Chapter XXII: Closing Events of the Year (2)

Brigadier Stuart, portions of whose column were engaged in and near Neemuch, Mundisore, Dhar, Mehidpore, Rampoora, and Kotah in October, swept off many parties of rebels from the regions bordering on Malwah and Rajpootana. Nevertheless the state of affairs remained very unsettled. Many petty chieftains, incited by the numerical weakness of the British, and by the unexpected stand made by rebels elsewhere, appeared by tacit agreement to consider this the proper time to set up as little kings on their own account, each relying on the services of retainers who probably thought that something good might come to their share in the scramble.

At a somewhat later date, when Stuart was in command of the Malwah Field Force, before its name was changed to the ‘First Brigade of the Nerbudda Field Force,’ he had a contest with the Mundisore rebels. Being joined by a portion of the Hyderabad Contingent under Major Orr, Stuart approached within three or four miles of Mundisore on the 21st of November. This town is a few miles south of Neemuch, on the road to Indore. The brigadier encamped until a good reconnaissance could be effected. The rebel enemy at Mundisore, hearing of his approach, had posted pickets entirely covering the country over which he was advancing; they also mustered in some force outside the walls, and appeared inclined to attack. In the afternoon he found that the enemy were advancing in form, threatening his centre and both flanks at the same time. They advanced steadily, in great numbers and with banners flying: and he went forth to meet them. The struggle was a brief one. Major Orr easily repulsed the enemy’s attack on the left flank; Captain Orr and Lieutenant Dew checked that on the right; a few rounds of artillery preserved the centre; and the enemy, giving way at all points, retreated into the town. Brigadier Stuart had now another matter to consider. He heard that a rebel army of 5000 men, employed in besieging Neemuch, intended to raise the siege, and to join their companions at Mundisore. This he resolved to prevent if possible by intercepting them. Accordingly, early on the 22d, he marched to such a position as would command the approaches to Mundisore; and later in the day his cavalry were engaged with a party of rebel horse under Heera Singh—one of many Rajpoot chieftains who took up arms at that disturbed period. Keeping a sharp watch during the night, Stuart prepared on the morning of the 23d to control the Neemuch and Mundisore road both from the north and the south. The enemy appeared, and took up a strong position with their right in and beyond the village of Goraria, their right centre covered by a date nullah and lines of date-trees, their battery of six guns on rising ground, with a large mud-hut protecting their gunners, and their left stretched along the ridge running east from the village. The battle that ensued was a very severe one. Stuart was obliged to recall a body of infantry, who charged a village that seemed full of the enemy; the rebels took possession of the houses, from which they kept up a very galling fire. The British could doubtless have taken the village; but the brigadier found his rear attacked by a second body of the enemy, requiring a new distribution of his troops. The engagements of this day resulted in a sort of drawn battle. On the 24th, the village was shelled for three hours; and was then captured by H.M. 86th and a native regiment, with considerable loss on both sides. During the ensuing night the enemy evacuated Mundisore and the whole vicinity, dispersing in flight throughout the country, after having lost at least fifteen hundred men during the four days. The brigadier then moved his camp to Mundisore, and made arrangements for dismantling the fort and destroying the guns before leaving the neighbourhood. By this series of operations, not only was Mundisore cleared of rebels, but Neemuch was relieved from a force which pressed very threateningly upon it.

The siege of Neemuch must now be noticed. The small English garrison at this station had for months been threatened by the Mundisore rebels; but it was not until the 8th of November that a formidable attack was actually made. A force of 5000 infantry, with three guns, advanced to within two miles of the town; and as it was impossible to meet such numbers in the open field, Captain Simpson prepared for the best defence he could make within the fort. Intrenchments had been formed some time before; but unfortunately they were too extensive to be effectively defended by the few hands in the garrison; and they thus speedily became occupied by the enemy. On the 9th, the enemy marched in full force into the bazaar and cantonment, plundering wherever they went. They then placed their guns at convenient distances, and began playing steadily against the fort. This cannonading was continued for several days. The rebels managed to build batteries for their guns in such positions that, from the foliage and other obstacles, they were unobservable from the walls of the fort. After about a fortnight of this battering, the rebels resolved to attempt an escalade. They brought forward huge ladders on wheels, affording room for four men abreast, and placed them against the walls of the fort; but here they were met by such steady and continuous volleys of musketry that not a man could enter. A Beloochee Mohammedan, belonging to the 12th Bombay native infantry, doing duty in Neemuch, performed an act of gallantry that won for him much and well-deserved applause. One of the besiegers, in retreating from the withering musketry-fire from the fort, dropped a splendid Mussulman green flag on the ground. The Beloochee at once offered to capture this flag. Under cover of a tremendous fire of musketry, he and a havildar were lowered by a rope from one of the enclosures; quick as lightning the flag was secured, and in a few minutes waved on the walls of Neemuch. The movements of Brigadier Stuart, recorded in the last paragraph, now disturbed the rebels; they departed, and Neemuch was for a time spared further molestation.

