Chapter XXVI: The Greeley Campaign

My own feelings immediately after the nomination were set forth in a telegram to the Chicago _Tribune_ published in its issue of May 4. The chief part was in these words:

CINCINNATI, May 3.--The nomination of Mr. Greeley was
accomplished by the people against the judgment and strenuous
efforts of politicians, using the latter word in its larger and
higher sense. The Gratz Brown performance has given the whole
affair the appearance of a put-up job, but it was merely a
lucky guess. The Blairs and Browns do not like Schurz. To
defeat a candidate who was likely to be on confidential terms
with Schurz, as either Adams or Trumbull would have been, was
the thing nearest to their hearts, and for this purpose Brown
made his appearance here. His speech in the Convention fell
like dish-water on the whole assemblage, and, being followed by
the transfer of the Missouri votes to Trumbull, instead of
Greeley, showed that he had no influence in his own delegation.
The changes from Brown to Greeley were few and far between, and
in a short time the convention only remembered that Brown had
been a candidate once and was so no longer. But the personal
popularity of Greeley was more than a match for the
intellectual strength of Trumbull and the moral gravity of
Adams. He was stealing votes from both of them all the time.
When the Illinois delegation at last perceived that the heart
of the convention was carrying away the head, and retired for
consultation, the surprising fact was developed that fifteen of
their own number preferred Greeley to any candidate not from
their own state. The supporters of Adams, while entertaining
the most cordial feeling for the friends of Trumbull, think
that if the latter had come over to Adams's corner the result
would have been different. I do not think so. If the Illinois
vote could have been cast solid for Adams at an earlier stage,
the result might have been different: but there was no time
when Adams could have got more than the twenty-seven votes
which were finally cast for him. The contingency of having to
divide between Adams and Greeley had never been considered,
and, therefore, no time had been allowed to compare views. The
vote of the state being thus divided, its weight was lost for
any purpose of influencing other votes. Then gush and hurrah
swept everything down, and, almost before a vote of Illinois
had been recorded by the secretary, the dispatches came rushing
to the telegraph instruments that Greeley was nominated. For a
moment, the wiser heads in the convention were stunned, though
everybody tried to look perfectly contented. Of all the things
that could possibly happen, this was the one thing which
everybody supposed could not happen. Not even the Greeley men
themselves thought it could happen. The only able politician
who seemed to be really for Greeley was Waldo Hutchins, of New
York, and even his sincerity was questioned by Greeley's
backbone friends as long as the Davis movement was regarded as
still alive.

How the news was received by Trumbull was told by the New York _Herald's_ Washington dispatch of May 3:

... The scene in the Senate, when the news was received, was
one of complacent dignity, such as only the members of that
body could arrange, even if they had studied to prepare
themselves for an art tableau. Mr. Fenton was the recipient of
the dispatches, and his chair was consequently surrounded by a
crowd of the less dignified Senators, who could not wait to
have the telegrams passed around. Trumbull was the most
undisturbed of all those on the floor. His equanimity
astonished his friends as well as the numerous strangers in the
galleries, who watched closely for indications of excitement in
his parchment-like face. In truth, he seemed to get the news
rather by some occult process of induction, if he got it at
all, than by the course usual to ordinary men. Other members
smiled, made comments, exchanged opinions and preserved their
dignity with customary success; but he alone asserted an
immobility of demeanor that will last for all time, in the
memory of its witnesses, as a remarkable instance of
self-possession. At last, when every one else had delivered
himself of some criticism he remarked to those in his
immediate vicinity: "If the country can stand the first
outburst of mirth the nomination will call forth, it may prove
a strong ticket."

Carl Schurz was slow in reaching a decision to support the ticket. His first endeavor was to induce Greeley, in a friendly way, to decline the nomination, by showing him the sombre aspects of the campaign ahead. In a letter dated May 18, he told Greeley that the dissatisfaction of an influential part of the Liberal Republican forces was such that a meeting had been called to consider the question of putting another ticket in the field before the Democrats should hold their convention. Other discouraging features were presented and the letter concluded with these words:

I have, from the beginning, made it a point to tell you with
entire candor how I feel and what I think about this business,
and now if the developments of the campaign should be such as
to disappoint your hopes, it shall not be my fault if you are
deceived about the real state of things.

