Chapter XXXVI: Franchise and Redistribution

JULY TO DECEMBER, 1884.

In the summer of 1884 the Government Bill for extension of the franchise had strong and even passionate support throughout the country; but that policy threatened a breach with Lord Hartington, who in the opinion of many was by prescriptive right Mr. Gladstone's successor. Still more entangling were the difficulties in respect of Egypt, over which the Government was so hopelessly divided that no coherent policy could be pursued. Sir Charles notes that on July 18th Mr. Gladstone,

'who had the greatest abhorrence for City dinners, proposed the
extinction of the Lord Mayor's ministerial banquet; the fact being
that the Government of London Bill and the failure to send an
expedition to Khartoum had made the Ministry so unpopular in the
City that he did not think it wise to subject himself to the torture
which such banquets are to him.'

'The Tory game,' Sir Charles wrote on May 24th, 1884, to his agent,
'is to delay the franchise until they have upset us upon Egypt,
before the Franchise Bill has reached the Lords.' [Footnote: This
letter is also quoted in Chapter XXXIV.]

When the Franchise Bill went up to the Lords in the first week of July, it was rejected for a reasoned amendment which declined to alter the franchise except as part of a scheme dealing with redistribution of seats.

'On July 5th there was a Cabinet to consider what was called the
crisis--our relations with the House of Lords over the franchise,
and Spencer was present.... The question to be considered was that
of dissolution or an autumn Session. Lord Granville, Hartington, and
Lord Derby were for an immediate dissolution on the old franchise,
which was at once negatived.'

'On June 21st there was mentioned the attitude of the House of
Lords. Lord Granville said something in favour of life peerages. I
asked Chamberlain whether he thought that it was seriously meant,
and writing passed between us in which he replied: "Serious, I
think"; to which I answered: "You won't have it, will you?" Answer:
"No."'

'On July 7th Mr. Gladstone explained to me his plan for dealing with
the House of Lords, which was not so objectionable to me as the
schemes known as "Reform of the House of Lords." It was to imitate
the French constitution, and in cases of difference to make the two
Houses sit in Congress and vote together. From the practical point
of view it would be as difficult to carry as the abolition of the
House of Lords, and if carried would not be of much use to the
Liberal party except on occasions when their majority was absolutely
overwhelming.

'On July 8th offers of compromise came to us from the Lords, but
they would not offer terms which we could accept. We decided to
propose to them a solemn resolution by both Houses pledging us to
redistribution. This they refused.'

The extent of real agreement which existed between the two sides had not yet been divined; and it was Sir Charles who set on foot the work which finally averted conflict.

'Early in July I began to take time by the forelock by preparing,
without instructions from the Cabinet, a Redistribution scheme; and
the first memoranda drawn up by Sir John Lambert for my use were
written in that month, although it was not till after Parliament had
separated for the recess that we got seriously to work. In the
evening of July 14th Mr. Gladstone broached to me his views on
Redistribution, and we practically hatched the Bill.'

Party feeling ran high, and the Queen intervened.

'On July 9th in the morning Sir Henry Ponsonby came up to see the
Duke of Richmond and some of us, and tried to settle the deadlock,
but failed.... The Cabinet decided that Chamberlain must not take
the chair at a meeting at the Agricultural Hall to denounce the
House of Lords.'

Liberals in general were, however, speaking out, and at a Cabinet a week later they had 'some fun with Hartington concerning his Lancashire meetings, with strong resolutions directed against the House of Lords for doing that which he privately approved.' Also, there was a tremendous demonstration in the Metropolis.

'On July 21st I saw the Franchise Demonstration on this day from the
Speaker's window, the procession passing from three till six.'

