Chapter XXXV: Egypt (2)

'Then came the consideration of the action to be taken by the
Egyptian Government towards Mr. O'Kelly, M.P., [Footnote: Mr. James
O'Kelly, then M.P. for Koscommon, a very adventurous war
correspondent. He died in 1916.] Parnell's friend, who had been
trying to join the Mahdi. We next considered Lord Salisbury's
relations towards Tewfik as Khedive, as affected by the violent
attacks of many Conservative members, put up by Broadley, upon
Tewfik's character. Randolph Churchill had made a most ferocious
series of attacks upon the Khedive, without one atom of truth in
them. It is a curious example of his forgetful flightiness, that
when, a few years later, he went to Egypt, he was struck with wonder
at the Khedive's refusal to receive him. The terms of the French
acceptance of our invitation to the Conference were discussed, as
were the House of Commons questions as to Gordon, and the offer of
Mr. Guy Dawnay, M.P., to go as a messenger to Gordon at his own
cost. Then followed the internal condition of Egypt, as to which
Baring's views were stated by me; then Harrar; then the employment
of negroes or Turks for the Egyptian army; then the Turks at Suakim;
then the Somali coast.

'On the same day I had an interview with the ex-Khedive Ismail, who
had gone downhill. He always had a certain difficulty in collecting
his ideas and putting them into words, but on this occasion it went
farther than I had previously known. He wished to impress on me the
necessity for defending Egypt against the Mahdi at some given point
upon the Nile, when occurred that incident of his continually
working up to the name of the place and forgetting it. [Footnote:
See Chapter XXX., Vol. I., p. 487.]

'On May 5th there was a Cabinet. We considered the vote of censure
as to Gordon, and decided that time must be given for it; and I then
had some correspondence with Northbrook across the table as to an
expedition. I said: "Northbrook, I should be glad to know all you
know against the Nile route. Ismail, who knows all about it, thinks
it quite possible." Northbrook replied: "My objections are
uncertainty of getting steamers up at all (we know nothing of the
140 miles beyond Wady Halfa), and necessity of assistance from
natives, which may not be given. Key" (Sir Cooper Key) "is in rather
a delicate position, as he does not like to go against Wolseley,
whose opinion is for the Nile, and the responsibility is with the
W.O."

'On May 7th there was another Cabinet. It was decided that Nubar
need not be brought to London for the Conference, that a fresh place
in some other unhappy portion of the world must be found for
Clifford Lloyd; [Footnote: A Resident Magistrate who had come
violently into collision with the Nationalists in Ireland, and who
had also proved himself a storm centre in Egypt, as he afterwards
did in Mauritius.] and one was found, and he again fought with the
local authorities as he had fought in Ireland and in Egypt. With
regard to the attitude of France, it was decided that we could not,
so long as we remained in Egypt, put up with a new international
control. It was decided to bring the Turks to Suakim, although this
decision was afterwards reversed. We then wasted much of our time on
the consideration of what should be our attitude on the vote of
censure which was pending in the House. Harcourt had drawn an
amendment for Mr. Gladstone on which they had agreed. Chamberlain
and I had agreed to support a mere negative, and we talked the
others over....

'On May 11th Fitzmaurice wrote to me complaining that no definite
instructions had been given him with regard to the conduct of the
Gordon debate' (on the vote of censure), [Footnote: See _Hansard_,
vol. cclxxxviii., 3rd series, debate of May 13th, 1884] 'as was
usual in such important cases, but stating that he expected me to
speak. On the next day, May 12th, I learnt that Hartington had
refused to speak, although he was finally made to do so by Mr.
Gladstone. On Tuesday, May 13th, I made a good speech from 12.10 to
1.10 a.m.--too late for the reporters. "The debate has (I noted in
my diary) been the best I ever heard. Mr. Gladstone was not so good
as usual, while Hartington and I were neither better nor worse than
usual. But Churchill, Forster, Cowen, John Morley, and Beach, all
spoke far above their usual level; and the rest were good. A
memorable debate, which I do not expect to see excelled for interest
and fire, and I am glad to have had the honour to wind it up for the
Liberal party." Afterwards I noted that it "does not read well."

