Chapter VII: The Election of Lincoln--Secession (1)

The nomination of Lincoln for President by the Republican National Convention in 1860 was a rather impromptu affair. In the years preceding 1858 he had not been accounted a party leader of importance in national politics. The Republican party was still inchoate. Seward and Chase were its foremost men. Next to them in rank were Sumner, Fessenden, Hale, Collamer, Wade, Banks, and Sherman. Lincoln was not counted even in the second rank until after the joint debates with Douglas. Attention was riveted upon him because his antagonist was the most noted man of the time. After the contest of 1858 was ended, although ended in defeat, Lincoln was certainly elevated in public estimation to a good place in the second rank of party leadership. It was not until the beginning of 1860, however, that certain persons in Illinois began to think of him as a possible nominee for the Presidency. Lincoln did not think of himself in that light until the month of March, about ten weeks before the convention met. His estimate of his own chances was sufficiently modest, and even that was shared by few. After the event his nomination was seen to have been a natural consequence of preexisting facts. Seward was the logical candidate of the party if, upon a comparison of views, it were believed that he could be elected. One third of the delegates of Illinois desired his nomination and intended to vote for him after a few complimentary votes for Lincoln.

There were some indispensable states, however, which, many people believed, Seward could not carry. In Pennsylvania, Indiana, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island he was accounted too radical for the temper of the electors. Illinois was reckoned by Trumbull and other experienced politicians as doubtful if Seward should be the standard-bearer. A conservative candidate of good repute, and sufficiently well known to the public, seemed to be a desideratum. Nobody had as yet thought of seeking a _radical_ candidate, who was generally reputed to be a _conservative_. Bates, of Missouri, and McLean, of Ohio, were the men most talked about by those who hesitated to take Seward. McLean was a judge of the Supreme Court appointed by President Jackson. He had been Postmaster-General under Monroe and John Quincy Adams, and was now seventy-five years of age. Trumbull considered him the safest candidate, for vote-getting purposes, as regarded Illinois, if Lincoln were not nominated. In a letter dated April 7, Lincoln had said that "if McLean were ten years younger he would be our best candidate." Bates was regarded by both Lincoln and Trumbull as a fairly good candidate, but Trumbull had been advised by Koerner, the most influential German in Illinois, that Bates could not command the German vote. Koerner had said also (in a letter dated March 15) that he had made himself acquainted with the contents of more than fifty German Republican newspapers in the United States and had found that they were nearly unanimous for Seward, or Fremont, as first choice, but that they would cordially support Lincoln or Chase.

On the 24th of April, Trumbull wrote to Lincoln in reference to the Chicago nomination. He said that his own impression was that, as between Lincoln and Seward, the latter would have the larger number of delegates and would be likely to succeed; and that this was the prevailing belief in Washington, even among those who did not want Seward nominated. He was also of the opinion that Seward could not be elected if nominated. The Congressmen from the doubtful states were generally of that opinion, and his own correspondence from central and southern Illinois pointed the same way. The next question was whether the nomination of Seward could be prevented. It was Trumbull's opinion that McLean was the only man who could succeed in the convention as against Seward, and he could do so only as a compromise candidate, beginning with a few votes, but being the second choice of a sufficient number to outvote Seward in the end. As to Lincoln's chances he said:

Now I wish you to understand that I am for you first and
foremost, and want our state to send not only delegates
instructed in your favor, but your friends, who will stand by
you and nominate you if possible, never faltering unless you
yourself shall so advise.

In conclusion he asked Lincoln's opinion about McLean. Lincoln replied in the following letter:

SPRINGFIELD, April 29, 1860.

Hon. L. Trumbull,

My dear Sir: Yours of the 24th was duly received, and I have
postponed answering it, hoping by the result at Charleston, to
know who is to lead our adversaries, before writing. But
Charleston hangs fire, and I wait no longer.

As you request, I will be entirely frank. The taste _is_ in my
mouth a little; and this, no doubt, disqualifies me, to some
extent, to form correct opinions. You may confidently rely,
however, that by no advice or consent of mine shall my
pretensions be pressed to the point of endangering our common
cause.

Now as to my opinion about the chances of others in Illinois, I
think neither Seward nor Bates can carry Illinois if Douglas
shall be on the track; and that either of them can, if he shall
not be. I rather think McLean could carry it, with Douglas on
or off. In other words, I think McLean is stronger in Illinois,
taking all sections of it, than either Seward or Bates, and I
think Seward the weakest of the three. I hear no objection to
McLean, except his age, but that objection seems to occur to
every one, and it is possible it might leave him no stronger
than the others. By the way, if we should nominate him, how
should we save ourselves the chance of filling his vacancy in
the court? Have him hold on up to the moment of his
inauguration? Would that course be no drawback upon us in the
canvass?

Recurring to Illinois, we want something quite as much as, and
which is harder to get than, the electoral vote,--the
legislature,--and it is exactly on this point that Seward's
nomination would be hard on us. Suppose he should gain us a
thousand votes in Winnebago, it would not compensate for the
loss of fifty in Edgar.