'After the Cabinet on August 5th we congratulated Chamberlain upon
his Birmingham franchise meeting, and he told us that Birmingham was
"thirsting for the blood of the Lords"--saying to Bright: "You are
too lenient with them. We won't stand them any longer." I told him
that as the _Times_ had said that he was too violent, I had no doubt
the Queen would say so also, to which he replied: "Probably, and if
she does I shall most likely ... deny her right to criticise my
speeches, although she may, if she likes, dismiss me, in which case
I will lead an agitation against the Lords in the country." I
answered: "Yes, but you cannot go alone in such a case, and
therefore should not appear to contemplate doing so." He replied: "I
am not going, but perhaps she can dismiss me. What then? I am not
going to tie my tongue." I retorted: "In that case it would surely
be even more essential than usual that I should go too." He closed
the matter by saying: "If it really arose out of the agitation
against the Lords and the interference of the Crown with the liberty
of speech of ministers, I do not see how a Radical could stay in.
Remember, I have observed Mr. Gladstone's limits. I have said
nothing about the future; only denounced past action."'

Mr. Chamberlain's outside agitation coincided with Sir Charles's work towards a peaceful solution. On August 9th

'A Committee of the Cabinet was appointed to deal with
Redistribution--to consist of Hartington, Kimberley, Childers,
Chamberlain, and me, with the addition of Lefevre. They forgot
James, who was anxious to be on it, [Footnote: Sir Charles wrote to
Sir Henry James on the matter, and received a reply admitting that
he had been "slightly touched" by the omission of his name, but
saying that he would still give his services.] but I soon got rid of
the Committee and went on by myself with Lambert.'

Parliament was prorogued on August 14th, but very soon compromise was in the air.

'On August 21st and 22nd I had interviews with Hartington at his
wish, nominally to talk over the sending of Wolseley to Egypt, but
really to see what I thought of a compromise with the Lords on the
basis of Lord Cowper's letter in the _Times_--introduction of the
Redistribution Bill in October.'

The situation was profoundly modified by speeches from Lord Salisbury, which made it clear that the plan "hatched" between Mr. Gladstone and Sir Charles was not likely to have any terrors for him. Lord Kimberley wrote in September:

'Now that Salisbury is going in for electoral districts, it will
become a sort of open competition which party can go furthest. I
should not be surprised if he were to trump us by proposing to
abolish the House of Lords.'

'I had now decided to agree with Lord Salisbury in advance, and
divide the counties into single-member districts if Mr. Gladstone
would let me; and Trevelyan, to whom I had broached my scheme,
wrote: "I very much approve of the scheme of dividing counties. I
hope to goodness you will be able to carry it out."'

The original draft, completed on September 18th, followed the lines laid down in consultation with Mr. Gladstone. The object of obtaining fair representation, and doing away with over-representation of vested interests, was thus attacked and began with two great industrial centres.

The scheme for England treated Lancashire and Yorkshire as urban throughout, and divided them into single-member districts; but the remaining 'rural' counties of England were divided into two-member districts. Thus, 'the net increase of county members was 53.' Boroughs which had less than 10,000 inhabitants (53 in all) were merged into the counties; those with a population of between 10,000 and under 40,000, which had two members, lost one. Thus, having added to the under- represented, Sir Charles took from the over-represented, and adds: 'this gave us 33 more seats.' Sir Charles in a secret memorandum added that he thought the fixing of so low a limit as 10,000 showed 'an altogether indefensible tenderness to vested interests.' 'I should carry the loss of one member far higher than the 40,000 line adopted, and should take away one member up to the point at which I began to give two' to a new constituency. Dilke was in favour of carrying merger of small boroughs to a greater extent than was adopted in the Act.

'Summing up, on our English borough scheme,' he said, 'I am struck
by its _extreme_ timidity. I do not see how it is to stand the
revolutionary criticism of Lord Salisbury.' 'My plan for the
Metropolis gave to it its legitimate proportion of members: 55 in
all.... These figures should be compared with 22--the previous
number.'

