Chapter XIII: Preparations: Calcutta and London (2)

Such was the state of the European element in the Indian army at, and some time before, the commencement of the mutiny. It was on the 27th of June, we have said, that the bad news from Meerut reached London. Two days afterwards, the Court of Directors ordered officers at home on furlough or sick-leave to return to their regiments forthwith, so far as health would permit. They also made a requisition to the government for four full regiments of infantry, in addition to those already decided on; to be returned, or replaced by other four, when the mutiny should be ended. On the 1st of July—shewing thereby the importance attached to the subject—the government announced, not only its acquiescence in the demand, but the numbers or designations of the regiments marked out—namely, the 19th, 38th, and 79th foot, and the 1st battalion of the 1st foot. It was also agreed to that the four regiments intended to have been relieved—namely, the 10th and 29th foot, and the 9th and 14th Dragoons—should _not_ be relieved at present, but that, on the contrary, drafts should go out to reinforce them. Another mail arrived, making known further disasters; whereupon the directors on the 14th of July made another application to government for _six_ more regiments of infantry, and eight companies of royal artillery—the artillerymen to be sent out from England, the horses from the Cape of Good Hope, and the guns and ammunition to be provided in India itself. Two days afterwards—so urgent did the necessity appear—the government named the six regiments which should be sent out in compliance with this requisition—namely, the 20th, 34th, 42d, 54th, and 97th foot, and the 2d battalion of the Rifle Brigade; together with two troops of horse-artillery, and six companies of royal (foot) artillery.

Summing up all these arrangements, therefore, we find the following result: Two regiments of royal infantry—7th Fusiliers and 88th foot—were to go to India, to replace two borrowed or withdrawn from the Company in 1854; two others—the 90th foot and the 3d battalion of the Rifle Brigade—to relieve the 10th and 29th foot, and two regiments of cavalry—the 2d and 3d Dragoons—to relieve the 9th Lancers and 14th Dragoons, but the four relieved regiments not to return till the mutiny should be quelled; four regiments of infantry—the 19th, 38th, and 79th foot, and the 1st battalion of the 1st foot—to go out in consequence of the bad news received from India at the end of June; six regiments of infantry—the 20th, 34th, 42d, 54th, 97th, and 2d battalion of the Rifle Brigade—together with several troops and companies of artillery, were to go out in consequence of the still more disastrous news received in the middle of July; drafts were to go out to bring up to the full strength the whole of the Queen’s regiments in India; and, lastly, recruits were to go out, to bring up to the full complement the whole of the European regiments belonging to the Company. These various augmentations to the strength of armed Europeans in India amounted to little less than twenty-four thousand men, all placed under orders by the middle of July.

Various discussions bearing on the military arrangements for India, took place in the two houses of parliament. Lord Ellenborough frequently recommended the embodiment of the militia and the calling out of the yeomanry, in order that England might not be left defenceless by sending a very strong royal army to India. The Earl of Hardwicke suggested that all the troops at Aldershott camp, about sixteen thousand in number, should at once be sent off to India. These, and other members of both Houses, insisted on the perilous position of India; whereas the ministers, in their speeches if not in their proceedings, treated the mutiny as of no very serious importance. Differences of opinion existed to a most remarkable extent; but the president of the Board of Control, Mr Vernon Smith, subjected himself at a later period to very severe criticism, on account of the boldness of the assertions made, or the extent of the ignorance displayed, in the earlier stages of the mutiny. When the news from Meerut and Delhi arrived, he said in the House of Commons: ‘I hope that the House will not be carried away by any notion that we exaggerate the danger because we have determined upon sending out these troops. It is a measure of security alone with respect to the danger to be apprehended. I cannot agree with the right honourable gentleman (Mr Disraeli) that our Indian empire is imperiled by the present disaster. I say that our Indian empire is _not_ imperiled; and I hope that in a short time the disaster, dismal as it is, will be effectually suppressed _by the force already in that country_.... Luckily the outrage has taken place at Delhi; because it is notorious that that place _may be easily surrounded_; so that if we could not reduce it by force, we could by famine.... Unfortunately, the mail left on the 28th of May; and I cannot, therefore, apprise the House that the fort of Delhi has been razed to the ground; but I hope that ample retribution has by this time been inflicted on the mutineers.’ That other persons, military as well as civil, felt the mutiny to be a wholly unexpected phenomenon, is true; but this minister obviously erred by his positive assertions; his idea of ‘easily surrounding’ a walled city seven miles in circuit was preposterous; and there was displayed an unpardonable ignorance of the state of the armies in that country in the further assertion that ‘there are troops in India equal to _any_ emergency.’

A question of singular interest and of great importance arose—how should the reinforcements of troops be sent to India? But before entering on this, it will be well to notice the arrangements made for providing a commander for them when they should reach their destination. As soon as it was known in London, early in July, that General Anson was dead, the government appointed Sir Colin Campbell as his successor. The provisional appointment of Sir Patrick Grant as commander of the forces in India was approved as a judicious step on the part of the Calcutta government; but, rightly or wrongly, the permanent appointment to that high office had come to be considered a ministerial privilege in London; and thus Sir Colin was sent out to supersede Sir Patrick. Fortunately, the general selected carried with him the trust and admiration of all parties. For a time, it is true, there was a disposition to foster a Campbell party and a Grant party among newspaper writers. One would contend that Sir Colin, though a brave and good soldier, and without a superior in command of a brigade, had nevertheless been without opportunity of shewing those powers of combination necessary for the suppression of a wide-spread mutiny, perhaps the reconquest of an immense empire; whereas Sir Patrick was just the man for the occasion, possessing the very experience, temper, and other qualities for dealing with the native soldiers. On the other hand, it was contended that Campbell was something more than a mere general of brigade, having successfully commanded masses of troops equal in extent to armies during the Punjaub war; whereas Grant, being by professional education and military sympathies a Bengal officer—although afterwards commander at Madras—had imbibed that general leaning towards the sepoys which rendered such officers unfit to deal sternly with them in time of disaffection. Happily, this controversy soon came to an end; Sir Colin was pronounced by the public verdict to be the right man, without any disparagement to Sir Patrick; and it was judiciously suggested by the Earl of Ellenborough that the last-named general might, with great advantage to the state, be made a military member of the supreme council at Calcutta, to advise the governor-general on army and military subjects. The nation recognised in Sir Colin the soldierly promptness which had distinguished Wellington and Napier, and which he illustrated in the following way: On the morning of Saturday the 11th of July, the news of General Anson’s death reached London; at two o’clock on the same day a cabinet council was held; immediately after the council an interview took place between the minister of war and the commander of the forces; consequent on this interview, Sir Colin Campbell was offered the post of commander-in-chief in India; he accepted it; he was asked how soon he could take his departure; his reply was ‘To-morrow;’ and, true to his word, he left England on the Sunday evening—taking very little with him but the clothes on his back. Men felt that there would be no unnecessary amount of ‘circumlocution’ in the proceedings of such a general—a veteran who had been an officer in the army forty-nine years; and who, during that long period, had served in the Walcheren expedition; then in the Peninsular battles and sieges of Vimieira, Corunna, Barossa, Vitoria, San Sebastian, and Bidassoa; then in North America; then in the West Indies; then in the first Chinese war; then in the second Sikh war; and lastly in the Crimea.

