Chapter XXXVIII: Divided Counsels

JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1885

At the close of 1884 Mr. Gladstone's colleagues expected that he would resign, and it appears that he had really thought of doing so, provided that a ministry could be formed under Lord Hartington's leadership. Franchise and Redistribution were virtually settled, and there was no legislative proposal before either the Cabinet or the country on which Lord Hartington was in marked disagreement with his colleagues. But they were still 'an Egyptian Government,' and here differences seemed to be irreconcilable.

'The Egyptian policy of the Government had now become thoroughly
unpopular, and those of us who, although we had favoured
intervention as necessary at the time, had deplored alike the
engagements of our predecessors which had made it necessary, and the
occupation which, unnecessarily in my opinion, followed it, were as
unpopular as were those like Hartington, and the majority of the
peers in the Cabinet, who had insisted not only on going, but on
staying--at least in Cairo. It is curious to reflect how
intervention in the East is judged by subsequent complications which
do not affect the principle. The intervention of 1860-61 in Syria
gave considerable popularity to the Government who agreed to it, and
to Lord Dufferin who conducted it on the spot; and it was as popular
in France which found the troops, as in England which found the man.
By that intervention Syria was pacified and war in the East
prevented, and ultimately it was followed by evacuation and
reversion to what diplomatists style in their jargon "an improved
_status quo_."

'It is too often now (1891) forgotten that we actually proposed in
1884 to France (in connection with a Conference which took place,
obtaining therefore to some extent, it might be contended, valuable
consideration for our proposal) that we would, at or before the
expiration of our occupation, propose to the Powers and to the Porte
a scheme for the neutralization of Egypt on the basis of the
principles applied to Belgium. A document which we printed at the
beginning of 1885 gave our suggested wording for the neutralization
treaty, declaring that Egypt should be an independent and
perpetually neutral State under the guarantee of the contracting
parties; limiting the strength of the Egyptian army, the claim of
Turkey to military aid from Egypt, and so forth.'

The suggestion was not welcomed by the Powers.

'On New Year's Day I left Antibes for Paris, which I reached on
Friday, the 2nd January, and quitted for London on Saturday, the
3rd.

'Chamberlain wrote to me that Mr. Gladstone was threatened with a
return of his illness, that he required rest, that Egypt had been
for the moment tided over, though it might at any moment break up
the Government. It had been decided to send a firm but courteous
despatch to France demanding immediate consideration of our
proposals, failing which we should "take our own course."
Chamberlain, however, added, "What that course is to be is the
question on which agreement appears impossible. It is 'scuttle and
bankruptcy' against 'protectorate and guarantee.' Sufficient unto
the day is the evil thereof."'

Mr. Gladstone was with Dilke and Chamberlain in opposing protectorate or guarantee in any shape. But there were other questions of Imperial policy upon which the Imperialism of these two Ministers divided them from Mr. Gladstone.

'New Guinea had also been discussed, and Chamberlain was for
demanding explanations from the Germans. Zululand had been
mentioned. Chamberlain supported the annexation of the coast of
Pondoland: Mr. Gladstone, with the support of Trevelyan, "opposing
any attempt to anticipate Germany."

'On Sunday, January 4th, Chamberlain wrote again from Birmingham.
His letter shows that I was anxious for resignation on the Egyptian
question, and Chamberlain replied that he could not find a
satisfactory boat to leave the ship in, and that he thought that the
Government had more lives than a cat. Chamberlain added that he had
to speak on January 5th, and should find it difficult to steer
between Jingoism and peace-at-any-price.'

'He also was engaged in preparing a programme for the future to be
set forth at Ipswich. This last was the memorable "Unauthorized
Programme."'

A first instalment of this programme was given by Mr. Chamberlain in a speech at Birmingham, which advocated restriction of game-preserving, provision of land for agricultural labourers, and better housing. The accusations of Communism brought against Mr. Chamberlain began at this point; and they, of course, redoubled after he had proposed on January 10th at Ipswich to give local bodies power for compulsory acquisition of land.

At this juncture Mr. Chamberlain was absent from London, and communicating only by letter with Sir Charles, whom he had not seen since the middle of December, when Sir Charles crossed to Paris, on his way to Toulon; and before the unauthorized programme was launched Lord Hartington contemplated forming a Government which would have given the foremost positions to Dilke and Chamberlain.

