Chapter II: Was Independence Promised? (1)

It has long been the fashion in certain quarters to allege, or to insinuate, that American consuls and naval officers promised the Insurgent leaders that the independence of the Philippines would be recognized by the United States. It has been claimed by some that the coöperation of the Insurgents in the military operations against Manila was sought for and secured. Others say that they were at least _de facto_ allies of the United States, and that they were in the end shamelessly betrayed and wantonly attacked.

These are very serious charges. I shall prove, chiefly by the Insurgent records, that each of them is false. I ask the forbearance of my readers if, in the three chapters which I devote to these matters, I quote documentary evidence at length. When original documents or extracts from them tell a clear and reasonably concise story, I sometimes insert them bodily in the text. In other cases I give my own version of the facts which they set forth, but give the full text in foot-notes. In nearly all instances references are given to sources of documentary information. I greatly regret that Taylor's narrative, with its very numerous supporting documents, is not readily accessible to the student of history. It ought to have been published, but never got beyond the galley-proof stage. In referring to it, I am therefore obliged to use the word Taylor followed by the letters and figures designating the page of this galley proof on which the passage referred to is found. Whenever possible I give the War Department numbers [6] of Insurgent documents, but in a few cases can give only the exhibit numbers assigned by Taylor in printing the documents.

As his exhibits are serially arranged it is easy to find any one of them. Copies of his work may be found in the War Department and in the office of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary.

Referring to the charge that the Insurgents were deceived, even had deceit been practised as claimed, Aguinaldo would have had no just ground for complaint, for he himself not only frankly advocated its use, but deliberately employed it in his dealings with the Americans, as clearly appears in records hereinafter cited. [7] However, most Americans hold to a standard very different from his. Was it departed from in this instance?

Aguinaldo has specifically and repeatedly charged that Pratt and Dewey promised him the recognition of the independence of the Philippines by the United States. [8]

Judge Blount has referred to the "_de facto_ alliance between the Americans and Aguinaldo," and has dwelt at length on "promises, both expressed and implied," which were subsequently repudiated by Consul Pratt, Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and Merritt, constantly suggesting, even when he does not specifically charge, bad faith on the part of these officers of the United States. [9]

On analyzing his statements we find that he is discreetly non-committal as to exactly what were the expressed promises, nor does he make it so plain as might be desired what legitimate inferences were deducible from the acts of the Americans in question. He quotes an alleged statement of General Anderson to the effect that:--

"Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, [10] and
Williams [11] did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a
Philippino government would be recognized, the Phillippinos
certainly thought so, judging from their acts rather than
from their words. Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition,
as I did subsequently at his request." [12]

Before discussing these charges I will briefly review certain historical facts, knowledge of which will be useful in considering them.

In August, 1896, an insurrection against Spain had broken out in the Philippines under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, a resident of Cavite Viejo, who had been a school teacher, and was, at that time, _gobernadorcillo_ [13] of his town.

It had been terminated by the so-called "Treaty of Biacnabató," signed in Manila on December 15, 1897.

This document provided for the surrender of "Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Supreme Chief of the Insurgents in arms," and Don Marciano Llanera and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo, his subordinates, together with their soldiers and arms.

"The Excellent Señor General in Chief" of the Spanish forces was to "provide the necessary means for supporting the lives" of those who surrendered before a certain fixed date.

In actual practice what was done was to agree to pay them $800,000 [14] in three instalments, the first of $400,000, the second and third of $200,000 each.

Aguinaldo and certain other leaders were to take up their residence outside the islands. Their deportation was duly provided for, and Aguinaldo and twenty-six of his companions were taken to Hongkong, on the Spanish steamer _Uranus_; arriving there on December 31, 1897.

On January 2, 1898, $400,000 were deposited in the Hongkong Bank, to the credit of Aguinaldo and Co.

The Insurgent leaders remaining at Biacnabató had a meeting under the presidency of Isabelo Artacho, an Ilocano [15] who was the ranking officer in the absence of Aguinaldo, and requested that the second instalment, of $200,000, be paid to them. The Spanish governor-general, Primo de Rivera, acceded to their request, and they divided the money, although Aguinaldo denied their right to do so, claiming that it should have been sent to Hongkong.

The third payment of $200,000 was apparently never made. Primo de Rivera says that he turned over a check for $200,000 to his successor, General Augustin, in April, 1898; giving as his reason for refusing to pay it to the Insurgents that there seemed to him to be no prospect of its being equitably divided among those who were entitled to receive it under the agreement.

Aguinaldo and his associates claimed that certain reforms were promised by the Spanish government at the time the treaty of Biacnabató was negotiated, and as these measures were not put into effect, they organized a junta or revolutionary committee at Hongkong. It included in its membership a number of Filipino political exiles, then residing at that place.

The men who composed this organization soon fell to quarrelling and it became necessary to come to a definite understanding as to its aims. Under the arrangement finally reached, the junta, as a whole, was charged with the work of propaganda outside of the archipelago; with all diplomatic negotiations with foreign governments; and with the preparation and shipment of such articles as were needed to carry on the revolution in the Philippines. It was to be allowed voice by Aguinaldo's government in any serious question which might arise abroad, and would aid that government in bringing the civil administration of the Philippines to the level of that of the most advanced nations.