'On May 14th Cabinet again decided that Nubar must not come over for
the Conference; discussed internal affairs of Egypt, then the
Conference again; and then called in Sir Evelyn Baring and discussed
with him the same matters of Clifford Lloyd, Nubar, Conference, the
Turks and the Red Sea ports, what was to be said to Waddington about
the Conference, and the detail of a scheme of Childers upon Egyptian
finance, which was extraordinarily unpopular with the Cabinet.

'On May 17th at noon there was a full Cabinet (Spencer being
present), and a long one. The first matter discussed was the Queen
and Conference, [Footnote: Proposed Conference of the Powers on the
Law of Liquidation.] and a strong objection on the part of Mr.
Gladstone to tell Parliament anything about the Conference.
Chamberlain wrote to me on this: "What a queer twist this objection
of Mr. G. is!" To which I replied: "I really wish he would have gone
to Coombe for this lovely day and let us go on without him. He has
wasted an hour and a half. Mr. G. will fight a whole day in Cabinet
to avoid telling Parliament something, and then after all will tell
them twice as much in reply to Ashmead Bartlett." On this
Chamberlain wrote:

"Here lies Mr. G., who has left us repining,
While he is, no doubt, still engaged in refining;
And explaining distinctions to Peter and Paul,
Who faintly protest that distinctions so small
Were never submitted to saints to perplex them,
Until the Prime Minister came up to vex them."

[Footnote: These were notes passed during the sitting of the Cabinet. On Mr. Gladstone's inconvenient habit of giving information at question time, see Vol. I., pp. 307, 384, 459, 535; and _infra_, p. 118.]

'The Cabinet decided to send a telegram to Gordon through Zebehr, in
order to obtain safe conveyance for it, offering free use of money
among the tribes.

'To Grant Duff I wrote on May 17th: "The Queen is much against our
arrangements with France. If we 'let them out' we spoil them, and if
we don't we shall be condemned for a 'secret negotiation with France
by a moribund Cabinet.' Yet, though we look very wrong, we _are_
right."'

'On the 19th it was decided that the Nile was to be patrolled by the
Navy as far as Wady Halfa.'

This was in the direction of the military policy which Sir Charles favoured, but in which he was not to succeed. His diplomatic proposals now have to be considered.

'At this time I sent a box round the Cabinet as to the
neutralization of Egypt, Northbrook assenting. In a minute dated May
22nd, Lord Northbrook wrote: "I am disposed to think it would be
wise to propose at once an international guarantee of the neutrality
of Egypt, (1) It would give a substance and solidity to the French
assurances." (To Grant Duff I wrote on the 22nd: "We have got from
France an engagement not to go to Egypt when we come away, and never
at any future time, except by the authority of Europe.") "(2)
Without it I hardly see a chance of escaping from annexation.... All
the circumstances of Egypt ... point to this solution, and ... the
release of Egypt from the Soudan makes the solution possible."
Chamberlain wrote: "I agree entirely with Dilke and Northbrook. (1)
As to the intrinsic importance of such a proposal. If adopted it
secures every essential British interest, and promises relief from
the intolerable burden of a continued occupation. I am strongly in
favour of making the proposal at once. It will give a real guarantee
to the Powers of our good faith and intention to clear out of the
country. (2) I attach great importance to it as forming a definite
policy.... To make Egypt the 'Belgium of the East' is an object
easily popularized. The phrase will carry the proposal." Kimberley
wrote: "I agree with Northbrook and Dilke. The neutralization of
Egypt will be a gain in itself, irrespective altogether of the
question of its internal administration. It would also ... render it
easy to establish a firm domestic Government in so far as it would
put an end to the rivalries ... which exercise a very disturbing
influence on all Egyptian affairs.--K." This minute received the
support of the signatures of the Chancellor, Harcourt, and Childers.
Lord Derby wrote: "I agree so entirely with the views of Lord
Northbrook and Sir Charles Dilke that I need add nothing to what
they have written. There is only one alternative in the long-run;
guaranteed neutrality or annexation.--D., May 23." Carlingford also
agreed, but Hartington strongly dissented; and although Lord
Granville agreed with us, Hartington's dissent was so fierce that he
succeeded in preventing Mr. Gladstone from expressing an opinion,
and the view taken by ten members of the Cabinet remained without
effect.