Sir Colin Campbell, as a passenger remarkably free from luggage and baggage of every kind, was able to take advantage of the quickest route to India—by rail to Folkestone, steam to Boulogne, rail to Marseille, steam to Alexandria, rail and other means to Suez, and thence steam to Calcutta. Whether the troops could take advantage of this or any other kind of _swift_ conveyance, was a question whereon public authorities and public advisers soon found themselves at variance. There were four projects—to proceed through France to Alexandria and Suez; to reach Alexandria by sea from Southampton; to steam from England to Calcutta round the Cape of Good Hope; and to take this last-named route by sailing-ships instead of steamers. A few words may usefully be said on each of these four plans.

As the overland route through France is the quickest, some advisers urged that it would therefore be the best; but this was by no means a necessary inference. It would require an immense amount of changing and shifting. Thrice would the men of the various regiments have to enter railway-trains—at London or some other English station, at Boulogne, and at Alexandria—perhaps also a fourth time at Paris; thrice would they have to leave railway-trains—at Folkestone, at Marseille, and at Cairo or some other place in Egypt; thrice would they have to embark in steamers—at Folkestone, at Marseille, and at Suez; and thrice would they have to disembark—at Boulogne, at Alexandria, and at Calcutta. The difficulties incidental to these many changes would be very great, although of course not insuperable. There would, in addition, be involved a delicate international question touching the passage of large bodies of troops through the territories of another sovereign. The Emperor of France, at a time of friendly alliance, would possibly have given the requisite permission; but other considerations would also have weight; and it is, on the whole, not surprising that the route through France was left unattempted.

It does not follow, however, from difficulties in the French route, that the sea-route to Alexandria would be unavailable; on the contrary, that mode of transit found many advocates. The distance from Southampton to Alexandria is about three thousand miles; and this distance could obviously be traversed, in a number of days easy of estimate, by a steamer requiring no transhipment of cargo. Another steamer would make the voyage from Suez to Calcutta; and an overland passage through Egypt would complete the route. This is a much shorter route to Calcutta than that _viâ_ the Cape of Good Hope, in the ratio of about eight thousand miles to twelve thousand; it is adopted for the heavy portion of the India mail; and many persons thought it might well be adopted also for the transmission of troops. The ministers in parliament, however, explained their reasons for objecting to this route. These objections referred principally to steamers and coal, of which there were no more in the Indian seas than were necessary for the mail service. The matter was argued thus: The first mail from England, after the news of the mutiny, left on the 10th of July; it would reach Bombay about the 10th of August; a return mail would start from Bombay on the 16th of August, describing the arrangements made for receiving at Suez any troops sent by the Egyptian route; that letter would reach London about the 16th of September; and if troops were sent off immediately, with everything prepared, they could not have reached India till towards the end of October—four months after the receipt of the first disastrous news from Meerut. A vessel by the Cape route, if sent off _at once_, would reach as soon. This argument depended wholly on the assumption that it would be necessary to spend three months in sending and receiving messages, before the troops could safely be started off from Southampton to Alexandria. Some of those who differed from the government on this point admitted that only a small number of troops could be conveyed by this route, owing to the unfinished state of the land-conveyance from Alexandria to Suez.[37] The thirty miles of sandy desert to be traversed, either by marching or in vehicles, would necessarily entail much difficulty and confusion if the number of troops were large, especially as neither the isthmus nor its railway belonged to England. Then, again, there are questions concerning calms, storms, monsoons, trade-winds, shoals, and coral reefs, which were warmly discussed by the advocates of different systems; some of whom contended that the Red Sea cannot safely be depended on by ship-loads of troops during the second half of the year; while others argued that the dangers of the route are very slight. On the one side, it was represented that, by adopting the Suez route, there would be many changes in the modes of travel, many sources of confusion wherever those changes were made, many uncertainties whether there would be steamers ready at Suez, many doubts about the supply of coal at Aden and elsewhere, many perils of wreck in and near the Red Sea, much deterioration of health to the troops during the hot weather in that region, and much embarrassment felt by Viscount Canning if the troops came to him faster than he could transfer them up the country. Certain of these government doubts were afterwards admitted to be well founded; others were shewn to be erroneous; and though a few regiments were sent by the Suez route later in the year, it became pretty generally admitted, that if only one or two regiments had taken that route _early in July_, the benefit to India would have been very great, and the difficulties not more than might have been easily conquered.

Next for consideration was the Cape route. Those who admitted that the overland journey was suited only for a _small_ body of troops, and not for an army of thirty thousand men, had yet to settle whether sailing-ships or steamers were best fitted for this service. In some quarters it was urged: ‘Employ our screw war-steamers; we are at peace in Europe, and can send our soldiers quickly by this means to India, without the expense of chartering steamers belonging to companies or private persons. If sufficient bounties are offered, in one week we could obtain seamen enough to man twenty war-steamers. Take the main and lower-deck guns out of the ships; place fifteen hundred troops in each of the large screw line-of-battle ships; and man each ship with half the war complement, the soldiers themselves serving as marines.’ To this it was replied that line-of-battle ships would be dearer rather than cheaper than chartered vessels, because they could not lessen the charge by back-cargoes. Sir Charles Napier contended, moreover, that screw war-steamers could not be fitted out as troop-ships in less than three months after the order was given; and that great difficulty would be found in raising men for them. The government was influenced by these or similar considerations; for no troops were sent out in war-vessels—possibly owing to a prudential wish to keep all war-ships ready for warlike exigencies.