Trouble soon arose among the former Insurgent leaders over the division of the funds deposited at Hongkong.

Taylor gives a trustworthy and concise account of the events of this period, and as it is of historic interest, and makes clear just how Aguinaldo came to go to Singapore, meet Pratt, and enter into negotiations with him, I quote extensive extracts from it. [16]

"From January 4 to April 4, Aguinaldo withdrew from the
banks 5786.46 pesos in part interest on the money he had
deposited. This was used to pay the expenses of himself and his
companions in Hongkong. These expenses were kept at a minimum;
the money was drawn and spent by him. If one of the men with
him needed a new pair of shoes, Aguinaldo paid for them;
if another wanted a new coat, Aguinaldo bought it. Minute
accounts were kept, which are on file among his papers,
and it is seen from them that his expenses were exceeding
his income, which could only be 12,000 pesos a year, while he
was living at the rate of 22,000, with constant demands being
made upon him by men who came from the Philippines. Life was
not easy under these conditions. Aguinaldo's companions were
entirely dependent upon him. Their most trivial expenses had
to be approved by him, and he held them down with a strong
hand. They were men living in a strange land, among a people
whose language they did not speak, having nothing to do but
quarrel among themselves, exiles waiting for a chance to
return to their own country, which they watched with weary
eyes while they guarded the embers by which they hoped to
light the fires of a new insurrection.

"The men who had accompanied Aguinaldo to Hongkong were
not the only Filipinos domiciled there; a number of men had
taken refuge in that British colony after the events of 1872,
and some of them at least had prospered. Some of them, like
the members of the Cortes family, seem to have had almost
no relations with the followers of Aguinaldo; some, like
J. M. Basa, knew them and took part in some of the meetings of
the governing groups, but were probably not admitted to their
full confidence, as Aguinaldo and his immediate following
wanted and were working for independence and independence
alone, while the Filipinos who had long lived in Hongkong
wanted to see the archipelago lost to Spain, but had no
confidence in the ability of the country to stand alone or
in the fitness of Aguinaldo and his following to direct the
councils of a state. The character of the new refugees did
not inspire confidence in these older men, who hoped for a
protectorate by or annexation to the United States.

"On May 6, 1898, the consul-general of the United States there
informed the State Department that D. Cortés, M. Cortés,
A. Rosario, Gracio Gonzaga, and José Maria Basa (50), all
very wealthy land-owners, bankers, and lawyers of Manila,
desired to tender their allegiance and the allegiance of
their powerful families in Manila to the United States,
and that they had instructed all their connections to render
every aid to the United States forces in Manila. On May 14 he
forwarded statements of other Filipinos domiciled in Hongkong,
not members of the junta, that they desired to submit their
allegiance and the allegiance of their families in the
Philippine Islands to the United States. One of Aguinaldo's
followers, writing somewhat later, spoke with bitterness
of the rich old men who went about calling their companions
'beggarly rebels,' but these men were rich, and their names and
their apparent adhesion to the cause represented by Aguinaldo
would inspire confidence in him among men of property in
the Philippines. They were, accordingly, not to be lightly
alienated; therefore, at first, at least, no open break took
place with them, but their attitude toward the leaders of
the insurrection is shown by the fact that after the early
summer of 1898 they took no, or very little, part in the
insurgent movement, although they were living in Hongkong,
the seat of the junta, which conducted the propaganda for
the insurgent government of the Philippines.

* * * * *

"But, in fact, Aguinaldo had no just conception of the
conditions and of the opportunities which were about to open
before the Hongkong junta, for although war between Spain and
the United States was imminent and a United States squadron
was in Hongkong threatening Manila, Aguinaldo was chiefly
concerned in finding how to avoid losing the money which
had been received from the Spanish government as the price
of his surrender. The importance of his presence near the
Philippines in case of war did not occur to him, or if it did
occur to him anything which he could obtain there from the
aid of the United States probably seemed for the moment of
little consequence compared with escaping from his wrangling
companions with enough money to live on in Paris.

"Artacho, who had received 5000 pesos as his share of the
second payment, arrived in Hongkong and on April 5 demanded
200,000 pesos of the insurgent funds, probably under the
agreement that he should establish a company in Hongkong
for the benefit of the former leaders and not merely of
those who had accompanied Aguinaldo. But the leaders in
Hongkong had denounced that agreement, and refused to pay. He
then entered suit before the supreme court of Hongkong,
calling upon Aguinaldo for an accounting of the trust funds
deposited in his hands for the benefit of Artacho and others,
and asked for an injunction restraining Aguinaldo or any
member of the junta from handling or disposing of any part
of said funds. He filed as evidence copies of the Biacnabató
agreement and of the agreement made by the leaders on December
19. This suit was brought not merely in the name of Artacho,
but in that of all the exiles who were described as living
in exile in Hongkong in accordance with an agreement made
with the Spanish Government. Artacho probably had adherents
among these men, some at least of whom were utterly weary
of waiting in Hongkong and of living upon what was doled out
to them. Some at least saw no chance of any other fate than
indefinite exile spent in dependence upon the inner group
for even the means of existence.