To this Greeley replied on the 20th, saying that his advices warranted him in predicting that New York would give 50,000 majority for the Cincinnati ticket, and that New England and the South would be nearly solid for it, while in Pennsylvania and the Northwest the chances were at least even. He ended by saying: "I shall accept unconditionally."

The meeting foreshadowed in Schurz's letter to Greeley took place at the Fifth Avenue Hotel on the 20th of June. It was composed mainly of persons who had participated in the Cincinnati Convention and had been greatly disappointed by Mr. Greeley's nomination. William Cullen Bryant presided, but fell asleep in the chair soon after the proceedings began. The first speech was made by Trumbull, who said that his mind was made up to support the Cincinnati ticket. He thought that Greeley had gained strength during the first month of the campaign and that the chances of his election were good. He could see no reason for nominating another ticket. That would simply be playing into the hands of the supporters of Grant.

Schurz's position, as reported by the _Nation_, was this:

That he, more than any other man, was chagrined by the result
of Cincinnati; that he does not consider Mr. Greeley a
reformer, and has no expectations of any reforms at his hands,
and will say so on the stump; that he believes him "to be
surrounded by bad men"; that he (Mr. Schurz), however, is so
satisfied of the necessity of defeating Grant and dissolving
existing party organizations, that he is ready to use any
instrument for the purpose, and will, therefore, support
Greeley in the modified and guarded manner indicated above. He
looks forward, with a hopefulness bordering on enthusiasm, to
the good things which will grow out of the confusion following
on Greeley's election, and is deeply touched by the Southern
eagerness for Greeley.

A private letter from E. L. Godkin to Schurz, dated Lenox, Massachusetts, June 28, gives reasons for deprecating the course that the latter had decided to take in the campaign.

He has considered Schurz's words about Greeley; would be most
glad could he see any way to join in supporting Greeley, Schurz
being the one man in American politics who inspires Godkin with
some hope concerning them. He maturely considered what he could
and would do when Greeley was first nominated. In view of his
own share in bringing public feeling to the point of creating
the convention, he would have stood by Greeley if possible; saw
no chance to do so and sees none now; is satisfied he can have
nothing to do with Greeley. If Greeley gave pledges, and broke
them, "_as I believe he would_," it would be no consolation to
Godkin that an opposition would thereby be raised up. He went
through all this with Grant, who gave far better guarantees
than Greeley offers, "and he made fine promises and broke them,
and good appointments and reversed them, and I have in
consequence been three years in opposition." Cannot afford to
repeat this. "Greeley would have to change his whole nature, at
the age of 62, in order not to deceive and betray you," and
when he has done so it will be too late to atone for having
backed him by turning against him, which would then merely
discredit one's judgment, and invite suspicion of some personal
disappointment. Moreover, the small band of political reformers
will have fallen into disrepute and become ridiculous and the
country will be worse off than before. Feels that Schurz is
sacrificing the future in taking Greeley on any terms....

Parke Godwin was even more bitter against Greeley. He wrote to Schurz under date May 28:

"... I have so strong a sense of Greeley's utter unfitness for
the presidency that I cannot well express it. The man is a
charlatan from top to bottom, and the smallest kind of a
charlatan,--for no other motive than a weak and puerile vanity.
His success in politics would be the success of whoever is most
wrong in theory and most corrupt in practice." All the most
corrupt spoilsmen of either side are either with him now or
preparing to go to him. It is the first of duties to expose him
and his factitious reputation. Grant and his crew are bad,--but
hardly so bad as Greeley and his would be. Besides, Grant,
though in very bad hands, has his clutches full: Greeley's set
would be newcomers.