There remained, lastly, the question whether, the Cape route being adopted, it would be better to hire steam-ships or sailing-ships for conveying troops to India. Eager inquiries on this question were made in parliament soon after the news of the outbreak arrived. The ministers, in reference to the superiority of steamers over sailing-ships, stated that, from the difficulty in procuring steamers of the requisite kind, and the delay caused by the number of intermediate points at which they would have to touch for coal, steamers would probably not reach the Indian ports more quickly than sailing-ships. Lord Ellenborough admitted that, when he was in India, sailing-vessels were found better than steamers for India voyages in the autumnal half of the year; but this left untouched the important improvements effected in steam-navigation during the intervening period of fourteen years. The battle was much contested. Sir Charles Wood, First Lord of the Admiralty, pointed out that fast sailing-ships often went from England to Calcutta in 90 to 100 days; that auxiliary screws had been known to take from 90 to 120 days; and therefore that we were not certain of quicker voyages by steam than by sail, even (which was doubtful) if coal enough were procurable at the Cape. This roused the advocates of steaming, who complained that the minister had compared quick sailing-ships with slow steamers. Mr Lindsey asserted that the average duration of twenty-two sail-voyages was 132 days; and that the steam-average would not exceed 94 days. Another authority averred that the average of ninety-eight sail-voyages was 130 days; and that of seven screw-steam voyages, 93 days.

Such were a few of the points brought under consideration, in connection with the schemes for sending troops to India. We mention them here, because they bore intimately on the mutiny and its history. A compromise between the various schemes was effected by the government, in this way:—The ten thousand troops intended to be sent out, as reinforcements, reliefs, and recruits, _before_ the news of the disasters reached England, were despatched as originally intended, in ordinary sailing-vessels; the four thousand additional troops, immediately applied for by the Company, were despatched, half in screw-steamers, and half in fast-sailing clippers; while the six thousand supplied on a still later requisition were sent almost wholly in steamers. It was not until late in the year, when the slowness of most of the voyages had been made manifest, that the superiority of steaming became unquestionable—provided the various coal-depôts could be kept well supplied. Setting aside all further controversy as to the best mode of transit, the activity of the movements was unquestionable. In May and June few of the regiments and ships were ready, and therefore few only were despatched; but after that the rapidity was something remarkable. In July more than thirty troop-laden ships departed from our shores, carrying numbers varying from 131 to 438 soldiers each. August was a still more busy month, in relation both to the number of ships and the average freight of each; there being forty troop-laden ships, carrying from 208 to 1057 soldiers each. In July not a single steam-ship was included in the number; but in August nearly half were steamers. The most remarkable shipments were those in the _James Baines_ clipper sailing-ship (1037 men of the 42d and 92d foot), the _Champion of the Seas_ clipper (1032 men of the 42d and 20th foot) and the _Great Britain_ screw-steamer (1057 men of the 8th Hussars and 17th Lancers). In these three splendid ships the troops were conveyed with a degree of comfort rarely if ever before attained in such service. While the necessary arrangements were in progress for shipping off the twenty-four thousand men chosen by the middle of July, other plans were being organised for despatching further regiments; insomuch that, by the end of the year, very nearly forty thousand men had been sent off to the scene of mutiny. In what order and at what times these troops reached their destination, may usefully be noted in a later page. Towards the close of the year the Suez route was adopted for a few regiments; and the rapidity of passage was such as to lead to much expression of regret that that route had not been adopted earlier—although an opinion continued to prevail on the part of the government and the Company that it would not have been practicable to send the bulk of the army by that means.

Another important question arose during the year, how these troops ought to be clothed, and their health secured. English soldiers complain of their tightly buttoned and buckled garments in hot weather, even in an English climate; but in an Indian summer the oppression of such clothing is very grievous; and much anxiety was manifested, when it became known that thirty or forty thousand troops were to set out for the East, as to the dress to be adopted. The War-office issued a memorandum on the subject, chiefly with the view of allaying public anxiety;[38] but it became afterwards known that, owing to blunders and accidents similar to those which so disastrously affected the Crimean army, the light clothing, even if sufficient in quantity, was not in the right place at the right time; and our gallant men were only kept from complaining by their excitement at the work to be done. It must at the same time be admitted that, owing to the slowness of the voyages, the majority of the reinforcements did not land in India till the intense heat of summer had passed. In reference to the important question of the health of the troops, Dr James Harrison, of the Company’s service, drew up a series of rules or suggestions, for the use of officers in the management of their troops. These rules, which received the approval of Sir Colin Campbell, bore relation to the hours of marching; the length of each march; the kind of beverage best for the soldier before starting; the marching-dress in hot weather; the precautions against sitting or lying in wet clothes; the necessity for bathing; the best choice of food and the best mode of cooking; the stimulants and beverages, &c.

It would be difficult to enumerate all the modes in which the government, the legislature, and the press, sought to meet the difficulties and remedy the evils arising out of the Indian mutiny; nor would such an enumeration be necessary, further than concerned the really practicable and adopted measures. At a time when each mail from India increased the sum-total of disastrous news, each grievance found its own peculiar expositor, who insisted that _that_ particular grievance had been the main cause of the mutiny, and that a remedy must be found in that particular direction. Nevertheless, in a series of short paragraphs to close the present chapter, it may be possible to sketch the general character of the plans and thoughts that occupied the public mind.