'On the morning of January 5th Harcourt had told me that Mr.
Gladstone intended to resign, and that Lord Granville would follow
Mr. Gladstone, in which case Hartington intended to make him,
Harcourt, Chancellor, to move Lord Derby and Childers, to put in
Rosebery, [Footnote: As Secretary for the Colonies.] to offer
Chamberlain the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, and me the
Secretaryship of State for Foreign Affairs. But, great as were the
offices proposed, Chamberlain and I could not have consented to
remain in if Mr. Gladstone had gone out notoriously dissatisfied. If
he had gone out on grounds of health alone, it would, of course,
have been another matter.'

In a letter,

'probably of Monday morning, January 5th, Chamberlain said that Mr.
Gladstone's retirement was possible, and might be necessary; that
Hartington and Harcourt could bring it about; but that we must be
most careful not to allow them to say that we had been engaged in an
intrigue with them against Mr. Gladstone. He thought that we ought
to tell them frankly that we could enter into no negotiations with
them, and to put this in a Memorandum to which we could afterwards
appeal. On the other hand, he was willing to state his views as to
policy, provided all reference to personal questions was avoided. As
his Egyptian policy, he stated "immediate bankruptcy, communication
to the Powers of our fixed intention to leave, declaration that we
would not allow intervention by other Powers in our place, and
Conference to settle details of neutralization." As to domestic
policy, he agreed in my suggestion that we should insist upon an
immediate Civil List Committee, and proposed an inquiry into labour.
He gave me leave to discuss his letter with Harcourt ("the latter
has always been a most loyal friend, though he can not be expected
to agree with us in everything"), and I did so before the Cabinet of
January 7th.'

By this time Mr. Chamberlain had come to London, and there is no indication that his speech at Birmingham had created friction. But the party which wished to offer resistance to Germany's high-handed policy had been strengthened by a new instance of usurpation.

'Mr. Gladstone was absent from this Cabinet. The first matter
discussed was that of Samoa raised by me. There had been received on
the night of the 6th from the Governor of New Zealand a telegram
saying that the Germans had made a treaty giving the whole authority
of Government to the German Consul. While Münster had been telling
Lord Granville that Germany would take no step hostile to Samoan
independence, the Germans had sent warships there with secret
orders, and had hoisted their flag in various parts of the islands.
The next subject mentioned was that of Zanzibar, and it was decided
that we should warn Germany that we would not brook interference
there. At the same time I had much doubt whether Lord Granville
would act upon the instructions of the Cabinet in this matter, and
my doubts were justified. The third matter was that of the Pondo
coast, and also the coast of Zululand. Mr. Gladstone alone objecting
to a protectorate and being absent, it was decided to have one.'

'Then came the old question of sending troops to Suakim; [Footnote:
Colonial troops were offered about this time, and the Diary contains
the entry, February 20th: "The sending of a Colonial force to
Suakim. Hartington and Derby had snubbed the Colonists, and were
snubbed by the Cabinet in consequence."] then that of Egyptian
Finance, on which Harcourt broached his scheme by which the United
Kingdom was to pay the difference caused by a reduction of the rate
of interest, to which scheme Chamberlain and I were opposed. We were
informed that the Queen "most strongly protested against our binding
ourselves to leave Egypt."'

Meanwhile the Radicals in the Cabinet considered their concerted action in view of a change of leadership.

'We settled during the Cabinet that Trevelyan, Chamberlain, and I
should meet at my room at the Local Government Board, directly the
Cabinet was over, to discuss the terms on which we would join a
Hartington administration; and we did so, finding Egypt and my
proposed inquiry into the Civil List the only real difficulties. The
Civil List could be got over, as it was certain that the Whigs would
give in to pressure from us upon this point. But Harcourt had
informed us that our Egyptian policy made the formation of a
Government impossible, as Hartington would not consent to accept
office on our Egyptian policy.'

It was very difficult to come to an agreement about Egypt. Lord Derby had declared that the only alternatives were guaranteed neutrality or annexation. Dilke and Chamberlain stood for the former, considering their duty done if they prevented occupation by any other European Power, and took steps to establish internal order--which meant completing the organization of an Egyptian army. There was a third policy; for Lord Hartington, who repeatedly in public repudiated the idea of annexation, insisted upon the retention of a single control during a prolonged occupation. In this he had the strongest backing from the Queen.

