Chapter III: Insurgent "Coöperation" (1)

I have previously [72] called attention to the minutes of a session of the Hongkong junta held on May 4, 1898, from which it indirectly appears that the Filipino leaders at that time hoped to secure arms at the expense of the Americans and purposed to attack them later if it seemed advisable.

The treacherous policy then outlined was never departed from by Aguinaldo and his associates, who sailed for Manila with their eyes wide open, knowing full well that they had been promised nothing; prepared to match their wits against those of Admiral Dewey, and intent on deceiving him and on securing from him arms to be used first against the Spaniards and later against the Americans, after they had been employed to help bring about the downfall of Spain.

There exists a significant circular signed "J.M.B." [73] believed to have been an outright forgery, both from its tenor and from the fact that the signature "J.M.B." is not in the handwriting of Basa's letter hereinbefore quoted.

It contains the following statements:--

"The true patriots have organized a committee to which
I belong, naming Aguinaldo as President and Agoncillo as
Vice-President. The latter and three others have commenced
diplomatic negotiations with the Admiral and American Consul,
and we infer that they are trying to make colonies of us,
although they said they would give us independence. The
Committee deemed it advisable to simulate belief, at the same
time equipping ourselves with arms.

"We have accepted arms offered by the Admiral which will be
disembarked in the Philippines by the squadron.

"A part of our forces will aid the Americans by fighting with
them in order to conceal our real intentions, and part will
be held in reserve. If America triumphs and proposes a colony,
we shall reject such offer and rise in arms.

"A separate expedition will disembark at whatever point may
be considered suitable.

"José Alejandrino embarked with the American squadron in
order to give secret instructions to the Chiefs.

"Be very cautious about this exceedingly delicate point;
you will communicate with prudent and intelligent chiefs who
will recognize the gravity of the subject." [74]

Here, then, in a faked-up letter on which Basa's initials were forged in order to gain the prestige of his name for this treacherous plan, we have definitely set forth the purpose of the Filipinos to deceive the Americans by allowing a part of the Insurgent force to fight with them, and then to attack them.

Reference has already been made to Agoncillo's advice to Aguinaldo, given under date of August 26, 1898, to the effect that friendly relations should be maintained with the Americans until the diplomatic negotiations at Paris should end; that an effort should be made to find out the future status of the islands "by deceitful means," and that confidence should never be put in the Americans.

Aguinaldo put the whole matter in a nutshell in a postscript to this letter, saying:--

"You should issue an order commanding that all our chiefs
should employ a policy of friendship toward the Americans until
our status is defined; but said order should be confidentially
given. Try to mislead them." [75]

Bray also very strongly advised awaiting the results of the Paris conference. [76]

Blount claims that the Filipinos hoped that the Treaty of Paris would leave their country to them as it left Cuba to the Cubans, [77] and adds that having helped us take the city of Manila, they "felt that they had been 'given the double cross,'" "believed that the Americans had been guilty of a duplicity rankly Machiavellian, and that was the cause of the war." [78]

The quotations already given from Insurgent records show plainly that the principal thing for which the Filipinos were waiting was the ousting of Spain from the Philippines by the United States; those which follow show that war was by no means inevitable as a result of a a decision at Paris adverse to Filipino hopes, for the question of whether a United States protectorate, or even annexation to the United States, might be considered, was left open to a very late date. [79]

It has been claimed not only that the Insurgents whipped the Spaniards without our assistance, but whipped them so thoroughly that Spanish sovereignty had practically disappeared from the islands at the time Manila surrendered. It has further been alleged that "decrepit" Spain "could not possibly have sent any reinforcements to the Philippines. Besides, the Filipinos would have 'eaten them up.'" [80]

But the Filipinos had fought Spain before and were by no means sanguine. Their more intelligent and reasonable men clearly foresaw that they could not win unaided. Señor Antonio Regidor was at the time residing in London. He was a Filipino of unusual intelligence and exceptionally good education. He took a keen interest in the situation, and on July 28, 1898, telegraphed Agoncillo as follows:--

"In the name of the Filipinos, you should immediately send
a telegraphic message to MacKinley, requesting him not to
abandon the islands, after having fought as brothers for a
common cause. Pledge him our unconditional adhesion, especially
of well-to-do people. To return to Spain, in whatever form,
would mean annihilation, perpetual anarchy. Filipinos en
masse should visit the consuls at Hongkong, Singapore. London
commerce support it. Influence Aguinaldo to accept American
flag, flying it everywhere, thus obliging them to remain." [81]