'... On May 24th, the next matter discussed was the neutralization
of Egypt, which Mr. Gladstone decided, in face of Hartington's
minute, was "not to be immediately proposed."' [Footnote: The offer
of neutralization was, however, made. See _infra_, Chapter XXXVIII.,
pp. 94, 97.]

'We then returned to our old business of Waddington and the
Conference. Mr. Gladstone next complained that he had been
catechized in the House of Commons on Monday, May 19th, as to
whether he "told most lies on Monday or on Thursday." We then
discussed the desirability of making a statement in the House as to
the number of years that our troops would remain in Egypt;
Northbrook and Hartington suggesting either five years or three
years from January, 1885, and Carlingford suggesting one year, in
which he was supported by the Prime Minister and myself; but three
years prevailed. Next came Morocco; and then a Gordon
expedition--Mr. Gladstone speaking strongly against it.

'On May 27th there was a Cabinet before the Whitsuntide recess. It
was decided what statement was to be made to Parliament about the
Conference. Lord Granville had told Waddington that we should not
stay more than five years in Egypt at the outside, and Hartington,
who himself had been willing to limit our stay to three years, now
fought violently against a limitation even to five. Chamberlain
wrote to me: "As usual--the question having been twice settled,
Hartington, in a minority of one, raises the whole question again.
It is direct, unmitigated, and unconcealed obstruction." We then
discussed the expedition to Khartoum and the making of a Suakim-
Berber railway, but it was decided that orders were not yet to be
given. On the next day Mr. Gladstone, who had gone to Hawarden,
wrote:

'"My Dear Northbrook,

'"I have received and read this morning Sir Cooper Key's very
interesting paper on an expedition to Khartoum. I write, however, to
suggest that it would be a great advantage if two suggestions it
contains were to be fully examined and developed. (1) The _small_
river expedition which he thinks practicable. (2) The small desert
expedition from Korosko to which he also adverts as an auxiliary
method.... Clear as is the case for the railway from Suakim, as
against the large expedition by the Nile, in every other view it is
attended with the most formidable difficulties of a moral and
political kind ... whether the 'turning of the first sod' of a
Soudan railway will not be the substitution for an Egyptian
domination there, of an English domination ... more unnatural, more
costly, more destructive, and altogether without foundation in
public right. It would be an immense advantage that the expedition
(should one be needed) should be one occupying little time, and
_leaving no trace behind it_.

'"Yours sincerely,
'"W. E. Gladstone."

'Of this letter a copy was made by Edward Hamilton, and enclosed to
me with an autograph letter from Mr. Gladstone.

'On May 31st I had received a further letter from Mr. Gladstone
about the Soudan expedition, in which he said: "Suakim and Berber
route has utterly beaten Nile route for a large expedition.... But
the question of a small expedition has hardly yet been touched,
while some believe Gordon is or will be free, and there need be no
expedition at all." I sent this letter to Lord Northbrook, and to
Lord Hartington, pointing out that Colonel Sartorius had written a
letter to the papers in favour of an expedition of a thousand picked
men armed with repeating rifles; and after receiving replies, I
wrote to Mr. Gladstone on June 4th that I had not had much
encouragement from Hartington and Northbrook, the fact being that
Hartington was determined on giving Wolseley his big job. [Footnote:
See _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., p. 395.]