'Chamberlain at our meeting added a fresh proviso--namely, that
Parnell or some other Irishman should be Chief Secretary. I
afterwards informed Harcourt of Chamberlain's views, adding that
Chamberlain was willing to avoid all personal questions, although he
much wished that John Morley should be in the Cabinet, [Footnote:
Sir Charles had noted his own strong wish to this effect in the
previous year.] that he wholly rejected Harcourt's plan for Egypt as
being a bribe to buy off the Powers, forced on us by unworthy fears.
Chamberlain wished, if his own Egyptian policy was not adopted, to
simply evacuate the country.

'Chamberlain, I was empowered to say, had also mentioned the English
land question, and was opposed to allowing Lord Salisbury to come
in,' as this, he said to Sir Charles, 'would surely be a hopeless
confession of weakness, and give him a chance with the new electors.

'I argued against Chamberlain's Egyptian policy, not on the merits,
but on the chances of our getting our own way.

'"I doubt our getting our way as to bankruptcy, and am not sure that
we ought to put that forward as sole or chief cause for not joining
Hartington." To this Chamberlain replied: "True. But how can we join
another Government without any settled policy about Egypt?
Harcourt's alternative is impossible; then what is there? I should
refuse to join Hartington unless we can agree as to Egypt policy,
and if we do agree, there can in that case be no reason for letting
Salisbury in."'

Egypt was in Sir Charles's view the main, but not the only, difficulty. The Government policy of 'lying down to Germany' was another. At the same date:

'January 7th, Chamberlain and I had a conference with regard to
Samoa, in which I pointed out that if we quarrelled with France
about Egypt she would have all Europe behind her, whereas in our
dealings with Germany about Samoa, Zanzibar, and other matters,
Germany would stand alone.' [Footnote: A letter to Lord Hartington
from his secretary, Mr. Brett, which is quoted by Mr. Bernard
Holland (_Life of Duke of Devonshire_, vol. ii, pp. 38, 39),
suggests that the Hartington section had difficulty in reconciling
Sir Charles's attitude on other Imperial matters with his Egyptian
policy: "It would indeed be a farce, after all the fuss about the
Cameroons and Angra Pequena, to allow Suakim, which is the port of
Khartoum, and the Nile to pass into the hands of foreigners." The
answer is, first, that Sir Charles would certainly never have
consented to let any port in Egypt or the Soudan pass into the hands
of any European Power: his proposal was neutralization of Egypt
under international guarantee; and, secondly, that the questions
were governed by different conditions, which he set out in
conference with Mr. Chamberlain about Samoa.]

January 9th, 'I had decided that if I resigned, or if I refused to join a Hartington administration, I should mention four subjects--Egypt, Samoa, Zanzibar, and (probably) the Civil List inquiry (if I were not completely satisfied). On the same day I was at work on our draft despatch to Sir Edward Malet as to Zanzibar, which had been settled on the 8th after the Cabinet of the 7th, but which did not go off until the 14th. On January 14th I noted in my Diary, "The Zanzibar despatch went. Seven days' delay. I know that two days' delay was caused by the necessity of sending to Osborne and to the Prime Minister, but why seven days?"

'On January 21st the first matter discussed was that of New Guinea,
in which we found ourselves in difficulties caused by absence of
jurisdiction over foreigners, and we agreed in consequence to
annexation.'

The situation with Germany was undoubtedly grave, but ought not, Sir Charles maintained, to entail the sacrifice of Zanzibar. On February 24th Count Münster, the German Ambassador, told Mr. Alfred de Rothschild that he expected to be withdrawn, but that New Guinea was the only serious matter in dispute.

'On Tuesday, February 24th, I breakfasted at Alfred de Rothschild's
house, to meet the German Ambassador, Count Münster, at the latter's
wish. Alfred de Rothschild did not sit down with us, and we were
_tête-à-tête_. Münster was very free in his remarks about Bismarck.
"No one ever contradicts him." "He sees none but flatterers." "His
life is a period to be got through."'

Two March entries are apposite here:

'On Wednesday, March 4th, Rosebery wrote to me to ask me to dine
with him to meet "Herbert Bismarck," who had suddenly arrived, but I
was engaged to the Speaker's dinner, and had to put off seeing young
Bismarck till Thursday, the 5th. He had come over to try to force us
to dismiss Lord Granville and Lord Derby. I noted in my Diary:
[Footnote: Sir Charles's Diaries, to portions of which certain
biographers had access, are at this point quoted by Lord Edmond
Fitzmaurice in his _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii., p. 430. The
passage runs: "Negotiations with Germany on the vexed colonial
questions were meanwhile proceeding, more particularly with regard
to New Guinea. Sir Julian Pauncefote proposed a plan which it was
hoped might satisfy the German Chancellor, and Count Herbert
Bismarck reappeared as co-negotiator with Count Münster in London.
Lord Rosebery, who had just joined the Cabinet as Lord Privy Seal,
also took part in the negotiations. 'Herbert Bismarck came over
again,' Sir Charles Dilke noted; 'if at his former visit he had only
tried to get us to dismiss Lord Derby, on this occasion he wanted us
to dismiss Lord Granville and Lord Derby.'"] "He puts us in a
difficult position as individuals, for how can we say to this
personally friendly fellow that we do not think Lord Granville's
speech in the Lords on Friday foolish, or how say that we think that
the allusion to old Bismarck's dislike of Münster in a recent
despatch from Malet ought to have been published."

