Chapter XI: Muhamed Es Sadek

The first act of the newly proclaimed Bey was to assure the British Consul-General of his desire to maintain intact his political relations with the Porte, and General Kheir-ed-Din was sent with rich presents to Stamboul to demand the usual patent of investiture. On the 24th October Muhamed es Sadek signed his first Convention with France on the subject of the construction of electric telegraphs throughout the Regency, and at the same time decided to carry out the plans of his predecessor for giving the capital a supply of water by the restoration of the Roman aqueduct to Zaghouán. In November Lord John Russell answered in a cordial manner the letter of the Bey announcing his accession to the Queen, but Muhamed es Sadek was greatly disappointed at the communication not having assumed the character of an autograph letter. “It is to me,” said the Bey, addressing Mr. Wood, “a matter of unfeigned regret, that whilst it is from England I expect countenance and support, I should have to represent that it is alone her sovereign who, by not condescending to transmit to me her autograph commands, deprives me of the honour which my ancestors and predecessors have enjoyed till recently, and which I still continue to enjoy from other sovereigns. I hope, therefore, that Her Majesty will be pleased to honour me by continuing a privilege of which my predecessors were so justly proud.” The Bey, nevertheless, did not fail to submit to Mr. Wood a copy of his letter to the Sultan, together with a list of the presents forwarded to Stamboul, and to ask as usual for the good offices of the British Ambassador. There can be no doubt that Muhamed es Sadek was at first inclined to fall back once more on the anti-Turkish policy for a short time followed by Ahmed Bey, but the logical arguments of Mr. Wood soon induced him to adopt a different course, and General Kheir-ed-Din was instructed to strengthen as much as possible the existing link between the Regency and the Ottoman Empire.

In January the Turkish Commissioner arrived, and the investiture was performed in the most public manner, although the Bey was uniformly described in the firman as “my Governor-General.” Independently of this circumstance, which had its signification, the “three tails,” which are the insignia of a Turkish Pacha of the highest rank, were displayed together with the Ottoman and Tunisian flags. The ever-watchful eye of Mr. Wood, however, observed that a regular throne had been introduced into the audience-chamber, and he hastened to request an explanation of the political significance of the change. The Bey replied as follows:—“We never imagined that the mere change of the shape of our state-chair could give rise to an idea of any change in the present state of the political affairs existing between us and the other Governments. We inform you that this chair is a substitute for the chair which we usually sit upon in our ceremonies, and on which our predecessors have sat for centuries. The change of shape can be of no consequence, for its importance consists in the rules on which it rests. We have not the least scope in the change, and so we inform you.” In spite of this little incident, there can be no doubt that the understanding between the Bey and the Porte from this time became one of the most satisfactory character.

The Bey during the summer of 1860 submitted to Mr. Wood a project for the elaboration of the constitution already promulgated by Sidi Muhamed. It was now proposed to form a Chamber or Senate in great part of a representative character; the Bey was only to act henceforward with the advice of his Ministers, who in their turn were to be responsible to the Assembly. The financial administration was to be improved by the introduction of a budget and civil list, and a court of appeal and criminal tribunal were to be instituted. In September much excitement was occasioned in Tunis by the attempt of one Sheref El Hashem (“the Damascene”) to excite a _jehad_ or religious war against the French from the Tunisian frontier. El Hashem was one of the heads of the Kaderia confraternity at Baghdad,[32] but notwithstanding he ran the risk of deeply offending this all-powerful community, Muhamed es Sadek arrested him and condemned him to death, in order to faithfully carry out his obligations towards France. The last words spoken by El Hashem were these:—“You have sacrificed my life to please your Christian allies, who will themselves soon avenge my death, _for you will be the last of the line of Hussein Ben Ali_.” Two weeks later the Bey was received by Napoleon III. at Algiers. Decorations in brilliants were exchanged between the host and his guests. Muhamed es Sadek was profuse in his promises of cordial support to France and French interests, and even Mr. Wood was reluctantly obliged to report that “the influence of France is now in the ascendant.” Some of the remarks of the Emperor were not forgotten by the Bey, and especially an assertion, two or three times repeated, that the Turkish Empire was soon destined to inevitable dissolution. Soon after his return he requested Mr. Wood to come to see him at the Bardo.

After repeating what the Emperor had said about Turkey, the Bey remarked, “You see that I am forced to conciliate my formidable neighbour by all the means in my power. Any two common Arabs on the frontiers have the power to bring about a serious misunderstanding between us; but had my country been separated from Algeria by the sea, my conduct and my policy would have been very different.” On the 15th November the Bey handed personally to Mr. Wood a copy of the amended constitution he was about to promulgate for transmission to the Queen. “We trust,” he observed, “your august sovereign will appreciate the difficulties and obstacles attending the transition from an old to a totally new form of government. At the wish of England, my cousin Ahmed abolished slavery, and it is at her suggestion, expressed through you, that we now grant liberty and freedom to our subjects. Can Tunis give further proof of her trust in England?”