A word now for your own special benefit. You better write no
letter which can be distorted into opposition, or
_quasi_-opposition, to me. There are men on the constant watch
for such things, out of which to prejudice my peculiar friends
against you. While I have no more suspicion of you than I have
of my best friend living, I am kept in a constant struggle
against questions of this sort. I have hesitated some to write
this paragraph, lest you should suspect I do it for my own
benefit and not for yours, but on reflection I conclude you
will not suspect me. Let no eye but your own see this--not that
there is anything wrong or even ungenerous in it, but it would
be misconstrued.

Your friend as ever,

A. LINCOLN.

What happened in the Chicago Convention was widely different from the conjectures of these writers, but the result seemed entirely reasonable after it was reached. Lincoln was as radical as Seward--subsequent events proved him to be more so--but his tone and temper had been more conservative, more sedative, more sympathetic toward "our Southern brethren," as he often called them. He had never endorsed the "higher-law doctrine," with which Seward's name was associated; he believed that the South was entitled, under the Constitution, to an efficient Fugitive Slave Law; he had never incurred the enmity, as Seward had, of the Fillmore men, or of the American party.

These facts, coupled with some personal contact and neighborliness, early attracted the conservative delegates of Indiana. Seward, with his "irrepressible conflict" speech, had been too strong a dose for them, but they were quite willing to take Lincoln, whose phrase, "the house divided against itself," had preceded the irrepressible conflict speech by some months. The example of Indiana bore immediate fruit in other quarters, and especially in Pennsylvania. Curtin, the nominee for governor, was early convinced that Seward could not carry that state, but that Lincoln could. Curtin and Henry S. Lane, the nominee for governor of Indiana, became active torch-bearers for Lincoln.

When those states pronounced for Lincoln, the men of Vermont (the most radical of the New England States), who had been waiting and watching in the Babel of discord for some solid and assured fact, voting meantime for Collamer, turned to Lincoln and gave him their entire vote. Vermont's example was more important than her numerical strength, for it disclosed the inmost thoughts of a group of intelligent, high-principled men, who were moved by an unselfish purpose and a solemn responsibility. Lincoln had now become the cynosure of the conservatives with a first-class radical endorsement to boot, and he deserved both distinctions. His nomination followed on the third ballot.

Dr. William Jayne, Springfield, May 20, wrote to Trumbull:

The National Convention is over and Lincoln is our
standard-bearer, much (I doubt not) to his own surprise; I know
to the surprise of his friends. They went to Chicago fearful
that Seward would be nominated, and ready to unite on any
other man, but anxious and zealous for Lincoln. Pennsylvania
could agree on no man of her own heartily. Ohio was for Chase
and Wade. Indiana was united on Lincoln. That fact made an
impression on the New England States. Seward's friends were
quite confident after the balloting commenced. Now, if Douglas
is not nominated, we will carry the state by thousands. If D.
is nominated, we will carry the state, but we will have a hard
fight to do it.

Out of a large mass of letters in the Trumbull correspondence touching the nomination of Lincoln, a half-dozen are selected as examples.

Richard Yates, Jacksonville, May 24, 1860, says the Chicago
nominations were received with delight, and there is every
indication of success in Illinois.

John Tillson, Quincy, May 28, writes that the nominations are
highly acceptable here to every one except the Douglas men, who
have just found out that Mr. Seward is the purest, ablest, and
most consistent statesman of the age.

J. A. Mills, Atlanta, Logan County, June 4: "I have never seen
such enthusiasm, at least since 1840, as is now manifested for
Lincoln. Scores of Democrats are coming over to us."

B. Lewis, Jacksonville, June 6: "The Charleston Convention has
struck the Democratic party with paralysis wherever Douglas was
popular as their leader (and that was pretty much all over the
free states), and we have now such an opportunity to make an
impression as I never saw before.... We are actually making
conversions here every day. The fact tells the whole story. In
1858 I anxiously desired to hear of one occasionally, at least
as a sign, but I could never hear of a single one. Now it is
all gloriously changed."

W. H. Herndon, Springfield, June 14: "Lincoln is well and doing
well. Has hundreds of letters daily. Many visitors every hour
from all sections. He is bored, _bored badly_. Good gracious! I
would not have his place and be bored as he is. I could not
endure it."

H. G. McPike, Alton, June 29: "We have distributed a large
number of speeches as you are aware, the most effective, I
think, under all the circumstances, is that of Carl Schurz."

In reply to letters of Trumbull, of which no copies were kept by him, Lincoln wrote the following:

SPRINGFIELD, May 26, 1860.

HON. L. TRUMBULL,

MY DEAR SIR: I have received your letter since the nomination,
for which I sincerely thank you. As you say, if we cannot get
our state up now, I do not see when we can. The nominations
start well here, and everywhere else as far as I have heard. We
may have a back-set yet. Give my respects to the Republican
Senators, and especially to Mr. Hamlin, Mr. Seward, Gen.
Cameron, and Mr. Wade. Also to your good wife. Write again, and
do not write so short letters as I do.