Railways were not forgotten. It was strongly urged that if Indian railways had been begun earlier, and carried to a further stage towards completion, the mutiny either could not have happened at all, or might have been crushed easily by a small force having great powers of locomotion. The disorders in India did not prevent the forwarding of schemes for new lines of railway—such as the Sinde Railway, from Kurachee to Hydrabad, there to be connected with steamers up the Indus to Moultan; the Punjaub Railway, from Moultan to Lahore, there to join the grand trunk railway; the Oude Railway, to supply Lucknow with a series of lines radiating in various directions; and the East Bengal Railway, to accommodate the region eastward of Calcutta. But besides these, the mutiny gave a new impetus to schemes for carrying railways across Western Asia towards India; either from Scutari (opposite Constantinople) to Bagdad, or from Antioch to the Euphrates, with a railway or a steam-route thence through Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf. Some parts of these schemes were very wild; the projectors, in every case, required guaranteed interest from government, on the ground that the particular railway advocated would form a new and quick route from England to India available for government purposes; but as no guarantee was forthcoming, the schemes remained in abeyance.

Electric telegraphs did not fail to occupy a portion of public favour; and there is no question that their benefit was immense. Every lessening of the time for transmitting a message from India to London, or _vice versâ_, was so much gained to those responsible for quelling the mutiny. In the middle of 1857, small portions of submarine cable were immersed in the Mediterranean; but by the end of the year the islands of Corsica, Sardinia, Malta, and Corfu were all connected, greatly shortening the time for transmitting a telegram from Alexandria to Marseille. Superadded to this, the usefulness of the telegraph encouraged the projectors of new lines—from Corfu to Alexandria; from Antioch to the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf; from Suez down the Red Sea to Aden and Kurachee. Rival companies occupied much of the public attention; and, had the British government been favourably disposed towards a guarantee or subsidy, engineers were not wanting who would have undertaken to connect London with Calcutta by an unbroken wire.

River-steaming was advocated as one of the great things needed for India. One scheme was for an Indus flotilla. Supposing a hundred miles of railway to be constructed from Kurachee to Hydrabad, then the Indus would be reached at a point whence it is navigable to Moultan for five hundred and seventy miles; and it was proposed for this service to establish a flotilla of fifteen steamers, fitted up for passengers and a little cargo, and each towing two flat-bottom barges for the conveyance of troops and heavy cargo. Irrespective of the success or failure of any particular project, the establishment of steamers on the Indus was unquestionably a practical good to which India had a right to look forward; for, as a glance at a map will shew, the Indus instead of the Ganges seems the natural route of communication from Europe to the upper provinces of India. The Ganges provinces also would undergo an immense development of resources by the increase of steam-navigation on that noble river.

Gun-boats for India did not fail to find advocates. It was deemed almost a certainty that if light-draught vessels of this description had been on two or three of the Indian rivers, especially the Ganges and the Jumna, the mutineers would have met with formidable opponents; and even if the mutiny were quelled, a few gun-boats might act as a cheap substitute for a certain number of troops, in protecting places near the banks of the great rivers. Impressed with this conviction, the East India Company commissioned Messrs Rennie to build a small fleet of high-pressure iron gun-boats; each to have one boiler, two engines, two screw-propellers, and to carry a twelve-pounder gun amidships. The boats were seventy-five feet long by twelve wide, and were so constructed as to be stowed away in the hold of a ship for conveyance from England to India.

The means of locomotion or communication—railways, electric telegraphs, river-steamers, river gun-boats—formed only one portion of the schemes which occupied public thought during the first six months of the mutiny. Still more attention was paid to men—men for fighting in India and for defending our home-coasts. Shortly before the bad news began to arrive from India, a council order announced that the militia would _not_ be called out in 1857; two months afterwards, in reply to a question in the House of Commons, Viscount Palmerston would not admit that circumstances were so serious as to necessitate a change in this arrangement; he thought that recruiting would be cheaper than the militia, as a means of keeping up the strength of the army. In August, however, the ministers obtained an act of parliament empowering them to embody some of the militia during the recess, if the state of public affairs should render such a step necessary. A system of active recruiting commenced, and was continued steadily during several months. These recruits were intended, not to increase the number of regiments, but to add a second battalion to many regiments, and to increase the number of men in each battalion; some of the regiments were, by this twofold process, raised from 800 or 1000 to 2000 or 2400 men each. Volunteers, also, came forward from France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and other foreign countries; but these were mostly adventurers who sought officers’ commissions in India, and their services were not needed. The government made an attempt to encourage enlisting by offering commissions in the army to any private gentlemen who could bring forward a certain number of men each—a project not attended with much success. At certain crises, when the news from India was more than usually disastrous, appeals to patriotism shewed themselves in the newspapers—‘A Young Englishman;’ ‘Another Young Englishman;’ ‘A True Briton;’ ‘One of the Middle Class;’ or ‘A Young Scotsman’—would write to the journals, pour out his patriotism or his indignation, and shew what he would do if he only had the power. One proposed that clerks and shopmen out of situations should be embodied into a distinct volunteer corps; another said that, as he was a gentleman, and wished to avenge the foul murder of innocent women and children, he thought that he and such as he ought to be encouraged by commissions in the Indian army; another suggested that, if government would use them well, many young men would volunteer to serve in India, to return to their former mode of life when the mutiny was over. Some, rather in sarcasm than in earnest, suggested that drapers’ shopmen should drop the yard-measure, and go to India to fight; leaving to women the duty of serving muslins, and laces, and tapes. There was a certain meaning in all the suggestions, as expressive of honest indignation at the atrocities in India, especially those at Cawnpore; but, in its practical result, volunteering fell to the ground; and even the militia was not much appealed to. Various improvements were made in the condition of the common soldier; and recruits for the regular army came forward with much readiness.

We must now mention those who offered their monetary instead of their personal services in alleviation of the difficulties experienced in our Indian empire. Long before the mutinies in India had arrived at their greatest height, the question was anxiously debated both in that country and in England, what would be the worldly condition of the numerous families driven from their homes and robbed of all they possessed by the sepoys and marauders at the various stations? Every mail brought home fresh confirmation of the fact that the number of families thus impoverished was rapidly increasing; while on the other hand it was known that the East India Company could not reimburse the sufferers without much previous consideration. For, in the first place, it would have to be considered whether any distinction ought to be made between the two classes of Europeans in India—the civil and military servants of the Company, and those who, independent of the Company, had embarked capital in enterprises connected with indigo factories, opium farms, banks, printing-presses, &c.; and then would come a second inquiry whether the personal property only, or the commercial stock in trade also, should be considered as under the protection of the government. It was felt that immediate suffering ought not to wait for the solution of these questions; that when families had been burnt out or driven out of their homes, penniless and almost unclothed, immediate aid was needed from some quarter or other. This was admitted in the Punjaub, where Sir John Lawrence organised a fund for the relief of the necessitous; and it was admitted at Calcutta, where Lord and Lady Canning headed a subscription for providing shelter, raiment, and food to the hundreds of terrified fugitives who were constantly flocking to that capital. By the time the principal revolts of June were known in England, the last week of August had arrived; and then commenced one of those wonderful efforts in which London takes the lead of all the world—the collection of a large sum of money in a short time to ameliorate the sufferings arising out of some great calamity.