On the 23d April 1861 the Bey in person opened both the Legislative Assembly and the Supreme Court. The city was illuminated at night, and public rejoicings took place on an extensive scale. On the following day the Bey attended the first sitting of the Legislative Assembly in the Dar-el-Bey or city palace, and delivered a spirited speech from the throne, concluding with these words:—“I have honestly endeavoured to remove all pretext for complaint against my administration, and it now remains for you to promote by your enactments the well-being of the inhabitants of this country. I call upon God and this assembly to witness my words, and I pray Him to lend you His aid in putting my measures into execution.” Upon this the gaudily painted council-room resounded with the cries of “May God grant a long life to our prince!” Shortly after this Prince Louis Napoleon and the Princess Clothilde visited Tunis, and were, together with the Bey and his Prime Minister, present at the inauguration of the newly built French consular residence. Although a shower of foreign decorations (the grand crosses of Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Norway amongst the number) was the immediate consequence of the constitution, the new Chamber, and more especially the new courts, became increasingly unpopular, and a tumultuous mob even invaded the precincts of the Bardo. The offenders were subsequently pardoned, but the conviction gained ground that serious troubles were at hand.

During the following year the Bey resolved to send a special envoy to congratulate the Sultan Abd el Aziz on his accession to the imperial throne. In May 1862 the first local loan, which was afterwards to be the cause of so much mischief, was contracted, and about the same time some of the Algerian tribes led by Spahis in the French service attacked the Tunisian clan Boughanem on the Tunisian side of the frontier. This greatly irritated the Bey, and he received very favourably a proposal by Mr. Wood to enter into a convention permitting British subjects to hold real property in the country. During the autumn the Khamírs rose in rebellion against the Bey owing to the imposition of an extraordinary poll-tax. In spite of the natural difficulties which the dense forests of their country present, the heir-apparent in a short time succeeded in restoring order. It was just at this juncture that a timely visit of the Prince of Wales and the Crown Prince and Princess of Prussia created a very happy impression on the Bey’s mind as regarded his relations with England, and very formal assurances were given him that as long as he followed the policy he had already adopted he might always count on the friendly offices of Great Britain. Two months later the present King of Italy arrived in Tunis, and during the festivities which ensued somewhat surprised his suite by investing the Bey with the insignia of the Annunziata. Victor Emmanuel some months afterwards confirmed by patent the spontaneous nomination made by his son. The pecuniary embarrassments of the Bey soon passed beyond the reach of local loans, and in May 1863, after long negotiations, he borrowed £1,400,000 from Messrs. Oppenheim and Erlanger for fifteen years at the interest of twelve per cent. From this date began the long series of financial difficulties which have not a little contributed to the virtual absorption of the Regency.

During the summer the Bey had occasion to complain of three specific raids on his subjects committed by Algerian tribesmen. “These incursions,” remarked Mr. Wood, “are unfortunately becoming more frequent, and now generally lead to remonstrances and misunderstandings between the French authorities and the Bey’s Government. In the last aggression reported, it is, to say the least, singular that the French troops at Tebessa did not interfere to prevent the attack.” The Bey at last signed the convention allowing British subjects to hold landed property in the country. This diplomatic success was hardly of less importance than the abolition of slavery and the constitution itself, and the more so as no similar concession had ever yet been before granted in any Moslem country.

The year 1864 was ushered in by a revolution of the Arab tribes. In order to pay the interest due to Messrs. Oppenheim and Erlanger the poll-tax payable by every Tunisian subject was raised from 36 to 72 piastres, and the attempt to levy this wholly exorbitant demand terminated by a serious revolt. Beja was besieged, Matar fell into the hands of the insurgents, and the Governor of Kef, proceeding to join his post, was killed by the warlike tribe of the Boughanem. M. De Beauval, who had succeeded M. Roche as French Chargé d’Affaires, within a few hours of the news of the outbreak reaching Tunis, went to the Bey and _demanded in the name of the Emperor the abrogation of the constitution_. “Your Organic Laws,” he said, “are wholly and solely the cause of the present discontent. The Arabs are tired of your regular tribunals and prefer your summary justice; and if you do not choose to go back to it, they will make you.” The Bey curtly declined. The Emperor at Algiers had received an emblazoned copy of the Tunisian code, and had highly complimented its author. Muhamed es Sadek could not as yet understand the inexpediency of a too liberal and constitutional state existing on the frontiers of the dominions of the Algerian Bureaux Arabes. As usual, he took refuge from his perplexity in an interview with Mr. Wood. Meanwhile the disaffection spread southwards. Sfax and Susa were threatened, and the Bey at last realised the fact that he was almost defenceless. While he was elaborating his constitution and receiving foreign grand crosses, the remains of his cousin Ahmed’s force had dwindled down to a few regiments of tattered soldiers, who were more able to knit stockings than face the hardy tribesmen of the interior. It was under these circumstances decided that the Tunisian commander-in- chief should treat with the rebels. Meanwhile M. De Beauval sought an interview with the Bey, and said that the British convention must be also annulled as a second cause of offence. The Bey declined even to discuss such a proposal, whereupon M. De Beauval rejoined “that he had become English and would repent of it.” He went on to say that the Regency was really under the protection, not of France, but of the French Consulate-General, and that he demanded the dismissal of the Vizier Mustapha and General Kheir-ed-Din as the supporters and promoters of Anglo-Turkish views and interests.

