Chapter XVI: An Interview with the Bey

The Bardo Palace, or official abode of the Beys of Tunis, is in reality a walled town, surrounded by a ditch, about two miles from the gates of Tunis. It has evidently existed ever since the time of the Spaniards, for the name is clearly a corruption of the Spanish Pardo—a royal domain just outside Madrid. The Bardo contains a bazaar, a mosque, and a Turkish bath, the three outward and visible signs of all Tunisian cities, both great and small, besides a hall of justice, two audience- chambers, a quadrangle usually known as the Court of Lions, the public offices, a series of dungeons for political offenders, and an enormous _seraglio_, behind the latticed windows of which European gaze has never penetrated. No Bey of Tunis has ever been known to inhabit the palace of his predecessor, and each occupant of the throne has generally built a pleasant place for his residence according to his own devices. Ahmed Bey lived far away in the Zaghouán plain, while his successor preferred to enjoy the cool breezes of the Mediterranean amongst the palm groves and vineyards of the Marsa under the shade of the Carthage hills. For several years Muhamed es Sadek “avoided the evil eye,” by transferring his court to the half-ruinous Bardo enclosure, in which some of his ministers now built convenient dwelling-houses. One of them, Sy Ismael Sunni, purchased a plot of ground in the smiling Manouba plain just outside the Bardo _fosse_, and erected a four-storied mansion after the fashion of an Italian barrack or English workhouse, which he called inappropriately enough the Kasr-es-Said, or the “abode of felicity.” Sy Ismail did not live to see the orange gardens blossom round his new house, for in 1867 he was accused of participation in the romantic rebellion of the Bey’s brother, Sidi Adel, was dragged from the gilded apartments of Kasr-es-Said to the executioner’s chamber in the Bardo, and there strangled with a silken cord. Muhamed es Sadek confiscated the property of his dead minister, and removed his _penates_ from the gloomy old _seraglio_ of his ancestors to the more cheerful palace on the other side of the ditch. Kasr-es-Said has proved almost as unfortunate for the prince as it did for his servant. The very room in which Sy Ismail Sunni struggled with his captors, has now witnessed the extinction of even the remaining shadow of Tunisian independence. It was in Kasr-es-Said that the last “possesseur du royaume de Tunis” became a vassal of France.