This leaves no room for doubt as to Regidor's views, but Agoncillo did not share them. He replied on July 29:--

"Provisional government's aspiration is independence. Make
this campaign." [82]

Regidor was not to be persuaded. On July 30 he replied as follows, addressing his communication to Basa:

"America vacillating as to remaining fears conflicts later with
natives international question other difficulties necessary to
encourage her all of you submit united unconditionally raising
American flag great demonstrations necessary to influence
outside opinion show islands resolved united America high
circles advise in view present circumstances only feasible
programme is protectorate." [83]

Obviously, Agoncillo was somewhat impressed by this cablegram, for on August 1 in a letter to Aguinaldo he made the following statements and inquiries:--

"If the American troops leave us alone there, the questions
which will arise are these: Have we sufficient arms to maintain
the war against Spain in order to secure our independence? If
the other nations are opposed to our independence and wish
that we should continue under the Spanish sovereignty,
have we sufficient strength to wage a war and obtain victory
over Spain and over them in the future? If you think that we
have not sufficient strength to fight against them, should
we accept independence under the American protectorate? And
if so, what conditions or advantages should we give to the
United States? You should carefully consider the preceding
questions, and I suggest that you should, in a confidential
manner, consult them with your cabinet-in-banc, as well as
with your private secretary and military chiefs of rank;
and your decision be notified to our representatives abroad
in order that they may know what they must do in their
negotiations. You will see from the telegram addressed to
me by Regidor that he suggests to me to send a message to
MacKinley requesting him not to abandon us, and to submit
to them [the U. S.] unconditionally. As I do not agree with
him and as I cannot take any action which is against the
instructions of the government, I replied to him that the
only desire of our government is independence. This may be
seen from the enclosed telegram. On account of this reply,
he was, I think, somewhat offended, as he afterwards sent a
telegram to Joviales [Basa] instead of to me. The latter,
upon receiving the telegram, convened all the boastful
patriots, and they adopted a resolution to send a message
to MacKinley requesting annexation. Fortunately, in the
meeting there was present Dr. Justo Lucban, who protested
against such measure. In view of this protest, they again
agreed that I should be present in the meeting, since I am
the representative of our government. At the meeting where
I was present, I pointed out the inadvisability of their
resolution, stating, as one of the reasons, that we should
await your instructions in regard to the matter before sending
any message of that character. So the message was not sent;
but I was later informed that Basa had, after all, sent it
yesterday, because he believed that it would not injure our
cause. Upon learning this, I was carried away by passion and
went so far as to say to Basa the following: 'Many of us,
especially myself, think ourselves to be wise, without being
so; politicians for what we hear from others; we claim to be
patriots, but we are only so in words; we wish to be chiefs,
but none of us act in a way worthy of a chief.' To this he
did not reply. Perhaps his conscience accused him of an act
of treachery, since we agreed in the meeting to await your
letter. What union can you expect from this people?" [84]

Note that the Basa here referred to is the man whose initials were forged on the letter quoted on page 67.

In the course of the above-mentioned letter Agoncillo came back once more to the question of independence under a protectorate and made it very clear that at this late day he did not know whether this was or was not what the Filipinos desired. [85]

On August 21, Apacible obviously did not think that it would be an easy matter to escape from Spanish domination, much less that the islands were already rid of it, for he wrote to Mabini that the United States were likely again to deliver the Filipinos into the hands of Spain. He said that "if events will be what their telegrams indicate, we have a dark and bloody future before us. To be again in the hands of Spain will mean a long and bloody war, and it is doubtful whether the end will be favourable to us... Spain free from Cuba and her other colonies will employ her energy to crush us and will send here the 150,000 men she has in Cuba." [86] Apacible thought that the best thing was independence under an American protectorate.

On August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo warned Agoncillo that in the United States he should "not accept any contracts or give any promises respecting protection or annexation, because we will see first if we can obtain independence." [87]

Even annexation to the United States was not excluded by Aguinaldo from the possible accepted solutions, for in outlining the policy of the Philippine government to Sandico on August 10, 1898, he wrote:--

"The policy of the government is as follows: 1st. To struggle
for the independence of 'the Philippines' as far as our
strength and our means will permit. Protection or annexation
will be acceptable only when it can be clearly seen that the
recognition of our Independence, either by force of arms or
diplomacy, is impossible." [88]

On August 26, 1898, Aguinaldo was still ready to consider annexation if necessary. [89] He was apparently not sanguine at this time as to the result of a continued struggle with Spain. At all events, he wanted the help of the Americans if such a struggle was to come, and desired to know on what terms it could be had. [90]

Meanwhile the Filipinos in Hongkong who favoured annexation made themselves heard.