The regular Republican Convention met at Philadelphia, June 5, and nominated General Grant for President by unanimous vote. The names of Henry Wilson, Schuyler Colfax, and several others were presented for Vice-President. On the first roll-call Wilson had 361 votes and Colfax 306, and there were 66 for other candidates. Before the result was announced, 38 votes from Southern States were changed to Wilson, giving him 399, a majority of the whole number cast. This decision was brought about by the wish of Grant himself, communicated to General Grenville M. Dodge before the convention met. Grant had no liking for Colfax.[128]

The platform of the convention laid stress on the imperative duty of "suppression of violent and treasonable organizations in certain lately rebellious regions and for the protection of the ballot-box." This meant the stern execution of the Ku-Klux Law, under suspension of the writ of _habeas corpus_, which was already in progress. The remainder of the platform was either "pointing with pride" at past achievements, or clap-trap of various kinds, including a promise to take good care of capital and labor, so as to secure "the largest opportunities and a just share of the mutual profits of these two great servants of civilization."

The Democratic National Convention met at Baltimore, July 9, and adopted both the platform and the candidates of the Cincinnati Convention. This involved a complete reversal of the party's principles as declared in its last previous platform, but it was not inconsistent with inexorable facts. There was nothing else to be done unless the party was determined still to battle against the result of the Civil War. It was inevitable, however, that there should be a remnant of the party that would never vote for Greeley--the man who above all others had gored them most savagely in the fights of a quarter of a century. The dissentients called and held a convention at Louisville, September 3, where they nominated Charles O'Conor of New York for President and John Quincy Adams for Vice-President, both of whom declined. Other attempts to put a third ticket in the field came to nothing. The recalcitrants either voted for Grant or abstained from voting altogether.

Trumbull took an active part in the campaign, speaking to large crowds and almost incessantly in Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois. His first speech was made at Springfield, Illinois, June 26, a synopsis of which will serve to indicate the views which he advocated.

He said that he was glad to explain to Illinoisans the position
he had felt it his duty to take on many points. It was now more
than seventeen years that he had represented the state in
Washington. In that time the principles on which the Republican
party was formed had all been settled. Nothing remained but the
machinery, which had fallen into the hands of those who sought
to use it for merely selfish ends. During his service he had
sometimes not acted according to the views of all his
constituents, but he had not failed to follow his own sense of
duty and right. Within the last ten years many abuses had crept
into the Government and numerous defalcations had occurred,
perhaps the most noted being that of Hodge, paymaster, in the
office of the Paymaster-General, "whose defalcations, occurring
right under the eye of the Government, amounted to more than
$400,000." An investigating committee had reported to a
previous Congress great abuses in the New York
Custom-House--bribery and demoralization. At the beginning of
the recent session he [Trumbull] had introduced a resolution
for a joint committee of investigation, with power to send for
persons and papers; introduced it in good faith to unearth
frauds, if existent, and to correct them, without design of
injuring the party. "I was simple-minded enough to believe that
the Republican party, ... with which I had been identified for
so many years, would be lifted in public estimation ... if it
had the virtue and the honesty to expose, even among its own
members, wrong, corruptions, and fraud if fraud existed, and to
apply the proper corrective. And I was very much astonished
when that proposition was met by gentlemen in the Senate who
constitute what, for brevity's sake, I may denominate a
Senatorial Ring, denouncing me as unfaithful to the Republican
party and as throwing dirt upon it by offering a resolution to
inquire into the conduct of public officers."