As to Ireland, he admitted that 'if you take its population as a whole it was over-represented in our plan; yet the difference in favour of Ireland is very small; moreover, Wales is vastly better treated than Ireland.' Lord Spencer 'thought there would be a howl from Belfast,' and wished for the representation of minorities. 'But the Irish Government made no practical proposal,' and the whole of this intricate business was left almost entirely to Sir Charles.

'On September 29th Mr. Gladstone wrote at length conveying his
general approval of my plan, and stating that he did not intend to
"handle" the Bill in the House of Commons; and so wished to defer to
the opinions of his colleagues. He gave me leave to add 12 members
to the House for Scotland, instead of taking the 12 from England;
and he congratulated me upon the "wonderful progress" which I had
made.... On the same day on which I had received Mr. Gladstone's
letter I saw one from Sir Henry Ponsonby to Mr. Gladstone with Mr.
Gladstone's reply. Sir Henry Ponsonby made proposals.... Mr.
Gladstone had refused both for the present; the former with scorn
and the latter with argument. [Footnote: The first was "that the
Lords should read the Franchise Bill a second time, and then pass a
resolution declaring that they would go into Committee as soon as
the Redistribution Bill reached them."]

'On September 30th further letters were circulated, one from Sir
Henry Ponsonby on the 27th, in which he said that the reform of the
House of Lords must in any case come, but must come later, and that
he would see the leaders of the Opposition about the second
suggestion of his previous letter as it had not been absolutely
refused (the suggestion being that the Lords should provide in the
Franchise Bill that it should come into force on January 1st, 1886,
unless the Redistribution Bill were sooner passed).

'On October 4th Hartington made a speech which produced a storm upon
this subject of Compromise as to Reform.' (He proposed that the
Lords should pass the Franchise Bill 'after seeing the conditions of
the Redistribution Bill and satisfying themselves that they were
fair.') 'But Mr. Gladstone went with Chamberlain and myself against
any compromise.'

Mr. Chamberlain put the point that no bargain could be considered unless the Franchise Bill were first passed without conditions very plainly in a speech on October 7th, and next day at the Cabinet

'Mr. Gladstone expressed his approval of Chamberlain's speech of the
previous night, and attacked Hartington for his earlier one. It
seemed to me that at this moment Lord Salisbury might have caught
Hartington by offering the compromise which Hartington had
suggested.... I refused to discuss Redistribution with the Cabinet,
telling Chamberlain that they would "drive me wild with little
peddling points."'

The appreciation of Sir Charles's competence was general. It was not limited to Parliament, and he met the expression of it when he appeared on the platform in three great centres of the Lancashire industrial democracy.

'On Tuesday, October 14th, I spoke at Oldham, and on October 15th at
the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, and on the 16th at Stockport. I had
a wonderful reception at all these meetings, but especially at the
Manchester meeting.'

Sir Charles's personal record served the party well, for the Tory cry was that the Liberals wished to preserve the inequalities of the existing divisions. To this he answered by appealing to the projects which he had introduced year after year, and recalling their reception from the Tory Government:

'I have preached for redistribution in the desert, I have advocated
it unceasingly for years, I have been a bore upon it in Parliament
and out; even the franchise is no less important in my eyes as being
that which I have a dozen times called "the necessary first step to
a complete redistribution" than in and for itself. Redistribution
is, however, if possible, of even more tremendous difficulty than
importance. It offers a greater hold than any other subject to the
arts of blocking and delay.' [Footnote: October 14th, at Oldham.]

'On October 17th Spencer reported from Balmoral that the Queen was
much pleased with her "Speech"; but not so with other people's
speeches, being angry at the violence of the language used.'

Lord Salisbury had declared that if Birmingham was going to march on London, he hoped Mr. Chamberlain would head the procession and get his head broken for his pains. Mr. Chamberlain retorted that he would gladly head the procession if Lord Salisbury would promise to come and meet it, and then, if his own head were broken, 'it should be broken in very good company.' On October 21st

'I was sent for by Mr. Gladstone about Chamberlain's speech, and
wrote to Chamberlain to ask him if he could tone it down a
little.... On October 22nd at the Cabinet Chamberlain told me that
he was willing to adopt the words of my letter in explanation of his
speech.'