'On June 6th Lord Granville called a meeting to ask us whether,
Waddington having now agreed to all our demands, we could devise
some plan of getting out of them. He said that for his own part he
should not have asked the question, but that Hartington had
suggested it.... He said: "I must rather complain of Hartington's
conduct--from so intimate a friend. If it had been Dodson I should
have been very angry." After such an introduction, the meeting could
hardly come to a conclusion favourable to Hartington's views.

'On June 9th Sir Henry Ponsonby came to see me before the Cabinet,
wishing to talk to me before he spoke to any other member, as the
Queen thought that I was the most in agreement with her views, which
was not the case, as regarded evacuation. He discussed with me two
points: First the term of years, as to which I explained that, under
the agreement, if at the end of three and a half years any one Power
thought we had better stay, and we ourselves wished to stay, then we
could stay. It was not my wish that we should. Secondly, as to the
union of Bulgaria and East Roumelia, about which I did not care, and
as to which I suggested that the Queen should propose to Lord
Granville to take counsel with Austria. [Footnote: The union took
place in 1885.] At the Cabinet which followed we discussed the words
of our promise to lay our French agreements before Parliament, and
also our answer as to the Turks and Suakim. The French having
written us a disagreeable despatch, we agreed that they must be made
to take it back.

'On the next day, June 10th, there was a Cabinet to begin the
railway from Suakim. and to consider the draft despatch to
Waddington, and as the Government at this time was not very strong,
it was decided to leave for our successors a Cabinet minute upon the
subject of our relations at this time with France. After the Cabinet
I had to see Mr. Gladstone from Lord Granville upon the question
whether we should insist on a casting vote on the Caisse. Mr.
Gladstone, against the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet, replied:
"No, not to the point of breaking off."'

On June 12th Sir Charles made two notes in his Diary of that date:

'I think that if Mr. Gladstone was to stay in, and live on, we
should come as regards Egypt to evacuation and neutralization. Under
the Tories, or under Hartington, the _status quo_ may be tried for a
long time.'

'When Bismarck offered Egypt to Dizzy, it was in order to embroil
England with France.'

III.

From this point onwards in the Memoir the focus of the Egyptian question changes; attention is centred on the diplomatic questions arising out of the financial problem.

As between England and France the issue concerned itself with the proposal to pay less than the promised interest on previously existing loans. The French view, expressed through M. Barrère, the French agent in Egypt, was that interest need not be reduced; the alternative view was that the bondholders must make a sacrifice of part of their interest, at any rate for some period of years, in return for the better security they were obtaining.

'On July 3rd Barrère called and explained to me a scheme of his on
Egyptian finance, in which he was now highly skilled, having been
French Agent in Egypt for some time. I put the matter before Lord
Granville, who sent it to Mr. Gladstone and Childers. Barrère argued
that it was not necessary to reduce interest, or, to use the slang
of the moment, to "cut the coupon." We called a meeting of the
Commons Ministers, and Chamberlain announced that he should resign
if the coupon were not cut.

'July 18th, 1884.--We had virtually decided on declaring Egypt
bankrupt in order to force the hands of the French, but Waddington,
at a meeting with Childers, had broached a plan, which had
originally been suggested by the Germans, for a temporary reduction
of interest, to be reconsidered at the end of a certain number of
years.' (These proposals were discussed at the Conference, which met
in the latter half of July, held seven sittings, and then broke down
without arriving at a conclusion on August 1st.) 'The question now
raised was--at the end of what number of years? The French said
three, and we decided to propose ten; but with a willingness to take
six or even five; we advancing 4 1/2 millions instead of 8, or, in
other words, leaving out the indemnities due by Egypt. If this
arrangement failed, then we were to fall back on bankruptcy.
Harcourt was much against declaring bankruptcy, and in favour of the
policy of "scuttle." Hartington was against bankruptcy, and for
paying the differences ourselves; so as to force us into annexation.
Spencer, Childers, Chamberlain, and I, were for bankruptcy or for a
strong threat of bankruptcy.