"The suit was in equity, and called for an accounting for the
trust funds which the complainant recognized were legally
in the hands of Aguinaldo. It could be carried on only
with great difficulty without his presence and without his
account books. Meetings were held, and Artacho was denounced
as attempting to extort blackmail, but he refused to yield,
and Aguinaldo, rather than explain the inner workings of the
Hongkong junta before a British court, prepared for flight. A
summons was issued for his appearance before the supreme court
of Hongkong on April 13, 1898, but he was by that time beyond
its jurisdiction.

"He drew out the 50,000 pesos from the Chartered Bank,
which had become due according to the terms of the deposit,
and perhaps such other sums as could be drawn upon by check,
engaged passage for Europe by way of Singapore for G. H. del
Pilar, J. M. Leyba, and himself under assumed names, appointed
V. Belarmino to succeed to his functions, and gave him checks
signed in blank to draw the interest of the sums on deposit to
provide for the support of the exiles. He gave as his reason
for departure that he was going to remain under cover until
Artacho could be bought off, but he intended to go far afield
for this purpose, as he gave his destination as Europe and
the United States.

"Aguinaldo and his companions probably sailed from Hongkong
on April 8, 1898, and arrived in Singapore on April 21, after
stopping in Saigon. War between the United States and Spain
had been rendered inevitable by the resolution of Congress
demanding that Spain should withdraw her forces from Cuba,
and was declared on April 21. Although Aguinaldo and his
followers did not appreciate the influence which conditions on
the other side of the world might have upon the future of the
Philippines, it happened that in Singapore at that time there
was an Englishman named Bray who did. He had been a member of
the civil service in India, and had lived for some years in the
Philippines, but he had fallen upon evil days and was engaged
in writing letters to the Singapore _Free Press_ upon the
Philippines, and in retailing such information as was in his
possession concerning them to the United States consul-general
in Singapore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, for transmittal to
Commodore Dewey. Bray heard of the arrival of Aguinaldo and
realized what could be done with him, and that if the matter
were well handled it might be to his own advantage. He went
at once to see Aguinaldo and informed him that the United
States consul-general was anxious to see him. He went to the
consul-general and informed him of the importance of Aguinaldo,
and that he was in Singapore. Aguinaldo had to be persuaded
to agree to a meeting. The consul-general was anxious for it,
and it took place, according to Aguinaldo, on the night of
April 22 (according to Pratt, on the morning of April 24). The
statement made by Aguinaldo is probably correct. According
to his account book, he paid $11 on April 23, 1898, for a
telegram to the Hongkong junta concerning the negotiations
'with America.'

"Aguinaldo knew but little English, Pratt knew no Spanish, so
in their interview Bray acted as interpreter. An interpreter
who is interested in the subject of the discussion may
be a dangerous man. It is impossible to say what he told
Aguinaldo. Certainly Pratt did not know; but whatever was
said during these conversations it is within the limits
of possibility that Pratt may have been made to say by the
interpreter more than he intended, and that his statements of
what would probably be granted by the United States Government
and his expression of good wishes for the cause of Filipino
independence may have been translated as assurances and as
promises. Bray, who, according to his Filipino former friends,
was apt to talk too much, may have talked too much on this
occasion, and so the myth of the formal agreement between
Aguinaldo on behalf of the Filipino insurgents and Pratt on
behalf of the United States grew up, a fiction which Bray
himself, with a natural desire to add to his own importance,
did his best to circulate.

"Bray did not ask for his reward at the time, but probably
reckoned upon making himself indispensable as an adviser,
so that later he could make his own terms. For a time he
wrote letters of advice to Aguinaldo, which may have had
some influence upon the line of conduct which he adopted, and
later was employed in furnishing from Hongkong news to various
newspapers of events and conditions in the Philippines. His
cablegrams shortly before the outbreak of hostilities between
the United States and the insurgents were more picturesque
than veracious, but they were apparently considered effective,
as Aguinaldo ordered that he should be given $5000. He wanted
more, but the Hongkong junta did not trust him, and he ceased
to be in their employment." [17]

As we shall see, Bray did not do all of the interpreting at Singapore, and we shall be able to determine with some accuracy what actually transpired there.

We can now consider understandingly the charges made against Pratt and Dewey.

It has been claimed over and over again, that Pratt promised Aguinaldo recognition of tile independence of the Philippines if he and his people would cooperate with the United States forces against Spain.

Aguinaldo himself made the charge in his "Reseña Verídica" [18] in the following words:--

"In this interview Consul Pratt told me that because the
Spaniards had not complied with the agreement of Biac-na-bató,
the Filipinos had a right to renew their interrupted revolution
and advised me to take up arms anew against Spain, assuring me
that America would give the Filipinos the greatest advantages
(mayores ventajas). Then I asked the Consul what advantages the
United States would concede to the Philippines, suggesting,
when I had the proper opening, the propriety of making an
agreement in writing, to which the Consul answered that he
would report, by telegraph, on the subject to Mr. Dewey,
who was the chief of the expedition against the Philippines,
and who had ample powers from President McKinley.

