Chapter I: Preface

I have associated with my narrative of the French conquest of Tunis the title of Punic War, partly from the fact of the invasion having taken place on the spot which once witnessed three famous contests of antiquity so called, and partly on account of the consistent _Punica fides_[1] displayed in the web of tortuous diplomacy which has practically put an end to Tunisian independence.

If my reader will open the _Almanach de Gotha_ for 1881, at page 1029, he will find the following passage:—

“TUNIS (RÉGENCE).”

“Depuis 1575 sous la souveraineté de la Turquie. Le Sultan a réglé, par firman du 25 Octobre 1871 (9 Chabân 1283), les conditions de la souveraineté de la Sublime-Porte sur Tunis et il a renoncé à l’ancien tribut. D’après ce firman la situation de Tunis est à présent celle-ci: Le ‘Bey’ reçoit l’investiture de Constantinople, il ne doit sans l’autorisation du Sultan ni faire la guerre, ni conclure la paix, ni céder du territoire. Il ne doit faire de négociations diplomatiques avec l’étranger que sur des questions intérieures. Il est obligé de frapper la monnaie au nom du Sultan et de mettre ses troupes à la disposition de la Sublime-Porte en cas de guerre.”

Within four months from the time when this clear and unmistakable definition of the political status of the Regency of Tunis appeared in the celebrated _Annuaire genéalogique, diplomatique et statistique_, the government of the French Republic, without any declaration of war, either against the Bey of Tunis or the Sultan of Turkey, invaded the country, compelled the Bey, by moral if not physical duress, to accept a Protectorate, and finally effected a complete military occupation of the Regency from the Khamír mountains to the frontiers of Tripoli. The virtual extinction of Moslem power in Tunis, after an unbroken duration of more than twelve centuries, is in itself an occurrence of no small political importance, but when considered in connection with its actual and possible consequences, not only in Tunis itself but throughout the whole of North Africa, the “last chapter in the history of the Moors” seems to be likely to excite a durable, and perhaps an increasing, interest. This belief has prompted me to attempt to write the chronicles of the French Invasion, and to briefly sketch, by way of introduction, the more recent chapters of Tunisian annals.

In 1880 the Moslems of North Africa had almost forgotten the shock occasioned to their religious susceptibilities by the conquest of Algeria, and prior to the events of which I am about to speak, Panislamism had in that region a theoretical rather than a practical existence. Tunis has always been an intact Moslem state, and it contains Holy Kairwán, after Mecca perhaps the most hallowed of Moslem cities. The invasion of the Regency, and the occupation of the shrine, at once converted this sentimental Panislamism into a stern and uncompromising reality.

To these causes must undoubtedly to a certain extent be attributed the rising in Algeria, the so-called insurrection in Tunis itself, the wide- spread agitation in Tripoli, and the crisis in Egypt. So much for the consequences of the “Last Punic War,” as far as they concern the World of Islam. In Europe its effects have been hardly less momentous; Italy has become the avowed enemy of France, England no longer believes in the peaceful intentions of the Government of the Republic, Spain is hankering after Morocco, and Germany is posing as the champion of the Caliphate. In Italy the Ministry of Signor Cairoli fell twice within a month, because it was unable to stay effectually the tide of French Diplomacy, while in France M. Ferry succumbed to the unpopularity which attends a failure, and M. Gambetta was wrecked in the storm to a great extent occasioned by his injudicious support of M. Roustan. All this and much more has resulted from the taking of Carthage. While France has her hands full in Tunis, both Turkey and Italy are openly and almost ostentatiously watching their opportunity. These patent facts can but enhance the historical importance of the events which are related in these volumes.

The policy of England as regards the Tunisian Question has been almost a diplomatic enigma. She sang a song of triumph over the Firman of 1871, still declared Tunis “an integral part of the territory of the Sublime Porte in 1880, then told the Bey just one year later to cheerfully assist at his political suicide, and finally, just six days _after_ the convention of Kasr-es-Said, promulgated an Order in Council, to be cited as _the Ottoman (Tunis) Order of_ 1881, the preamble of which justifies its existence by the consideration that “by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means, Her Majesty the Queen has power and jurisdiction in relation to Her Majesty’s subjects and others _in the Ottoman Dominions!_”