'On July 21st there was a meeting of members of the Cabinet after
questions, at which Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, Hartington,
Harcourt, Childers, and I, were present. The French had backed out
of their proposals, and we considered a new scheme of Childers's to
put all administrative charges in Egypt before interest of debt, a
scheme which it was certain that the French would refuse. Harcourt
was again violent against bankruptcy, which he announced he thought
grossly "illegal," as if there were such a thing as illegality in
such affairs.

'On August 2nd there was a full Cabinet, every member being present,
and we had to consider whether, the Conference having broken down,
Baring should go back to Egypt or remain at the Foreign Office and
continue to advise us. Lord Granville proposed that he should
remain, and that Malet should go to Egypt. Chamberlain proposed that
Goschen should go. Childers proposed J. K. Cross. [Footnote:
Under-Secretary for India.] Dufferin was mentioned; then Lord
Granville proposed Northbrook. All other names were immediately
withdrawn, and Northbrook took time to consider, but evidently meant
to go, and decided, I think, in the course of the same evening.
Baring was then called in, and we once more began to chop straw by
considering the "ulterior consequences" of the collapse of the
Conference--i.e., bankruptcy. Lastly, Gordon was dealt with, and
it was decided that a supplementary estimate should be proposed,
with the understanding that we should spend more if it was wanted. I
wrote to Chamberlain: "We always have two subjects--(a) Conference,
(b) Gordon." And he wrote back: "The first always taking up two or
three hours; and the second five minutes at the fag end of
business."

'On August 3rd I noted "we are going to send Northbrook to Egypt to
put down Barrère."

'On August 5th we considered the instructions to Northbrook, or
rather whether he should have any at all, and if so, what they
should be. Northbrook read us a scheme which he had written, which
attempted to conciliate Turkey and Italy, so as to have great naval
strength in the Mediterranean and to prevent all chance of a sudden
occupation of Egypt by France. We were to express our continued
determination not to annex. We were to stay five years at the
request of the Sultan. We were again to propose to the Powers those
arrangements with regard to the Canal which we had proposed already.
We were to pay the indemnities in stock; and the next coupon in
full; and we were to promise for the future not less than 4 per
cent, on privileged stocks, and not less than 3 per cent, on the
Unified debt, while we were in Egypt. Indian troops were to hold
Massowah. Harcourt, in reply, read a written counter-statement,
again proposing to "scuttle," and again threatening us that we
should have war with France. Hartington again spoke for a guarantee
by us of the whole Egyptian debt. After Hartington's observations
the discussion was, as usual, adjourned. Chamberlain and I decided
that we would ask for our old term of three and a half years'
occupation, as against Northbrook's five. Next came Gordon, and
Hartington proposed that we should embody some militia.

'On August 6th there was another Cabinet, and the first question was
that of Northbrook's scheme. Lord Granville agreed to a temporary
use of Turkish troops provided that they were to leave Egypt when we
left. Chamberlain would not agree, and wished to stick to
Northbrook's phrase only inviting "co-operation." This view
prevailed, and it was decided that if the Turks proposed to send a
commissioner, we were to refuse. But the question of troops was
really left open for more discussion. Next came the question of an
advance of nearly a million which had been made by Rothschild to
Egypt, and we asked him, as a favour to ourselves, to let it run,
which was all he wanted us to do. Northbrook, who is not strong, had
been a good deal fatigued with the discussion on his scheme, and
instead of sleeping (his usual practice at a Cabinet) on this
occasion fainted, and we had to get up and look after him at this
point.