On July 18, 1898, Consul-General Wildman wrote from that place:--

"I believe I know the sentiments of the political leaders
and of the moneyed men among the insurgents, and, in spite
of all statements to the contrary, I know that they are
fighting for annexation to the United States first, and
for independence secondly, if the United States decides to
decline the sovereignty of the Islands. In fact, I have had
the most prominent leaders call on me and say they would not
raise one finger unless I could assure them that the United
States intended to give them United States citizenship if
they wished it." [91]

We have already noted the action of Basa and the Cortez family who insisted that the Islands must remain American, [92] and that of Agoncillo, who cabled President McKinley in Aguinaldo's name and his own, congratulating him on the outcome of the war, commending the occupation of Manila, and assuring the people of the United States of the allegiance and unquestioning support of the Filipinos, [93] but it is to be feared that the sending of this cablegram was only one more move in the Insurgent game of deceit.

There were annexationists in Manila as well as in Hongkong. [94] Indeed we know that some of the strongest and best of the Filipinos there were in favour of it.

Felipe Buencamino, writing in 1901, said:--

"In June of 1898, Don Cayetano Arellano [95] addressed to
Don Felipe Buencamino and Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista a
letter written from the town of Pagsanján, province of Laguna,
in reply to one addressed to him by those two gentlemen. In
this letter Don Cayetano outlined the idea of union with the
United States and said: 'Avoid all doing and undoing, and
when America has established a stable order of affairs, then
it will be time enough to make laws.' Mabini, whose influence
at that time was in the ascendant in Aguinaldo's government,
paid no heed to this wise advice. In October of 1898, while
the Philippine government was established in Malolos, and
before congress had promulgated a Philippine constitution,
Messrs. Arellano and Pardo [96] still more earnestly advocated
union with America, the first as secretary of foreign affairs
and the latter as chief diplomat. Their plan consisted in
asking the United States to acknowledge the independence
of the country under a protectorate through the mediation
of General Otis, and this plan was accepted at a cabinet
meeting by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. But on the following day
Sandico came and told Aguinaldo that he had had a conference
with the Japanese consul and had been told by him: 'that if
Aguinaldo would support absolute independence the Japanese
Government would help.' Aguinaldo believed Sandico's story
(which turned out to be absolutely false) and did not carry
out the resolution adopted by the cabinet. Messrs. Arellano
and Pardo, after this affront, separated themselves from
the Malolos government. Aguinaldo told me afterwards that
he had received a letter from Agoncillo, dated Washington,
assuring him that a majority of the American people were
inclined to acknowledge the independence of the Philippines
and of Cuba." [97]

But annexationists were not confined, in the Philippines, to the vicinity of Manila.

As late as September 6 Consul Williams reported that a delegation from four thousand Visayan soldiers, a delegation which also represented southern business interests, had come to him and pledged loyalty to annexation. [98]

Clearly, then, the situation early in September was as follows: All were agreed that the assistance of the United States was necessary in getting rid of Spanish sovereignty.

Under the plan of Aguinaldo and his followers friendly relations were to be maintained with the United States, if possible, until Spain was ousted from her Philippine territory, and then they were to "show their teeth," and see "who was deceiving whom," resorting to "force of arms" if necessary. Protection or annexation would be accepted only when it could be clearly seen that the recognition of independence, won either by force of arms or by diplomacy, was impossible.

Other influential and patriotic Filipinos favored annexation to the United States or a United States protectorate, but their views were in the end ignored by Aguinaldo and his following, and as the latter had the guns their ideas prevailed.

The Treaty of Paris, which terminated Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, was signed on December 10, 1898. It is important to bear this date in mind later, when considering the Insurgent records relative to the preparations which were so carefully made for attacking the American troops.

And now let us consider the actual facts as to the coöperation alleged to have been asked by Americans and given by Filipinos. The following points are not in dispute:--

Pratt asked Aguinaldo to coöperate with Dewey.

Aguinaldo was taken to Manila with the understanding that he would do so.

