Chapter III: Insurgent "Coöperation" (3)

"'This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line
of quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the
Spanish position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it
was difficult to deal with owing to the peculiar conditions
of our relations with the insurgents.... As General Aguinaldo
did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as a
subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the
President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by
the American land forces, and stated that "the powers of the
military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,"
I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication
with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession
of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until
then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce
my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash
with my designs. For these reasons the preparations for the
attack on the city were pressed and the military operations
conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent
forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully
established by the fact that when the troops at my command
carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from the sea to
the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under
no obligation, by prearranged plans of the mutual attack,
to turn to the right and clear the front still held by the
insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy
the city and the suburbs.'" [183]

All that the Insurgents and the Americans ever had in common was an enemy. They each fought that enemy in their own way. There was no coöperation. On the part of the Insurgents there was treachery. I will submit further evidence of this fact.