"On the following day, between 10 and 12 in the morning, we
again took up the matter, Consul Pratt saying that the admiral
had answered my inquiry by saying that the United States
would at least recognize the independence of the Philippine
government under a naval protectorate, but that there was no
necessity to put it in writing, as the words of the admiral
and the American consul were sacred and would be fulfilled,
not being like those of the Spaniards, and finally, that the
Government of North America was a very honourable Government,
a very just and very powerful one." [19]

On April 27, 1908, Pratt telegraphed the Secretary of State as follows: --

"General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with
Dewey coöperation insurgents Manila.

"_Pratt_."

On the 28th he wrote the Secretary, explaining how he had come to meet Aguinaldo, and stating just what he had done. He said:--

"At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo
the state of an object sought to be obtained by the present
insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the
Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself,
whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the
Government, to point out the danger of continuing independent
action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the
expediency of cooperating with our fleet, then at Hongkong,
and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed
thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should
the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same
day as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:--

"'Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong
arrange with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents
Manila if desired. Telegraph.

"'_Pratt_.'"

The Commodore's reply read thus:--

"'Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.

"'_Dewey_.'"

Pratt adds:--

"I received it late at night, and at once communicated to
General Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and private
secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting
off by the British Steamer _Malacca_, which left here on
Tuesday the 26th.

"Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last
interview with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of which
I shall give you by next mail.

"The general impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability,
and courage, and worthy the confidence that had been placed
in him.

"I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with the
commander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict of
action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering
the Philippines.

"If this course of mine meets with the Government's approval,
as I trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray,
however, I consider there is due some special recognition
for most valuable services rendered.

"How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to
decide.

"I have, etc." [20]

It will be noted that Pratt explained to Aguinaldo that he had no authority to speak for the government; that there was no mention in the cablegrams between Pratt and Dewey of independence or indeed of any conditions on which Aguinaldo was to coöperate, these details being left for future arrangement with Dewey; and that Pratt thought that he had prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.

The particulars as to the second and last interview between Aguinaldo and Pratt were embodied in the following letter:--

"No. 213. _Consulate-General of the United States._

"_Singapore_, April 30, 1898.

"_Sir_: Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th instant,
I have the honor to report that in the second and last
interview I had with Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo on the eve of his
departure for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him the necessity,
under Commodore Dewey's direction, of exerting absolute
control over his forces in the Philippines, as no excesses
on their part would be tolerated by the American Government,
the President having declared that the present hostilities
with Spain were to be carried on in strict accord with modern
principles of civilized warfare.

"To this General Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that
he intended and was perfectly able, once on the field, to
hold his followers, the insurgents, in check and lead them
as our commander should direct.

"The general stated that he hoped the United States would
assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough
to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their
own, in the organization of which he would desire American
advice and assistance.

"These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss.

"I have, etc.,

"_E. Spencer Pratt_,

"_United States Consul-General_."

In a subsequent communication written on July 28, 1898, Pratt made the following statement:--

"I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the
question of the future policy of the United States with
regard to the Philippines, that I held out no hopes to him
of any kind, committed the government in no way whatever,
and, in the course of our confidences, never acted upon
the assumption that the Government would cooperate with
him--General Aguinaldo--for the furtherance of any plans
of his own, nor that, in accepting his said cooperation,
it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political
claims which he might put forward." [21]

What reason if any is there for denying the truth of this allegation?

I will give in full Blount's statement as to what occurred at a meeting held at Singapore, to celebrate the early successes of Dewey and Aguinaldo, as it constitutes his nearest approach to a direct claim, that any one at any time promised independence:--

"First there was music by the band. Then followed the formal
reading and presentation of the address by a Dr. Santos,
representing the Filipino community of Singapore. The address
pledged the 'eternal gratitude' of the Filipino people to
Admiral Dewey and the honored addressee; alluded to the glories
of independence, and to how Aguinaldo had been enabled; by the
arrangement so happily effected with Admiral Dewey by Consul
Pratt, to arouse eight millions of Filipinos to take up arms
'in defence of those principles of justice and liberty of
which your country is the foremost champion' and trusted
'that the United States... will efficaciously second the
programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo
in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence
under the protection of the United States.'

"Mr. Pratt arose and 'proceeded, speaking in French,'
says the newspaper--it does not say Alabama French, but
that is doubtless what it was--'to state his belief that the
Filipinos would prove and were now proving themselves fit for
self-government.' The gentleman from Alabama then went on to
review the mighty events and developments of the preceding six
weeks, Dewey's victory of May 1st, 'the brilliant achievements
of your own distinguished leader, General Emilio Aguinaldo,
_cooperating on land with the Americans at sea_,' etc. 'You
have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being
accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen
under his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned that General
Aguinaldo had arrived _incognito_ in Singapore, I immediately
_sought him out_. An hour's interview convinced me that he
_was the man for the occasion_; and, having communicated
with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join
the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.'" [22]

Now, it happens that Dr. Santos himself forwarded his speech, and his version of Pratt's reply thereto, in a letter to Aguinaldo, dated Singapore, June 9, 1898. As he served as interpreter, he, if any one, should know what Pratt said. After describing the change in tone of the Singapore _Free Press_, with which strained relations had formerly existed, and the subsequent friendliness of the editor of this paper and that of the _Straits Times_, he says that on the previous afternoon he went with the other Filipinos to greet Pratt. He continues:--