Dewey assisted Aguinaldo by destroying the main Spanish fleet; by bringing him and his associates back to the Philippines; by furnishing them arms and ammunition; by blockading Manila and by keeping at a safe distance the Spanish mosquito fleet, which would have made dangerous, or impossible, the landing of the arms subsequently imported by the Insurgents.

Aguinaldo successfully attacked the Spanish garrisons in the provinces and used the arms and ammunition captured, or brought in by deserters, to equip a force which surrounded and attacked Manila, drove large numbers of people into the walled city, thus rendering the position of the Spanish garrison very difficult in the face of a possible bombardment, and prevented this garrison from betaking itself to the provinces, as it might otherwise have done, leaving Manila to shift for itself.

Aguinaldo was powerless to take the place by assault.

It lay at the mercy of Dewey's guns, and it would have been possible for the Admiral to take it at any time, but he could not at first have garrisoned it with United States forces, and never thought of attempting to use Insurgent forces for this purpose.

Did Dewey really want or need Aguinaldo's help? Let us consider his testimony on the subject:--

"_Senator Carmack_. You did want a man there who could organize
and rouse the people?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I didn't want anybody. I would like to say
now that Aguinaldo and his people were forced on me by Consul
Pratt and Consul Wildman; I didn't do anything--

"_Senator Carmack_. Did they have any power to force him
upon you?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; they had in a way. They had not the
official power, but one will yield after a while to constant
pressure. I did not expect anything of them; I did not
think they would do anything. I would not have taken them;
I did not want them; I did not believe in them; because,
when I left Hongkong, I was led to suppose that the country
was in a state of insurrection, and that at my first gun,
as Mr. Williams put it, there would be a general uprising,
and I thought these half dozen or dozen refugees at Hongkong
would play a very small part in it." [99]

The picture of the poor admiral, busy getting his fleet ready for battle, pestered by officious consuls on the one hand and by irresponsible Filipinos on the other, is pathetic; but it had its humorous features, which were not lost on the Admiral himself. I quote the following:--

"_Senator Patterson_. Was there any communication between
you and Pratt in which the matter of a written pledge or
agreement with Aguinaldo was discussed with reference to the
Philippine Islands?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No.

"_Senator Patterson_. What became of the correspondence,
Admiral, if you know?

"_Admiral Dewey_. It is all in the Navy Department. When I
turned over my command my official correspondence was all
sent to the Navy Department.

"_Senator Patterson_. You retained all of your letters from
any United States officials?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No; they went to the Department.

"_Senator Patterson_. I mean you did not destroy them.

"_Admiral Dewey_. No; I did not destroy them.

"_Senator Patterson_. And you turned them over to the Navy
Department?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; our regulations require that. I may say
that for my own information I kept copies of certain telegrams
and cablegrams. I don't think I kept copies of Mr. Pratt's
letters, as I did not consider them of much value. He seemed to
be a sort of busybody there and interfering in other people's
business and I don't think his letters impressed me.

"_Senator Patterson_. He was the consul-general?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; but he had nothing to do with the
attack on Manila, you know.

"_Senator Patterson_. I understand that.

"_Admiral Dewey_. I received lots of advice, you understand,
from many irresponsible people.

"_Senator Patterson_. But Pratt was the consul-general of
the Government there?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; he was consul-general.

"_Senator Patterson_. And he communicated with you, giving you
such information as he thought you might be interested in,
and among other information he gave you was this concerning
Aguinaldo?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I don't remember; no, I really don't
remember his telling me anything about Aguinaldo more than
that cablegram there, and I said he might come. And you see
how much importance I attached to him; I did not wait for him.

"_Senator Patterson_. What you said was: 'Tell Aguinaldo to
come as soon as possible.'

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; but I did not wait a moment for him.

"_Senator Patterson_. Yes; but there was a reason for that.

"_Admiral Dewey_. I think more to get rid of him than
anything else.

"_Senator Carmack_. Rid of whom?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Of Aguinaldo and the Filipinos. They were
bothering me. I was very busy getting my squadron ready for
battle, and these little men were coming on board my ship at
Hongkong and taking a good deal of my time, and I did not
attach the slightest importance to anything they could do,
and they did nothing; that is, none of them went with me
when I went to Mirs Bay. There had been a good deal of talk,
but when the time came they did not go. One of them didn't
go because he didn't have any toothbrush.