It was on the 25th of August that the lord-mayor presided at a meeting at the Mansion House to establish a fund for the relief of the sufferers by the Indian mutiny. The sum subscribed at the meeting did not much exceed a thousand pounds; but the whole merits of the case being set forth in newspapers, contributions poured in from all quarters, in the same noble spirit as had been manifested during the Crimean disasters. The high-born and the wealthy contributed large sums; the middle classes rendered their aid; country committees and town committees organised local subscriptions; large sums, made up of many small elements, were raised as collections after sermons in the churches and chapels; and when the Queen’s subjects in foreign and colonial regions heard of this movement, they sought to shew that they too shared in the common English feeling. Thousands swelled to tens of thousands, these to a hundred thousand, until in the course of a few months the fund rose to three or four hundred thousand pounds. In order to give system to the operations, thirty-five thousand circulars were issued, by the central committee in London, to all the authorities in church and state, to the ambassadors and ministers at foreign courts, to the governors of British colonies, and to the consuls at foreign ports.

This Mutiny Relief Fund was administered by four committees—General, Financial, Relief, and Ladies’ Committees. The General Committee settled the principles on which the fund was to be administered, determined the amount and destinations of the remittances to India, and controlled the proceedings of the subordinate committees. The Financial Committee supervised the accounts, the investments of the money, and the arrangement of remittances. The Relief Committee decided on applications for relief, on the administration of relief by donation or by loan, and on the application of means for the maintenance and education of children. The Ladies’ Committee took charge of such details as pertained more particularly to their own sex. Each of these committees met once a week. The first remittance was a sum of £2000 to Calcutta, to relieve some of the families who had been driven by the mutineers to seek shelter in that city. This was followed by frequent large remittances to the same place, and to Agra, Delhi, Lucknow, Bombay, and Lahore. Committees, formed in Calcutta and Bombay, corresponded with the head committee in London, and joined in carrying out plans for the expenditure of the fund. The donations and loans to persons who had arrived in England were small in amount; most of the aid being afforded to those who had not been able to leave India. The money was put out at interest as fast as the amount in hand exceeded the immediate requirements. At one time the government made an offer to appoint a royal commission for the administration of the fund; but this was declined; and there has been no reason for thinking that the transference of authority would have been beneficial. It was soon found that there were five classes of sufferers who would greatly need assistance from this fund—families of civil and military officers whose bungalows and furniture had been destroyed at the stations; the families of assistants, clerks, and other subordinate _employés_ at the stations; European private traders and settlers, many of whom had been utterly impoverished; many missionary families and educational establishments; and the families of a large number of pensioners, overseers, artificers, indigo-workers, schoolmasters, shopkeepers, hotel-keepers, newspaper printers, &c. To apportion the amount of misery among these five classes would be impossible; but the past chapters of this work have afforded examples, sufficiently sad and numerous, of the mode in which all ranks of Europeans in India were suddenly plunged into want and desolation. At Agra, when the fort had been relieved from a long investment or siege by the rebels, almost the entire Christian population was not only houseless, but the majority were without the most essential articles of furniture or clothing; nearly all were living in cellars and vaults. At many other stations it was nearly as bad; at Lucknow it was still worse.

India speedily raised thirty thousand pounds on its own account, irrespective of aid from England; and most of this was expended at Calcutta in providing as follows: Board and lodging on arrival at Calcutta for refugees without homes or friends to receive them; clothing for refugees; monthly allowances for the support of families who were not boarded and lodged out of the fund; loans for purchasing furniture, clothing, &c.; free grants for similar purposes; passage and diet money on board Ganges steamers; loans to officers and others to pay for the passage of their families to England; free passage to England for the widows and families of officers; and education of the children of sufferers. These were nearly the same purposes as those to which the larger English fund was applied. The East India Company adopted a wholly distinct system in recognising the just claims of the officers more immediately in its service, and of the widows and children of those who fell during the mutiny—a system based on the established emoluments and pensions of all in the Company’s service.

* * * * *

It will thus be seen that the news of the Indian Revolt, when it reached London by successive mails, led to a remarkable and important series of suggestions and plans—intended either to strengthen the hands of the executive in dealing with the mutineers, or to succour those who had been plunged into want by the crimes of which those mutineers were the chief perpetrators.

Note.

At the end of the last chapter a table was given of the number of
troops, European and native, in all the military divisions of India,
on the day when the mutiny commenced at Meerut. It will be
convenient to present here a second tabulation on a wholly different
basis—giving the _designations_ of the regiments instead of the
_numbers_ of men, and naming the _stations_ instead of the
_divisions_ in which they were cantoned or barracked. This will be
useful for purposes of reference, in relation to the gradual
annihilation of the Bengal Hindustani army. The former table applied
to the 10th of May 1857; the present will apply to a date as near
this as the _East India Register_ will permit—namely, the 6th of
May; while the royal troops in India will be named according to the
_Army List_ for the 1st of May—a sufficiently near approximation for
the present purpose. A few possible sources of error may usefully be
pointed out. 1. Some or other of the India regiments were at all
times moving from station to station; and these movements may in a
few cases render it doubtful whether a particular corps had or had
not left a particular station on the day named. 2. The station named
is that of the head-quarters and the bulk of the regiment:
detachments may have been at other places. 3. The Persian and
Chinese wars disturbed the distribution of troops belonging to the
respective presidencies. 4. The disarming and disbanding at
Barrackpore and Berhampore are not taken into account; for they were
not known in London at the time of compiling the official list. 5.
The _Army List_, giving an enumeration of royal regiments in India,
did not always note correctly the actual stations at a particular
time. These sources of error, however, will not be considerable in
amount.

