Chapter XLII: Out of Office

JULY, 1885

After Lord Salisbury had formed, in June, 1885, what was called the 'stop-gap Government,' charged with carrying on business till the General Election fixed for the following winter, the heads of the Liberal party began to mature their plans. It soon became evident that the cardinal fact to be decided was whether Mr. Gladstone should continue to lead. This, again, was found to depend upon the policy adopted in relation to Ireland.

The Irish Question was at the moment in an extraordinary position. Lord Salisbury had appointed Lord Carnarvon, a known sympathizer with Home Rule, as Viceroy. Further, the Tory leaders in the House of Commons were refusing to take any responsibility for the actions of Lord Spencer, which were challenged especially in regard to the verdict upon one of the men sentenced for the Maamtrasna murders. This put Sir Charles and Mr. Chamberlain, who had always disapproved the policy of coercion, in a very difficult position, the more difficult because Mr. Trevelyan, a member of their inner Radical group, was jointly concerned with Lord Spencer to defend these actions.

'On July 4th I received from Maynooth a letter of thanks from Dr.
Walsh for my congratulations on his appointment to the Archbishopric
of Dublin, and he expressed the hope that we should meet in Dublin
when I came over with Chamberlain. On the same day, Saturday, July
4th, there took place at noon at my office a meeting of Chamberlain,
Trevelyan, Lefevre, John Morley, and myself, in which we discussed
the proposed mission of Wolff to Egypt, resolving that we would
oppose it unless the Conservative Government should drop it. We were
wrong, for it afterwards turned out that they meant evacuation. Next
the proposed movement on Dongola, which we did not believe to be
seriously intended; then the proposal to increase the wine duty,
which I was able to announce (on Foreign Office information) that I
knew that Lord Salisbury would drop; then the succession duties,
with regard to which we decided to support a motion to be brought
forward by Dillwyn; then police enfranchisement, we deciding that I
was to move an instruction on going into Committee to extend the
Bill, so as to shorten the period of residence for all electors.'

'Before we separated we discussed the inquiry proposed by the Irish
members into the Maamtrasna business. Trevelyan thought that he was
obliged in honour to speak against inquiry, but we decided that he
must not press for a division in resistance to the Irish demand.'

'On Monday, July 6th, I presided over my Royal Commission in the
morning, and in the evening dined at Grillion's Club. In the
afternoon Mr. Gladstone sent for me, and told me that whether he
would lead that party or would not, at the dissolution, or in the
new Parliament, would depend on whether the main plank in the
programme was what I called Home Rule or what Chamberlain called the
National Council scheme, or only the ordinary scheme of Local
Government for all parts of the United Kingdom. If the latter alone
was to be contemplated, he said that others would suffice for the
task. Parnell's acquiescence in the Home Rule scheme he thought
essential. If Parnell, having got more from the Tories, was going to
oppose, he, Mr. Gladstone, could not go on: and he evidently thought
that I should have the means of discovering what would be Parnell's
attitude. Parnell had, of course, been for what I believe was really
his own scheme, suggested to Chamberlain by O'Shea. But he was now
in league with R. Churchill and Lord Carnarvon. I advised Mr.
Gladstone to deal directly with Parnell, but he said that he would
not, and I noted in my diary that he and Parnell were equally
tortuous in their methods. Mr. Gladstone, failing me, as he said,
would deal with Grosvenor and Mrs. O'Shea. But it was clear to me
that he had already tried this channel.'

'On the next day I received interesting letters from Dr. Walsh and
Sir Frederick Roberts. The latter completely destroyed the foolish
War Office plan of preparing for a campaign in the Black Sea, and
once more laid down the principle that England must go to war with
Russia rather than permit her to occupy any portion of Afghanistan
in face of our interest and of our pledge to the contrary.

'Dr. Walsh wrote that in going to Rome he was by no means determined
to accept the archbishopric. "I am not Archbishop; acceptance is an
essential point, and I have a view of certain matters to set before
His Holiness before that stage is reached. I have sent on to Rome a
written statement of my views, that the matter may be considered
before I arrive there. I am thoroughly convinced that there is
another position in which I could be far more useful both for Church
and country. The Archbishopric of Dublin, now that it can be dealt
with as a purely ecclesiastical matter, can be very easily provided
for."

