, as being much
shorter than any possible ocean-route. The Court of Directors viewed
this proposal more favourably than the government. Until the month
of September, ‘political difficulties’ were dimly hinted at by
ministers, but without any candid explanations; and as the
objections gave way in the month just named, the nation arrived at a
pretty general conclusion that these difficulties had never been of
a very insurmountable character. It is only fair to state, however,
that many experienced men viewed the overland route with distrust,
independently of any political considerations. They adverted to the
incompleteness of the railway arrangements between Alexandria and
Cairo; to the difficulty of troops marching or riding over the sandy
desert from Cairo to Suez; to the wretchedness of Suez as a place of
re-embarkation; and to the unhealthiness of a voyage down the Red
Sea in hot summer weather. Nevertheless, it was an important fact
that the East India directors, most of whom possessed personal
knowledge concerning the routes to India, urged the government from
the first to send at least a portion of the troops by the Suez
route. It was not until the 19th of September that assent was given;
and the 13th of October witnessed the arrival of the first
detachment of English troops into the Indian Ocean _viâ_ Suez. These
started from Malta on the 1st of the month. On the 2d of October,
the first regiment started from England direct, to take the overland
route to India. The Peninsular and Oriental Steam-navigation
Company, having practically almost a monopoly of the Suez route,
conveyed the greater portion of the troops sent in this way; and it
may be useful to note the length of journey in the principal
instances. The following are tabulated examples giving certain
items—such as, the name of the steamer, the date of leaving England,
the number of troops conveyed, and the time of reaching Alexandria,
to commence the overland portion of the journey:

Steamer. Left England. No. of Days to
Troops. Alexandria.
_Sultan_, 1857. Oct. 2 248 13 days.
_Dutchman_, Oct. 14 256 17 days.
_Sultan_, Nov. 17 264 14 days.
_Euxine_, Dec. 2 236 15 days.
_Indus_, Dec. 4 83 14 days.
_Abeona_, Dec. 8 861 15 days.
_Pera_, 1858. Feb. 4 231 15 days.
_Ripon_, Feb. 11 242 15 days.
_Sultan_, Feb. 24 244 13 days.
_Malabar_, Mar. 11 264 14 days.
_Ripon_, Mar. 27 420 14 days.
_Benares_, Apr. 8 607 17 days.

Thus the voyage was made on an average in about 14½ days, from the
shores of England to those of Egypt. The landing at Alexandria, the
railway journey to Cairo, the journey by vans and donkeys across the
desert, the short detention at Suez, and the embarkation in another
steamer at that port, occupied a number of days varying from 2 to
17—depending chiefly on the circumstance whether or not a steamer
was ready at Suez to receive the troops when they arrived from
Alexandria; the average was about 5½ days. From Suez the voyages
were made to Kurachee, Bombay, Ceylon, Madras, or Calcutta. The
steamers took forward all the troops mentioned in the above list, as
well as others which reached Alexandria by other means. Most of
these troops were landed at Bombay or Kurachee, as being nearer than
Calcutta; and the average length of voyage was just 16 days. The
result, then, presented was this:

England to Alexandria, 14½ days’ average.
Alexandria to Suez, 5½ days’ average.
Suez to India, 16 days’ average.
———
36 days’ average.

Those which went to Calcutta instead of Bombay or Kurachee, were
about 3 days longer. Comparing these figures with those before
given, we arrive at the following remarkable conclusion:

Sailing-ships round Cape, 120 days’ average.
Steamers round Cape, 83 days’ average.
Suez route, 36 days’ average.

This, as a question of time, triumphantly justified all that had
been said by the advocates of the shortest route; nor did it appear
that there were any counterbalancing disadvantages experienced.
Between the 6th of November 1857, and the 18th of May 1858, more
than 5000 officers and soldiers landed in India, who had travelled
by the Suez overland route from England.