REGIMENTS AND STATIONS OF BENGAL ARMY—MAY 1857.

GENERAL ANSON, Commander-in-chief.

_European Cavalry._
6th Carabiniers (Queen’s), Meerut.
9th Lancers (Queen’s), Umballa.

_Native Regular Cavalry._
1st Regiment, Mhow.
2d Regiment, Cawnpore.
3d Regiment, Meerut.
4th Regiment, Umballa.
5th Regiment, Peshawur.
6th Regiment, Nowgong.
7th Regiment, Lucknow.
8th Regiment, Lahore.
9th Regiment, Sealkote.
10th Regiment, Ferozpore.

_Irregular and Local Cavalry._
1st Bengal Ir. C., Jelum.
2d Bengal Ir. C., Goordaspore.
3d Bengal Ir. C., Jhansi.
4th Bengal Ir. C., Hansi.
5th Bengal Ir. C., Sonthal.
6th Bengal Ir. C., Moultan.
7th Bengal Ir. C., Peshawur.
8th Bengal Ir. C., Sultanpore.
9th Bengal Ir. C., Hosheapore.
10th Bengal Ir. C., Goordaspore.
11th Bengal Ir. C., Berhampore.
12th Bengal Ir. C., Segowlie.
13th Bengal Ir. C., Bareilly,
14th Bengal Ir. C., Jhansi.
15th Bengal Ir. C., Oude.
16th Bengal Ir. C., Rawul Pindee.
17th Bengal Ir. C., Shumshabad.
18th Bengal Ir. C., Peshawur.
1st Gwalior Contingent Cavalry, Gwalior.
2d Gwalior Contingent Cavalry, Augur.
1st Punjaub Cavalry, Dera Ismael.
2d Punjaub Cavalry, Dera Ismael.
3d Punjaub Cavalry, Bunnoo.
4th Punjaub Cavalry, Kohat.
5th Punjaub Cavalry, Asnee.
1st Oude Irregular Cavalry, Secrora.
2d Oude Irregular Cavalry, Lucknow.
3d Oude Irregular Cavalry, Pertabghur.
Nagpoor Irregular Cavalry, Taklee.

_European Infantry._
8th Ft. (Qun.’s), Cawnpore.
10th Ft. (Qun.’s), Wuzeerabad.
24th Ft. (Qun.’s), Sealkote.
27th Ft. (Qun.’s), Sealkote.
29th Ft. (Qun.’s), Thayet Mhow.
32d Ft. (Qun.’s), Kussowlie.
35th Ft. (Qun.’s), Calcutta.
52d Ft. (Qun.’s), Lucknow.
53d Ft. (Qun.’s), Dugshai.
60th Ft. (Qun.’s), Jullundur.
61st Ft. (Qun.’s), Wuzeerabad.
70th Ft. (Qun.’s), Ferozpore.
75th Ft. (Qun.’s), Rawul Pindee.
81st Ft. (Qun.’s), Lahore.
87th Ft. (Qun.’s), Peshawur.
1st Europeans (East India Company’s), Dugshai.
2d Europeans (East India Company’s), Umballa.
3d Europeans (East India Company’s), Agra.

_Native Regular Infantry._
1st Regiment, Cawnpore.
2d[39] Regiment, Barrackpore.
3d Regiment, Phillour.
4th Regiment, Noorpore.
5th Regiment, Umballa.
6th Regiment, Allahabad.
7th Regiment, Dinapoor.
8th Regiment, Dinapoor.
9th Regiment, Allygurh.
10th Regiment, Futteghur.
11th Regiment, Allahabad.
12th Regiment, Nowgong and
Jhansi.
13th Regiment, Lucknow.
14th Regiment, Moultan.
15th Regiment, Meerut.
16th[39] Regiment, Meean Meer.
17th Regiment, Goruckpore.
18th Regiment, Bareilly.
19th Regiment, Berhampore.
20th Regiment, Meerut.
21st Regiment, Peshawur.
22d Regiment, Fyzabad.
23d Regiment, Mhow.
24th Regiment, Peshawur.
25th Regiment, Thayet Mhow.
26th Regiment, Meean Meer.
27th Regiment, Peshawur.
28th Regiment, Shahjehanpoor.
29th Regiment, Jullundur.
30th Regiment, Agra.
31st Regiment, Barrackpore.
32d Regiment, Sonthal.
33d Regiment, Hosheapore.
34th Regiment, Barrackpore.
35th Regiment, Sealkote.
36th[40] Regiment, Jullundur.
37th[40] Regiment, Benares.
38th[41] Regiment, Delhi.
39th[41] Regiment, Jelum.
40th[41] Regiment, Dinapoor.
41st Regiment, Seetapoor.
42d Regiment, Saugor.
43d Regiment, Barrackpore.
44th Regiment, Agra.
45th Regiment, Ferozpore.
46th Regiment, Sealkote.
47th[41] Regiment, Prome.
48th Regiment, Lucknow.
49th Regiment, Meean Meer.
50th Regiment, Nagode.
51st Regiment, Peshawur.
52d Regiment, Jubbulpoor.
53d Regiment, Cawnpore.
54th Regiment, Delhi.
55th Regiment, Nowsherah.
56th Regiment, Cawnpore.
57th Regiment, Ferozpore.
58th Regiment, Rawul Pindee.
59th Regiment, Umritsir.
60th Regiment, Umballa.
61st Regiment, Jullundur.
62d Regiment, Moultan.
63d Regiment, Barrackpore.
64th Regiment, Peshawur.
65th[41] Regiment, Dinapoor.
66th[42] Regiment, Almora.
67th[41] Regiment, {Etawah.
{Minpooree.
68th Regiment, Bareilly.
69th Regiment, Moultan.
70th Regiment, Barrackpore.
71st Regiment, Lucknow.
72d Regiment, Agra.
73d Regiment, Jumalpore.
74th Regiment, Cawnpore.