In April 1881, both the Bey and his Prime Minister were living in the Kasr-es-Said Palace, the only picturesque feature of which is the great garden of roses, jessamine, and orange-trees, in the midst of which it stands. The wide expanse of stucco façade is almost blinding in the sunlight, as one approaches the entrance by an avenue of palm and pepper trees, and above the roof floats the green, red, and orange-coloured silk banner, bearing as a device the golden two-bladed sword of the Hassanite dynasty. It was thus that I saw Kasr-es-Said on the 23d April 1881. Muhamed es Sadek was anxious that people in England should be acquainted with his troubles, and he asked me to come to the palace early on the morning in question. The only sign of the impending crisis was the entire desertion of the _bureaux_ at the Bardo, which were left in undisputed possession of General Musalli and one or two of his subordinates. Ministers and employés now crowded the ante-rooms of Kasr- es-Said, the Council of State held perpetual session in one of the drawing-rooms, and the corridors were thronged with Tunisian officers and Arabs from the interior. The department of Foreign Affairs had temporary quarters in a little chamber on the ground floor, which possessed several sofas but no table. A solemn silence was maintained throughout the building, in which the wives of both prince and premier were sharing, behind the gratings of the harem windows, the common anxiety. Cigarettes and coffee were almost forgotten. Every new-comer from the city underwent an ordeal of whispered questioning:—Is there any news from the frontier? What do the latest newspapers say? Has the English fleet come? Are the Italian troops already at Palermo? The Turkish music was playing as usual at the door when I arrived, and M. Sumaripa, the confidential agent of M. Roustan, had just left the palace, after delivering a verbal message to Mustapha. When I met the Prime Minister he was holding a letter in his hand. In order to avoid mistakes Sumaripa had given him a copy of his instructions. It was a last attempt on the part of M. Roustan to induce the Bey to commit political suicide. The memorandum ran as follows:—“The recent declarations made by the Bey to M. Roustan and the _corps consulaire_ have increased the anxiety already excited by his first communications. It is true that His Highness asserts his firm intention to maintain order, but he adds that he can no longer be responsible for it when once the expedition against the Khamírs commences. In the presence of these apprehensions in the mind of His Highness, M. Roustan informs him that he is ready to place at his disposal a company of marines, together with two cannons belonging to the French frigate in the roadstead, which force will be amply sufficient to maintain order in and protect the European quarter. But as we are now, and desire to remain in peace with the Bey, the disembarkation in question can only take place on the express demand of His Highness. Ask for an immediate answer, and in case of refusal say that we take note of it.” Mustapha had already given orders for a reply to be sent to M. Roustan, and having called M. Conti, the Bey’s interpreter, we ascended the staircase together and entered a small _salon_. The room was typical of the whole place. The floor was covered with Sicilian tiles, and the wooden ceiling painted with wreaths of red, yellow, and blue flowers. Window curtains, sofa cushions, and _portières_ alike consisted of faded yellow damask. The table was missing, but there were two chests of drawers, each supporting a clock flanked by two artificial bouquets in Parian vases. A side door opened, and the Bey entered; he took me kindly by the hand, and asked me to sit down. Mustapha also occupied a place on the divan, but M. Conti remained standing. The Bey is a fine-looking old man, with grey hair and beard, and a ruddy complexion. His features are rather Turkish than Arabic, and I never saw trouble more clearly written on a human face. He was dressed in a black frock-coat and red trousers, and wore only his Pacha’s sword and Turkish and Tunisian orders. Muhamed es Sadek at once began the conversation:—“You have come lately from England, do Englishmen believe in the Khamírs?” I replied that “I was afraid they knew very little about them, but that the English press had unanimously deprecated the expedition.” He said he knew that, and was grateful for the sympathy of Englishmen, but that he wished to make his case more widely known both in England and Europe generally. He then, with much animation and gesture, spoke at considerable length as to his grievances. He commenced by observing that both he and his predecessors had received, during more than two centuries, continued marks of sympathy from England, and that on their part the Beys of Tunis had always followed implicitly every suggestion made by the English Government. His cousin Ahmed was the first Mussulman sovereign who had abolished slavery, and he had himself first granted permission to British subjects to hold land in the Regency, and had done everything to promote English interests in his country. He regarded with peculiar pride the high distinction the Queen had conferred on him in sending him the Grand Cross of the Bath, as well as many other assurances of her approbation. The Bey expressed his surprise that his position as a vassal of the Sublime Porte had ever been questioned in Europe. No Bey of Tunis had ever ascended the throne without the Sultan’s investiture, and he himself had received three separate firmans of appointment from Abdul Aziz and his two successors. He pointed out that his jewelled sword and the Order of the Osmanlie in diamonds were the insignia of his rank as Pacha of Tunis. The firman of 1871, about which much has been said, was merely a confirmatory and declaratory act, which was elicited from the Sultan by the accident of one of the Powers calling the _status_ of Tunis in question. The Bey added several details on the subject of the subordinate political position of Tunis, and declared that he and his predecessors had scrupulously carried out every demand of their suzerain, both during the Crimean war, and again in 1878. His principal consolation under the present trial was the unqualified approval of his conduct twice already conveyed to him by telegraph from the Sultan. He alluded to the explicit treaty engagements he had entered into with the Powers, by which he guaranteed equal privileges to all Europeans in his dominions, and said that if he had favoured one nation more than another it was undoubtedly France. Till a very recent period his relations with France had been most cordial, and he had never refused any request made to him by her representative which he could grant with any show of justice. France possessed a railway which crossed his dominions, as well as the sole means of telegraphic communication with Europe. He alluded in the strongest terms to the course pursued by the Havas Agency, which had endeavoured to deceive the world as to the Tunisian question, and to the attacks made on him by the Algerian press, and particularly the _Akhbar_; but in spite of all this, he said he would never ignore the importance of legitimate French interests in the Regency, or abandon the hope of the restoration of his old cordial relations with the French Government, which only very recently had acknowledged his efforts to maintain perfect order on the frontier. He said that M. Roustan had unceasingly pressed on him for thirteen months the acceptance of a French protectorate, and he added with energy, that, apart from his treaties with the great Powers, his political and religious relations with the Sultan would never allow him to accept it, and that nothing could ever change his fixed determination on the subject; although his suzerain alone had spoken, he could never believe that England and Italy were indifferent to his fate. Not only had they both large and important colonies, but they could not ignore the consequence of the complete subversion of the government of his country which M. Roustan asked for. He left this, however, to their own just appreciation, but they had in the past ever insisted on an equality of treatment at his hands. He bitterly complained of the conduct of M. Roustan towards him, and said that it had made his life a burden to him for some time past. As regards the Khamírs, a calm investigation would show that the true details of the dispute were these:—France had assured Europe that she desired to punish the Khamírs, but in a few days his own troops, under the command of his brother, had occupied the part of the country in which they lived, and any satisfaction France desired would be readily given. This being the case, no shadow of an excuse existed for invading his territory, and imperilling the peace of his country and the safety of the European colony. M. Roustan had for some days asked his permission for the French troops to occupy his territory, but he never could consent to this step, either in his own name or in that of the Sultan. He expressed his strong indignation at the attempt which had been made to shift the responsibilities of the consequence of the invasion upon him, and especially at the suggestion which M. Roustan had that day made to him to concur in the disembarkation of French troops with two cannon at Goletta. He pointed out that such a proceeding must inevitably lead to very serious consequences. He said that every foreign representative must testify to the perfect order prevailing in the country in spite of warlike rumours and continued menaces, and he left it to such Englishmen as Earl De la Warr and Mr. Guest to let England know, from their own experience, how he had governed, and whether he was or was not entitled to the sympathy of England. He felt sure an inquiry would lead a generous nation like that of France to a different opinion concerning him. He said he had no quarrel whatever with France; that he would always further her interests in Tunis; but that, as a vassal of the Porte, nothing could ever induce him to accept a French protectorate of his states, or allow his territory to be occupied without protest. An armed resistance he could not make, but he would be at his post to maintain order and public security. He felt that he must leave his fate to the justice of Europe, towards both himself and his suzerain.