The negotiations with the revolted tribes took a favourable turn, and the obnoxious tax was repealed by proclamation. Meanwhile several British ships of war arrived as well as a French squadron. M. De Beauval at once repaired to the palace, accompanied by the Admiral, some officers of his staff, and Colonel Campenon, formerly military instructor in the Tunisian army. The French Chargé d’Affaires renewed his demand for the abrogation of the Organic Laws and the dismissal of his Minister. The Bey absolutely rejected the former request, but observed that “as he had made a constitution to please England and France, he had no objection to unmake it, provided the two Governments were agreed on the subject.” Colonel Campenon then violently denounced the Prime Minister, and said that “while he had been heaping up riches the country had grown too poor to maintain the standing army necessary for its defence.” So warm an altercation then ensued that the Bey and Sidi Mustapha were obliged to leave the room.

The Italian fleet now hastened to join the English and French vessels. Although no hostile movement was made by the tribes in the interior, the rebels sacked Sfax on the 30th April, and obliged the European colonists to take refuge in the ships lying off the town. Their wrath seems to have been particularly directed against the Government farmers and monopolists, and their houses and stores were pillaged “even to the nails.” It was agreed that if disorders occurred at Tunis the marines of the English, French, and Italian ships should proceed thither by boat to assist the male inhabitants in constructing barricades and defending the European quarter. The critical situation of the whole country did not deter M. De Beauval from continuing his endeavours to still further embarrass the Bey. He put his various demands in the form of an ultimatum, and sent M. Jules Lesseps with it to the palace. In order to facilitate a solution of the difficulty, Sidi Mustapha tendered his resignation, and the Bey finally threatened to abdicate in four days.

This seems to have brought matters to a deadlock. M. De Beauval attempted to induce the Admiral to land troops at Goletta, but before he had time to do further mischief, England, France, and Italy had agreed to a _joint_ action regarding Tunis. The time for the French to take Carthage had not yet come. A week later Haider Effendi, the Commissioner Extraordinary of the Porte to “inquire into the state of affairs at Tunis,” arrived at Goletta with three Ottoman ships. Before the vessels finally anchored, Admiral D’Herbingham went on board, and endeavoured, both by persuasion and threats, to induce Haider Effendi to refrain from landing. The Turkish envoy prolonged the discussion sufficiently to enable him to take up an advantageous position, and then quietly refused to comply with the propositions made to him. The advent of Haider Effendi added not a little to the difficulties of the situation. During the month of May the revolution continued unabated. The rebels at Sfax pronounced the deposition of the Bey and hoisted the Ottoman flag, and the European colonists at Susa three times took refuge in the European ships in the roadstead on the false alarm of a general rising. Meanwhile the Bey held long conferences with Haider Effendi, and used every exertion to prepare a small force to march into the disturbed districts. During all this time the four fleets remained at Goletta and on the coasts, while the tortuous diplomatic game was being played out at Paris, London, Turin, and Constantinople. Lord Russell’s prompt and vigorous action had at the onset nipped M. De Beauval’s schemes in the bud by inducing M. Drouyn de Lhuys to accept the principle of joint action in any case, but a fresh obstacle to his plans soon afterwards presented itself. Italy now for the first time became a factor in the Tunisian question. Her ships contained soldiers and engineers as well as sailors; her press talked magnanimously of a wholly disinterested Italian occupation on behalf of the Allied Powers; and France began to perceive that her jealousy of England in Tunis must be henceforth transferred to the proceedings of Italy.