'On August 26th I received a letter from Hartington, saying that
Northbrook was going to Osborne at the end of the week, and starting
for Egypt from there. Hartington told me he was coming up to meet
him, and he afterwards wrote to me to fix an appointment at the War
Office on the 29th. This I kept. Northbrook was deplorably weak. He
had returned from Rosebery's completely under the influence of Mr.
Gladstone's pro-French views. [Footnote: At Dalmeny Lord Northbrook
"met Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone." See Life of Lord Northbrook, p. 190.]
He had settled to spend a day at Walmer, and had telegraphed to Lord
Lyons to meet him there. His plan now was to ask the French
Government to send a man to Egypt in order that he and the Frenchman
might settle matters together. Hartington and I pointed out to him
that the Frenchman's instructions from his Government must either be
to refuse all reduction of interest, or to consent to it upon
obtaining from us a better political position than that given to
France by the Anglo-French agreement. We explained to him that it
would be impossible for us to tolerate such proposals. I wrote to
Chamberlain a full account of the interview.

'September 22nd_.--We decided with reference to Egyptian finance
that Chamberlain should write a strong letter to Lord Granville
protesting against any British advance to Egypt, unless accompanied
by a cutting of the coupon. He did so, and on September 25th sent me
a copy, and I sent the copy to Childers, and wrote myself to Lord
Granville. On the 27th I received a memorandum from Chamberlain as
to Lord Granville, Lord Derby, and Bismarck.

'Chamberlain's memorandum was a fierce denunciation of the
principles laid down in Northbrook's despatch No. 4, dated September
13th, and received September 22nd.' [Footnote: Lord Northbrook had
arrived in Egypt.]

Controversy now raged over Lord Northbrook's scheme, and added to the difficulties of the Cabinet, which was divided on the question of lowering or not lowering the rate of interest.

'On 19th November the second matter mentioned was Northbrook's
scheme, against which I fought hard.... I pointed out that early in
April, when Mr. Gladstone had wished to borrow on the future value
of the Canal shares, that proposal had not been accepted, and we
laid down the principle that it was for the bondholders to make
sacrifices. On July 3rd we had decided that the coupon must be
"cut." On July 18th the whole Cabinet had taken the same view except
Harcourt and the Chancellor, and four members--Childers, Spencer,
Chamberlain, and I--had advocated distinct bankruptcy. On August 2nd
we had seen Baring to lay our plans for bankruptcy. On August 5th
Northbrook himself had proposed a reduction of the interest. On
August 29th there had been a general agreement to the same effect.
Northbrook's policy had enormously sent up Egyptian stocks. After my
strong observations the opinions stood: Mr. Gladstone, Childers,
Chamberlain, Harcourt, Trevelyan, and Dilke against Northbrook's
scheme; for it, Lord Granville, the Chancellor, Hartington, Spencer,
Kimberley, Derby, Carlingford, and Northbrook himself. All the Lords
on one side, curiously enough, and all the Sirs and Mr.'s on the
other; eight to six against us. But I noted: "Mr. Gladstone is so
strong that we shall win." "As we did."' [Footnote: Letter from Sir
Charles to Mr. Brett (afterwards Lord Esher):

Local Government Board,
Whitehall,
_November_ 19_th_, 1884.

'_My_ policy has always been bankruptcy and stand the shot, and if
we had stuck to that we should have had no trouble with the Powers;
but indiscretions have made that difficult. It is not pleasant to be
called in too late. I quite agree in your general view, but how can
the bondholder be got to make sacrifices without his consent?']

'At the meeting of the Cabinet of December 2nd, Egyptian finance
again came up. We were informed that Prince Bismarck suggested oral
communications among ambassadors. For this Malet proposed Paris, and
we replied Berlin.'

IV.

During this time the Government continued to waver as to the Soudan expedition.

On June 21st

'with regard to Gordon it was decided to wait ten days before
settling anything, and to see whether we heard from him in reply to
the silly questions which had been asked.'