'I suppose that Dr. Walsh wished to be Papal Legate. He went on to
say:

'"As to the Bishops you should see, I would say, in the South, as
you begin there, Cashel and Limerick (Cloyne, unfortunately, is very
deaf; otherwise I should like you to meet him). In the West,
_Galway_, Elphin, Achonry. In the North, Raphoe (of whom Mr.
Childers can tell you something), Clogher, Ardagh, Meath, and Down
and Connor. In this province of Dublin our Bishops are either very
old or very young in the episcopacy: they could not give you much
information. All I have mentioned are generally on the popular side.
Of those on the less popular or nonpopular side, we have Cork,
Kerry, and _Coadjutor of Clonfert_. Clonfert himself is on the most
advanced National lines. But his views are rather general. It might
be well to see him. He is a great admirer of Davitt's.

'"I remain, my dear Sir Charles,
'"Sincerely yours,
'"William J. Walsh."

'I sent this letter to Chamberlain, who replied that it was very
satisfactory.

'On Saturday, July 11th, we had another meeting of our "party," I
again being in the chair, Chamberlain, Lefevre, and John Morley,
being present, and Trevelyan absent. We decided that Chamberlain,
Lefevre, and Dilke should see Mr. Gladstone as to the Maamtrasna
inquiry, in which we were strongly opposed to Spencer. With regard
to the organization of the Liberal party, which meant the adoption
of Schnadhorst by the party, Chamberlain, Lefevre, and Dilke, were
also to see Mr. Gladstone.

'On Saturday evening I went down to Dockett, where I stayed till
Monday, Cyril Flower spending with me the day of Sunday, July 12th.
On Monday, July 13th, I again presided at my Royal Commission, and
again dined at Grillion's.

'On the same day Chamberlain, Lefevre, and I, saw Mr. Gladstone.
After talking over Maamtrasna, I repeated a statement which O'Shea
had made to me, namely, that Fottrell [Footnote: Sir Charles, during
his visit to Dublin, had been much impressed by Mr. Fottrell, who
had acted as intermediary between the Castle and the Nationalists
(see p. 140). He wrote to Mrs. Pattison that Mr. Fottrell and Sir
Robert Hamilton were the only two men who counted in that city.] had
had a two-hours interview with Randolph Churchill on Home Rule. I
also informed Mr. Gladstone that O'Shea had shown me a letter from
Alfred Austin,' (afterwards Poet Laureate) 'a hot Tory leader-writer
on the _Standard_, asking to be introduced to Parnell for the
benefit of the country. Lefevre having gone away, Chamberlain and I
talked with Mr. Gladstone as to organization. It was decided that we
should have an interview with him on the subject (Grosvenor to be
present) the next day.

'I was going out a good deal this week, and on the Wednesday was at
parties at Lady Salisbury's, at the Austrian Embassy, and at the
Duchess of Westminster's, and at one of them met Harcourt and
arranged for a meeting on Thursday, July 16th, at my Commission
office in Parliament Street, with Chamberlain and Harcourt, to
discuss Schnadhorst; Harcourt favouring our view that he should be
adopted by the party, which was done, and the National Liberal
Federation installed at Parliament Street. But the Whips "captured"
it! On Friday, July 17th, Chamberlain and his son dined with me to
meet Harcourt and Gray of the Irish party and _Freeman's Journal_.

'On Saturday, July 18th, we had our usual cabal, Trevelyan being
again absent, and the same four present as on the previous Saturday.
We discussed the proposed Royal Commission on the depression of
trade; land purchase, Ireland; party organization; and the land
question.

'On July 22nd I heard from Mr. Gladstone:

'"1, Richmond Terrace,

'"_July 21st,_ 1885.

