Chapter XXXIII: Appendix: II

In reply to the joint letter, Chamberlain wrote to Dilke:

"I have received the interesting paper on the subject of National
Defence which you have communicated to me on behalf of yourself and
the other signatories. One of the greatest difficulties which any
politician must feel in dealing with this question has been the
apparent difference of opinion among those best qualified to speak
authoritatively on the subject, and it is an important advance to
find practical proposals agreed to by some of those who have given
special study to the problems involved. Without venturing at the
present state of the inquiry to commit myself to any specific
proposal, I may say that I am favourably inclined to the main lines
laid down in your paper--namely, the closer union between the two
great departments of national defence, and the recognition of the
responsibility of the professional advisers of the Cabinet on all
questions of military and naval provision and administration."

Mr. Balfour wrote:

"I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 12th,
dealing with certain very important points connected with the
problem of National Defence. Though it would be inopportune for me
to pass any detailed judgment upon the scheme which you have laid
before me in outline, and though it is evident that difficulties of
a serious kind must attend any effort to carry out so important a
change in our traditional methods of dealing with the Admiralty and
the War Office, I may yet be permitted to express my own conviction
that the evils that you indicate are real evils, and that the
imperfections in our existing system, on which you insist, might
under certain not impossible contingencies seriously imperil our
most important national interests.

"That four gentlemen of different training, belonging to different
parties in the State, approaching this subject from different points
of view, and having little, perhaps, in common except a very
intimate knowledge of the questions connected with National Defence,
should be in entire agreement as to the general lines along which
future reformation should proceed, is a fact of which the public
will doubtless take note, and which is not likely to be ignored by
those responsible for the preservation of the Empire."

'Our letter was in all the papers about February 28th (1894), with
replies from Balfour and Chamberlain. Mr. Gladstone's reply, written
just before he resigned, was in his own hand, and more than usually
legible. Though it was not marked "Private," I did not print it, as
it seemed too personal and playful. It meant that he had resigned,
but I did not know this till an hour after I had received it:

'"You will forgive my pleading eyesight, which demanded the help of
others and thereby retarded operations, as an excuse for my having
failed to acknowledge the paper on Naval Defence which you were so
good as to send me. You will, I fear, find me a less interesting
correspondent than some who have replied at length, for I fear I
ought to confine myself to assuring you that I have taken care it
should come to the notice of my colleagues."

'On March 9th I sat near to Asquith at a dinner, and he told me that
his Defence Committee of the Cabinet, favoured by Balfour and
Rosebery, would soon be "a fact." The decision was made known in a
debate which I raised on the 16th.'

A note adds: 'When the Tories came in in June, 1895, they adopted the scheme of a Minister (the Duke of Devonshire) over both army and navy, which had been put forward in the Dilke--Chesney--Arnold-Forster-- Wilkinson correspondence with Balfour and Chamberlain, and originally invented by me. On the night of the Government (Liberal) defeat Campbell-Bannerman had promised a Commander-in-Chief who should be the Chief Military Adviser, a double triumph for my view.'