Your friend as ever,

A. LINCOLN.

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., June 5, 1860.

HON. L. TRUMBULL,

MY DEAR SIR: Yours of May 31, inclosing Judge R.'s[38] letter
is received. I see by the papers this morning, that Mr.
Fillmore refused to go with us. What do the New Yorkers at
Washington think of this? Governor Reeder was here last
evening, direct from Pennsylvania. He is entirely confident of
that state and of the general result. I do not remember to have
heard Gen. Cameron's opinion of Penn. Weed was here and saw us,
but he showed no signs whatever of the intriguer. He asked for
nothing and said N. Y. is safe without conditions.

Remembering that Peter denied his Lord with an oath, after most
solemnly protesting that he never would, I will not swear I
will make no committals, but I do not think I will.

Write me often. I look with great interest for your letters
now.

Yours as ever,

A. LINCOLN.

Notwithstanding the brilliant opening of the campaign, the contest in Illinois was a very stiff one. Dr. Jayne's forecast was confirmed by the result. Lincoln's plurality over Douglas in the state was 11,946, and his majority over all was 4629. Dr. Jayne was himself elected State Senator in the district composed of Sangamon and Morgan counties. The Republican State Committee made extraordinary efforts to carry this district, as they believed that the reelection of Senator Trumbull would depend upon it. They obtained five thousand dollars as a special fund from New York for this purpose. Jayne was elected by a majority of seven votes, but Douglas received a plurality of one hundred and three over Lincoln in the same district. By the election of Jayne, the Republicans secured a majority of one in the State Senate. This insured the holding of a joint convention of the legislature, at which Trumbull was reelected Senator.

At Springfield, Illinois, November 20, 1860, there was a grand celebration of the election of Lincoln and Hamlin, at which speeches were made by Trumbull, Palmer, and Yates. Lincoln had been urged to say something at this meeting that would tend to quiet the rising surges of disunion at the South, but he thought that the time for him to speak had not yet come. He wished to let his record speak for him, and to see whether the commotion in the slaveholding states would increase or subside. Meanwhile he desired that the influence of this public meeting at his home should be peaceful and not irritating. To this end he wrote the following words, handed them to Trumbull and asked him to make them a part of his speech:

I have labored in and for the Republican organization with
entire confidence that, whenever it shall be in power, each and
all of the states will be left in as complete control of their
own affairs respectively, and at as perfect liberty to choose
and employ their own means of protecting property and
preserving peace and order within their respective limits, as
they have ever been under any administration. Those who have
voted for Mr. Lincoln have expected and still expect this; and
they would not have voted for him had they expected otherwise.

I regard it as extremely fortunate for the peace of the whole
country that this point, upon which the Republicans have been
so long and so persistently misrepresented, is now brought to a
practical test and placed beyond the possibility of a doubt.
Disunionists _per se_ are now in hot haste to get out of the
Union, because they perceive they cannot much longer maintain
an apprehension among the Southern people that their homes and
firesides and their lives are to be endangered by the action of
the Federal Government. With such "Now or never" is the maxim.
I am rather glad of the military preparations in the South. It
will enable the people the more easily to suppress any
uprisings there, which those misrepresentations of purpose may
have encouraged.

These words were incorporated in Mr. Trumbull's speech and were printed in the newspapers, and the manuscript in Lincoln's handwriting is still preserved.[39]

But Mr. Lincoln's record neither hastened nor retarded the secession of the Southern States. The words he had previously spoken or written were as completely disregarded by the promoters of disunion as were those uttered now by Trumbull.

Jefferson Davis was not one of the hot-heads of secession. His speech in the Senate on January 10, 1861, reads like that of a man who sincerely regretted the step that South Carolina had taken, and deprecated that which Mississippi was about to take, although he justified it afterward, but he believed that the coercion of South Carolina would be the death-knell of the Union. His remedy for the existing menace was not to reinforce the garrison at Fort Sumter, but to withdraw it altogether, as a preliminary step to negotiations with the seceding state. Yet he did not say what terms South Carolina would agree to, or that she would agree to any. That Lincoln was in no mood to offer terms to South Carolina or to any seceding states which did not say what would satisfy them, was made emphatic in a letter from Dr. William Jayne to Trumbull, dated Springfield, January 28, saying that Governor Yates had received telegraph dispatches from the governors of Ohio and Indiana, asking whether Illinois would appoint peace commissioners in response to a call sent out by the governor of Virginia to meet at Washington on the 4th of February. "Lincoln," he continued, "advised Yates not to take any action at present. He said he would rather be hanged by the neck till he was dead on the steps of the Capitol than buy or beg a peaceful inauguration."

The following letters from Lincoln throw light on his attitude toward a compromise at a somewhat earlier stage:

_Private and Confidential_

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 10, 1860.

HON. L. TRUMBULL,

MY DEAR SIR: Let there be no compromise on the question of
_extending_ slavery. If there be, all our labor is lost, and
ere long must be done over again. The dangerous ground--that
into which some of our friends have a hankering to run--is Pop.
Sov. Have none of it. Stand firm. The tug has to come; and
better now than any time hereafter.