"_Senator Burrows_. Did he give that as a reason?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; he said, 'I have no toothbrush.'" [100]

However, Dewey ultimately yielded to the pressure exercised on him by Pratt and Wildman, and allowed Aguinaldo and some of his associates to be brought to Manila. Having them there he proposed to get assistance from them, not as allies, but as a friendly force attacking a common enemy, in its own way.

Let us continue with his testimony as to cooperation between Aguinaldo and the naval forces of the United States:--

"_Senator Patterson_. Then, Admiral, until you knew that
they were going to send land forces to your assistance you
thought there was a necessity to organize the Filipinos into
land forces, did you?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No; not a necessity.

"_Senator Patterson_. You thought it might prove of value
to you?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I testified here, I think, in a way that
answers that. I said to Aguinaldo, 'There is our enemy;
now, you go your way and I will go mine; we had better act
independently.' That was the wisest thing I ever said.

"_Senator Patterson_. But you stated that you were using
these people and they were permitted to organize, that you
might use them.

"_Admiral Dewey_. They were assisting us.

"_Senator Patterson_. Very well, they were to assist you. Did
you not either permit them or encourage them--I do not care
which term you use--to organize into an army, such as it was,
that they might render you such assistance as you needed?

"_Admiral Dewey_. They were assisting us, but incidentally
they were fighting their enemy; they were fighting an enemy
which had been their enemy for three hundred years.

"_Senator Patterson_. I understand that, Admiral.

"_Admiral Dewey_. While assisting us they were fighting their
own battles, too.

"_The Chairman_. You were encouraging insurrection against
a common enemy with which you were at war?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I think so. I had in my mind an illustration
furnished by the civil war. I was in the South in the civil
war, and the only friends we had in the South were the negroes,
and we made use of them; they assisted us on many occasions. I
had that in mind; I said these people were our friends, and
'we have come here and they will help us just exactly as the
negroes helped us in the civil war.'

"_Senator Patterson_. The negroes were expecting their
freedom--

"_Admiral Dewey_. The Filipinos were slaves, too.

"_Senator Patterson_. What were the Filipinos expecting?

"_Admiral Dewey_. They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards;
I do not think they looked much beyond that. I cannot recall
but I have in mind that the one thing they had in their minds
was to get rid of the Spaniards and then to accept us, and
that would have occurred--I have thought that many times--if
we had had troops to occupy Manila on the 1st day of May
before the insurrection got started; these people would have
accepted us as their friends, and they would have been our
loyal friends--I don't know for how long, but they would have
been our friends then.

"_Senator Patterson_. You learned from Pratt, or Wildman,
or Williams, very early, did you not, that the Filipinos
wanted their own country and to rule their own country;
that that is what they were expecting?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I heard from Williams that there was an
insurrection there against the Spaniards. The Spaniards were
very cruel to them, and I think they did not look much beyond
getting rid of them. There was one, Dr. Rizal, who had the
idea of independence, but I don't think that Aguinaldo had
much idea of it.

"_Senator Carmack_. Then what useful purpose did the Filipino
army serve; why did you want the Filipino army at all?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I did not want them.

"_Senator Carmack_. Did you not want the Filipino forces?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No, not really. It was their own idea coming
over there. We could have taken the city at any moment we
had the troops to occupy it."

Admiral Dewey has made the following statements relative to the importance of Aguinaldo's military operations:--

"Then he began operations toward Manila, and he did wonderfully
well. He whipped the Spaniards battle after battle, and finally
put one of those old smoothbore guns on a barge, and he wanted
to take this up--wanted me to tow it up so he could attack the
city with it. I said, 'Oh, no, no; we can do nothing until
our troops come.' I knew he could not take the city without
the assistance of the navy, without my assistance, and I knew
that what he was doing--driving the Spaniards in--was saving
our own troops, because our own men perhaps would have had to
do that same thing. He and I were always on the most friendly
terms; we had never had any differences. He considered me
as his liberator, as his friend. I think he had the highest
admiration for us because we had whipped the Spaniards who
had been riding them down for three hundred years.

* * * * *

"_Senator Patterson_ (continuing). You sent this short dispatch
to the Secretary of the Navy:--

"'Aguinaldo, the revolutionary leader, visited the _Olympia_
yesterday. He expects to make general attack on May 31. Doubt
his ability to succeed. Situation remains unchanged.'

"Do you recall that visit?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes.

"_Senator Patterson_. He came to tell you, did he, that he
was going to make a general attack, and you--

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes.