The summer of 1864 passed away in groundless alarms. M. De Beauval made various efforts to furnish an excuse for intervention by keeping alight the smouldering embers of the insurrection, but he was doomed to disappointment. The rebel chief Ali Ben Ghadam made his peace with the Bey, and the influence of the Tijania confraternity, to which he belonged, was also directed to putting an end to the conflict. After a series of conferences held at Kairwán, the Sheikhs of the southern tribes determined to give in their submission, provided the English Consul-General would guarantee their personal safety, and at length the revolutionary movement was successfully confined to the towns and villages surrounding Susa. During all this time the French press alternately denounced Turkey and England as the cause of the insurrection, which it was alleged had been excited and fostered as an excuse for bringing the Regency under the direct rule of the Porte. This theory, however, was soon destined to receive a rude shock. When Ali Ben Ghadam decided to abandon the _rôle_ of an agitator, and asked to be allowed “to retire from the world and spend his days upon a small plot of ground on which he would build a _zaouia_ of the Tijania brotherhood,” he voluntarily placed in the hands of Muhamed es Sadek three extraordinary letters which he had received from M. De Beauval through one Giovannino Mattei, the French Vice-Consul of Sfax. They merit to be handed down to posterity as unique specimens of diplomatic ingenuity, and the more so as their authenticity never appears to have been denied. It need hardly be said that the French naval and military officers were entirely ignorant of these or any similar communications.

LETTER NO. 1 (_Literal Translation_).

In the name of the one God. From M. De Beauval, French Consul in Tunis, to our beloved, respected, and learned Seïd Aly Ben Mohamed Ben Ghadam. After greetings, we have to inform you, first, that we solemnly swear by the Almighty who sent the gospel with Christ that we will not hide from you anything nor the wishes of our Government. The arrival of our ships of war at the Goletta is with the object of forcing your Government to accede to your demands, without which your property, your persons, and your well-being will be imperilled. When we asked the Bey to comply with your desires, he desired to have four days to consider his answer, at the expiration of which time he replied that you had not made the demands that we had stated to him, but that some evil-doers were circulating these reports; in proof thereof he mentioned the arrival of the Kabyles in order to pay him their accustomed homage. We were obliged to wait. After a few days, some self-styled Sheikhs of the Kabyles came, followed by others. On their arrival, the Bey informed us that all the tribes were coming, which we know to be incorrect, as we are aware that these individuals are the inhabitants of shores of the neighbouring lakes, and consequently are people of no importance, their sole object being to receive the robes (investiture) promised them by the Governors as well as the protection of the Government. We feel confident that this circumstance does not weaken your union and confederacy for the attainment of your objects as well as the prosperity of your country. We will now acquaint you with what will strengthen your cause, inasmuch as the facts we narrate tend to the ruin of your country. Your Ministers have made a treaty with the English just before your revolt, the first condition of which is that the English shall have the right to possess and hold immovable property, such as houses, farms, and lands. You will be deprived, therefore, of this kind of property, because your fortunes do not equal theirs. For instance, a field for which you cannot afford to pay one thousand piastres, and in which, according to your manner of farming, you could only sow one kaffis (measure) of wheat and another of barley, the English can afford to pay ten thousand piastres for, because by a superior mode of farming they could plant cotton and other rich produce, which you have neither the means to do nor the custom. Secondly, they desire to construct railroads similar to those in our own countries, to remain in their possession until their income shall have paid off the capital, the accounts to be accepted as presented by them. This is just the manner to take possession of your country; for according to their laws whoever obtains an uninterrupted possession of anything for twenty years becomes the proprietor of it; and the lord of the soil, notwithstanding the legal instruments he may possess, may ask the Almighty for its restitution, their laws giving greater weight to possession than to documents. Thirdly, to open in Tunis a bank with a large capital, for the purpose of lending money at interest, thereby converting all your people into debtors, thus carrying out the Arabic proverb that “your creditor becomes your lord.” Fourthly, that all lands and mountains where gold, silver, lead, and other minerals are found shall appertain to the English, they having the right of working them on their own account. The consequence will be that any one might be dispossessed of his own lands by their researches, since, should they discover any minerals, the lands will become their property, to the exclusion of the rights of the true possessor, inasmuch as the mineral grounds have been sold to them by the Government. These nefarious transactions, which no one who has any feeling of humanity can tolerate, have aroused the anger of my Government, and its object in sending the fleet is to obtain the dismissal of the Minister and the abrogation of the Organic Laws, upon which the aforesaid treaty is founded. As the abrogation of the constitution will carry with it the annulment of the aforesaid treaty as well as the fall of the Minister who is its maker, with the aid of God there is not the slightest necessity for these _disgraceful_ transactions. I must also acquaint you that France, my powerful country, makes great efforts for the welfare of all countries, and particularly for that of Tunis, owing to its proximity to Algeria, and also for the princes of the Husseinite dynasty. I have also to inform you that your Ministers are pressing the Bey to send a camp of soldiers with artillery by way of “Bejia” and Kirwan, with the intention of separating the tribes from you in order to weaken you. You must, and it is your duty to come to “Sidy el Hatab” (a sanctuary within three leagues of Tunis) with about four thousand horsemen, informing me of it a day or two previous to your arrival. You will then ask for a general conference, and I shall be with you and for you, and nothing shall occur but what will be advantageous.