"This occasion was unusually opportune by reason of ours having
been victorious and immediately after the cry of our worthy
chief which found an echo in this colony. For this purpose 30
or more Filipinos--9 of the higher class, 15 musicians and the
remainder of the middle class--went to greet Consul A., here,
and on the invitation of Mr. Bray we ascended. He received us
in his private office, and it was imposing to see that the only
decoration was the American flag which covered the desk, and in
its centre, a carved wooden frame holding the portrait of our
worthy chief. He shook hands with all of us, and I introduced
them all. We found there also, and were introduced to, the
Editor of the _Straits Times_ and the _Free Press_ of here,
and after being thus assembled, after a musical selection,
I read the following speech in French:--

"'_His Excellency, The Consul General of the United
States of America in Singapore_:

"'_Your Excellency_: The Filipinos of all social
classes residing in this port, have come to greet
Your Excellency as the genuine representative of
the great and powerful American Republic in order to
express to you our eternal gratitude for the moral
and material support given by Admiral Dewey to our
General Aguinaldo in his campaign for the liberty of
eight million Filipinos. The latter and we ourselves
hope that the United States, your nation, persevering
in its humanitarian policy, will without cessation and
(with) decided energy continue to support the programme
agreed upon in Singapore between Your Excellency and
General Aguinaldo, that is to say, the Independence
of the Philippine Islands, under an American
protectorate. Accept our cordial acknowledgments and
congratulations on being the first one in accepting
and supporting this idea which time and events have
well developed to the great satisfaction of our
nation. Finally, we request you, Most Excellent Sir,
to express to your worthy President and the American
Republic, our sincere acknowledgments and our fervent
wishes for their prosperity. I have concluded.'

"The Consul replied hereto in French, in more or less the
following terms:--

"'You have nothing to thank me for, because I have only
faithfully followed the instructions received from my
Government; the fact of the sudden departure of your General
will permit you to infer that I have done so. I shall in any
case inform my Government of your good wishes and I thank you
in its name. You know that your wishes are mine also, and for
this reason at the last interview I had with Mr. Aguinaldo,
I repeated to him that he should observe the greatest humanity
possible in the war, in order that our army, our soldiers,
our nation and all the other nations may see that you are
humane and not savages, as has erroneously been believed.'

"After this there was enthusiastic applause for the Consul;
he offered us all cigars, glasses of very fine sherry, and
lemonade for the musicians and the majority. The toasts were
offered with the sherry by your humble servant, Sres. Cannon,
Enríquez, Celio, Reyes, the Consul, the editors of the _Free
Press_, _Straits Times_ and Mr. Bray. We drank to America
and her humanitarian work of redemption; to the Philippines
with America; we gave thanks to the Consul, to Mr. Bray as an
important defender; we drank to the _Free Press_ for taking
such an interest in our affairs, and to the _Straits Times_
(sarcastically); but I was very careful not to propose a toast
to our general, which was done at the proper time by 'Flaco'
[23] when we gave three cheers; for the sake of courtesy we
cheered for England, which had been so hospitable to us, and
when everybody had become quiet, the Editor of the _Straits
Times_ took his glass in his hand and cried in a loud voice,
'The Philippine Republic,' to which we all responded. 'Flaco'
disappeared a moment, and when he returned he brought with
him the American flag, and formally presented it to us in
French, which I interpreted to all in Spanish, as follows:
'Gentlemen: The American Consul, with his deep affection for
us, presents us this flag as the greatest and most expressive
remembrance which he can give us. The red stripes stand for
the generous blood of her sons, shed to obtain her liberty;
the white stripes stand for her virginity and purity as our
country; the blue background indicates the sky and each star
represents a free and independent State; this is America, and
the Consul is desirous that we also should have so glorious
a history as hers and that it may be as brilliant as could
be wished, securing peace with respect, and may God be our
help and guide in securing liberty. Viva and with it our
most sincere thanks for so signal a courtesy.' Hereupon, to
the surprise of everybody as no one expected it, the Consul
requested that some Filipino airs be played which seemed to
please him very much. Finally, about 6.15, we left, very well
satisfied with the reception accorded us and the kindness
of the Consul. Mr. Bray asked me for the text of my speech,
which I insert above and I secured from the Consul his French
text, which I enclose in my letter to Naning. Without anything
further for the present, awaiting your reply and your opinion
as to the above, as also orders and instructions for the
future, I am,

"Yours, etc.

(Signed) "_Isidoro de los Santos_."

To this letter Major Taylor has appended the following note:--

"(_Note by Compiler._--In a letter written in Tagalog to
Aguinaldo on June 6 by Santos he describes the American consul
general as having cried out 'Hurrah for General Aguinaldo,
hurrah for the Republic of the Philippines' and then, having
apparently taken several drinks, he passed up and down the
room waving the American flag before giving it to the assembled
Filipinos (P.I.R., 406.7).)" [24]

This final statement does not present the representative of the United States government at Singapore in a very favourable light, but I take the facts as I find them. If now we compare the speech actually made by Dr. Santos with Blount's version of it, we shall find that with the exception of the words "eternal gratitude" the passages which he encloses in quotation marks are not in the original at all. The glories of independence are not alluded to, nor is there so much as a suggestion that Aguinaldo had been enabled to arouse eight millions of Filipinos to take up arms, which he certainly had not done.