"_Senator Patterson_. And you doubted his ability to succeed?

"_Admiral Dewey_. And he wanted me to assist him. He wanted
me to tow one of his guns up into position. I knew he could
not take the city; of course he could not.

"_Senator Patterson_. Did you urge that he should not make
the attack?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I do not remember that; very likely I did.

"_Senator Patterson_. And was he not persuaded or restrained
by you from doing so?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I do not remember; but it is very likely. I
did not want to see a lot of them killed unnecessarily,
because I knew they could not take that walled city. They had
no artillery, and they could not take it, I knew very well,
and I wanted the situation to remain as it was until our
troops came to occupy it.

"_Senator Patterson_. But you found that whenever you expressed
a strong objection to anything being done at that time that
Aguinaldo yielded to your request?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Up to the time the army came he did
everything I requested. I had not much to do with him after
the army came." [101]

But Dewey's influence over Aguinaldo was not sufficient to prevent his looting, as the following extracts from his testimony show:--

"_Senator Patterson_. Is that what you mean when you say he
looted--that he made reprisals for his army, took provisions
and whatever was necessary? That is what you meant?

"_Admiral Dewey_. That is one part of it.

"_Senator Carmack_. This was taking provisions for the use
of the army?

"_Admiral Dewey_. That is one thing he did.

"_Senator Carmack_. You said you did not object to that at
the time?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No. It would have been useless; he got
beyond me very soon--he got out of my hands very soon. [102]

"_Senator Carmack_. You said yesterday you suspected that
Aguinaldo took the lion's share of the provisions that were
gathered for the army. What was the ground upon which you
made that accusation?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Because he was living in Malolos like a
prince, like a king, in a way that could only have come about
by his taking the lion's share. Then, in regard to his looting,
I repeat what I said yesterday. He began within forty-eight
hours after he landed in Cavite to capture and take everything
he wanted. I know these things of my own knowledge, because
I saw the loot brought in; and I know that every dollar that
was taken from the workingmen at the navy-yard was taken at
the threat of death. [103]

* * * * *

"_Senator Patterson_. Do you believe in this proclamation he
was uttering falsehoods to the Filipino people?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; I do absolutely. I think he was there
for gain--for money--that independence had never up to that
time entered his head. He was there for loot and money. That
is what I believe, since you ask me my belief; I believe that
implicitly. [104]

* * * * *

"_Senator Patterson_. And you found nothing to cause any
doubt as to his loyalty up to the time until after Manila
surrendered?

"_Admiral Dewey_. His loyalty to whom?

"_Senator Patterson_. To you and to the cause for which he
was fighting?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I began to suspect he was not loyal to us
about the time our troops arrived, when he demurred at moving
out of Cavite to make room for our troops.

"_Senator Patterson_. Do you mean by that that you feared
that he was commencing to think more of independence than
the success of the American cause?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes." [105]

We have seen to what extent Aguinaldo coöperated with the marine forces of the United States. Now let us examine the claim that he cooperated with the land forces after their arrival.

One of the things which the Insurgents are said to have accomplished was the maintenance of an effective land blockade which prevented the entrance of provisions, and produced a very serious food shortage. Both Otis and Dewey have stated that they did this, but we learn from the Insurgent records how erroneous was this conclusion. [106]

The landing of the American troops for the attack on Manila was not actively opposed by the Filipinos, but it was narrowly and distrustfully watched.

Necessary transportation requested by General Anderson was ultimately furnished by Aguinaldo, but only grudgingly after a three weeks' delay, and as a result of threats that it would be seized if not voluntarily supplied.

The necessary positions in the trenches around Manila from which to make the attack on that city were, in part at least, yielded to the Americans by the Filipinos upon the request of the former.

The Insurgents twice informed the Spaniards in advance of projected American attacks.

They carried out their own attack on the city without regard to the plans, or the requests, of the Americans. They secretly treated with the Spaniards in the endeavour to secure the surrender of the city to themselves.

After the capitulation to the Americans had been agreed upon, and on the very morning of the day of the surrender, they endeavoured to push home an attack. Disregarding the request that they keep out of the final assault, they crowded into the city with, and after, the American troops. They fired on Spanish soldiers on the city wall while a flag of truce was flying, provoking a return fire which killed and wounded American soldiers.

They demanded for themselves Malacañang palace and other buildings and a share in "the war booty." They promptly looted the parts of the city which they occupied, and ultimately retired from their positions within the city limits on the evening of their last day of grace after being warned by General Otis that if they did not do so they would be driven out.