The public indignation aroused by this forced the Senatorial
Ring to action. "A party caucus of Republican Senators was
called, and a scheme devised to change the character of the
resolution, and to organize and pack the committee, which,
instead of going forth to uncover and expose corruption, should
go forth to conceal and cover it up. The proposition for the
joint committee of the two houses, with power to send for
persons and papers, was voted down, and in its place a
resolution was passed creating a committee of the Senate alone.
The members of the committee were selected in a party caucus,
and not a single Republican Senator who had originally favored
the investigation was placed upon the committee. This was
contrary to parliamentary law, and contrary to the plainest
principles of common sense, if the object was to discover
abuses, and contrary to that ordinary rule which says that a
child must not be put to a nurse who cares not for it. This
investigation was placed in the hands of the parties to be
investigated...." Even this committee, going to New York, could
not, however, shut their eyes to the enormous abuses there. But
they did give public notice that any merchants who had paid
bribe money to customs officials would be prosecuted to the
extent of the law, thereby securing the non-appearance of any
such merchant as a witness. They acted as if sent to
investigate merchants, not officials.... And the Senate Ring
would allow no measure to be considered tending to rectify
these abuses, wanting to keep the spoils to carry next fall's
elections. A bill from the House was referred to the Judiciary
committee, which had a majority of Ring members,--a bill to
inaugurate reforms and to protect merchants from plunder.
Although it was before the committee two months it was never
reported to the Senate. "I made two motions in the Senate to
have the committee discharged and to bring the bill before the
Senate, that it might receive its attention, but they were
voted down under party drill."

"Let me tell you of another committee of investigation, raised
in the House of Representatives, and packed also by an
obsequious and partisan Speaker,--a committee, a majority of
which consisted of the friends of the Secretary of the Navy
whose conduct was about to be investigated. I want to tell you
what that committee did, and I think you will be astonished
when I state the fact that a committee of members of the House
of Representatives could have been found, who were so blinded
by party zeal, so full of bigotry or cowardice that they could
not see, or were afraid to expose, violations of the law on the
part of political associates. This committee was raised on the
motion of Governor Blair, of Michigan, a high-minded,
independent, and able Republican.... At his [Blair's] instance,
a committee was raised to inquire into certain transactions in
the Navy Department, presided over by Secretary Robeson....
Among many of the things that the committee was instructed to
inquire into ... was a claim for building certain vessels for
the Government of the United States during the war. I have the
precise figures here, giving the exact amounts which the
Government contracted to pay for the construction of the three
vessels, Tecumseh, Mahopac, and Manhattan. The contract was
made in 1862, and the Government agreed to pay a contractor of
the name of Secor $1,380,000 for the construction of these
three vessels. After the contract was made, the Government
desired some changes in the plans of the vessels, and a board
of naval officers was appointed to superintend them and to
certify bills for extra work, which they did to the amount of
more than $500,000. The vessels were furnished, the contract
price paid--the sum due for the extra work was paid, and it was
all settled and closed in the Navy Department in 1865. But
these contractors, who had received more than $1,900,000 for
building the vessels and the extra work, came to Congress by
petition, and complained that they still had not received as
much as they ought, because they said that they were delayed in
their contracts by the action of the Government; that while
thus delayed the price of labor and of materials advanced, and
they had met with great loss, and they, therefore, asked
Congress to allow them something more. Congress, in 1867,
passed a law directing the Secretary of the Navy to look into
this matter and report to the next session. The Secretary
appointed a board of Naval officers, who made the
investigation, and reported to Congress that these Secors ought
to be allowed $115,000 more (I use round numbers)--$115,000 in
addition to what they had already received, and put into the
law these words, 'which shall be in full discharge of all
claims against the United States on account of the vessels upon
which the Board made the allowance as per this report.' Now,
do any of you, does any lawyer, ... know how to write a
stronger clause than that to end this claim? If you do, I do
not.... The Secors, in 1868, received the $115,000 and gave
their receipt.... Would you believe it possible that the
Secretary of the Navy would, after that, pay anything more?...
Mr. Robeson, in 1870, ... on his own motion, without any act of
Congress authorizing it, proceeds to reinvestigate this claim,
and without coming to Congress at all pays over to these
gentlemen $93,000 more. Well, that is not the worst of it. He
might just as well have paid them $93,000,000. The Congress of
the United States never appropriated any money to pay this
$93,000, but the Secretary of the Navy took the money
appropriated for other purposes and other years and paid it out
of that. This is bad enough.... But when this packed committee
came to examine this transaction, a majority of its members
reported that the transactions only involved a mere difference
of opinion as to the construction of the law, and, in their
opinion, the Secretary had construed it rightly. And Mr.
Robeson, instead of being rebuked, is commended by the
committee, and is continued in office. It is due to the
chairman of the committee--Governor Blair, of Michigan, and one
of his associates--the committee consisted of five members--to
say that they dissented from the majority report, and held that
the transaction was not only without authority of law, but in
direct violation of it....