'On Friday, March 6th, I saw Herbert Bismarck again twice.... I
having expressed anxiety about Zanzibar, he told me that his father
had directed him to say that he "considered Zanzibar as independent
as Turkey or Russia." It is to my mind shameful that, after this,
Lord Granville should have begun and Lord Salisbury have rapidly
completed arrangements by which the Zanzibar mainland, the whole
trade of which was in our hands, was handed over to Germany.'

'On March 7th we discussed Herbert Bismarck's views on the
Cameroons, on German claims in New Guinea (on this head we settled
with him), and on Pondoland.'

While the difficulties with Germany were being discussed, differences as to Egyptian policy and our relations with France continued.

On January 20th, Egypt once more threatened to break up the Government. France had proposed an international Commission of Inquiry into the financial situation.

'We discussed a French proposal which, as I wrote to the Chancellor,
had at least one advantage--namely, "that it re-forms the majority
in the Cabinet by uniting two of the three parties--yours and mine."
Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, Kimberley, Derby, Harcourt, the
Chancellor, Trevelyan, and Dilke, eight in all, supported taking the
new French proposals as a basis. Chamberlain was absent ill.
Northbrook, Hartington, Childers, to my astonishment, and
Carlingford were against us. After the Cabinet Hartington wrote to
Mr. Gladstone to say that he "could not accept the decision," and
Northbrook supported him.' Next day, however, 'when we turned to
Egyptian finance, Trevelyan went over from our side to the other.
Mr. Gladstone announced that what we had decided on the previous day
was not to prevent our arguing against the French proposed inquiry,
and thus Hartington was kept in.'

'On January 23rd I forwarded to Chamberlain a letter from
Sandringham, which showed that the Queen had been alarmed at the
possibility that my proposed Civil List inquiry might affect not
only new grants, but also the Civil List arrangements made at the
beginning of the reign. Chamberlain made a Delphic reply that, on
the one hand, inquiry would be a farce if it did not include the
existing Civil List, but that on the other hand there could be no
intention to make any change in the arrangements with the Queen.'

'On January 28th, I heard from Sandringham that the Prince of Wales
was going to Osborne the next day, and would broach to the Queen his
friendliness to the idea of a new settlement of the Civil List.
Chamberlain was anxious that no difficulty should be made by us on
the occasion of the marriage of Princess Beatrice. He wrote: "_If
alone_, I should wait for something or somebody to turn up. Before
Prince Edward wants an allowance who knows what may happen? But I am
perfectly ready to follow your lead or to lead to your prompting."'

All arrangements were being made on the assumption that Lord Hartington would become Prime Minister.

'I had been left by Mr. Gladstone in a certain doubt as to whether I
was to be completely responsible for the Redistribution Bill, or
whether Hartington was to share the responsibility. I wrote to
Hartington: "Mr. Gladstone sends me everything on Redistribution,
and expresses no opinion of his own. Northcote and Salisbury write
to me only, and the whole thing is more and more in my hands. If I
let things drift, it is clear that I shall practically have sole
charge of the Bill, for no one else will know anything about it. I
do not shrink from this at all. It is work I like. But, as you will
probably be called on to form an Administration immediately after
the passing of the Bill, don't you think it would look well, and
that our people and the Press and the country would like it, if you
were to take charge of the Bill? If so, I had better have two or
three days' work at it with you."

'Hartington had asked me to stay with him at Hardwick to talk it
over, but it was only a Saturday to Monday visit from January 10th
to 12th, and there were many people in the house, and our whole
conversation was but very short; and Hartington continued to show
but little desire to work at the detail, and the Bill could only be
handled by those who knew its detail.'

Although the Opposition leaders had accepted the compact, it was at this time quite uncertain whether the House of Commons would consent to the Redistribution scheme--affecting as it did the interests of every member. The Fourth Party had not been consulted in the arrangement, and inevitable friction followed.