Yours as ever,

A. LINCOLN.

_Confidential_

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 17, 1860.

HON. L. TRUMBULL,

MY DEAR SIR: Yours enclosing Mr. Wade's letter, which I
herewith return, is received. If any of our friends do prove
false and fix up a compromise on the territorial question, I am
for fighting again--that is all. It is but a repetition for me
to say I am for an honest enforcement of the Constitution--the
fugitive slave clause included.

Mr. Gilmore of N. C. wrote me, and I answered confidentially,
enclosing my letter to Gov. Corwin to be delivered or not as he
might deem prudent. I now enclose you a copy of it.

Yours as ever,

A. LINCOLN.

_Confidential_

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 21, 1860.

HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,

MY DEAR SIR: Thurlow Weed was with me nearly all day yesterday,
and left last night with three short resolutions which I drew
up, and which, or the substance of which, I think, would do
much good if introduced and unanimously supported by our
friends. They do not touch the territorial question. Mr. Weed
goes to Washington with them; and says that he will first of
all confer with you and Mr. Hamlin. I think it would be best
for Mr. Seward to introduce them, and Mr. Weed will let him
know that I think so. Show this to Mr. Hamlin, but beyond him
do not let my name be known in the matter.

Yours as ever,

A. LINCOLN.

The first of the three resolutions named was to amend the Constitution by providing that no future amendment should be made giving Congress the power to interfere with slavery in the states where it existed by law. The second was for a law of Congress providing that fugitive slaves captured should have a jury trial. The third recommended that the Northern States should "review" their personal liberty laws.

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 24, 1860.

HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,

MY DEAR SIR: I expect to be able to offer Mr. Blair a place in
the Cabinet, but I cannot as yet be committed on the matter to
any extent whatever.

Dispatches have come here two days in succession that the forts
in South Carolina will be surrendered by order, or consent, at
least, of the President. I can scarcely believe this, but if it
prove true, I will, if our friends in Washington concur,
announce publicly at once that they are to be retaken after the
inauguration. This will give the Union men a rallying cry, and
preparations will proceed somewhat on this side as well as on
the other.

Yours as ever,

A. LINCOLN.

Trumbull's own opinions about compromise were set forth in a correspondence with E. C. Larned, an eminent lawyer of Chicago. Under date January 7, Larned sent him a series of resolutions written by himself which were passed at a great Union meeting composed of Republicans and Democrats in Metropolitan Hall. One of these resolutions suggested "great concessions" to the South without specifying what they should be. Larned asked Trumbull to read them and advise him whether they met his approval. Trumbull replied under date January 16, at considerable length, saying:

In the present condition of things it is not advisable, in my
opinion, for Republicans to concede or talk of conceding
anything. The people of most of the Southern States are mad and
in no condition to listen to reasonable propositions. They
persist in misrepresenting the Republicans and many of them are
resolved on breaking up the Government before they will
consider what guarantees they want. To make or propose
concessions to such a people, only displays the weakness of the
Government. A Union which can be destroyed at the will of any
one state is hardly worth preserving. The first question to be
determined is whether we have a Government capable of
maintaining itself against a state rebellion. When that
question is effectually settled and the Republicans are
installed in power, I would willingly concede almost anything,
not involving principle, for the purpose of overcoming what I
regard the misapprehension and prejudice of the South, but to
propose concessions in advance of obtaining power looks to me
very much like a confession in advance that the principles on
which we carried the election are impracticable and wrong. Had
the Republican party from the start as one man refused to
entertain or talk compromises and concessions, and given it to
be understood that the Union was to be maintained and the laws
enforced at all hazards, I do not believe secession would ever
have obtained the strength it now has.

The pages of the _Congressional Globe_ of 1860-61 make the two most intensely interesting volumes in our country's history. They embrace the last words that the North and South had to say to each other before the doors of the temple of Janus were thrown open to the Civil War. As the moment of parting approached, the language became plainer, and its most marked characteristic was not anger, not hatred between disputants, but failure to understand each other. It was as though the men on either side were looking at an object through glasses of different color, or arguing in different languages, or worshiping different gods. Typical of the disputants were Davis and Trumbull, men of equally strong convictions and high breeding, and moved equally by love of country as they understood that term. Davis made three speeches, two of which were on the general subject of debate, and one his farewell to the Senate. The first, singularly enough, was called out by a resolution offered by a fellow Southerner and Democrat, Green, of Missouri (December 10, 1860), who proposed that there should be an armed police force provided by Federal authority to guard, where necessary, the boundary line between the slaveholding and the non-slaveholding states, to preserve the peace, prevent invasions, and execute the Fugitive Slave Law. This scheme Davis considered a quack remedy, and he declared that he could not give it his support because it looked to the employment of force to bring about a condition of security which ought to exist without force. The present want of security, he contended, could not be cured by an armed patrol, but only by a change of sentiment in the majority section of the Union toward the minority section. Upon this test he argued in a dispassionate way for a considerable space, ending in these words:

This Union is dear to me as a Union of fraternal states. It
would lose its value to me if I had to regard it as a Union
held together by physical force. I would be happy to know that
every state now felt that fraternity which made this Union
possible; and if that evidence could go out, if evidence
satisfactory to the people of the South could be given, that
_that_ feeling existed in the hearts of the Northern people,
you might burn your statute books and we would cling to the
Union still. But it is because of their conviction that
hostility and not fraternity now exists in the hearts of the
Northern people, that they are looking to their reserved rights
and to their independent powers for their own protection. If
there be any good, then, which we can do, it is by sending
evidence to them of that which I fear does not exist--the
purpose in your constituents to fulfill in the spirit of
justice and fraternity all their constitutional obligations. If
you can submit to them that evidence, I feel confidence that
with the evidence that aggression is henceforth to cease, will
terminate all the measures for defense. Upon you of the
majority section it depends to restore peace and perpetuate the
Union of equal states; upon us of the minority section rests
the duty to maintain our equality and community rights; and the
means in one case or the other must be such as each can
control.[40]

This was the explicit confirmation of what Lincoln had said, in his Cooper Institute speech a year earlier, was the chief difficulty of the North: "We must not only let them (the South) alone, but we must somehow convince them that we do let them alone."

The best speech made on the Republican side of the chamber during this momentous session of Congress was made by Trumbull on the night of March 2. It was a speech adverse to the Crittenden Compromise, and was a reply to Crittenden's final speech in support of it. This measure was a joint resolution proposing certain amendments to the Constitution, the first of which proposed to apply the old Missouri Compromise line, of 36 deg. 30' north latitude, to all the remaining territory of the United States, so that in all territory north of it, then owned or thereafter acquired, slavery should be prohibited, and that in all south of it, then owned or thereafter acquired, slavery should be recognized as existing, and that the right of property in slaves there should be protected by Federal law. It was offered on the 18th of December, 1860, and debated till the 2d of March following, when it was defeated by yeas 19, nays 20, all the Republicans voting against it except Seward, who did not vote and was not paired.[41]

Just before the vote was taken, Crittenden tried to amend his measure by striking out the words "hereafter acquired" as to the territory south of 36 deg. 30', which he said was giving great offense in some parts of the North. This was not in the measure as originally proposed by him, but he had accepted it as an amendment offered by his colleague, Senator Powell. It was then too late to amend except by unanimous consent, and Hunter, of Virginia, objected. In this last debate, Mason drew attention to the minimum demands of Virginia as expressed by her legislature. These were the Crittenden Compromise, including territory "hereafter acquired," and the right of slaveholders to pass with their slaves through the free states with protection to their slave property in transit. Mason intimated pretty plainly that even this would not satisfy him, for which he received some castigation at the hands of Douglas. The latter was a steady supporter of the Crittenden Compromise, but he maintained throughout the debate that no cause for disunion would exist, even if the measure were defeated, and that none would exist if the Federal Government should attempt to compel a state or any number of states to obey the Federal law.

Simultaneously with the rejection of the Crittenden Compromise, the Senate, by a two-thirds majority, passed a joint resolution to amend the Constitution by adding to it the following article:

Article XIII. No amendment shall be made to the Constitution
which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish
or interfere, within any state, with the domestic institutions
thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by
the laws of said state.

This was a resolution introduced by Corwin, of Ohio. It had already passed the House by a two-thirds majority, but it fell into the limbo of forgotten things before sunrise of the 4th of March.

During this crisis Trumbull was receiving hundreds of letters from his constituents, nearly all exhorting him to stand firm. The only ones counseling compromise were from the commercial classes in Chicago, and of these there were fewer than might have been expected in view of the threatened danger to trade and industry. The dwellers in the small towns and on the farms were almost unanimously opposed to the Crittenden Compromise. A few letters are here cited from representative men in their respective localities:

A. B. Barrett (Mount Vernon, January 5) has taken pains to
gather the opinions of Republicans in his neighborhood in
reference to the secession movement and finds them, without a
single exception, in favor of enforcing the laws and opposed to
any concession on the part of Congress which would recognize
slavery as right in principle, or as a national institution.

J. H. Smith (Bushnell, January 7) contends that the Chicago
platform was a contract between the Republican voters and the
men elected to office by them, and the voters expect them to
live up to it, to the very letter. "If the South wants to fight
let them pitch in as soon as they please; we would rather fight
than allow slavery to go into any more territory." Encloses
resolutions to this purport passed by a public meeting of
citizens of his town.

A. C. Harding (Monmouth, January 12) is pained to hear a rumor
that some Republicans in Washington are considering a bill to
make a slave state south of 36 deg. 30', thus sanctioning a slave
code by Congress. Any concessions that shall violate the
pledges of the Republican party will instantly turn the guns of
our truest friends upon those who thus give strength to the
Southern rebels. Neither Adams nor Seward nor Lincoln can for a
moment escape the fatal consequences if they yield their
principles at the threat of disunion.