This narrative may pass over without particular mention the other regions of the vast empire of India. Disturbances there were in November and December, but not of such grave importance as to call for record. At Saugor and at Jubbulpore, the Europeans cried loudly for more troops, but they were still able to defend themselves against actual attacks. At Gwalior and at Bhopal, at Indore and at Mhow, although the vexations were many, the continued fidelity of Scindia and Holkar lessened the calamities that might otherwise have befallen the British. In Rajpootana and Gujerat, petty chieftains would from time to time unfurl the flag of rebellion, and collect a band of fighting retainers around them; but these territories were within practicable reach of Bombay, whence columns marched for the pacification of the upper country. Some portions of the Nizam’s territory were occasionally troubled by insubordinate troops belonging to the contingent; as the Nizam and his prime-minister, however, remained firm in their alliance with the British, and as the distance was very great to the turbulent regions of the Jumna, serious danger was averted. In the South Mahratta country, around Kolapore, Sholapore, Satara, and Poonah, indications once now and then appeared that fanatic Mohammedans were ready to unfurl the green flag against the infidel Feringhees; but the near vicinity of the presidential city of Bombay, and the quiet demeanour of the natives further south, prevented the intended conspiracies from becoming serious in magnitude. In the Madras presidency, tranquillity was almost wholly undisturbed.

Thus ended the extraordinary year 1857—the most momentous that the English had ever experienced in India.

Notes.

_Proposed Re-organisation of the Indian Army._—In closing the
narrative for the year 1857, it may be useful to advert to two
important subjects which occupied the attention of the East India
Company—the state of the army, and the causes of the mutiny. Instead
of rushing to conclusions on imperfect data, the Court of Directors
instructed the governor-general to appoint two commissions of
inquiry, empowered to collect information on those two subjects. The
letters of instruction were both dated the 25th of November; the
first ran as follows:

‘1. We trust that when success, by the blessing of Divine
Providence, shall have attended your efforts to put down the
mutiny of the native army of your presidency, and to re-establish
the authority of the government in the disturbed districts, you
will be enabled to take advantage of the services of select
officers of ability and experience, to assist you, by
investigation and by practical counsel founded thereon, in forming
wise conclusions on the most important subject which must soon
press for decision—namely, the proper organisation of our army in
India.

‘2. To this end we authorise you to appoint, as soon as
circumstances will permit, a commission, composed of military
officers of the armies of the three presidencies (with whom should
be associated officers of the Queen’s army who have had experience
of Indian service), on whose knowledge, experience, and judgment you
can rely; together with one or more civil servants, whom you may
consider to be specially qualified for such a duty by their
knowledge of the native character and general administrative
experience.

‘3. In framing instructions for the guidance of this commission, we
are desirous that the following heads of inquiry should be
specified, in addition to any others which you may consider to
deserve their attention:

‘1st, Should corps be raised each in a prescribed district, and be
recruited there, and there only?

‘2d, Should corps be composed of troops or companies, each of which
shall consist of separate tribes or castes; or should the tribes or
castes be mixed up together in the whole regiment?

‘3d, Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component
part of a native regiment?

‘4th, What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations
relating to tribes and castes, with a view to determine the future
composition of the native army?

‘5th, Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical
countries, equally qualified for service in India, with the natives
of the country; and if so, should they be formed in separate
regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?

‘6th, Whether, in native infantry regiments, the discontinuance of
the grades of native commissioned officers, and the substitution of
a European sergeant and corporal to each company, is advisable; and
if so, whether, in lieu of the prospect of distinction and emolument
arising out of these grades, it would be advisable to establish
graduated scales of good-service pay and retiring pensions,
claimable after specified periods of service?

‘7th, Whether the system of promotion generally, by seniority, to
the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained),
should not be altered and assimilated to the systems in force at
Madras and Bombay?

‘8th, If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police
purposes, what will be the best organisation for each branch
respectively?

‘9th, Have the powers of commanding officers of native corps, and
the powers of officers in charge of companies, been diminished? What
consequences have been the result? Is it desirable that those powers
should be increased, or what other measures should be adopted for
the improvement of discipline?

‘10th, Should cadets be trained and drilled in European regiments
before they are posted to native regiments; or what would be the
best mode of drilling and training cadets before they are posted to
native regiments?

‘11th, Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native
army be retained; or should they be assimilated to the rules which
obtain in the British army; or ought there to be any, and what,
changes in those rules, or in the system of punishment?

‘12th, How can the demands for European officers for staff and
detached employments be best provided for, without injuring the
efficiency of regiments?

‘4. It is to be understood that the inquiries to be made by the
commission, and the opinions to be offered by them, are to have
reference to the several branches of the native army—infantry,
regular and irregular; cavalry, regular and irregular; artillery,
and Sappers and Miners; and, with respect to the artillery, and
Sappers and Miners, whether they should be composed, as heretofore,
of Europeans and natives, or be entirely European?

‘5. To aid your government in forming an opinion as to the
proportion which the European should bear to the native portion of
the army in India generally, and at each presidency separately, we
would recommend that your government should call upon the commission
to give their opinions on this very important question; and we can
entertain no doubt that the enlarged knowledge and experience of the
members of the Commission will enable them to furnish you with
valuable information on this head.