Greeting from the writer of these characters, Giannino, Consul at Sfax, at present in Tunis, and who writes the present letter by order of M. Consul Beauval, agent for the Emperor of France—may God render him victorious—and from your affectionate friend Campenon, French colonel.

25 HODJIA 1280 = 1st June 1864.

(At the foot of the letter is a seal with red wax effaced and some European letters.)

_P.S._—If you are unable to come, send us a certified document from the principal chiefs of all the tribes and their followers, containing all their demands from the Tunisian Government, as well as what may be satisfactory to you.

LETTER NO. 2.

In the name of God. To the beloved, accomplished, and learned Seïd Aly Ben Mohamed Ben Ghadam. We have to inform you that we have forwarded to you three letters previous to the present one, and we do not know whether they have reached you because we have not received any reply to them. Their contents referred to many of your affairs in which we take an interest, as the Almighty can witness. We are now obliged to allude to some of them, and to acquaint you with what has now come to our knowledge. In the first place, we swear by the gospel that we will not hide anything from you, and that we are firmly supporting you in all your demands, in all of which we concur with you, but that we shall greatly regret if you relinquish any of them, being persuaded it will be to your injury and will lead to the shedding of your blood, which the Minister desires above all things. Amongst the matters discussed at the Dar el Bey (residence of Ottoman Commissioner) was the requisition to the Sultan to send ten thousand soldiers to attack you. When, however, our Government became acquainted with it, it forced these troops to return from Malta, and it addressed itself at the same time to the Sultan, to whom it made known the oppression to which you were subjected, and in consequence of which you had risen to demand your rights. The Sultan acceded to its remonstrances and intrusted to us the settlement of your affairs with the Bey. From this we derive two advantages—first, your welfare, and, secondly, the prevention of the arrival of Turkish troops in Africa, which does not suit us. When the Minister became aware of it, he despatched General Sy Hussein to Susa to spread the news that the French were aiming at the possession of Africa, with a view to create enmity between us, having found us to be your supporters. Should your demand for Turkish intervention become public, our opposition to the arrival of Ottoman troops will be thereby weakened. We also inform you that the Minister has sent yourself Ben Beshir to “Bejia” for the purpose of inciting the tribes against you, so that upon the arrival of the camp it may find them prepared to join it. Be therefore on your guard, as we have apprised you of all that concerns you. In short, we swear by the head of the Emperor of France, that should the Minister remain in your country he will completely destroy you. With salutations from the commander-in-chief of the French ships of war stationed at the Goletta, from the French Consul-General in Tunis, and from the French Colonel residing in Tunis.

10 _Moharrem_ 1281.

LETTER NO. 3.

To the beloved, well-guided, &c., Seïd Aly Ben Mohamed Ben Ghadam.

We inform you that we have previously sent you several letters to which we have received no acknowledgment, in consequence of which we address you the present letter, to the effect that we still adhere to our words and give you our firm support, since we do not differ from you, as will be verbally explained to you by the bearer. We have to request you on the receipt of this letter to come to “Seïd Aly el Hattab,” or to some other place near Tunis, there to convoke an assembly, and, amongst others, to ask for me, in order to enable me to join the meeting, so that your demand may be submitted through me, that the Bey may not again say that you had not made such and such demands; because, whenever I speak to him on the subject, he desires me not to listen to public reports.

We believe that the camp will be delayed, notwithstanding that its departure is purposely announced that you may hear of it and postpone your advance, as your arrival is not desired, inasmuch as it would strengthen our proofs against them (the Ministers), and which are favourable to you. Pay no attention to the Minister’s statements, because all his acts are contrary to truth: they are all intrigues directed against you. In brief, the bearer of the letter will inform you of all our intentions in your behalf, he being a trustworthy friend of ours. When you come he will accompany you; listen to him, and do not act in opposition to his advice.

Salutations from the French Consul-General in Tunis, from the commander- in-chief of the French fleet at the Goletta, and from the French Colonel residing in Tunis.

_Dated_ 15 _Moharrem_ 1281.

The French Admiral, Count Bouet Willaumez, had for some time felt misgivings as to the _bona fides_ of M. De Beauval’s policy, and the perusal of these letters and other authentic reports induced him to make such representations to the Imperial Government as produced the indefinite postponement of the establishment of that “_prépondérance naturelle_,” which again and again finds a place even in the correspondence of M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

Meanwhile, although the rebellion was well-nigh stamped out, the fleets still remained on the coast. Then came another diplomatic struggle. Who was to go first? If France took the lead, it might be said she was driven away by Turkey and England; supposing Italy was left behind, there was a possibility of her carrying out a purely platonic occupation on her own account; but if the Turkish Commissioner went before the rest, the Moslem population would consider that he was flying from the giaours. After weeks of correspondence, a programme was drawn up with the assent of all parties. It is a noteworthy fact that Lord Russell and Mr. Wood induced the other interested parties to leave the English ships behind to keep the peace.