Wait Talcott (Rockford, January 17) has just finished reading
Seward's speech. It leads him to fear that yielding to the
South, and calling a national convention under their threat,
will embolden them, whenever the result of an election does not
suit them, to insist that the victors shall take the place of
the vanquished.

G. Koerner (Belleville, January 21): The Democratic Convention
at Springfield has done some mischief by inflaming the lower
order of the Democracy and confirming them in their seditious
views. On the other hand, it has disgusted the better class of
Democrats. It was a sort of indignation meeting of all the
disappointed candidates, office-seekers, and losers of bets. A
few Republicans are giving way under the pressure, but upon the
whole the party stands firm. "Has secession culminated or is
worse to come? I am prepared for the application of force. In
fact, a collision is inevitable. Why ought not we to test our
Government instead of leaving it to our children?"

H. G. McPike (Alton, January 24): "Our people believe the
Constitution to be good enough. Let it alone. A compromise of
any principle dissolves the Republican party, takes the great
moral heart out of it, and will in so far bring ruin on the
Government."

J. M. Sturtevant, president of Illinois College (Jacksonville,
January 30), protests against the tone of Mr. Seward's speech.
Says that the solid phalanx of thoughtful, conscientious,
earnest, religious men who form the backbone of the Republican
party will never follow Mr. Seward, or any other man, in the
direction in which he seems to be leading. "We want the
Constitution as it is, the Union as the Fathers framed it, and
the Chicago platform. And we will support no man and no party
that surrenders these or any portion of them."

Grant Goodrich (Chicago, January 31) is convinced by his
intercourse with the mass of Republicans, and with many
Democrats, that any concessions by which additional rights are
given to slavery will end the Republican party. There will be a
division of the Republicans; a new party will arise, which will
include the entire German element and which will be as hostile
to the "Union-saving" Republicans as to the Democrats, and much
more intolerant to their former allies.

E. Peck (Springfield, February 1) says that the proposition to
send commissioners to Washington was passed by the legislature
as a matter of necessity, because, if the Republicans had not
taken the lead, the Democrats would have done so, and would
have obtained the help of a sufficient number of weak-kneed
Republicans to make a majority. Mr. Lincoln would have
preferred that commissioners be not appointed.

W. H. Herndon (Springfield, February 9): "Are our Republican
friends going to concede away dignity, Constitution, Union,
laws, and justice? If they do, I am their enemy now and
forever. I may not have much influence, but I will help tear
down the Republican party and erect another in its stead.
Before I would buy the South, by compromises and concessions,
to get what is the people's due, I would die, rot, and be
forgotten, willingly."

Samuel C. Parks (Lincoln, Logan County, February 11) is opposed
to the Crittenden Compromise, because the integrity of the
Republican party and the salvation of the country require that
this grand drama of secession, disunion, and treason be played
out entirely. Either slavery or freedom must rule this country,
or there must be a final separation of the free and the slave
states. No compromise will do any permanent good. On the
contrary, if the territorial question is compromised now, it
will but postpone, aggravate, and prolong the contest.
Considers it mean and cowardly to leave to our children a great
national trouble that we might settle ourselves.

January 2, 1861, Trumbull wrote to Governor Yates advising that some steps be taken in the way of military preparations, saying:

The impression is very general here that Buchanan has waked up
at last to the sense of his condition and will make an effort
to enforce the laws and protect the public property. That this
was his determination two days ago, I have the best reasons for
knowing, but he is so feeble, vacillating, and irresolute, that
I fear he will not act efficiently; and some even say that he
has again fallen into the hands of the disunionists. This I
cannot believe. If he does his duty with tolerable efficiency,
even at this late day, there will be no serious difficulty. The
states which resolved themselves out of the Union would be
coming back before many months. But if he continues to side
with the disunionists, we cannot avoid serious trouble, for in
that event I think the traitors would be encouraged to attempt
to take possession here, and most of the public property and
munitions of war would be placed in the hands of the
disunionists before the 4th of March. In view of the present
condition of affairs and the uncertainty as to the future, I
think it no more than prudent that our state should be making
some preparations to organize its military, or get up volunteer
companies, so as to be ready to come to the support of the
Constitution and the laws if the occasion should require. I
think that there will be no occasion for troops here, and that
the inauguration will probably take place. But take place it
must, and at Washington, even though a hundred thousand men
have to come here to effect it. The Government is a failure
unless this is done.

Governor Yates's reply, if any, is not found in the Trumbull papers, but a letter from him dated Springfield, January 22, says that Frank P. Blair, Jr., had just arrived from St. Louis with information that the secessionists in Missouri had formed a plot to seize the United States Arsenal at St. Louis, which was the only depot of arms west of Pittsburg. If this should be attempted, Yates said it would lead to serious complications and perhaps a collision between Illinois and Missouri, since it could not be permitted that this great arsenal, intended for the use of the entire West, should fall into the hands of enemies of the Union. He asked Trumbull to see General Scott at once and insist that something be done which would obviate the necessity of action on the part of the state of Illinois.

Some letters from Mrs. Trumbull to her son Walter, who was on a warship in foreign parts during the month of January, 1861, supply a few items of interest.