‘6. Having obtained opinions on all these heads of inquiry, and on
such other heads as you may deem to be essential to the thorough
development of the important questions at issue, you will refer
the views of the commission for the consideration of the
commander-in-chief, and will then furnish us with the results of
your careful deliberation upon the whole of the measures which
should, in your judgment, be taken for the organisation and
maintenance, in the utmost practicable state of efficiency, of
whatever military force you may think it desirable to form.

‘7. The commission itself may be instructed to make to the
governor-general in council any suggestions or recommendations which
occur to them, although not on matters comprised in the specified
heads of inquiry.’

_Proposed Inquiry into the Causes of the Mutiny._—The second letter
adverted to above was in the following terms:

‘1. Although we are well aware that, from the period when the mutiny
of the Bengal army assumed a formidable aspect, your time must
necessarily have been too much engrossed by the pressing exigencies
of the public-service during each passing day, and in taking
provident measures for the future, to admit of your directing much
of your attention to past events, we have no doubt that you have not
omitted to take advantage of all the means and opportunities at your
command for the important purpose of investigating the causes of the
extraordinary disaffection in the ranks of that army, which has,
unhappily, given rise to so much bloodshed and misery.

‘2. In this persuasion, and as a review of the voluminous records
containing the details of the events which have occurred since the
first display of disaffection at Barrackpore, has entirely failed to
satisfy our minds in regard to the immediate causes of the mutiny,
we desire that you will lose no time in reporting to us your
opinions on the subject, embracing the following heads, together
with any others which you may deem it necessary to add, in order to
the full elucidation of the subject:

‘1st, The state of feeling of the sepoy towards the government for
some time preceding the outbreak.

‘2d, Any causes which of late years may be thought likely to have
affected their loyalty and devotion to the service.

‘3d, Whether their loyalty had been affected by the instigations of
emissaries of foreign powers, or native states, or by any general
measures of our administration affecting themselves or any other
classes of our subjects?

‘4th, Whether the proposed use of the new cartridges was to any, and
what, extent the cause of the outbreak?

‘5th, Whether the objects which the mutineers are supposed to have
had in view were directed to the subversion of the British power in
India, or to the attainment of pecuniary or other advantages?

‘6th, Whether the progress of the mutiny can be traced to general
combination or concert, or was the result of separate impulses at
the several stations of regiments; and, if the former, how the
combination was carried on without any knowledge or suspicion of it
on the part of the regimental officers?

‘3. If, however, you should not feel yourselves to be in possession
of information sufficient to form a well-grounded opinion upon the
causes and objects of the mutiny, we authorise you to appoint a
special mixed commission for a preliminary investigation into the
same, to be composed of officers selected from all branches of the
services of India, in whose personal experience and soundness of
judgment you have entire confidence. In that case, you will lose no
time in reporting to us your sentiments upon the conclusions arrived
at by the commission.’

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Footnote 124:

Chap. xvii., pp. 277-294; chap. xx., pp. 338-358.

Footnote 125:

See p. 103.

Footnote 126:

Chap. xxi., p. 369.

Footnote 127:

‘We marched off under the guidance of a native, who said he would take
us to the spot where the gun lay. We told him he should be well
rewarded if he brought us to the gun, but if he brought us into a
trap, we had a soldier by him “at full cock” ready to blow his brains
out. We passed our outside pickets, and entered the town through very
narrow streets without a single nigger being seen, or a shot fired on
either side. We crept along; not a soul spoke a word, all was still as
death; and after marching in this way into the very heart of the town,
our guide brought us to the very spot into which the gun was capsized.
The soldiers were posted on each side, and then we went to work. Not a
man spoke above his breath, and each stone was laid down quietly. When
we thought we had cleared enough, I ordered the men to put their
shoulders to the wheel and gun, and when all was ready, and every man
had his pound before him, I said “Heave!” and up she righted. We then
limbered up, called the soldiers to follow, and we marched into the
intrenchments with our gun without a shot being fired. When we got in,
the colonel returned us his best thanks, and gave us all an extra
ration of grog; we then returned to our guns in the battery.’

Footnote 128:

The regiments or portions of regiments—made up into four brigades of
infantry, one of cavalry, one of artillery, and one of engineers—were
the following: H.M. 8th, 23d, 32d, 38th, 42d, 53d, 64th, 82d, and 93d
foot; Rifle Brigade; 2d and 4th Punjaub infantry; H.M. 9th Lancers;
1st, 2d, and 5th Punjaub cavalry; Hodson’s Horse; horse-artillery;
light field-battery; heavy field-battery; Naval brigade; Queen’s and
Company’s Engineers; Sappers and Miners.

Footnote 129:

42d Highlanders, 403
53d foot, 413
93d Highlanders, 806
4th Punjaub rifles, 332
9th Lancers, 327
5th Punjaub cavalry, 85
Hodson’s Horse, 109
Horse-artillery, 83
Foot-artillery, 139
Sappers, 100

Footnote 130:

P. 356

COLONEL E. H. GREATHED.
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