Chapter XIX: Part I

"At the distance at which I am placed from the theatre of
events, and in my almost total ignorance of the state of
negociations, I can scarcely reason fitly. Nevertheless, as I
have long had a definite system touching the foreign policy
of France, as I was, so to speak, the first to call for the
emancipation of Greece, I readily, noble count, submit my
ideas to your judgment.

"There was as yet no question of the Treaty of the 6th of
July[676], when I published my Note on Greece[677]. That
Note contained the germ of the treaty: I proposed to the
five Great Powers of Europe to address a collective dispatch
to the Divan imperatively to demand the cessation of all
hostility between the Porte and the Hellenes. In case of
refusal, the five Powers were to declare that they recognised
the independence of the Greek Government and that they would
receive the representatives of that Government.

"This Note was read by the several Cabinets. The position
which I had occupied as Minister for Foreign Affairs lent
some importance to my opinion: what is singular is that
Prince Metternich showed himself less opposed to my Note than
Mr. Canning.

"The latter, with whom I had had fairly intimate relations,
was an orator rather than a great politician, a man of
talent rather than a statesman. He entertained a certain
jealousy of success in general, and especially of that of
France. When the Parliamentary Opposition either wounded
or exalted his self-esteem, he flung himself into false
measures, he launched out into sarcasm or boasting. It was
thus that, after the Spanish War, he rejected the demand for
intervention, which I had extracted with so much difficulty
from the Cabinet of Madrid, for the settlement of affairs
across the Atlantic: the secret reason was that he had
not himself made that demand, and he refused to see that,
even according to his system (always presuming that he had
one), England, represented in a general congress, would in
no way be bound by the acts of that congress, and would
always remain free to act separately. It was thus again that
Mr. Canning moved troops into Portugal, not to defend a
Charter at which he was the first to laugh, but because the
Opposition reproached him with the presence of our soldiers
in Spain and he wanted to be able to say that the British
Army was occupying Lisbon as the French Army occupied Cadiz.
Lastly, it was thus that he signed the Treaty of the 6th of
July against his private opinion, against the opinion of his
country, which was unfavourable to the cause of the Greeks.
If he agreed to that treaty, it was solely because he was
afraid of seeing us take the initiative in the question with
Russia and gain the glory of a generous resolution alone.
That minister, who, after all, will leave a great reputation,
also thought that he was hindering Russia's movements by this
very treaty; nevertheless, it was clear that the text of the
instrument in no way tied down the Emperor Nicholas and in no
way obliged him to waive a war of his own with Turkey.

"The Treaty of the 6th of July is a crude document
hurriedly drafted, devoid of all foresight and teeming with
contradictory provisions.

"In my Note on Greece, I presupposed the adhesion of the five
Great Powers; as Austria and Prussia have kept aloof, their
neutrality leaves them free, according to events, to declare
for or against either of the belligerent parties.

"There is no longer any question of going back to the past,
we must take things as they are. All that the governments
are obliged to do is to make the most of the facts when they
are accomplished. Let us therefore examine those facts.

"We are occupying the Morea[678], the towns on that peninsula
have fallen into our hands. So much for what concerns
ourselves.

"Varna is taken, Varna becomes an outpost at seventy hours'
march from Constantinople. The Dardanelles are blockaded;
the Russians will, in the course of the winter, seize
Silistria[679] and some other fortresses; numbers of recruits
will arrive. In the early days of spring, all will move for
a decisive campaign; in Asia, General Paskevitch[680] has
invaded three pashalics, he commands the sources of the
Euphrates and threatens the road to Erzeroum. So much for
what concerns Russia.

"Would the Emperor Nicholas have done better to undertake a
winter campaign in Europe? I think so, if it were possible.
By marching on Constantinople, he would have cut the Gordian
knot and put an end to all diplomatic intrigue; people
embrace the side of success; the way to secure allies is to
be victorious.