Dr. Santos in his speech did resort to a stereotyped Filipino procedure so very commonly employed that those of us who have dealt much with his people have learned to meet it almost automatically. It consists in referring to one's having said just exactly what one did not say, and then if one fails to note the trap and avoid it, in claiming that because one did not deny the allegation one has admitted its truth.

Aguinaldo himself later repeatedly resorted to this procedure in his dealings with Dewey and others.

In the present instance Santos employed it rather cleverly when he expressed the hope that the United States would "continue to support the programme agreed upon in Singapore, between your Excellency and General Aguinaldo, that is to say, the independence of the Philippine Islands under an American protectorate."

Now if this was agreed to, Aguinaldo later constantly violated his part of the agreement, for we shall see that he stated over and over again, in correspondence with members of the junta and others, that a protectorate would be considered only if absolute independence finally proved unattainable, but there is no reason to believe that any such agreement was made.

Dr. Santos read his speech to Mr. Pratt in French. Blount implies, whether rightly or wrongly I do not know, that Pratt's knowledge of French was poor. At all events Pratt in his reply made not the slightest reference to the hope expressed by Santos that the United States would continue to support the programme which Santos said had been agreed upon between Pratt and Aguinaldo, and claim of a promise of independence based on these speeches must obviously be abandoned. There is no doubt that Pratt personally sympathized with the ambitions of the Filipino leaders, and openly expressed his sympathy on this and other occasions, but to do this was one thing and to have attempted to compromise his government would have been another and very different one. The shrewd Filipinos with whom he was dealing understood this difference perfectly well.

It is a regrettable fact that there exists some reason to believe that his sympathy was not purely disinterested. Aguinaldo claims that Pratt wished to be appointed "representative of the Philippines in the United States to promptly secure the official recognition of our independence" and that he promised him "a high post in the customs service." [25]

It will be noted that several sentences and phrases in Blount's statement are enclosed in quotation marks. From what were they quoted? The next paragraph in his book tells us:--

"Says the newspaper clipping which has preserved the Pratt
oration: At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech, refreshments
were served, and as the Filipinos, _being Christians,
drink alcohol_, there was no difficulty in arranging as to
refreshments." [26]

The use of this clipping from the Singapore _Free Press_ illustrates admirably Blount's methods. The _Free Press_ had at first displayed a marked coldness toward the insurgent cause, but its editor, Mr. St. Clair, was opportunely "seen" by Bray, who reported that as a result of his visit, both the editor and the paper would thereafter be friendly, and they were. In other words, the _Free Press_ became the Singapore organ of the insurrection, and its editor, according to Bray, "a true and loyal friend" of Aguinaldo.

Blount claims to have made "an exhaustive examination of the records of that period." [27] Why then did he use as evidence a newspaper clipping from an Insurgent organ, instead of Santos's letter?

Blount endeavours to make capital out of the fact that Pratt forwarded to the State Department a proclamation which he says was gotten up by the Insurgent leaders at Hongkong and sent to the Philippines in advance of Aguinaldo's coming. He says that it was headed "America's Allies" and quotes from it as follows:--

"Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence
within our reach.... The Americans, not from mercenary
motives, but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations
of so many persecuted people, have considered it opportune,
etc. [Here follows a reference to Cuba.] At the present
moment an American squadron is preparing to sail for the
Philippines.... The Americans will attack by sea and prevent
any reënforcements coming from Spain; ... we insurgents must
attack by land. Probably you will have more than sufficient
arms, because the Americans have arms and will find means
to assist us. _There where you see the American flag flying,
assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers!_" [28]

The translation that he used is that given in Senate Document No. 62, L. 60, and is none too accurate. He allows it to be inferred that this proclamation was actually issued. It was not. Its history is as follows:--

On May 16, 1898, J. M. Basa, a Filipino, who had lived in Hongkong since 1872, on account of his connection with the troubles of that year, wrote letters [29] to a number of friends recommending the widest possible circulation of a proclamation enclosed therewith, as an aid to the American policy in the Philippines "in the war against the tyrannical friars and the Spaniards."

With these letters there were sent two different proclamations, each beginning with the words "Fellow Countrymen." The first, which is the one referred to by Blount, continues:--

"Divine Providence places us in a position to secure our
independence, and this under the freest form to which all
individuals, all people, all countries, may aspire.

"The Americans, more for humanity than for self-interest,
attentive to the complaints of so many persecuted Filipinos,
find it opportune to extend to our Philippines their protective
mantle, now that they find themselves obliged to break their
friendship with the Spanish people, because of the tyranny
they have exercised in Cuba, causing all Americans, with whom
they have great commercial relations, enormous damages.

"At this moment an American fleet is prepared to go to the
Philippines.

"We, your fellow-countrymen, fear that you will make use of
your arms to fire upon the Americans. No, brothers; do not
make such a mistake; rather (shoot) kill yourselves than
treat our liberators as enemies.

"Do not pay attention to the decree of Primo de Rivera,
calling on you to enlist for the war, for that will cost
you your lives: rather die than act as ingrates toward our
redeemers, the Americans.