He agreed to write for publication a letter to one of his Quaker constituents; but it was judged insufficient.

'On October 28th Mr. Gladstone wrote to me: "I thought you and I
were perfectly agreed about the unfortunate expressions in
Chamberlain's speech ... and in the expectation that his letter ...
would fully meet the case. I own that in my opinion it did not come
up to the mark. All I had really wished was a note conceived in the
same spirit as that in which he withdrew the 'jackal' because it
gave offence. Can nothing more be done? You saw a recent letter of
mine in defence, written when I thought the objections taken not to
be just. I am precluded from writing any such letter with the facts
as they now stand, but I hope that you may be able to bring them to
the standard of our reasonable expectations." I sent this letter to
Chamberlain, as was intended, with a note from me to say that it was
clear that the Queen had written Mr. Gladstone a second letter about
the matter, and asked whether I should say that I thought
Chamberlain's letter met the case; and Chamberlain replied: "Yes. I
cannot and _will not_ do more." This I communicated to Mr.
Gladstone. Randolph Churchill had taken the matter up. He accused
Chamberlain of having advocated violence, and was loudly
threatening, even to me, that there should be "somebody killed at
Birmingham next time." Chamberlain told me that Randolph had tried
to get up a march against Highbury on the part of the Birmingham
Tory roughs; but they were still on speaking terms, and often
chatting together at the smoking-room at the House. On the same day,
the 28th, late in the evening Mr. Gladstone sent for me about the
Chamberlain matter, and said of the Queen: "She not only attacks him
but me through him, and says I pay a great deal too much attention
to him." When Chamberlain and I went home, as we almost always did,
together in one cab, he broke out, evidently much worried and
excited, against Mr. Gladstone.

'Next day I warned Mr. Gladstone that it would not take much to make
a serious row.'

On October 15th Sir Charles wrote to Sir M. Grant Duff that he expected 'they would sit till February, and send the Bill up a third time.' On October 24th Mr. Gladstone was inclined to resign at the second rejection, which was taken for a certainty. But as to the final issue, it was becoming daily clearer that the Commons were going to win against the Lords. Even in the home counties Liberalism had become aggressive.

'October 24th.--Franchise and Redistribution seemed well in view
when I discovered on this day that Nathaniel Rothschild, who had
lately looked on Buckinghamshire as his own, was now down on his
knees to Carrington about it.' Work now began on the details of the
draft Bill.

'On October 25th there was a full meeting of my Committee of the
Cabinet on Redistribution. I took the chair, and Hartington,
Kimberley, Childers, Chamberlain, James, and Lefevre, sat round the
table. I got my own way in everything, and succeeded in raising the
10,000 limit of merger to 15,000. Mr. Gladstone, who disliked the
change, and who was the strongest Conservative living upon the
subject, yielded to it on the same night by letter.'

Sir Charles now threw himself into getting as big a measure as possible by a 'truce of God' between the parties.

'On October 29th Mr. Gladstone told me that Lord Carnarvon had
proposed to him that they should meet in order to come to some
conclusion about Redistribution. He had declined, but had tried,
through Sir Erskine May, to induce the Tories to appoint a Committee
of their own to draw up a scheme. I saw Sir Erskine May and told him
to tell Northcote that I would accept, and press the acceptance of,
any scheme not obviously unfair, and not containing minority
representation, which I should be unable to carry.'