'"My Dear Dilke,

'"I cannot forbear writing to express the hope that you and
Chamberlain may be able to say or do something to remove the
appearance now presented to the world of a disposition on your parts
to sever yourselves from the executive, and especially from the
judicial administration of Ireland as it was carried on by Spencer
under the late Government. You may question my title to attempt
interference with your free action by the expression of such a hope,
and I am not careful to assure you in this matter or certain that I
can make good such a title in argument. But we have been for five
years in the same boat, on most troubled waters, without having
during the worst three years of the five a single man of the company
thrown overboard. I have _never_ in my life known the bonds of union
so strained by the pure stress of circumstances; a good intent on
all sides has enabled them to hold. Is there any reason why at this
moment they should part? A rupture may come on questions of future
policy; I am not sure that it will. But if it is to arrive, let it
come in the course of nature as events develop themselves. At the
present moment there appears to be set up an idea of difference
about matters which lie in the past, and for which we are all
plenarily responsible. The position is settled in all its elements,
and cannot be altered. The frightful discredit with which the new
Government has covered itself by its treatment of Spencer has drawn
attention away from the signs of at least passive discord among us,
signs which might otherwise have drawn upon us pretty sharp
criticism. It appears to me that hesitation on the part of any of us
as to our own responsibility for Spencer's acts can only be
mischievous to the party and the late Cabinet, but will and must be
far more mischievous to any who may betray such disinclination. Even
with the Irish party it can, I imagine, do nothing to atone for past
offences, inasmuch as it is but a negative proceeding; while from
Randolph, Hicks Beach, and Gorst, positive support is to be had in
what I cannot but consider a foolish as well as guilty crusade
against the administration of criminal justice in Ireland; which may
possibly be defective, but, with all its defects, whatever they may
be, is, I apprehend, the only defence of the life and property of
the poor. It will be the legislation of the future, and not this
most unjust attack upon Spencer, which will have to determine
hereafter your relations with Ireland, and the 'National' party. I
may be wrong, but it seems to me easy, and in some ways
advantageous, to say: 'My mind is open to consider at large any
proposals acceptable to Ireland for the development and security of
her liberties, but I will not sap the foundations of order and of
public right by unsettling rules, common to all parties, under which
criminal justice has been continuously administered, and dragging
for the first time the prerogative of mercy within the vortex of
party conflict.' I dare say I may have said too much in the way of
argument on a matter which seems to me hardly to call for argument,
but a naked suggestion would have appeared even less considerate
than the letter which I have written, prompted by strong feeling and
clear conviction.

'"Yours sincerely,
'"W. E. Gladstone."

'I sent the letter to Chamberlain, asking whether he thought he
could say at Hackney, where he was about to speak, anything
flattering to Spencer, and he replied: "I am not certain that I
shall say anything about Spencer; at most it would be only a
personal tribute."'

With these words ends the story of Sir Charles Dilke's official relations with his party.

* * * * *

Looking back on that story, Sir George Trevelyan writes: 'I never knew a man of his age--hardly ever a man of any age--more powerful and admired than was Dilke during his management of the Redistribution Bill in 1885.' This influence had been built up by the long years of sustained work, of which the story has been told in his own words.

He combined two unusual characteristics: he was one of the Radical leaders at home, and he also carried extraordinary authority on the subject of foreign affairs both here and on the Continent.

The depth of his convictions as a Radical is attested by a note to Mr. Frank Hill, [Footnote: Undated, but evidently written about this time.] editor of the _Daily News_: 'As a _man_ I feel going out on this occasion very much indeed, but Chamberlain and I are trustees for others, and from the point of view of English Radicalism I have no doubt.' Yet Radicalism never fettered his capacity for working with all men for the great questions which are beyond party, and uniting their efforts on big issues of foreign policy.

It was this gift which frequently made him more the spokesman of the House of Commons than of party in Government counsels. The approval of the House of Commons was, in his opinion, essential to the development of foreign policy, and his views as to the undesirability of unnecessary concealment were strong. While recognizing that everything could not be disclosed, he thought that the House of Commons should be in the Government's confidence as far as possible in diplomatic relations, and he looked on the tendency to surround all official proceedings with secrecy as more worthy of a bureaucrat than a statesman. Bismarck, Dilke said in 1876, was the diplomatist of foreign Europe who was never believed because he told the truth. He had no sympathy with the isolation of Great Britain, which had been a feature of our policy during his early career. But when Lord Beaconsfield would have plunged into a war with Russia in 1878, without an ally or a friend, he opposed that policy as suicidal. Of that policy he said at that time: 'English Radicals of the present day do not bound their sympathies by the Channel ... a Europe without England is as incomplete, and as badly balanced, and as heavily weighted against freedom, as that which I, two years ago, denounced to you--a Europe without France. The time may come when England will have to fight for her existence, but for Heaven's sake let us not commit the folly of plunging into war at a moment when all Europe would be hostile to our armies--not one Power allied to the English cause.' [Footnote: Vol. I., Chapter XVI., p. 239.] The keynote of his policy was friendship with France. His experience in the Franco-German War had for ever changed the friendly impression which led him first to follow the German forces into the field.

Germany at war and Germany in a conquered country taught him in 1870-71 a lesson never to be forgotten, and affected his whole attitude to that Great Power. It has been seen how in the eighties he opposed, to the point of contemplated resignation of office, the Governmental tendency to accept German aggression--'to lie down' under it, as he said; and he fought for the retention of the New Guinea Coast and Zanzibar in 1884-85, as later he fought against Lord Salisbury as to the surrender of Heligoland. [Footnote: _Present Position of European Politics_, p. 242.]

It was this courage as well as consistency of policy that bound Gambetta to him, and made Bismarck wish that he should be sent to Berlin at a critical moment in 1885 'to have a talk.' [Footnote: _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii., p. 439.] Strong men recognize one another.