"I was never a party man to the extent of being willing to
serve the party against my country and if, to-day, I am acting
with the Liberal Republican party, if I have denounced these
transactions at the hazard of being myself denounced, it was
done in good faith on my part, for the purpose of correcting
abuses, and appealing from a party tyranny established by a
Senatorial Ring to the honest, intelligent, upright citizens of
the country, who are bound by no such shackles as will compel
them to cover up fraud and iniquity in any party...."

He mentioned the encroachments of the Federal Government, as in
the attempt to destroy the privilege of the writ of _habeas
corpus_ in the last session of Congress, as a bill virtually
placing the elections of the Southern States under the
direction of the President. If the people have become so far
indifferent to their rights as to permit the President to
suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_ at will, and to control
and supervise their elections, their liberties are gone, and
"they have only to wait until a man sufficiently ambitious
reaches the Presidency, for him to grasp and maintain absolute
powers."

The speech was two hours long, and concluded with this tribute to Greeley:

... Mr. Greeley [he said] is a man of the highest character and
intelligence. No man in the land is better acquainted with the
public men of the country than he. He is a man of purity of
character, of strict honesty, who would not look upon
corruption and official delinquency with the least degree of
allowance. You may rely upon that and upon his bringing about
him the ablest men of the land to form a strong and able
Administration, because he knows who the able men are, and
could have no other motive than to make his Administration a
success, as he will not seek a reelection. I am not in the
habit of saying much about individuals, but I think I may say
to you that you may trust Horace Greeley for an honest
administration of the Government, and that is what the people
of the country want. You may trust him above almost all other
men in this land for bringing about that state of good feeling
between the North and the South, so essential to the peace and
prosperity of the nation.

The campaign started with considerable eclat among the ranks of Greeley's supporters and corresponding depression on the other side. Carl Schurz, who took the laboring oar, at first with reluctance bordering on gloom, gathered confidence as he progressed in his stumping tour. Enthusiasm for the old white hat seemed to be no figment of imagination, but a living reality. All eyes were fixed upon North Carolina which had an election for state officers on the 1st of August, and which the Liberals expected to win. The early returns seemed to justify their confidence, but there was a change when the western mountain districts were heard from. The supporters of Grant carried the state by about 2000 majority. This wound was not so deep as a well nor so wide as a church door, but it answered one purpose. It ended the "old white hat" enthusiasm and turned attention to the more sober and solid aspects of the campaign. That Greeley was an unbalanced character, that he was lacking in steadiness, in mental equipoise and ability to look at both sides of any question where his feelings were strongly enlisted, it was easy to show by many examples in his brilliant career. His occasional controversies with Lincoln during the war, in which he was invariably worsted, were now reproduced with effect by the orators on the Grant side, and the old white hat and coat and the Flintwinch neck-tie were savagely pictured by Tom Nast in _Harper's Weekly_. There were satirical persons who said that Greeley took as much pains to make himself a harlequin as another might take to make himself a dandy.

The attacks were not without effect upon people who had never seen Greeley face to face. To his immediate friends in New York it seemed necessary that he should show himself to the public so that people might know he was a man of solid parts, of statesmanlike proportions and brain power. He was persuaded to make a series of speeches in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania in the month of September, as those states were likely to have a decisive influence on the country in their local elections, which took place in October. Accordingly he took the stump, beginning at Jeffersonville, Indiana, and moving eastward. His speeches surprised both friends and enemies by their high tone, argumentative force, good temper, and versatility and vigor of expression. The main point which he sought to enforce was the need of restored peace and brotherhood in all the land. No pleading could be more persuasive or more touching. No doubt can exist of the sincerity with which it was uttered.