'On October 31st there was a Cabinet which was Trevelyan's first,
and very glad he and his wife were to escape from Ireland,
[Footnote: The Chief Secretaryship was offered to Mr. Shaw Lefevre,
who refused on the same ground as had previously been taken by Sir
Charles. Without Cabinet rank he was not prepared to accept it. Sir
Henry Campbell-Bannerman was then appointed. Mr. Lefevre entered the
Cabinet as Postmaster-General after the death of Mr. Fawcett, which
occurred on November 6th, 1884.] which had aged him dreadfully....
On the question of Reform Hartington told us that he had had several
interviews with Sir Michael Beach, who had expressly stated that he
was not authorized by his party to make suggestions, but had
proposed total merger up to 25,000, and loss of the second seat up
to 80,000. I, to clinch the matter, at once volunteered to draw up a
scheme on this basis.'

'James called my attention to some communications in the
Conservative newspapers, stating that he had it on very high
authority (which with James always meant Randolph Churchill) that
the extremely large schemes hinted at were Lord Salisbury's, and
would be supported by the whole Conservative party; but these
schemes suggested minority-representation in urban districts, with
single-member constituencies in counties; or, as Chamberlain said,
"Tory minority represented in towns, and Liberal minority
extinguished in county." Lord Salisbury, however, was only keeping
his friends in good humour with minority-representation. In the
evening Randolph Churchill sent me a message that he wished to have
a conference with me about Redistribution, and by an arrangement
made through Sir Erskine May, we met in the Office of the Serjeant-
at-Arms. He then told me that Beach's scheme was his, and that he
was convinced that an agreement might be come to on those lines. I
assured him of my warm support for a large scheme. I think this was
the occasion (about this time) when Randolph, who was thinking of
going to India, vented his anger as to Salisbury. Winston Churchill
told me in March, 1901, that his father had come to terms with
Salisbury as to the future Tory Government before he started for
India. I told him this could not be, as the possibility of forming
one depended on the Irish, and that Lord Salisbury could not at this
early date have agreed to buy them by the promises of (1) Enquiry
into Spencer's police, (2) no Coercion, (3) a Viceroy personally
favourable to Home Rule.

'In the evening I dined with the Duchess of Manchester to meet the
Dufferins, on which occasion Dufferin shone, but his health and
spirits were now beginning to decline. Hartington was at the dinner,
and told me that he had had a fresh interview with Beach, this time
at his (Hartington's) request.

'On Saturday, November 1st, I had some correspondence with
Hartington about these interviews, of which I warmly approved; and
on the 3rd Hartington wrote to me that he was going to see Beach
again that day, and I placed all my scheme before him for
communication to the Conservative front bench.'

Publicly there was war.

'On November 4th was the laying of the foundation-stone of the
National Liberal Club, at which Harcourt, after saying that he was a
moderate politician, compared the House of Lords to Sodom and
Gomorrah.'

But privately

'on this day Hartington again saw Beach, and afterwards
Churchill.... Beach said that Lord Salisbury unreservedly accepted
the Queen's suggestion for a meeting of the leaders.... Conferences
went on, but all through the month Beach declined to take a
"representative character, or negotiate in such a way as would
commit his party"--to use Hartington's words. Hartington now thought
"Mr. Gladstone would be able either to come to terms with Lord
Salisbury or to put him completely in the wrong." Hartington added:
"Beach very much regrets the Lowther and John Manners speeches,"'

and probably Lord Hartington expressed regret for Sir William Harcourt's references to Sodom and Gomorrah.

'On the 6th there was a meeting of my Committee on Redistribution to
consider Beach's proposals, at which I took the chair, but did
little else, and left all the talking to the others, and their view
came to this--that they were quite willing to agree to the Tory
revolutionary scheme, provided the Tories would take the odium with
the House of Commons of proposing it.'

'On November 7th the Cabinet decided that I should be joined to
Hartington as recognized plenipotentiary.'

On the 10th

'I proposed and Mr. Gladstone agreed to write to Lord Salisbury
"distinctly accepting the Queen's offers." On November 11th we
confirmed our decisions at the last Cabinet as to completely taking
away from Lord Salisbury the power of saying that he had accepted
and we declined the Queen's proposals, by unreservedly supporting
Mr. Gladstone's letter to the Queen.'