_Irregular and Local Infantry._
1st Oude Irregular Infantry, Persadpore.
2d Oude Irregular Infantry, Secrora.
3d Oude Irregular Infantry, Gonda.
4th Oude Irregular Infantry, Lucknow.
5th Oude Irregular Infantry, Durriabad.
6th Oude Irregular Infantry, Fyzabad.
7th Oude Irregular Infantry, Lucknow.
8th Oude Irregular Infantry, Sultanpore.
9th Oude Irregular Infantry, Seetapoor.
10th Oude Irregular Infantry, Mullaong.
1st Gwalior Contingent Infantry, Gwalior.
2d Gwalior Contingent Infantry, Gwalior.
3d Gwalior Contingent Infantry, Gwalior.
4th Gwalior Contingent Infantry, Gwalior.
5th Gwalior Contingent Infantry, Seepree.
6th Gwalior Contingent Infantry, Lullutpore.
7th Gwalior Contingent Infantry, Augur.
1st Punjaub Infantry, Kohat.
2d Punjaub Infantry, Kohat.
3d Punjaub Infantry, Kohat.
4th Punjaub Infantry, Dera Ghazi.
5th Punjaub Infantry, Bunnoo.
6th Punjaub Infantry, Dera Ismael.
1st Sikh Infantry, Hazara.
2d Sikh Infantry, Kangra.
3d Sikh Infantry, Khan.
4th Sikh Infantry, Umballa.
1st Nagpoor Irregular Infantry, Seetabuldee.
2d Nagpoor Irregular Infantry, Chandah.
3d Nagpoor Irregular Infantry, Raypoor.
Regiment of Guides (foot and horse), Peshawur.
Regiment of Kelat-i-Ghilzi, Shubkuddur.
Regiment of Loodianah (Sikhs), Benares.
Regiment of Ferozpore (Sikhs), Mirzapore.
Ramgurh Light Infantry, Dorunda.
Hill Rangers, Bhagulpore.
Nusserree Rifles, Simla.
Pegu Light Infantry, Myan Owng.
Sirmoor Rifles, Almora.
Kumaon Battalion, Deyra.
Assam Light Infantry, 1st, Debroogurh.
Assam Light Infantry, 2nd Gowhatti.
Mhairwarra Battalion, Bewar.
Aracan Battalion, Akyab.
Hurrianah Light Infantry, Hansi.
Silhet Light Infantry, Cherrah.
Malwah Bheel Corps, Sirdarpore.
Mewar Bheel Corps, Khairwarah.
Sebundee Corps, Darjeeling.

_Artillery, Engineers, Sappers and Miners._
Horse-artillery, 1st Brigade:
3 European Troops. }
2 Native Troops. } Head-quarters:
Horse-artillery, 2d Brigade: } Meerut.
3 European Troops. } Jullundur.
1 Native Troop. } Peshawur.
Horse-artillery, 3d Brigade: } Umballa.
3 European Troops. } Cawnpore.
1 Native Troop. } Sealkote.
Foot-artillery, 6 European Battalions. } Dumdum.
(4 Companies each.) }
Foot-artillery, 3 Native Battalions. }
(6 Companies each.) }

Engineers, } Head-quarters:
Sappers and Miners, 8 Companies, } Roorkee.

_Mixed Corps—Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery._
Shekhawuttie Battalion, Midnapore.
Jhodpore Legion, Erinpoora.
Malwah Contingent, Mehidpore.
Bhopal Contingent, Sehore.
Kotah Contingent, Kurrowlee.

REGIMENTS AND STATIONS OF MADRAS ARMY—MAY 1857.

SIR PATRICK GRANT, Commander-in-chief.

_European Cavalry._
12th Lancers (Queen’s), Madras.

_Native Cavalry._
1st Madras Light Cavalry, Trichinopoly.
2d Madras Light Cavalry, Sholapore.
3d Madras Light Cavalry, Bangalore.
4th Madras Light Cavalry, Kamptee.
5th Madras Light Cavalry, Bellary.
6th Madras Light Cavalry, Jaulnah.
7th Madras Light Cavalry, Secunderabad.
8th Madras Light Cavalry, Bangalore.

_European Infantry._
74th Foot (Queen’s), Madras.
84th Foot (Queen’s), Burmah.[43]
1st Europeans (East India Company’s), [Persia].
2d Europeans (East India Company’s), Burmah.
3d Europeans (East India Company’s), Secunderabad.

_Native Infantry._
1st Regiment,[44] Secunderabad.
2d Regiment, Quilon.
3d Regiment, Cananore.
4th Regiment, Burmah.
5th[44] Regiment, Berhampore.
6th Regiment, Burmah.
7th Regiment, Moulmein.
8th Regiment, Rangoon.
9th Regiment, Samulcottah.
10th Regiment, Rangoon.
11th Regiment, Cananore.
12th Regiment, Madras.
13th Regiment, Moulmein.
14th Regiment, Singapore.
15th Regiment, Burmah.
16th[44] Regiment, Mangalore.
17th Regiment, Madras.
18th Regiment, Madras.
19th Regiment, Bangalore.
20th Regiment, French Rocks.
21st Regiment, Paulghaut.
22d Regiment, Secunderabad.
23d Regiment, Russelcondah.
24th[44] Regiment, Secunderabad.
25th Regiment, Trichinopoly.
26th[44] Regiment, Kamptee.
27th Regiment, Vellore.
28th Regiment, Hosungabad.
29th Regiment, Penang.
30th Regiment, Cuddapah.
31st Regiment, Vizianagram.
32d Regiment, Kamptee.
33d Regiment, Kamptee.
34th Regiment, Trichinopoly.
35th Regiment, Hurryhur.
36th[44] Regiment, Madras.
37th[45] Regiment, Burmah.
38th[44] Regiment, Singapore.
39th Regiment, Madras.
40th Regiment, Cuttack.
41st Regiment, Secunderabad.
42d Regiment, Secunderabad.
43d Regiment, Vizagapatam.
44th Regiment, Burmah.
45th Regiment, Rangoon.
46th Regiment, Henzana.
47th Regiment, Bellary.
48th Regiment, Moulmein.
49th[44] Regiment, Secunderabad.
50th Regiment, Bangalore.
51st Regiment, Pallamcottah.
52d Regiment, Mercara.

_Artillery, Engineers, Sappers and Miners._ Horse-artillery, 4 European Troops. } Horse-artillery, 2 Native Troops. } Head-quarters: Foot-artillery, 4 European Battalions, } St Thomas’s Mount, (4 Companies each.) } Bangalore, Foot-artillery, 1 Native Battalion. } Kamptee, Saugor, (6 Companies.) } Secunderabad.