_Programme of the Departure of the French, Italian, and Turkish Squadrons, fixed to take place on Friday the 23d September 1864, at 11 o’clock a.m._

1. The Vice-Admiral Count Bouet Willaumez, commander-in-chief of the French squadron, will give the signal to his vessels to light their fires by hoisting a yellow flag.

2. The Italian Admiral will simultaneously give the same signal.

3. The Turkish frigate will also light her fires.

4. When each of the squadrons shall be ready to start, the national flag shall be hoisted to the mainmast of the ship bearing the commander-in- chief.

5. The Turkish frigate shall do the same.

6. When the squadrons are on the point of departure, the French and Italian Admirals shall give a signal by dipping their respective flags.

7. The two allied squadrons shall then move forward, with the exception of the vessels of the commanders-in-chief.

8. The Turkish frigate shall then set sail.

9. The Admirals will start as soon as the Turkish fleet has passed them.

10. The squadrons will wait for their commanders-in-chief beyond Cape Carthage.

Agreed to on board the “Solferino” in the roads of Tunis, 20th September 1864.

(Signed) BOUET WILLAUMEZ. ALBINI.

Soon after the departure of the fleets the Bey’s troops defeated the rebels outside Susa; a rising in Djerba was promptly put down, and the Bey’s authority re-established from Tabarca to the Tripolitan frontier. Before he quitted Tunis, Muhamed es Sadek informed Haider Effendi that recent events had convinced him that the only chance of preserving the Regency from his neighbours was to follow the advice of England and strengthen his connection with the Porte. “Assure my Imperial Master,” he said, “that I look forward to an early opportunity of placing our relations on a firm basis, and beyond the reach of cavil and dispute.”

On the 4th November a lamentable accident occurred to eight officers and four men belonging to H.M.S. “Orlando.” Their boat was swamped returning from an excursion to the coast, and none of the bodies were ever recovered. Friends of the deceased often inquire for some memorial at Tunis. None was ever erected here, but a tablet near the Auberge de Castille in Malta records the date of the catastrophe and the names and rank of the victims.

The Bey’s gratitude to England was almost boundless, and he addressed the following letter to the Queen, in answer to a communication from Lord Russell expressing Her Majesty’s satisfaction at the restoration of peace in the Regency.

Praise be to God!

To the exalted sovereign who is praised both for her virtues and their effects, which are as glorious as they surpass the power of description, the offspring of powerful sovereigns, at whose commands both sword and pen obey, our friend the Lady Victoria, Queen of Great Britain. May her reign be exalted, and may the praises of her excellences never cease to be repeated!

After the salutations the most suitable to your royal rank, which is exalted above all description.

We have received from your illustrious Minister in Your Majesty’s name a pledge of your gracious favour, emanating from that amity which has been established and consolidated in the course of ages, and which, having been transmitted as an inheritance by fathers and ancestors, has ever been fruitful of beneficial effects, and has led to paths of prosperity. That pledge is the gratification which Your Majesty in her benevolence (the full extent of which the bounds of a letter cannot possibly detail) has felt in consequence of the restoration of peace in this kingdom and of the return of the population to their accustomed obedience.

The admirer of your exalted character feels convinced that Your Majesty’s wish is in unison with what is contained in the said kind letter, to the effect that your sincere intention is the maintenance of our present usages without diminution or disturbance. For this expression of clear and manifest beneficence we shall be ever grateful.

Written by Your Majesty’s ever faithful humble servant of God, the Muchir Mohamed Essadek Basha Bey, possessor of the Tunisian kingdom.

_The 11th Jumad el Thani_ 1281.

_11th November_ 1864.

The Bey now resolved to send an envoy to Constantinople to thank the Sultan for his sympathy during the insurrection, and especially for a donation from the Imperial privy purse of £50,000. At the same time General Kheir-ed-Din had private instructions to bring about, if possible, a clear and definite understanding as to the future relations between the Regency and the Porte. It was arranged that the embassy should leave Goletta on the 17th November. On the morning of the 12th M. De Beauval called unexpectedly at the palace. He no sooner entered than in an imperious manner he enjoined the Bey not to send any agent to Stamboul. The discussion waxed warm between them, and De Beauval at last told Muhamed es Sadek clearly that he would bar the passage of General Kheir-ed-Din by force. He refused to take the Bey’s hand on leaving, and quitted the room with angry and significant gestures. A cabinet council was held immediately, and it was resolved to hasten the envoy’s departure. Next evening General Kheir-ed-Din went on board the Tunisian steamer the “Beshir” at dusk. At that time the French ironclad “Invincible” was lying off Goletta. The commander at once sent a messenger on board, who intimated to the General the desire of M. De Beauval that he should put off his journey till instructions reached him from Paris. Kheir-ed-Din demurred to such a request, and the French officers left the ship. It grew dark, and the “Invincible” began to burn blue-fires and discharge rockets. Suddenly the “Beshir” started on her journey, and the “Invincible” followed in her wake. The two vessels approached the islet of Zembra at the entrance of the Gulf of Tunis. A dangerous channel between the rock and the mainland gives any vessel taking it an advantage of several miles. The “Beshir” unhesitatingly entered the passage at full speed and was lost in the darkness. It would have been sheer madness for the “Invincible” to follow, and she returned during the night to her anchorage at Goletta.