On November 15th Mr. Gladstone informed the Cabinet that the Lords were unyielding.

'Northcote had taken tea with him on the previous evening. The Lords
would not part with the Franchise Bill till the Redistribution Bill
was in their House. As regarded Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford
Northcote, Mr. Gladstone considered the door absolutely closed, but
he was informed that the Duke of Richmond and Lord Cairns did not
agree with the leaders. We then drew up a statement to be made on
Monday, November 17th, in both Houses of Parliament as to the steps
we had taken to produce conciliation, Harcourt saying: "This is the
apple-woman spitting on her old apples and shining 'em up!"--the
fact being that it was only done to put the Lords in the wrong.'

'On Monday, November 17th, when I returned from Sandringham, I had
to see Lord Rowton, who had been sent to me by the Prince of Wales
to try and produce a settlement of the Redistribution difficulty,
but we only sat and smiled at one another; he saying that he had
come because he had been told to come, and I saying that I had
nothing new to tell him, for Lord Salisbury knew all we had to say.'

'On November 19th there was a Cabinet. The first matter mentioned
was the arrangement with the Conservatives for an interview, and at
four o'clock on this day, November 19th, occurred the first meeting
of the parties: an interview between Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford
Northcote on the one side, and Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville on
the other. Lord Salisbury had written to me about it already, and
had privately seen my papers the previous day at the Commission, and
had asked me a great number of questions, and I had given him my
division of the Metropolis and of Lancashire at his wish, and
received from him the following note: "I do not know whether it will
be possible to discuss the application of the one-member principle
to the Counties and the Metropolitan Constituencies and the suburbs
of the larger towns." The hesitating way in which he asked shows
that we might have avoided the single-members had we fought upon the
point. But, as I liked them myself, I fought the other way, against
Mr. Gladstone. At the interview between the leaders of the two
parties and the two Houses it was merely decided that the real
interview should take place on Saturday, November 22nd, at noon
between the two Conservative chiefs and Mr. Gladstone, Lord
Hartington, and me, Lord Granville being left out as knowing nothing
of the subject. On November 21st I continued my private conference
with Lord Salisbury at the Royal Commission, and we settled who the
Boundary Commissioners should be. On Saturday, November 22nd, I had
a conference with Chamberlain before going to the meeting with Lord
Salisbury. Chamberlain was in favour of two-member seats as against
single members, especially for boroughs. He was as clear as was Lord
Salisbury that the single-member system would damage the Liberal
party in the Metropolis.

'In the afternoon the Conference took place, and there never was so
friendly and pleasant a meeting. I fully described it in three
letters to Chamberlain, in which I said, among other things: "It
looks as though Lord Salisbury is really anxious that we should pass
our Bill." No memorandum on this day passed in writing, and the
written compact was concluded between Lord Salisbury and me only on
November 28th. The meeting of the 22nd was known at the time as the
Downing Street meeting; and the other as "the Arlington Street
compact."

'On Sunday, November 23rd, Lord Salisbury wrote to me a letter which
I sent on to Mr. Gladstone and which he kept. Mr. Gladstone replied
on the same day undertaking to move the adjournment of the House for
a week, and showing that he was not at all sure that Lord Salisbury,
having got from us the whole of our scheme and given us nothing in
writing which was worth anything, did not mean to sell us.
Chamberlain wrote on the same day in reply to my letters, "I cannot
make head or tail of Salisbury. He appears to be swallowing every
word that he has ever written or spoken about Redistribution.... I
wonder if he will carry his party with him.... On the whole, you
seem to be doing very well."'