'On January 27th I had a correspondence with Northcote in reference
to some mischief which had been made by Randolph Churchill.
Northcote had been told by the Conservative Chief Whip, "Dilke told
Randolph that the Government would have given more grouping if we
had pressed for it." The Conservative party being angry at the
absence of grouping of the boroughs, Northcote had taken up the
point, but he now wrote: "Whatever Churchill said must have been in
the nature of an inference of his own from what had previously
passed, from which he had probably gathered that the Government were
ready to concede grouping." But there was a lady in the case who had
gossiped about what Northcote had said to her, and he promised to
write to the offender.'

'On January 13th Mr. Gladstone wrote as to the Redistribution Bill:
"The difficulty as I see it about communication with Northcote is
that he seems to have little weight of influence, and to be afraid
or unwilling to assume any responsibility. I have usually found him
reasonable in his own views, but obliged to reserve his judgment
until after consulting his friends, which consultations I have found
always to end badly. On the other hand, it is, of course, necessary
to pay him due respect. What may prove to be best under these
circumstances is--(1) not to be bound always to consult HIM, (2) to
consult him freely on the easier and smaller matters, but (3) in a
stiff question, such as the numbers of the House may prove to be, to
get at Salisbury if possible, under whose wing Northcote will, I
think, mostly be content to walk, (4) Or, if Salisbury cannot be got
alone, then Northcote and Salisbury would be far preferable to
Northcote alone."'

All these difficulties had to be met by Sir Charles. When the Bill actually came before the House, 'Mr. Gladstone instructed James to assist me in the conduct of it. But practically I had it to myself.' Lord Hartington had rendered invaluable service in the preliminary negotiations. But for such laborious work of detail as was needed to carry through this Bill, neither temperament nor surroundings had fitted him. His Hardwick home is thus described by Sir Charles in a letter which he wrote to Mrs. Pattison:

'I am writing in my bedroom, which is--bed and all--that of Mary
Queen of Scots, who was the prisoner of Bess of Hardwick. It is a
wonderful house, indeed--enormous, and yet completely covered with
the tapestry and the pictures of the time.... The casement windows
have never been touched since Queen Elizabeth was here, and are
enormous. (There is a local proverb which speaks of the hall as "all
window and no wall.") The result is that, in spite of heavy hanging
curtains, the candles are blown out if you go near the windows....
The portrait of the first Cavendish--who was usher of Cardinal
Wolsey, and who married Bess of Hardwick, the richest lady of the
day--is exactly like Hartington, but a vulgar Hartington--fat and
greasy--a Hartington who might have kept a public-house.'

Mr. Chamberlain wrote to Sir Charles at Hardwick concerning his host:

'The true Whig tradition is to keep abreast of the movement which
they would willingly restrain, and do nothing to quicken, but it is
difficult for a man of Hartington's temperament to make the
sacrifice of pride which these tactics require.'

Mr. Chamberlain's Ipswich speech had made its mark, and Sir Charles notes 'the beginning of the terror caused by the unauthorized programme' in 'a letter which I received from Lord Salisbury, who was at Florence, as to my draft Report of the Housing Commission.'

'Lord Salisbury had greatly changed his views since he had sketched
out socialistic proposals for me in his own hand. He now complained
of that which I had said on "the burning questions of expropriation,
betterment, and land tenure," and thought that Chamberlain's
evidence had affected the report, and that such views "must now be
considered in the light of the doctrines as to land he has recently
laid down."'

That letter, received on January 30th, must have been written two days earlier, and evidently at that moment there were plans of forming an administration which should exclude the Radicals.

'On January 28th Harcourt told me that he had stopped the Queen
deciding to send for Goschen to form a Whig Ministry if we were
beaten or if Mr. Gladstone resigned by telling her that Goschen
would refuse, or that, if he consented, no one would join him.'

On January 29th, at Birmingham, Mr. Chamberlain made reply to his critics in a speech which added to the Ipswich programme manhood suffrage and payment of members, and which further declared that the sanctity of public property far exceeded that of private property. If land, for instance, had been 'lost or wasted or stolen,' some equivalent for it must be found, and some compensation exacted from the wrongdoers. [Footnote: 'The ransom theory,' afterwards alluded to (see Chapter XLIV., p. 182).]

These utterances from a member of the Cabinet were not likely to pass unchallenged.

