Chapter XVI: Appendix: To Book XI

(By M. EDMOND BIRÉ)

THE CONGRESS OF VERONA AND THE SPANISH WAR

The Memoirs present a voluntary and compulsory gap. Nothing is said of the twenty months (October 1822 to June 1824) during which Chateaubriand was, first, French Ambassador at the Congress of Verona and, later, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris; nothing of the Spanish War, which was nevertheless his work. Certainly he had no intention of placing in the shade the very events to which the honour of his name as a statesman is attached. He wished, on the contrary, to speak of them at his ease. Of all the various periods of his life, it is this which assumed the greatest development under his pen: a development so great that this narrative at first formed four volumes, reduced later to two, under circumstances which I will presently relate. Those two volumes in reality form an integral portion of the Mémoires d'Outre-tombe. That they do not figure there is due to the fact that the author feared, by giving them a place in his Memoirs, to disturb the fine ordering of his book, in which the proportions are so well preserved, in which all the parts of the work harmonize among themselves with an art so perfect. For this reason, and also in order publicly to revenge the Restoration for the calumnies of which it was then the daily object, he decided, in 1838, to publish as a separate work all that he had written on the Congress of Verona and the Spanish War.

His manuscript, as I have just said, formed four volumes. This meant eighty thousand francs (twenty thousand francs per volume) which fell due to him, under the terms of his contract with the syndicate which possessed the right of publishing his future works. The four volumes were almost printed, when M. de Marcellus and M. de La Ferronnays, alarmed at seeing certain diplomatic documents brought to light which were destined, according to them, to remain secret, entreated Chateaubriand to sacrifice, here, there and everywhere, documents which, nevertheless, possessed the liveliest interest He consented to most of the curtailments asked for, and gave his friends such liberal measure that the original four volumes became reduced to two actual volumes.

"Well," said Chateaubriand to M. de Marcellus, when the sacrifice was consummated, "the two of you cost me forty thousand francs."

"Be it so," rejoined M. de Marcellus; "rather forty thousand francs than regrets when it is too late."

And Chateaubriand replied:

"The thing is done now; I have respected your scruples and La Ferronnays'; I have struck out a great deal to please you. But neither of you has placed himself sufficiently, in thought, outside his century and public affairs. To judge of an effect of tone, we should place ourselves at a distance. It is by saying all that one distinguishes one's self from the herd of buttoned-up and over-scrupulous statesmen. I have conceived diplomacy on a new plan; I speak out. You are wrong to dread my revelations; they could only do you credit. I tell you: you will do later, La Ferronnays or you, when you think the danger lessened, and for the same reasons, what you are preventing me from doing now. As far as I am concerned, I give you my authorization beforehand[494]."

Since Chateaubriand was induced to leave out of his Memoirs the Spanish War, which was "the great political event of his life," it is fitting that I should here remind the reader, if only in a few words, that this war was an act of high and great politics and not, as the enemies of the Restoration have repeated to satiety, an act of "servitude and subjection to the Northern Cabinets."

When M. de Montmorency, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, went to the Congress of Verona, he was the bearer of positive instructions containing these very words:

"France being the sole Power which is to act with her troops, she will be the sole judge of that necessity. The plenipotentiaries must not consent that the Congress should lay down the conduct of France with regard to Spain."

[Sidenote: Appendix to Book XI.]

Led away by the generosity and elevation of his sentiments, which sometimes assumed a tinge of mysticism, to embrace a policy in which the private initiative of each nation should disappear before the decisions taken in common by a sort of directorate of the Great Powers charged to secure the universal prevalence of the interests of justice and humanity, the loyal and chivalrous Mathieu de Montmorency had been induced to demand that Russia, Austria, Prussia and France should address a final notice to Spain, after which the ambassadors were to be recalled. M. de Villèle declared himself against this collective action, in the council of ministers held at the Tuileries on the 25th of January 1822. He claimed the right of France to intervene alone. Louis XVIII. sided with his opinion, and declared that "France occupied a special position towards Spain; that for her to recall her ambassador was either too much or too little;" then he added:

"Louis XIV. destroyed the Pyrenees, I will not allow them to be set up again; he placed my House on the Throne of Spain, I shall not allow it to fall from it; my Ambassador must not leave Madrid before the day when a hundred thousand Frenchmen are pushing forward to take his place."