Discussion now went on by correspondence between Sir Charles and Lord Salisbury, and it touched subjects which might easily have led to friction. Lord Salisbury proposed to create a number of urban constituencies by grouping; his plan being to get the small towns taken out of rural districts which he looked upon as otherwise Conservative, and to group them with small manufacturing boroughs:

'I was aghast at this suggestion, because it was a very difficult
thing, in a Parliamentary sense, to create a few such groups in
England; and if the thing was to be carried far and not confined to
a few cases only it would entirely have destroyed the whole of the
work that we had done, because all the counties would have had their
numbers altered. I therefore fought stoutly for my own scheme, which
I succeeded in carrying almost untouched. Lord Salisbury's letter
crossed one from me to him in which, after Mr. Gladstone's leave
(conveyed in the words "I see no objection to sending him this
excellent and succinct paper marked Secret"), I had communicated to
Lord Salisbury my views and the grounds on which they were based.'

'On the 26th, at four o'clock, we met at Downing Street, all five
being present.... Lord Salisbury, yielding to my reasoning, gave up
grouping,' on the understanding that the Boundary Commissioners were
'to keep the urban patches as far as possible by themselves....
Ultimately it was settled that single-member districts should be
universal in counties, and that we should leave open for the present
the question of how far it should be applied to boroughs.'

Lord Salisbury wished to retain the minority clause in places where he thought it had worked well, but he did not ask for it in Birmingham and Glasgow. 'All this showed great indecision,' says Sir Charles, and he observes that 'Lord Salisbury did not seem to me thoroughly to understand his subject.' It is probable, at all events, that he was no match on the details either for Sir Charles or for Mr. Gladstone, who, after the Conference, thus summed up his impressions in a letter dated November 26th:

'My Dear Dilke,

'I send you herewith for your consideration a first sketch which I
have made of a possible communication to-morrow after the Cabinet
from us to the Legates of the opposite party. I think that if the
Cabinet make it an _ultimatum_ we should be safe with it. There was
a careful abstention to-day on their side from anything beyond
praising this or that, and at the outset they spoke of the
one-member system for boroughs "with exceptions" as what they
desired.

'Yours sincerely,

'W. E. Gladstone.'

'Mr. Gladstone's memorandum was on my lines. On the next morning,
November 27th, Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, Hartington, I, and
Chamberlain met before the Cabinet at 11 o'clock, and kept the
Cabinet waiting, the Cabinet having been called for twelve, and
Redistribution alone being considered at it. I announced at the
Cabinet that the Tories proposed and we accepted single-member
districts universally in counties, boundaries to be drawn by a
commission who were to separate urban from rural as far as possible,
without grouping and without creating constituencies of utterly
eccentric shape. The names of the commissioners had been settled,
and both sides were pledged to accept their proposals, unless the
two sides agreed to differ from them. [Footnote: At the meeting of
the 26th 'it was agreed that the Boundary Commissioners should
consist of those gentlemen who had been advising me.']

'The Tories proposed single-member districts almost everywhere in
boroughs, and only positively named one exception--the City of
London--but were evidently prepared to make some exceptions. They
made our agreement on this point the condition of passing the
Franchise Bill, of giving up the decrease of the Irish members from
103 to 100 which they urged, of giving up all forms of minority
vote, and of giving up grouping. My own opinion and that of the
Prime Minister were in favour of agreement. Hartington, who much
disliked what he thought would be the extinction of the Whigs by an
omnipresent caucus for candidates' selection, was hostile to the
single-member system. I pointed out that we already proposed in our
amended scheme 120 single-member borough seats out of 284 borough
seats. We had thrown out to the Tories a question as to whether they
would accept, say, 184 single-borough seats, and give us, say, not
more than 100 for double-member seats; or, if they liked, two-thirds
and one-third; and they did not positively decline this suggestion.
Mr. Gladstone proposed to "save from compulsory division those urban
constituencies, not Metropolitan, which, now possessing dual
representation, are to have their representation neither increased
nor diminished." (This was the ultimate agreement.) Also, that
"cities and towns which are to receive four members and upwards, ten
in number, should have one central or principal area set apart with
two members." (This was purely personal on Mr. Gladstone's part and
was universally rejected.)