January 21 she says:

The Senators of Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida yesterday
took formal leave of the Senate. The speech of Clay, of
Alabama, was very ugly, but that of Davis was pathetic, and
even Republican ladies were moved to tears. Gov. Pickens of S.
C. sent for $300 due him as Minister to Russia, and the
Treasurer sent him a draft on the sub-treasury at Charleston
which the Rebels had seized.

January 24:

Called at Dr. Sunderland's[42] yesterday. He said that in
talking with a disunionist a few days ago he asked what the
South demanded and what would satisfy them. He replied that the
North must be uneducated, or educated differently; their
sentiments must be changed, and it can't be done in this
generation.

Just before starting home, Toombs's coachman, strange to say,
deserted his kind master for a trip on the Underground
Railroad, greatly to the disgust of Mrs. Toombs. She was met by
Mrs. Judge McLean, who said to her, "Mrs. Toombs, are you going
to leave us?" "Yes," she replied, "I am glad enough to go; here
I am riding in a hack!" It was very hard, very disgusting, and
Mrs. McLean, instead of trying to hunt up her fugitive for her,
told her that when the South had all seceded, they would have
Canada right on their borders, and where one now escaped, there
would then be a hundred.

January 26:

The city begins to present a warlike appearance. Two companies
are stationed quite near us on E St. and others are placed in
Judiciary Square near the Capitol, and at the President's,
about 700 in all. A company of light artillery arrived
yesterday morning, soon after which cannonading was heard,
volley after volley. I supposed the thunder of the cannon was
meant to convey wholesome instruction to the revolutionists,
but I learned this evening that it was a salute for Kansas,
which is now a state. Thirty-four guns were fired. I understood
that some of the ladies at the National Hotel were so alarmed
that they began to pack their trunks so as to retreat promptly
with all their luggage. I believe that Gen. Scott intends to
have more troops here, but the O. P. F.[43] countermands most
of his orders. The Cabinet find him very troublesome even now;
he still listens to Slidell and others.

A set of compromisers came here a few days since from New York
with a string of resolutions and explained them to Senator
King, hoping he would endorse them. Mr. King read them and
handed them back silently. Said the spokesman: "I trust they
meet your approval, they are good resolutions; you approve
them, do you not, Mr. King?" He answered in his good-humored,
laughing way, but withal very firmly: "I would resign my seat
first and I think I would rather die." The same men went to
your father urging him to support them, and stated that New
York would not defend the public property within her limits
unless Congress adopted some such action. Your father told them
that if that was to be the course of New York, we might as well
know it now as ever, and refused to have anything to do with
their resolutions.

In the same letter she writes:

Mrs. McLean called yesterday. She said they dined at the White
House once while the President was making up his mind whether
or not to recall Major Anderson. The judge took the President
aside to make some inquiries about the Major. Buchanan replied
that he had exceeded his instructions and must be recalled. The
Judge raised his hand with vehemence, almost in the President's
face, and asserted with emphasis: "You dare not do it, sir, you
dare not do it." And he did not.

Probably this is the only instance on record where a Judge of the Supreme Court shook his fist in the face of the President after dining with him at the White House. It is not improbable that the vehemence of the venerable Judge was one of the potent reasons deterring Buchanan from ordering Anderson to return from Fort Sumter to Fort Moultrie.[44]

TRUMBULL'S SPEECH AGAINST THE CRITTENDEN COMPROMISE

[In the Senate, March 2, 1861.]

MR. TRUMBULL. Mr. President, the long public service of the
Senator from Kentucky, his acknowledged patriotism and devotion
to the Union, give great importance to whatever he says; and in
all he has said in favor of the Union and its preservation, and
the maintenance of the Constitution, I most heartily concur. No
man shall exceed me in devotion to the Constitution and the
Union. But, while this is so, what the Senator says of those of
us who disagree with him as to the mode of preserving the Union
and maintaining the peace of the country is well calculated, in
consequence of the position he occupies, to mislead and
prejudice the public mind as to our true position. Does he
expect, or can he expect, that compromises will be made and
concessions yielded when he talks of the great party of this
country, constituting a majority of its people, as being wedded
to a dogma set up above the Constitution; when he talks of us
as usurping all the territories, as ostracizing all the people
of the South, and denying them their rights? Is that the way to
obtain compromises? Instead of turning his denunciation upon
those who violate the Constitution and trample the flag of the
country in the dust, he turns to us and talks to us of
usurpations, of our dogmas; tells us that for a straw we are
willing to dissolve the Union and involve the country in blood.
Why are not these appeals made and these rebukes administered
to the men who are involving the country in blood? If it is a
straw for us to yield, is it anything more than a straw for
them to demand? If it is a trifle for us to concede, is it any
larger than a trifle which the South demands, and to obtain
which it is willing to destroy this Union, which he has so
beautifully and so highly eulogized?