After taking leave of the Bey, I went into the temporary office below to read over the reply to M. Sumaripa’s demand, which had been approved by the council. The letter was couched in the following terms:—

_The Bey to M. Roustan (April 23d)._

Our Prime Minister has brought to our knowledge the communication which has been made to him in your name by M. Sumaripa. You state that additional anxiety has been created amongst the European colonists by reason of the recent declaration which we have made to you and the representatives of the friendly Powers, and suggest that this impression should be removed by the landing of a force of marines with two cannons from the frigate at Goletta, in order to reassure the European population of Tunis. You add that this measure can only be adopted with our consent, because by God’s goodness we are at peace with your Government, which desires to remain on friendly terms with us.

We must first thank both you and your Government for this spontaneous declaration of its wish to continue at peace with us. We are obliged also for your solicitude for our good and for the preservation of public order, of which we consider your proposal itself as an evident proof. We regret, however, to be obliged to decline your assistance because the result would be contrary to what you imagine, and its acceptance would amount to a confession of our inability to maintain order, which is far from being the case. You are yourself a witness, that, under God’s providence, nothing whatever has happened to justify the fears entertained by the colonists, and that order everywhere prevails. The interpretation you seek to give to our declarations is at variance with the declarations themselves. We have assured both your honourable colleagues and yourself that as long as things continue in their normal course we will answer for the public order and tranquillity, and that in any case we will do our utmost to prevent the smallest breach of the peace. We repeat to you, however, once more, that if any portion of the Regency is invaded by the French troops, we may find ourselves in the presence of a general rising, which will spread all over the country notwithstanding our efforts to suppress it. It is this danger we have endeavoured to point out, and for which we must decline all responsibility.

We still hope that the Government of the Republic will take all this into serious consideration, and will reflect on the various perils which an invasion of our country may engender. We trust, therefore, that we may be permitted to exclusively treat the matter of the Khamírs, concerning which we shall arrive at a solution of a satisfactory nature, and such as will secure the end we both profess to have in view.

M. Roustan was very wroth at this unexpected refusal, and in the course of the afternoon sent one of his janissaries to make a round of the Consulates with the following protest in the shape of a circular:—

_M. Roustan to the Corps Consulaire (April 23d)._

The undersigned Chargé d’Affaires of the French Republic has the honour to bring the following to the knowledge of all the representatives of foreign nations at Tunis. In view of the renewed declarations of the Bey in his last communications to the consuls, and of the alarm they have caused among the population, the undersigned has thought it his duty to inform His Highness that he was ready to place at his service the landing party of the “Jeanne d’Arc,” at present in the roads off Goletta, with two cannons, an amply sufficient force to maintain order in the European quarter, and protect it against any aggression. The undersigned only added that the landing could not take place except at the express request of the Bey, who, this very morning, formally declined these offers. The undersigned takes note of the refusal, and loses no time in informing his colleagues of the fact. They will conclude therefrom, like himself, that the uneasiness the Tunisian Government feels as to the maintenance of order is less great than that which it affects to be, or else that it has determined to accept, whatever occurs, the responsibilities it has hitherto tried to decline.

Before leaving the palace the Prime Minister told me that the Bey had determined to charter a steamer to carry his telegrams for Constantinople to Marsala, as it was worse than useless for him to avail himself of the French line, and offered to allow me to take advantage of this mode of communication. I was therefore able to telegraph an account of my conversation with the Bey to England the next day from Trapani in Sicily. Mustapha was very anxious for me to join Ali Bey’s camp amongst the Khamírs in order “to see what really took place,” but I told him it was impossible for me to leave Tunis. He then repeated several times, “We must have a witness, an _English_ witness,” and I suggested to him that perhaps Mr. Perkins, a British resident in Tunis, would be able to meet his wishes. Mr. Edmund Arthur Perkins started for the Khamír country the same day, and continued to send valuable information to Tunis until the final retreat of Ali Bey. His journal has especial interest, as unlicensed writing was strictly forbidden amongst the invaders. Every correspondent who joined the French columns was forced to sign the following undertaking, which was very strictly adhered to:—

“I engage on my honour not to transmit any information, either directly by telegraph or letter, or by third persons, without having the _visa_ of the commander of the column or of the officers he has delegated. I admit that any breach of that engagement exposes me to all the rigours of martial law. I moreover admit having been warned that if the journal in the name of which I am accredited publishes news of a nature to be of use to the adversaries of France, I may be forthwith escorted back to the nearest port of embarkation, and that residence in Algeria be forbidden me.”

It was hardly probable that the intelligence department of the Khamírs (and, according to M. Roustan’s own showing, they were the only “enemies of France”) comprised a collection of European journals, but the very existence of such restrictions has rendered all communications from independent sources of additional importance, and, as events afterwards proved, Mustapha was wise in his generation, when he determined at any cost to have a “witness” with the Tunisian troops amidst the Khamírs.