To speak in this way was to separate the action of France from that of the other Powers; M. Duvergier de Hauranne does not hesitate to admit this[495]. It was to disown M. de Montmorency; he forthwith resigned his office. He had wished to make the Spanish question an European question; with Chateaubriand, his successor, it became a French question. At this the head of the British Cabinet, Mr. Canning[496], displayed a profound irritation. The hostility of England did not stop the Government of Louis XVIII.:

"Keep up a high tone with the English ministers," wrote
Chateaubriand, on the 16th of January 1823, to M. de
Marcellus, France's representative in London.

"Say and repeat to Mr. Canning," he wrote again in a dispatch
dated 28th January, "that we are as anxious for peace as he,
and that England can obtain it before the opening of the
campaign, if she will hold the same language as ourselves and
demand the liberty of the King. But be sure to add that our
decision is taken, and that _nothing will make us go back._"

And on the 13th of March 1823:

"Mr. Canning is angry with me for not yielding to his threats
and casting France at the knees of England. He cannot go to
war, he has not so much as one half a plausible reason for
doing so, he feels this, and he is piqued at having gone so
far. But _war or no war, France will do what she must do, or
I shall cease to be minister..._"

And, in a postscript:

"Give parties, and _answer Mr. Canning firmly._"

On the 17th of April:

"England feels that _this war is giving us back our influence
and restoring us to our place in Europe_; she must needs be
irritated and ill-disposed. Mr. Canning's self-esteem is
compromised: hence his violence and his ill-humour.... I
recommend you henceforth to show yourself cold and reserved
with Mr. Canning.... Be polite, but talk little; and let him
see, by your manner, _that the French Government knows its
strength and defends its dignity._[497]"

The deeds were on a level with the words. Chateaubriand's policy had been able and firm: a prosperous and well-managed war crowned it. Read in what terms Benjamin Constant and General Foy, although speaking in the name of the Opposition, judged the Spanish War:

"So far from contesting what our honourable colleague has
said on past events, I wish to recognise with him that the
whole of that memorable expedition has been full of glory
for our army, and I will add that this glory is so much
the finer in that it does not consist solely of military
successes. French generosity, inspiring even our private
soldiers, has always worked and sometimes happily succeeded
in making humanity prevail over vengeance, pity over fury,
and in protecting the disarmed enemy against the auxiliary
embittered by long reverses."

Thus did Benjamin Constant express himself in the tribune of the Chamber of Deputies, on the 28th of June 1824. In the same sitting, General Foy added these words:

[Sidenote: Appendix to Book XI.]

"The swiftness of the operations in Spain and the plenitude of the military success have deceived the expectations of those who were opposed to the war and surpassed the hopes of those who wished for it."

All truly liberal minds have agreed to recognise that the Spanish War was not only politic, but legitimate and, above all, national. While strengthening the Government at home, it restored to France her liberty of action abroad. The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had freed our territory. The Congress of Verona and the campaign which followed emancipated our policy. We once more became a great nation.

M. Guizot was, in 1823, one of the opponents of the expedition; this did not prevent him, when he had himself passed through public life, from writing in his Memoirs:

"As a bold stroke of dynastic and party politics, the
Spanish War succeeded fully. The sinister forebodings of
its adversaries were belied and the hopes of its supporters
surpassed. Put to the test together, the loyalty of the army
and the powerlessness of the conspirators seeking refuge
abroad were made manifest at the same time. The expedition
was an easy one, although not without glory. The Duc
d'Angoulême covered himself with credit. The prosperity and
tranquillity of France suffered from it in no way[498]."

Lastly, Sir Robert Peel, in a conversation with M. de Marcellus, thus summed up the results of the campaign:

"Providence is on your side, you were right.... You have won a real influence on the Continent: a loyal army; flourishing finances; an heir to the Crown who has acquired as much glory by his courage as his moderation[499]."

[Footnote 494: COMTE DE MARCELLUS, _Politique de la Restauration en 1822 et 1823_, p. 49--B.]

[Footnote 495: DUVERGIER DE HAURANNE, _Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire en France_, Vol. VII. p. 218.--B.]

[Footnote 496: Lord Liverpool was Prime Minister, Canning Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in 1823.--T.]

[Footnote 497: MARCELLUS, _Politique de la Restauration_, pp. 123, 128, 169, 201.--B.]

[Footnote 498: GUIZOT, _Mémoires_, Vol. I. p. 258.--B.]

[Footnote 499: MARCELLUS, _Politique de la Restauration_, p. 274.--B.]