It was somewhat droll that in the last speech of the series he was confronted by a speaker on the Grant side at Easton, Pennsylvania, September 28, who predicted that if Greeley were elected all the furnace fires in the Lehigh Valley would be put out and their working-people thrown upon the almshouses. This to the stoutest champion of the protective tariff then living! He was not, however, struck dumb by the prospect of the early impoverishment of the iron workers. He said:

A recent speaker of the opposition has asserted that if I were
made President all the furnace fires in the Lehigh Valley would
presently be put out. This seems incredible. All men know I am
a protectionist; but that I would not veto any bill fairly
passed by the Congress of the United States modifying or
changing the tariff is certainly true. I do not believe in
government by selfish rings, but I believe just as little in
government by the one-man power. I don't believe in government
by vetoes. The veto power of the President is not given him to
enable him to reject every bill for which he would have refused
to vote if a member of Congress, but only to be employed in
certain great emergencies where corruption or recklessness has
passed a measure through Congress which would not stand the
test of inquiry. I tell you, friends, I believe in legislation
by Congress, not by Presidents, and I should myself approve and
sign a bill which had a fair majority in Congress, although in
my judgment it was not accordant with public policy--with the
wisest policy.

Although Greeley's stumping tour raised him in the public estimation, it is doubtful if it gained him any votes. It was now too late. People's minds were made up and nothing could change them, not even the Credit-Mobilier scandal. General Grant was not concerned in this scandal, but a number of his most distinguished supporters, the very pillars of the Republican party, beginning with Vice-President Colfax, were named as guilty of taking bribes to influence their votes in Congress for the Union Pacific Railroad. This accusation was not made public until September, and then by accident. Most of the persons accused made denial, and since no investigation could be had until the next session of Congress (a month later than the election), nobody was bound to give credence to an unproved charge. The general answer of the supporters of Grant was that they would not withhold their votes from him even if the charge were true. Nor could they be blamed for so saying. If the persons accused were really guilty, they would be punished in due time, or at all events exposed, and exposure would itself be punishment. It is needless to go into the details of the Credit-Mobilier scandal here. It was investigated by an able and impartial committee of the House, and all the guilty ones were visited with such punishment as Congress could legally inflict.

Of the three October states, Pennsylvania and Ohio gave large Republican majorities and Indiana a small majority for Hendricks (Democrat) for governor. This was decisive of the general result in November. Greeley and Brown were overwhelmingly defeated. The only states that gave them majorities were Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Tennessee, and Texas, having altogether 66 electoral votes. The others gave Grant and Wilson a total of 272 electoral votes. The state of New York, which Greeley, in his letter to Schurz, had claimed by 50,000, gave 53,000 majority against him.

I have always held the opinion that either Adams or Trumbull could have been elected if nominated at Cincinnati. I think also that Adams was the stronger of the two, because he had incurred no personal ill-will during the twelve years of war and Reconstruction and because the minds of the Democratic leaders who had encouraged the Liberal movement were eagerly expecting him. There would have been no bolting movement in that quarter. The Germans also were enthusiastic for Adams, and although they would have supported Trumbull willingly, there would have been perhaps a trifle less of cordiality for him. Neither of the two was gifted with personal "magnetism," but either of them had as much of that quality as Grant had, or as the public then desired. The voters were not then in search of the sympathetic virtues. There was a yearning for some cold-blooded, masterful man to go through the temple of freedom with a scourge of small cords driving out the grafters and money-changers. Adams was qualified for this role. He was also the man of whom the Republican leaders had the gravest fears as an opposing candidate.

The campaign and its result killed poor Greeley. The election took place on the 5th of November. On the 10th he wrote a letter of two lines marked "private forever" to Carl Schurz, saying:

I wish I could say with what an agony of emotion I subscribe
myself, gratefully yours, Horace Greeley.