"As for Turkey, it has been made clear to me that she would
have declared war on us if Russia had failed before Varna.
Will she have the good sense to-day to open up negociations
with England and France, if only to rid herself of both?
Austria would gladly advise her to adopt that course; but
it is difficult to foresee the conduct of a race of men who
have not European ideas. At the same time cunning as slaves
and haughty as tyrants, with them anger is never tempered
by anything save fear. Sultan Mahmud II.[681] appears, in
some respects, to be a superior prince to the last sultans;
he has, above all, political courage; but has he personal
courage? He is content to hold reviews in the suburbs of his
capital, and he lets himself be entreated by the magnates not
to go even so far as Adrianople. The mob of Constantinople
would be better held in check by triumphs than by the
presence of its master.

"Let us, however, admit that the Divan consents to a
parley on the basis of the Treaty of the 6th of July. The
negociation would be a very intricate one; even if one had
only to fix the limits of Greece, there would be no end to
it. Where shall those limits be placed on the Continent? How
many islands shall be restored to liberty? Shall Samos, which
has so gallantly defended its independence, be abandoned? Let
us look further, suppose the conference to be established:
will it paralyze the armies of the Emperor Nicholas? While
the plenipotentiaries of the Turks and of the three Allied
Powers are treating in the Archipelago, every step of the
invading forces in Bulgaria will change the state of the
question. If the Russians were repulsed, the Turks would
break up the conference; if the Russians arrived at the gates
of Constantinople, there would be a fine question of the
independence of the Morea! The Hellenes would need neither
protectors nor negociators.

"Therefore, to persuade the Divan to apply itself to the
Treaty of the 6th of July is to postpone the difficulty, not
to solve it. The coincidence of the emancipation of Greece
and the signing of peace between the Turks and Russians is,
in my opinion, necessary to extricate the Cabinets of Europe
from their present embarrassment.

"What conditions will the Emperor Nicholas lay down for peace?

"In his manifesto, he declares that he waives conquests, but
he speaks of indemnities for the cost of the war: that is
vague and may lead to much.

"Will the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, pretending to regularize
the Treaties of Akerman[682] and Jassy[683] demand (1) the
complete independence of the two principalities; (2) liberty
of commerce in the Black Sea, not only for Russia, but the
other nations; (3) the repayment of the sums expended in this
last campaign?

"Innumerable difficulties present themselves against the
conclusion of a peace on these bases.

"If Russia desires to give the principalities sovereigns of
her choosing, Austria will look upon Moldavia and Wallachia
as two Russian provinces and will oppose this political
transaction.

"Will Moldavia and Wallachia fall under the sway of a prince
who shall be independent of any Great Power, or of a prince
installed under the protectorate of several sovereigns?

"In that case, Nicholas would prefer the hospodars appointed
by Mahmud, for the principalities, continuing to be Turkish,
would remain vulnerable to the Russian armies.

[Sidenote: On Eastern affairs: part I.]

"Liberty of commerce in the Black Sea, the opening of that
sea to all the fleets of Europe and America would shake the
power of the Porte to its foundations. To grant the right of
passage of warships under Constantinople is, with reference
to the geography of the Ottoman Empire, as though one were to
recognise the right of foreign armies to cross France at all
times along the walls of Paris.

"Lastly, where would Turkey find the money to pay the costs
of the campaign? The so-called treasure of the Sultans is
an antiquated fable. The provinces conquered beyond the
Caucasus might, it is true, be ceded as security for the sum
demanded: of the two Russian armies, one, in Europe, appears
to me to be entrusted with the interests of Nicholas' honour;
the other, in Asia, with his pecuniary interests. But, if
Nicholas did not consider himself bound by the declarations
of his manifesto, would England with an indifferent eye see
the Muscovite soldier advancing along the road to India? Was
she not alarmed already in 1827, when he took one more step
forward in the Persian Empire?

"If the double difficulty arising from the carrying into
effect of the treaty and from the pertinence of the
conditions of a peace between Turkey and Russia were
to render useless the efforts made to overcome so many
obstacles; if a second campaign were to open in the spring,
would the powers of Europe take sides in the quarrel? What
part ought France to play? This is what I propose to examine
in the second part of this Note."