'On Monday, February 2nd, Chamberlain telegraphed to me that he was
coming up on the next day, Tuesday, the 3rd, on purpose to see me on
an important matter; and on the morning of the 3rd I received in a
secret box the letters about which he was coming. There was one from
Mr. Gladstone complaining of the unauthorized programme, and a draft
proposed reply, and Chamberlain added: "Take them (Mr. Gladstone's
letters and enclosures from the Whigs) in connection with the
_Times_ articles. There is to be a dead set evidently.... There are
three possibilities. (1) Mr. Gladstone may wish me to resign. (2) A
vote of censure may be proposed in the House of Commons and carried.
(3) Mr. Gladstone may defend me, and in so doing may to all intents
and purposes censure me in such a way as to entail my resignation.
The first would not, I think, do me any harm. The second would do me
good. The third would not be pleasant. My object in proposed reply
is to make Mr. G. speak more plainly, and to let me know where I
stand. I have spoken in the first person because (until I see you) I
have no right to assume that you will accept a joint responsibility.
But I think you will, and then if we go out or are forced out there
will be a devil of a row. I have been speaking to Schnadhorst to-day
on the possibility. He says (you must take the opinion for what it
is worth) that it would strengthen us in the country.... I assume
Trevelyan would go with Mr. G.... I shall want to know what you
think of it all, and whether you have any alterations to propose in
the reply."

'I noted: "I, of course, make common cause. The Whigs want to force
him into a row with Mr. G., who, they think, will break him in place
of his breaking Hartington after Mr. G. is gone." I admitted to
Chamberlain when we met on February 3rd that there was, as he said,
a dead set at him, and that the _Pall Mall_ for a wonder was backing
it up. On his first point I was sure that Mr. Gladstone did not wish
for his resignation, and knew that I should go too. On the second, I
doubted any member being ready to bell the cat; and on the third
point I was sure that Mr. Gladstone's defence of Chamberlain would
not be such as to entail his resignation.'

Sir Charles thought, and told Chamberlain, that the object of the Whigs was to force them 'to war with Mr. G. who is strong, and not with Hartington,' against whom the Radicals would hold winning cards. 'We therefore play into their hands by going NOW.' Meanwhile, he took up a fighting attitude towards the rest of the world.

'I had written to Mr. Gladstone very strongly backing up
Chamberlain's right to express his individual opinion upon the
questions of the future, and pointing out his patience in not
repudiating some of Hartington's remarks, and saying that I could
not let him go out alone.'

'On February 4th I heard from Chamberlain ... thanking me for
getting Carrington, who represented my Department in the Lords, to
make a pro-Chamberlain speech.'

This was the more valuable because the whole Press was against the "unauthorized programme." At the same time, Sir Charles did not fail to point out that their position was an unsound one, writing first:

'Our words as to the future are too wide. They would cover my
preaching a Republic for two years hence, or your preaching the
nationalization of land without compensation for the next
Parliament.'

He urged also that the precedent which Mr. Chamberlain sought to establish was two-edged.

February 5th, 'At night I gave Chamberlain a hint that some day others might turn against him that freedom of speech which he claimed as against Hartington; and he prepared a document which, under the form of standing out for full right of free speech, really yielded the whole point. He covered his retreat with great skill, and the document as corrected by me would be valuable if it could be found. I have no copy, but have memoranda which passed between us, in one of which I begged him to keep the draft with my corrections as representing our joint view, inasmuch as it might be important in the future. Chamberlain notes, in a minute which I have, his acceptance of the general doctrine, with a declaration that the present was an exceptional period; that there was a new departure under the franchise reform, that it was essential to give a general direction to the discussion, that his actual proposals were moderate, and such as only to point to, firstly, a revision of taxation which Mr. Gladstone himself had advocated, details being open, but the principle being to secure equality of sacrifice; secondly, the extension of power of local authorities on lines already conceded in Ireland.'

The two allies were fighting a hard fight at a critical moment. At such times even the closest friends naturally seek to reassure each other, and to a letter from Sir Charles Mr. Chamberlain made this reply, January 11th:

'The malice and ingenuity of men is so great that I should be afraid
they would some day break our friendship if it had not victoriously
stood the strain of public life for so many years. I will swear that
I will never do anything knowingly to imperil it, and I hope that we
are both agreed that if by any chance either of us should think that
he has the slightest cause of complaint he will not keep it to
himself for a day, but will have a frank explanation. In this case I
shall feel safe, for I am certain that any mistake would be
immediately repaired by whoever might be in fault.'