Sir, I have heard this charge against the people of the North,
of a desire to usurp the whole of the common territories, till
I am tired of the accusation. It has been made and refuted ten
thousand times. Not a man in the North denies to every citizen
of the South the same right in a territory that he claims for
himself. And who are the people of the South? Slaveholders? Not
one white citizen in twenty of the population in the South owns
a slave. The nineteen twentieths of the non-slaveholding
population of the South are forgotten, while the one twentieth
is spoken of as "the South." The man who owns a slave in the
South has just as much right in the territory as a man in the
North who owns no slave. If the Southerner cannot take his
negro slave to the territory, neither can the Northern man.

Again, sir, the Senator talks of the rights of the States to
the common territories. The territories do not belong to the
States; they are the property of the General Government; and
the state of Kentucky has no more right in a territory than has
the city of Washington, or any county in the state of Maryland.
As a state, Kentucky has no right in a territory, nor has
Illinois; but the territories belong to the Federal government,
and are disposed of to the citizens of the United States,
without regard to locality.

But, sir, I propose to inquire what it is that has brought the
country to its present condition; what it is that has
occasioned this disruption, this revolution in a portion of the
country. Many years ago an attempt was made in the state of
South Carolina to disrupt this Government, at that time on
account of the revenue system. It failed. The disunionists of
1832 were put down by General Jackson; and from that day to
this there have been secessionists _per se_, men who have been
struggling continuously and persistently to propagate their
doctrine wherever they could find followers; and, I am sorry to
say, they seem to have impressed the public mind of the South,
to a great extent, with their notions. In 1850, the effort to
break up the Government was renewed. It was then settled by
what were known as the compromise measures of that year. The
great men of that day--Clay, Webster, Cass, and others--took
part in that settlement, and it was then supposed that the
settlement would be permanent. The controversy of 1850 was not
in regard to a tariff, but in regard to the negro question; the
very question which General Jackson had prophesied, in the
nullification times, would be the one upon which the next
attempt would be made to destroy the Government. After a long
struggle, the compromise measures of 1850 were passed. Quiet
was given to the country; all parties in all sections of the
country acquiesced in the settlement then made. Resolutions
were offered in this body denouncing any person who should
attempt again to introduce the question of slavery into
Congress. Speeches were made, in which Senators declared that
they would never again speak upon the subject in the Congress
of the United States. It was said that the slavery question was
forever removed from the halls of Congress, and we then
supposed that the country would continue quiet on this exciting
subject. But, sir, in 1854, notwithstanding the pledges which
had been given in 1850, notwithstanding the quiet of the
country, when no man was agitating the slavery question; when
no petitions came from the states, counties, cities, or towns,
from villages or individuals, asking a disturbance of former
compromises; when all was quiet, of a sudden a proposition was
sprung in this chamber to unsettle the very questions which had
been put to rest by the compromises of 1850. A proposition was
then introduced to repeal one of the compromises which had been
recognized by the acts of 1850; for the Missouri Compromise,
which excluded slavery from Kansas and Nebraska, was, by
reference, directly and in express terms, reaffirmed by the
compromises of 1850. But, sir, in the beginning of 1854, that
fatal proposition was introduced and embodied in the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, which declared that the eighth section of
the act for the admission of Missouri into the Union, which had
passed in 1820, and which excluded slavery from Kansas and
Nebraska, should be repealed, it being declared to be "the true
intent and meaning of the act not to introduce slavery into any
state or territory, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave
the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their
domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States"--a little stump speech, as
Colonel Benton denominated it, introduced into the body of the
bill, which has since become as familiar to all the children of
the land, from its frequent repetition, as Mother Goose's
stories. That was the fatal act which brought about the
agitation of the slavery question; and on the repeal of the
Missouri Compromise followed the disturbances in the settlement
of Kansas. That act led to civil war in Kansas, to the burning
of towns, to the invasion from Missouri, to all the horrors and
anarchy which reigned in that ill-fated territory for several
years, all of which is too fresh in the recollection of the
American people to require repetition. And, sir, from that day
to this, the doctrine which it is pretended was enunciated in
1854 in the Kansas-Nebraska Act, of non-intervention, of
popular sovereignty, for it is known under various names, has
been preached all over the country, until in the election of
1860, it was repudiated and scouted, North and South, by a
majority of the people in every state in the Union; and even at
this session, it has been thrust in here upon almost every
occasion, as the grand panacea that was to give peace to the
country; whereas it was the very thing which gave rise to all
the difficulties. The disunionists per se have seized hold of
the disturbances growing out of the slavery question, all
occasioned by this fatal step in 1854, to inflame the public
mind of the South, and bring about the state of things which
now exists.

But, sir, the Union survived the disunion movement of 1832; it
survived the excitement upon the slavery question in 1850; it
survived the disturbances in Kansas in 1855 and 1856,
consequent upon the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. It
survived them all without an actual attempt at disruption,
until we came down to 1860, and Abraham Lincoln was elected
President; and even now, notwithstanding the dissatisfaction at
his election in some portions of the country, and all the
previous troubles, the laws to-day would have had force in
every part of the Union, and secession would have been checked
in its very origin, had the Government done its duty and not
acted in complicity with the men who had resolved to destroy
it.