General Kheir-ed-Din did not only take with him to Constantinople a simple letter of thanks. He received a memorandum containing certain instructions which were to form the basis of a firman defining the Turkish supremacy over Tunis. While Muhamed es Sadek was awaiting with fear and trembling the result of his mission, he was agreeably surprised by the recall of M. De Beauval. The French could never forgive him the failure of his burlesque attempt to capture the Tunisian Envoy- Extraordinary on the high seas, and he was summarily replaced by M. De Bellecourt.

At the beginning of the year 1865 the Bey learned that General Kheir-ed- Din’s mission had been completely successful. The conditions which were to govern their future regulations were agreed on, and were embodied in a confidential vizirial letter, which contained a distinct assurance that upon the Bey’s application a regular firman would, be granted.[33] It was, however, decided that the whole matter should be for the present kept a profound secret. Prince Arthur of England arrived at Tunis during the spring, and was, as usual, most hospitably entertained, and in the month of May Earl Russell decided to confer on Muhamed es Sadek the Grand Cross of the Bath.

This fact, coupled with the moral support he had doubtless received from England during the campaign of M. De Beauval, made a deep impression upon his mind. “Whenever my people see my breast covered with the ribbon of the Bath,” he said to Mr. Wood, “they will appreciate and understand the fresh protection they have thereby acquired, and to whom they must turn for succour and counsel in their moments of perplexity and embarrassment.”

The Bey was strongly urged to invite the Emperor of the French, who was meditating a second visit to Algeria, to include Tunis in his programme, but he thought it most prudent to limit his attentions to a congratulatory mission. Taib Bey (now a prisoner in the Bardo palace) represented his brother on this occasion, and received the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour. When he came back, Taib told the Bey that the Emperor had twice remarked to him that “he should much like to visit the site of ancient Carthage, to elucidate some points with reference to his history of the life of Cæsar.” “I did not fail to tell him,” added Taib, “that they were all ploughed up, and that there was nothing whatever to be seen.” The French about this time successfully pressed upon the Bey a second telegraphic convention. During a great part of the year 1865 active negotiations were carried on to obtain a unanimous consent of the Powers to the issue of the firman between Tunis and Turkey, but the opposition of France prevented any agreement being arrived at. The Bey on the 31st July received with great ceremony the insignia of the Bath at the hands of Lord Yelverton, and although he is probably more decorated than any other living man, he has always shown a marked preference for his English order ever since. His satisfaction, however, was not destined to be of long duration. The insurrection had hopelessly crippled his finances; a letter had been intercepted from his Consul at Bone, M. Allegro, offering to stir up an insurrection on the frontier in the interest of France; it was no longer a secret that Marshals Randon and MacMahon were again urging on the Emperor the necessity of asserting French rights over Tunis; and at last, on the 21st September, Baron Saillard arrived at Goletta as the bearer of an ultimatum. The Governors of Tunis and Keff had administered the bastinado to two Algerian subjects in the Tunisian service, some Arabs had attacked a coral boat, and a forest had been burned on the frontier. Baron Saillard was consequently instructed to demand from the Bey prompt and signal satisfaction. This time Muhamed es Sadek surrendered at discretion: the officials complained of were dismissed, the venerable Prime Minister was sent to the French Consulate-General to ask pardon from Baron Saillard, and a notice was issued that henceforth Algerian Arabs under all circumstances would be treated as French subjects. At this price the Bey of Tunis obtained another respite.

In 1866 the financial troubles of the Tunisian Government came more prominently into notice. The state bonds remained unpaid; the European merchants protested; and finally, M. Musalli (one of the Bey’s interpreters) was sent to Paris to negotiate a loan. Money proved very difficult to get, and even the Bey’s steamer the “Beshir” was seized for debt at Malta.