'I argued warmly in favour of supporting Lord Salisbury's scheme
(upon which he and I were absolutely agreed), I being delighted at
having got seven more members for the Metropolis than were given by
my scheme in its last form after the Cabinet had cut it down. In
order to secure Chamberlain's support I told him "I might be able to
save a seat for you and give the extended Birmingham seven if you
liked to make that a condition, but in that case I must get one
somewhere for Glasgow also out of the rest of Scotland, which is
skinning flints."

'The reception of our proposals by the Cabinet, to which Grosvenor'
(the Chief Whip) 'had been called in, was not altogether favourable.
Childers talked about resigning, and Grosvenor was most hostile. We
had the enormous advantage, however, that Chamberlain and I and Mr.
Gladstone were the only three people who understood the subject, so
that the others were unable to fight except in the form known as
swearing at large. I was sent off from the Cabinet to Lord Salisbury
to tell him that we could agree. At three o'clock we had a further
conference with the Conservative leaders, and came to an agreement
on my base, Chamberlain, who was somewhat hostile, yielding to me, I
going in and out to him, for he was at Downing Street in another
room.'

Next day memoranda were exchanged between the parties to the Conference, and Mr. Gladstone was pledged to stand by the heads set down in his memoranda, and accept no provision outside of these without Sir Stafford Northcote's agreement. One detail is of interest as illustrating Mr. Gladstone's inherited Conservatism, which comes out all through these negotiations.

'Mr. Gladstone in sending this (memorandum) to me said: "You will
see that Salisbury stands upon our printed statement as to
Universities." Mr. Gladstone, knowing that I was strongly opposed to
University representation, took this matter upon himself. He
proposed a more general form of words in place of Lord Salisbury's
pledge against new matters, and, as for Universities, wrote: "Assure
Salisbury that I personally will _bind_ myself out and out to this
proposition."'

'In the afternoon I went to Lord Salisbury to settle the terms of
agreement, and had to go four times from him to Mr. Gladstone, and
four times back again, before we finished....

'The next day I lunched with Mr. Gladstone to meet Miss Mary
Anderson, the actress, and Princess Louise. I received at lunch a
letter from Lord Salisbury making a few reservations ... none of
them difficult of acceptance.

'On December 2nd I got a note from Harcourt--to ask what I had been
doing with the British Constitution in his absence. On December 8th
I had a serious grumble from Spencer from Dublin as to my having
settled with Salisbury who were to be the Irish Commissioners, and
only asked the Irish Government after the thing was done. I had
undoubtedly been wrong, and can only say that Spencer let me off
cheaply....'

Sir Charles's holiday in the South of France, whither he went on December 17th, was broken by copies of a correspondence between Lord Spencer and Lord Salisbury, the latter writing 'with much sound and fury' on the question of another Conservative Boundary Commissioner for Ireland. 'Lord Salisbury had always been so extremely soft and sweet to me that it was a revelation to find him writing to Spencer in the style of Harcourt or of Chamberlain when in a passion.'

'Sir Stafford Northcote also wrote to me upon the subject, and
passing on to Scotland in his letter, added, "It is, I think,
understood that we may have a free fight over the grouping of Scotch
boroughs." This question of the Scotch boroughs was afterwards
referred to me and Charles Dalrymple (M.P. for Buteshire), and I
gave Dalrymple one or two changes that he wanted, which, I think,
did not matter.'

Such difficulties were few and subordinate. The scheme was settled in principle, for after the Arlington Street compact

'I wrote the letter to the Boundary Commissioners the same night,
and after I had signed their instructions on December 5th I had a
pause in my Redistribution work for some time.'

But at the end of December Lord Hartington wrote:

'I think it will take two of us all our time to work the Bill
through; and you know so much more about it than anybody else that
you must necessarily take the greatest share of the details';

and ended with an invitation to Sir Charles to stay at Hardwick to do some preliminary work on the measure.