* * * * *

"Note well that the Americans have to attack by sea, at the
same time avoiding reinforcements which may come from Spain;
therefore the insurrection must attack by land. Perhaps you
will have more than sufficient arms, as the Americans have
arms, and will find the means to aid you.

"Whenever you see the American flag, bear in mind that they
are our redeemers." [30]

On the margin is written: "Viva, for America with the Philippines!"

Apparently what Basa here means by independence is independence from Spain, for it is known that he was in favour of annexation to the United States, and in the second proclamation we find the following:--

"This is the best opportunity which we have ever had for
contriving that our country (all the Philippine Archipelago)
may be counted as another Star in the Great Republic of
the United States, great because of its wisdom, its wealth,
and its constitutional laws.

"Now is the time to offer ourselves to that great nation. With
America we shall have development in the broadest sense
(of advancement) in civilization.

"With America we shall be rich, civilized and happy.

"Fellow patriots, add your signatures to those which have
already been given. Explain to all our fellow countrymen the
benefits of this change, which will be blessed by Heaven,
by men and by our children.

"Viva America with the Philippines!!!" [31]

The letters were undoubtedly given to Aguinaldo for delivery on his arrival. They were never delivered, and it is reasonable to suppose, especially as Basa, who was a man of importance and means, was a member of the group who desired annexation to the United States, that Aguinaldo took the letters along in order to avoid a rupture with him and then quietly suppressed them. Obviously, however, he sent or gave a copy of the first one to Pratt, presumably without the written words: "Viva, for America with the Philippines!"

And now comes a bit of evidence as to what occurred at Singapore which I consider incontrovertible.

Aguinaldo returned promptly to Hongkong and on May 4, 1898, a meeting of the junta was held. The minutes of this meeting, [32] signed by each of the several Filipinos present, form a part of the Insurgent records which have come into the possession of the United States Government. They state among other things that:--

"The temporary Secretary read the minutes of the preceding
meeting, which were approved. The temporary President reported
that D. Emilio Aguinaldo had just arrived from Singapore and
it became necessary for him to take possession of the office
to which he has been elected."

After the transaction of some further business Aguinaldo was summoned, appeared at the meeting, and was duly installed as President. Then:--

"The President described the negotiations which took place
during his absence in Singapore with the American Consul of
that English colony. Both agreed that the President should
confer with the Admiral commanding the American squadron in
Mirs Bay, and if the latter should accept his propositions,
advantageous, in his judgment, to the Philippines, he would go
to said country in one of the cruisers which form the fleet
for the purpose of taking part in the present events. And
as he did not find the Admiral, he thought it well to have
an interview with the American Consul of this colony on the
day of his arrival, but was not satisfied with such interview.

"Considering the critical conditions in the Philippines at
present, he begged the committee to discuss the advisability of
his going to said islands with all the leaders of prominence
in the last rebellion residing in this colony, in case the
Admiral gave them an opportunity to do so."

Note that there is here absolutely not one word of any promise of independence made to Aguinaldo by Pratt or any one else. Is it conceivable that Aguinaldo in describing "the negotiations which took place during his absence in Singapore with the American Consul of the English Colony" would, by any chance, have failed to inform his associates in Hongkong of such an extraordinary and fortunate occurrence as the promising by Mr. Pratt and Admiral Dewey that the United States would recognize Philippine independence?

Sandico [33] thought that Aguinaldo ought to go, for--

"From conferences which he had with the Admiral of the
American fleet and with the American Consul in this colony,
he believed that under present conditions it was absolutely
necessary for the President to go to the Philippines, since,
according to the American Consul, Manila had been taken by
said fleet, and a provisional government was now being formed
in that capital. The intervention of the President in the
formation of that government is undoubtedly essential, since
his prestige, which everybody recognizes, would evidently
prevent dissensions among the sons of the country, and it
would be possible thereby to obtain a perfect organization
both for the military and civil evolution of that country.

"Srs. Garchitorena [34] and Apacible [35] expressed themselves
in similar terms. Notwithstanding the previous remarks,
the President insisted that he considered it reckless for
him to go to the Philippines without first making a written
agreement with the Admiral, as it might happen, if he placed
himself at his orders, that he might make him subscribe to
or sign a document containing proposals highly prejudicial
to the interests of the country, from which might arise the
following two very grave contingencies:

"1st. If he should accept them, he would undoubtedly commit
an unpatriotic act, and his name would justly be eternally
cursed by the Filipinos.

"2d. If he should refuse, then the break between the two
would be evident.

"And to avoid this sad dilemma, he proposed to the committee
that the four parties (?) of the insurgents now here, under
charge of the competent chiefs authorized in writing by him,
should go to the Philippines to intervene, after a conference
with the Admiral, in these important questions; such means,
in his opinion, should be first employed to ascertain in an
authentic manner what the intentions of the United States
in regard to that country are; and if his intervention is
absolutely necessary, he would not object to go at once to
the Philippines, endeavouring by all the means in his power
to remedy the critical condition of the country, to which he
had offered, and always would willingly offer, to sacrifice
his life."

Why adopt means to learn from the admiral what the intentions of the United States were in regard to the Philippines if both he and Pratt had already promised recognition of independence?