I have endeavoured to tell the story of recent events in Tunis essentially from an English point of view, and to mete out impartially the share of praise and blame ascribable to the different contending parties. In all probability I shall please neither of them. The present result of the expedition in the Regency itself can be described in a word, _chaos_. Mr. Whitaker has very fairly summed up the situation in his useful Almanac for 1882: “Last year,” he writes, “Tunis was a tributary province of the Ottoman Empire, and in a state of profound peace. At the present time, it may be considered as a turbulent, informally annexed dependence of France, nominally under the dominion of the Bey, but really under the control of a French Resident.” The prime mover of the mischief, M. Théodore Roustan, has quitted the scene of his exploits, and M. Paul Cambon reigns in his stead. Upon him will fall the arduous task of evolving order out of chaos, and cleansing an Augean stable of no small dimensions. He promises well, and Europe will await with pardonable curiosity and some impatience the initiative which must sooner or later follow his study of existing difficulties. It must be remembered in England that the indemnity to the pillaged and bombarded Maltese of Sfax yet hangs fire, that none of the families of the British subjects massacred in cold blood at Oued Zerga or on the Kairwán road have been recompensed for their irreparable loss, and that no satisfaction has been given, or even proposed, for the judicial murder of the British Consular Agent’s servant at Hammamet. In these serious matters it is to be hoped that M. Paul Cambon will pour oil on the troubled waters.

I once and for all disclaim any intention of criticising in a hostile manner the conduct and bearing of the French troops. Their work has been performed well and honestly, and the marches of General Forgemol, as well as the organisation of the Susa column by General Étienne and Colonel Moulin, are deserving of all praise. To the French diplomacy concerning the Regency both at Paris and Tunis, I uncompromisingly take exception, and I fear that the political history of the “Last Punic War” throws its military achievements entirely into the shade. I believe that both M. Saint-Hilaire and M. Roustan “have deserved ill of the Republic,” in contriving and promoting the invasion and occupation of this country. At any rate, it is to be hoped that the numerous and serious complications which have been engendered by the “Last Punic War,” will serve as a memorable lesson to strong Powers endowed with absorptive tendencies as regards their weaker neighbours, and that the pitiful spectacle of the Paris Assize Court will prove a warning to Political Agents inclined to imitate the diplomatic vagaries of M. Roustan.

I desire to express my obligations to the kindly interest and assistance of the Earl De la Warr, to Colonel Frederick Burnaby for many excellent suggestions, to Colonel Moulin and Commandant Coyne for much assistance in the matter of detail concerning the military movements at Tunis and Kairwán, and to Mr. Vice-Consul Galea, who was good enough to lend me his diary of the siege of Sfax. The reproductions of the curious Spanish pictures illustrating the expedition of Charles V. have been reduced from large photographs in the possession of H.M. the Queen, which were taken from the original paintings by H.R.H. the late Prince Consort, and a few copies of which were printed by special permission for Lieutenant Colonel Playfair, the learned author of “Travels in the Footsteps of Bruce.”

I have to ask the readers indulgence for irregularities that he may discover in the spelling of Tunisian and other proper names; as distance from England, and the necessity of sending these volumes to press, have prevented me from finally revising the proof-sheets.

TUNIS, _June_ 20, 1882.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

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CHAP. PAGE

I. TOPOGRAPHY OF TUNIS 1

II. THE DWELLERS IN TUNISIA 15

III. NINE CENTURIES OF POWER, A.D. 648-A.D. 1535 30

IV. THE CONQUEST OF TUNIS BY CHARLES V. 36

V. SPANISH SUPREMACY 45

VI. THE TRIUMPH OF THE TURKS 48

VII. THE DOMINATION OF THE DEYS (A.D. 1590-1705) 51

VIII. THE BEYS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 68

IX. TUNIS BETWEEN 1800 AND 1837 82

X. THE REIGNS OF AHMED BEY AND HIS COUSIN MUHAMED BEY 97

XI. MUHAMED-ES-SADEK 114

XII. THE BEGINNING OF THE END 148

XIII. BEFORE THE STORM 181

XIV. THE ACUTE STAGE OF TUNISIAN POLITICS 194

XV. THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES 214

XVI. AN INTERVIEW WITH THE BEY 232

XVII. FRUITLESS APPEALS 247

XVIII. A FORTNIGHT AMONGST THE KHAMÍRS 255

XIX. AT BIZERTA 278

XX. THE THREE WEEKS’ WAR 286

XXI. AT KASR-ES-SAID 308

XXII. THE EARLY DAYS OF THE PROTECTORATE 320

XXIII. HOW THE FRENCH TOOK MATER 333

XXIV. THE CHASSE AUX KHAMÍRS 344

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ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOLUME I.

THE BEY OF TUNIS _Frontispiece._

CHRISTIAN SLAVES AT TUNIS _To face page_ 36

SIEGE OF GOLETTA BY CHARLES V. 36

LANDING OF CHARLES V. 36

BATTLE BETWEEN TUNIS AND GOLETTA 36

TAKING OF TUNIS BY CHARLES V. 36

MAP OF TUNIS _At the end._

TUNIS PAST AND PRESENT.

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