He then took to his bed and his friends became alarmed. Frequent bulletins were published in the _Tribune_ showing that he was a victim of insomnia, from which, the paper said, he had been a sufferer, more or less, at former periods of his life. He died on the 29th. His wife had died one month earlier, October 30. History says that he died of a broken heart.[129]

That Greeley had been eager for public office from an early period was shown by his famous letter withdrawing himself as junior partner from the firm of Seward, Weed, and Greeley. When the Cincinnati nomination came to him his fondest dreams seemed to be on the eve of fulfillment. Now all such dreams had vanished, a political party of noble aspirations had foundered on him as the hidden rock, his self-esteem had received an annihilating blow, and his beloved _Tribune_, the labor of his lifetime, was supposed to be ruined pecuniarily. Whatever his faults may have been, he received his punishment for them in this world. He was only sixty-two years of age, of sound constitution and good habits, and had never used liquor or tobacco. He ought to, and probably would, have lived twenty years longer if he had put away ambition and contented himself with the repute and influence he had fairly earned. He was the most influential editor of his time and country, but as a political writer E. L. Godkin was his superior, and in fact Godkin, in the columns of the _Nation_, contributed more than any other writer, perhaps more than any other person, to his overthrow.

* * * * *

The state election of Louisiana in 1872 had resulted in a disputed return for governor and legislature. One set of returns showed a majority for John McEnery, the conservative candidate. Another set showed a majority for William P. Kellogg, Republican. The sitting governor, Warmoth, controlled the returning board and he favored McEnery. A former returning board headed by one Lynch had been dissolved by an act of the legislature. To this defunct board the supporters of Kellogg appealed. The Lynch Board, without any actual returns before them, declared Kellogg elected. They then procured an order from Judge Durell, of the United States Circuit Court at New Orleans, to the United States Marshal, Packard, who had a small military force at his command, to seize the State House. This was done and the act was approved by President Grant. An appeal to him from the better class of citizens of New Orleans was rejected. The excitement in Congress growing out of this usurpation was intense, even among Republicans. The Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections was ordered to make an investigation, which it did, and it reported, through Senator Carpenter on the 20th of February, that the action of Judge Durell was illegal and that all steps taken in pursuance of it were void. It recommended a new election and reported a bill for holding it; but Senator Morton, who made a minority report, prevented it from coming to a vote. Trumbull, who was also a member of the committee, made a report more drastic than that of Carpenter and supported his own view by a speech delivered on the 15th of February.

Here you have [he said] an order sent from the city of
Washington on the 3d day of December, which was before Judge
Durell issued his order to seize the State House and organize a
legislature, and directing that nobody should take part in the
organization except such persons as were returned as members by
what was known as the Lynch Board, a board which the committee,
in their report drawn by the Senator from Wisconsin, say had
been abolished by an act of the legislature, and had not a
single official return before it. It undertook to canvass
returns without having any returns to canvass. On forged
affidavits, hearsay, and newspaper reports and verbal
statements, the Lynch Returning Board, consisting of four men,
without legal existence as a returning board, got together and
without one official return, or other legitimate evidence
before them, undertook to say who should constitute the
Legislature of Louisiana.[130]

This was Trumbull's last speech in the Senate and was one of his best, but other influences prevailed with Grant.[131]

Thus Kellogg and his crew became the masters of Louisiana, and four years later became the deciding factor in the Hayes-Tilden presidential contest.

FOOTNOTES:

[128] This fact was given to me by General Dodge, in writing.

[129] John Bigelow's Diary, under date Nov. 28, 1872, contains the following entry:

"Greeley is now in a madhouse, and before morning will probably be dead--so Swinton tells me to-day; and Reid, whom I saw to-day, confirms these apprehensions." _Retrospections of an Active Life_, v, 91.

[130] _Cong. Globe_, 1873, p. 1744.

[131] Rhodes thinks that the influence which prevailed with Grant in this instance was that of Morton. (_History of the United States_, VII, 111.)