"Srs. Sandico, Garchitorena, Gonzaga [36] and Apacible
replied that they were fully convinced the Admiral of the
American squadron would furnish the President all the arms
which he might desire, since the former was convinced that
the fleet could do nothing in the Philippines unless it were
used in conjunction with the insurgents in the development
of their plans of war against the Spanish government.... The
authority to treat which the President desired to give to the
other chiefs, without reflecting at all upon their personal
qualifications, they did not believe would be as efficacious
as his personal intervention which is necessary in grave
affairs, such as those the subject of discussion; there would
be no better occasion than that afforded them to insure the
landing of the expeditionary forces on those islands and to
arm themselves at the expense of the Americans and to assure
the situation of the Philippines in regard to our legitimate
aspirations against those very people. The Filipino people,
unprovided with arms, would be the victims of the demands
and exactions of the United States; but, provided with arms,
would be able to oppose themselves to them, struggling for
independence, in which consists the true happiness of the
Philippines. And they finished by saying that it made no
difference if the Spanish government did demand the return
of the P400,000, and if the demand were allowed in an action,
since the object of the sum would be obtained by the Admiral
furnishing the Filipinos the arms which they required for
the struggle for their legitimate aspirations."

Here, then, was a definite plan to obtain arms from the Americans to be used if necessary "against those very people" later.

"The President, with his prestige in the Philippines, would be
able to arouse those masses to combat the demands of the United
States, if they colonized that country, and would drive them,
if circumstances rendered it necessary, to a Titanic struggle
for their independence, even if they should succumb in shaking
off the yoke of a new oppressor. If Washington proposed to
carry out the fundamental principles of its constitution,
there was no doubt that it would not attempt to colonize the
Philippines, or even to annex them. It was probable then that
it would give them independence and guarantee it; in such
case the presence of the President was necessary, as he would
prevent dissensions among the sons of the country who sought
office, who might cause the intervention of European powers, an
intervention which there was no reason to doubt would be highly
prejudicial to the interests of the country.... What injury
could come to the Philippines, even if we admitted that the
Admiral would not give arms to the President on account of his
refusal to sign a document prejudicial to the country, after
he had taken all means to provide for her defence? None. Such
an act of the President could not be censured, but, on the
other hand, would be most meritorious, because it would be
one proof more of his undoubted patriotism."

Not one word of any promise of independence do we find in this remarkable document. On the contrary it furnishes conclusive proof that no such promise had been made and that the future relations between Filipinos and Americans were still completely uncertain.

And now comes some direct evidence. Bray and St. Clair, the latter the editor of the Insurgent organ in Singapore, were present on the occasion when independence was said to have been promised by Pratt. Bray subsequently declared in the most positive terms that it was promised. St. Clair wrote him a letter taking him roundly to task for this claim, in the following very interesting terms:--

"I felt it to be my duty to let Pratt know that you still hold
that you and Santos have evidence that will controvert his,
(and) he was, of course, extremely disappointed, because he
(is) quite aware of what took place in Spanish, and as to
turning of his conversation into a pretense of agreement
he knows nothing. He says very truly: 'My own party, the
Democrats, will say if they read this book--If this man takes
it upon himself to be a Plenipotentiary without authority, we
had better not employ him any more--I frankly cannot understand
your action, as to its unwisdom I have no doubt at all.'

"Admiral Dewey goes home, it is believed, to advise the
President on Naval and Colonial Affairs, he knows exactly
what did take place and what did not, and I should know if
he had any ground to think that the slightest promise was
made by Pratt to Aguinaldo he would declare it unauthorized
and decline to sanction it. I am certain Pratt reported what
he supposed took place accurately; he had no surety on what
you might have said, naturally.

"And, curiously, you never mentioned to me anything of
the agreement as having taken place then, nor in the paper
you communicated to me was there any mention of one, nor
did Pratt know of any. It is only more recently that the
fiction took shape. 'The wish father to the thought,' or
the statement repeated till it has become believed by the--,
[37] this is common.

"Now I would like to urge you, from the practical point
of view, to drop any such foolishness. The vital thing,
and nothing else counts, is what Dewey said and did when
he at last met Aguinaldo. That, that, that, is the thing,
all else is empty wind.

"Supposing that Pratt and Wildman had covered inches of
paper with 'Clauses' and put on a ton of sealing wax as
consular seals, what, pray, to any common sense mind would
all that have been worth? Nothing!! Nothing!! And yet,
where is the agreement, where is the seal? Where are there
any signatures? And if you had them--waste paper--believe
me, that all this potter about Pratt and Wildman is energy
misdirected. The sole thing to have impressed upon the
public in America would be the chaining of Dewey and
Aguinaldo together as participants in common action; you
surely comprehend this means! Think and think again; it
means success as far as it is possible. The other work is
not only lost, but does not gain much sympathy, especially
this criticism of the conduct of American troops; things may
be true that are not expedient to say. Sink everything into
Dewey-Aguinaldo coöperation, that was on both sides honest
even if it did not imply any actual arrangement, which, of
course, Dewey himself could not make. That here you have the
facts,--undenied--incontrovertible." [38]

The following letter of Bray to Aguinaldo, dated January 12, 1899, seems to me to throw much light on the question of how these claims relative to the promised recognition of Filipino independence sometimes originated and were bolstered up:--