The following year was not less disastrous for the Regency. The absence of rain, which commenced in 1866, continued, and the complete failure of the crops engendered first famine and then typhus. Italy now in turn threatened an interruption of diplomatic relations, because the Bey refused to pay the debts of the Tunisian princes, although their creditors had been again and again warned of the risk they were running. After much negotiations, an actual rupture was only prevented by the Bey paying about thirty per cent. on the total sum claimed. Mr. Wood was unfortunately absent, when, in September, the tribes around Beja once more raised the standard of revolt. Troops had no sooner been sent to the disaffected districts, when the news spread that Muhamed es Sadek’s younger brother, Adil Bey, had left his palace at the Marsa to place himself at the head of the insurgents. Sidi Adil was betrayed and fell into the hands of Ali Bey. He was brought a prisoner to Tunis, and died of “a rheumatic fever, caught by imprudent exposure in the Beja mountains,” on the 5th November. It is popularly supposed he was poisoned, but the evidence is exceedingly contradictory. Sidi Adil was never a robust man, but persons who knew him represent him as being by far the most intelligent and patriotic of the sons of Hussein Bey. He indulged in dreams of becoming the real leader of the Arab tribes, but he wholly failed in his attempt to realise them. The Bey now conceived that a widespread conspiracy existed against his person, and his suspicions were shared and fostered by Muhamed Khaznadar, who had held the office of Prime Minister for over thirty years. On the 5th September, General Sy Reschid and General Sy Ismael Sunni, two of the most prominent members of the Beylical Council, were arrested in their houses, dragged to the Bardo, and strangled by the common executioner. The city gates were shut during the perpetration of this outrage, and before any of the European Consuls could leave Tunis, both the victims had ceased to live. No occurrence had caused such widespread disapprobation since the judicial murder of the Jew Sfez ten years before. Mr. Werry at once repaired to the Bardo to remonstrate with the Bey. Muhamed es Sadek declared that he had ample proof of the guilt of the accused, and that, as the constitution had not been again put in force since its suspension in 1864, he was not bound to bring them to trial.

The famine, cholera, and typhus continued their ravages far into 1868, and the Bey and the Beylical Government were alike on the verge of bankruptcy. Mr. Wood hurried back to Tunis to endeavour to prevent the apparently inevitable collapse. In addition to the two foreign loans of 1863 and 1865, the Bey had created an internal debt with various European merchants by a series of operations called “conversions.” These loans and the usurious interest paid upon them were by no means the only cause of the national insolvency. The insurrection had involved the Government in extraordinary expenses; the State Treasurer, Caid Nessim, had crossed the Mediterranean to Leghorn, leaving a deficit of twenty- five millions of francs; and the pestilence and famine of 1866, 1867, and 1868 had prevented the collection of the usual amount of revenue. But there was another and more serious reason even than these: the Bey was surrounded by Memelouk Ministers and favourites, who invariably entered his service without a piastre, and heaped up enormous fortunes in the midst of the general ruin. The Prime Minister, Mustapha, himself was a Greek slave from Scio; and the _teskera_ or order for the purchase of General Kheir-ed-Din, when a handsome Circassian youth of sixteen, has lately figured as an exhibit in the dispute as to the Ben Ayad succession. Ahmed Bey in 1855 left 120,000,000 of francs in the Tunisian treasury, to be dissipated by his successor, Muhamed “the Magnificent,” in cargoes of beautiful Georgian, Turkish, and Circassian slave-girls from Stamboul, leaving only a very small surplus to be swallowed up by French engineers in bringing pure water to Tunis over the aqueduct of Adrian. From the hour of his accession to the throne, Muhamed es Sadek was almost in the power of a series of Memelouk favourites, who found in foreign loans that source of profit which the diminished revenues of the country no longer afforded.

In 1868 it was already evident that the Bey must compound with his creditors. The clamours of the French, Italian, and English bondholders could not much longer pass unheeded, and very serious remonstrances were addressed to the Tunisian Government by the foreign representatives. The French Chargé d’Affaires at first sought to propound a scheme exclusively under French auspices, but now, as in 1864, neither Italy nor England would consent to be ignored in the arrangement. It is under these circumstances that the International Financial Commission came into existence, in virtue of two proclamations bearing date the 5th July 1869 and 23d March 1870, and made with the concurrence of the three interested Powers, under whose guarantee the Bey’s decrees were to be carried out. The only advantage secured by France was the right of appointing a French employé as “inspector of finance,” whereas the other functionaries of the Executive Council are Tunisians. Although the Tunisian bonds of the Unified Debt of 125,000,000 francs were destined to become an important factor in the Tunisian question, the history of the Financial Commission is neither edifying nor interesting. Everybody who got “into” the Commission upheld it, and everybody who was kept outside in the cold denounced it. Its chief memorial will be a score of unreadable pamphlets in support of both sides of the case. During the past ten years the much-abused Commission has paid a fair proportion of the coupons as they became due, and the various “inspectors of finance” have been eminently honest, if not universally popular. The sources of Tunisian revenue having now become more than ever impaired by recent events, the creditors of the Tunisian Government will not probably object to a fresh financial adjustment, provided always that the present obligations are paid them at par. If this course is not thought expedient, they will certainly prefer to see the joint guarantee of the three Powers remain undisturbed.