-----

Footnote 171:

‘With the concurrence of the government, the commander-in-chief is
pleased to direct that white clothing shall be discontinued in the
European regiments of the Honourable Company’s army; and that for the
future the summer-clothing of the European soldiers shall consist of
two suits of “khakee,” corresponding in pattern and material with the
clothing recently sanctioned for the royal army of England. Corps are
to be permitted to wear out serviceable summer-clothing of the old
pattern now in use; but in regiments in which this clothing requires
to be renewed, the new pattern now established is to be introduced
without delay. Commanding officers will take steps to obtain patterns
from regiments of her Majesty’s service. A complete suit, including
cap-cover, should not exceed in cost 4-12 rupees. The summer-clothing
now authorised will be supplied from the clothing agency of the
presidency to all recruits of the Company’s service arriving at
Calcutta between 1st February and 1st October, to be issued with the
least possible delay after arrival of the recruits.’

Footnote 172:

_Cavalry._—_1st Brigade_, under Brigadier Jones (6th Dragoon Guards).
Head-quarters and two squadrons 6th Dragoon Guards, under Captain
Bickerstaff; Captain Lind’s Moultanee horse. _2d Brigade_, under
Brigadier Hagart (7th Hussars). Her Majesty’s 9th Lancers, under Major
Coles; 2d Punjaub cavalry, under Major S. Browne; detachments of
Lahore light horse, 1st Punjaub cavalry, 5th Punjaub cavalry, and 17th
irregular cavalry.

_Artillery._—Under Lieutenant-colonel Brind, C.B., B.A.;
Lieutenant-colonel Tombs’s troop, B.H.A.; Lieutenant-colonel
Remington’s troop, B.H.A.; Major Hammond’s light field-battery, B.A.,
four guns; two heavy field-batteries. Captain Francis, B.A.;
siege-train with Major Le Mesurier’s company, B.A., under Captain
Cookworthy’s detachment, B.A.; detachment R.E. Bengal and Punjaub;
Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant-colonel Harness, R.E.,
chief-engineer to the force.

_Infantry._—_Highland Brigade_, under Lieutenant-colonel Leith Hay,
C.B. (her Majesty’s 92d Highlanders). Her Majesty’s 42d Highlanders,
under Lieutenant-colonel Cameron; her Majesty’s 79th Highlanders,
under Lieutenant-colonel Taylor, C.B.; her Majesty’s 93d Highlanders,
under Lieutenant-colonel Ross; 4th Punjaub Rifles, Lieutenant M’Queen;
Belooch Battalion, Captain Beville. _Brigadier Stisted’s_ (70th)
_Brigade_. Seven companies her Majesty’s 64th foot, Lieutenant-colonel
Bingham, C.B.; her Majesty’s 78th Highlanders, Colonel Hamilton; 4
companies her Majesty’s 82 foot, Colonel the Hon. P. Herbert, C.B.; 2d
Punjaub infantry, Lieutenant-colonel Greene; 22d Punjaub infantry,
Captain Stafford.

Footnote 173:

‘The commander-in-chief has received the most gracious commands of her
Majesty the Queen to communicate to the army an expression of the deep
interest felt by the Queen in the exertions of the troops, and the
successful progress of the campaign.

‘Sir Colin Campbell has delayed giving execution to the royal command,
until he was able to announce to the army that the last stronghold of
rebellion had fallen before the persevering attempts of the troops of
her Majesty and the Hon. East India Company.

‘It is impossible for the commander-in-chief to express adequately his
sense of the high honour done to him in having been chosen by the
Queen to convey her Majesty’s most gracious acknowledgments to the
army, in the ranks of which he has passed his life.

‘The commander-in-chief ventures to quote the very words of the Queen:

‘“That so many gallant, brave, and distinguished men, beginning with
one whose name will ever be remembered with pride, Brigadier-general
Havelock, should have died and fallen, is a great grief to the Queen.
To all Europeans and native troops who have fought so nobly and so
gallantly—and amongst whom the Queen is rejoiced to see the 93d—the
Queen wishes Sir Colin to convey the expression of her great
admiration and gratitude.”’

Footnote 174:

See Chap. viii., p. 138.

Footnote 175:

Chapter xii., p. 208.

SIR HUGH ROSE.
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