On June 27th came the definitive news that Berber had fallen on May 26th. On July 5th

'We discussed the Egyptian army of the future, and then the question
of whether we should send an expedition to Khartoum, as to which we
again could come to no decision; Mr. Gladstone still opposing.'

Dilke, backed by Chamberlain, was still pressing the military solution which he favoured. On July 16th

'Hartington on this occasion gave up the Berber-Suakim route, and
pressed for a decision as to an immediate expedition by the Nile. He
was supported by the Chancellor, Northbrook, Carlingford, and
Dodson. Mr. Gladstone, Harcourt, and Childers opposed.

'Chamberlain and I opposed a large expedition by the Nile, and
supported a small expedition, under the control of the navy, with a
body of picked men. Baring was called in about the police in Egypt,
and his views in support of Nubar were approved. Nubar was to have
his own way in the appointment of Inspectors of Police in Egypt.'

'On July 22nd we found that Mr. Gladstone had again taken up Zebehr,
and was anxious to send him to Khartoum in order to avoid a British
expedition.

'On July 25th there was a full Cabinet, Spencer being present, which
first discussed the Conference and then the Gordon expedition, for
which for the first time a large majority of the Cabinet pronounced.
The issue was narrowed down to that of sending some sort of British
force to or towards Dongola; and this was supported by Hartington,
the Chancellor, Derby, Northbrook, Spencer, Carlingford, Dodson,
Chamberlain, and me, while on the other side were only Mr.
Gladstone, Harcourt, and Kimberley. Lord Granville said nothing. By
the stoutness of their resistance the three for the moment prevailed
over the nine.

'On July 31st a storm was brewing about Gordon, and Harcourt went
about declaring that the Government would break up upon the
question. On the next day, August 1st, a way out of the difficulty
was found in an agreement that we should ask for a small vote of
credit, which we were to use or not as should be thought right
later.'

It must be remembered that communications with Gordon were now interrupted, though occasionally renewed, and this added to the confusion.

'On September 17th we received a telegram from Gordon which looked
as though he were perfectly mad, although some of the other
telegrams from him sent at the same time were sane enough.'

Since Parliament had risen and the Cabinet scattered, preparations had been going on apace.

'When Hartington came to me on September 15th he told me that he had
already spent "£750,000 out of the £300,000" for the Gordon
expedition.' [Footnote: 'On August 9th Lord Hartington again asked
us for permission to embody militia or call out a portion of the
First-Class Army Reserve.']

'On October 4th Chamberlain had written strongly against Wolseley's
great expedition, Harcourt was still opposing the whole thing. After
this meeting of the Cabinet Northbrook wrote to Gordon a long letter
based on the Cabinet decision. He stated that the expedition under
Wolseley was not sent for the purpose of defeating the Mahdi, but
only of enabling the Egyptian garrison of Khartoum, the civil
employees and their families, with Gordon, to return to Egypt. He
offered the Grand Cross of the Bath' (to Gordon) 'as from the Queen
personally. He explained our refusal of Zebehr, and he suggested the
placing at Khartoum of the Mudir of Dongola. It was easy, however,
to write to Gordon, but it was not easy to get the letters to him;
and we had to attempt even to send them by Tripoli and the desert.'
[Footnote: As to the last communications with Gordon, see _Life of
Granville_, vol. ii., pp. 397-399. Besides the authorities already
quoted, the Parliamentary Papers Nos. 2, 6, 12, 13, and 25, for
1884, may be referred to.]

That is the last detailed reference to Gordon in the Memoir until February 5th, 1885, when the news of the fall of Khartoum reached London. The matter had passed out of the hands of the Cabinet into those of the soldiers.

This comment in the Diary may fitly end this chapter:

'On February 20th I noted (conversation, I think, not printed), Lord
Acton says of Gladstone: "Cannot make up my mind whether he is not
wholly unconscious when working himself up to a change of position.
After watching him do it, I think that he is so. He lives completely
in what for the moment he chooses to believe."'