Engineers, Head-quarters: Fort St George. Sappers and Miners, Head-quarters: Dowlaishweram.

REGIMENTS AND STATIONS OF BOMBAY ARMY—MAY 1857.

SIR HENRY SOMERSET, Commander-in-chief.

_European Cavalry._
14th Light Dragoons (Queen’s), Kirkee.

_Native Regular Cavalry._ 1st Lancers, Nuseerabad. 2d Light Cavalry, Rajcote. 3d Light Cavalry, [Persia.]

_Native Irregular Cavalry._ 1st Sinde Irregular Horse, Jacobabad. 2d Sinde Irregular Horse, Jacobabad. Poonah Irregular Horse, [Persia.] Gujerat Irregular Horse, Ahmedabad. South Mahratta Irregular Horse, [Persia.] Cutch Irregular Horse, Bhooj.

_European Infantry._ 64th Foot (Queen’s), [Persia.] 78th Foot (Queen’s), Poonah. 86th Foot (Queen’s), Kurachee. 1st Fusiliers (East India Company’s), Kurachee. 2d Light Infantry (East India Company’s), [Persia.] 3d Light Infantry (East India Company’s), Poonah.

_Native Regular Infantry._ 1st Regiment,[46] Baroda. 2d[46] Regiment, Ahmedabad. 3d Regiment, Sholapore. 4th[47] Regiment, [Persia.] 5th Regiment, Bombay. 6th Regiment, Poonah. 7th Regiment, Poonah. 8th Regiment, Baroda. 9th Regiment, Surat. 10th Regiment, Nuseerabad. 11th Regiment, Bombay. 12th Regiment, Deesa. 13th Regiment, Hydrabad. 14th Regiment, Kurachee. 15th Regiment, Bombay. 16th Regiment, Shikarpore. 17th Regiment, Bhooj. 18th Regiment, [Aden.] 19th Regiment, Mulligaum. 20th Regiment, [Persia] 21st Regiment, Neemuch. 22d Regiment, Satara. 23d Regiment, [Persia.] 24th Regiment, Ahmednuggur. 25th Regiment, Ahmedabad. 26th Regiment, [Persia.] 27th Regiment, Kolapore. 28th Regiment, Dharwar. 29th Regiment, Belgaum.

_Native Irregular Infantry._ 1st Belooch Battalion, Kurachee. 2d Belooch Battalion, [Persia.] Khandeish Bheel Corps, Dhurrungaum. Rutnagherry Rangers, Rutnagherry. Sawunt Waree Corps, Sawunt Waree. Satara Local Corps, Satara. Kolapore Infantry Corps, Kolapore.

_Artillery, Engineers, Sappers and Miners._
Horse-artillery, 1 European Brigade. }
(4 Troops.)[48] } Head-quarters:
Foot-artillery, 2 European Battalions. } Bombay.
(4 Companies each.) } Ahmedabad.
Foot-artillery, 2 Native Battalions. } Ahmednuggur.
(6 Companies each.) }

Engineers, Head-quarters: Bombay, Sappers and Miners, Head-quarters: Poonah and Aden.

Jumma Musjid, Agra.—Mosque built by Shah Jehan in 1656.
]

-----

Footnote 34:

┌───────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────┐
│Presidency.│ Queen’s │Company’s │Total.│
│ │Regiments.│Regiments.│ │
├───────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────┤
│Bengal, │ 16│ 3│ 19│
│Madras, │ 4│ 3│ 7│
│Bombay, │ 4│ 3│ 7│
├───────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────┤
│ │ 24│ 9│ 33│
└───────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────┘

Footnote 35:

┌───────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────┐
│Presidency.│ Queen’s │Company’s │Total.│
│ │Regiments.│Regiments.│ │
├───────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────┤
│Bengal, │ 15│ 4│ 19│
│Madras, │ 5│ 4│ 9│
│Bombay, │ 4│ 3│ 7│
├───────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────┤
│ │ 24│ 11│ 35│
└───────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────┘

Footnote 36:

_First Division_, under Major-general Stalker—

Natives, 3550
Europeans, 2270
————
5820

_Second Division_, under Brigadier-general Havelock—

Natives, 4370
Europeans, 1770
————
6140

Footnote 37:

In August 1857, of the whole railway distance marked out from
Alexandria through Cairo to Suez, 205 miles in length, about 175 miles
were finished—namely, from Alexandria to the crossing of the Nile, 65
miles; from the crossing of the Nile to Cairo, 65 miles; from Cairo
towards Suez, 45 miles. The remainder of the journey consisted of 30
miles of sandy desert, not at that time provided with a railway, but
traversed by omnibuses or vans.

Footnote 38:

‘According to existing regulations of some years’ standing, every
soldier on his arrival in India is provided with the following
articles of clothing, in addition to those which compose his kit in
this country:

‘Mounted Men.—4 white jackets, 6 pair of white overalls, 2 pair of
Settringee overalls, 6 shirts, 4 pair of cotton socks, 1 pair of white
braces.

‘Foot-soldiers.—4 white jackets, 1 pair of English summer trousers, 5
pair of white trousers, 5 white shirts, 2 check shirts, 1 pair of
white braces.

‘These articles are not supplied in this country, but form a part of
the soldier’s necessaries on his arrival in India, and are composed of
materials made on the spot, and best suited to the climate.

‘During his stay in India, China, Ceylon, and at other hot stations,
he is provided with a tunic and shell-jacket in alternate years; and
in the year in which the tunic is not issued, the difference in the
value of the two articles is paid to the soldier, to be expended (by
the officer commanding) for his benefit in any articles suited to the
climate of the station.

‘The force recently sent out to China and India has been provided with
white cotton helmet and forage-cap covers.

‘Any quantity of light clothing for troops can be procured on the spot
in India at the shortest notice.’

Footnote 39:

Grenadiers.

Footnote 40:

Volunteers.

Footnote 41:

Volunteers.

Footnote 42:

Goorkhas.

Footnote 43:

Removed to Calcutta.

Footnote 44:

Rifles.

Footnote 45:

Grenadiers.