I will now quote from the records in support of these statements.

The following is the programme of "coöperation" outlined to Aguinaldo by Bray in a letter dated June 30, 1898:--

"I am very anxious to receive the news of the capitulation of
Manila and I hope that General Augustín will be obliged to turn
over his sword to you in person and not to the Americans. You
are by right entitled to it and I should like to see it so from
a political standpoint, as I am of the opinion that you should
declare the independence of the Philippines before the arrival
of General Merritt, appointed by the President to be Governor
with full powers to establish a provisional government.

* * * * *

Any attempt on the part of the Americans to garrison the
interior towns with their troops or any other act which might
be construed as a conquest, should meet with resistance.

* * * * *

"After having written these lines, I had another conference
with Mr. St. Clair of the Free Press, who sent for me regarding
the question of independence. He has had a consultation with
the Supreme Judge of this place, and he is of opinion that you
should proclaim independence at once, notwithstanding what
Admiral Dewey and Consul Williams say against it, and this
should be done before General Merritt can arrive. A Government
having been thus constituted in due form, the Americans would
have no right to invade the Philippines without committing a
violation of international law. They are no longer fighting
against the Spaniards against whom they declared war. The
advice of Consul Williams to delay this, is a diplomatic play
to gain time until the arrival of General Merritt, because he
is well aware of the false position said General would find
himself in. The key to the situation is now in your hands;
do not permit any one to take it away from you. The Americans
have done nothing but bombard and destroy the Spanish fleet
on the high seas; they have not conquered any land, but in
the meantime the control of the Philippines has passed by
conquest from the hands of the Spaniards and the Americans
have no right to enter further. Under certain conditions and
guarantees, permit the landing of American troops; but be
very careful, they must not be permitted to land until they
execute an agreement with the duly constituted government of
the Philippines, respecting all its institutions, and they must
under no pretext whatever be permitted to garrison any place
except the municipal limits of Manila, Cebú, and Iloílo, and
even therein care should be observed ... You must not permit a
single soldier to land without having these guarantees." [107]

When General Anderson, with the first United States troops of occupation, arrived at Manila Bay, Aguinaldo did not call on him, as an "ally" might have been expected to do. Later, however, Admiral Dewey and General Anderson went to see Aguinaldo, but without any of the ceremony of an official military call, the Admiral saying to General Anderson:--

"Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put
on your blouse. Do not go with any ceremony." [108]

And they went in that way.

On July 4, 1898, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo definitely requesting his coöperation in the following words:--

"For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations
with you, and to have you and your force coöperate with us
in the military operations against the Spanish forces." [109]

On July 5 Aguinaldo replied, thanking General Anderson for the

"amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands
inspire in the Great North American nation," [110]

and also for his desire to have friendly relations with the Filipinos and treat them with justice, courtesy and kindness. There is, however, not a word relative to coöperation in his reply, and Anderson apparently never renewed his request for coöperation in military operations.

On July 6 he wrote to Aguinaldo again, saying:--

"I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by
Your Excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th
instant, to endeavour to come to a definite understanding,
which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very soon we expect
large additional land forces, and it must be apparent to you
as a military officer that we will require much more room to
camp our soldiers and also store room for our supplies. For
this I would like to have Your Excellency's advice and
coöperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources
of the country." [111]

To this letter there was no reply. However, in a letter dated July 9, 1898, to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army, General Anderson says of Aguinaldo:--

"When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at
all friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding
with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to
coöperate. But he has declared himself Dictator and President,
and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This
is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will,
I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish
a provisional government." [112]

Evidently, however, coöperation, even in the matter of getting necessary transportation, did not materialize, for on July 17 S. R. Jones, Chief Quartermaster, wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--

"We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for
transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For
all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We
find so far that the native population are not willing to give
us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have
it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send
out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very
much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our
nation has spent millions in money to send forces here to
expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole
people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight.

"General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are
here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor
and material at the current market prices. We are prepared
to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but cannot
undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner."

Aguinaldo sent this letter by a staff officer to General Anderson inquiring whether it was sent by authority of the latter, who then indorsed on it in a statement that it was. Nevertheless, Major Jones reported on July 20 that it was impossible to secure transportation except upon Aguinaldo's order and that the natives had removed their cart wheels and hidden them, from which it is to be inferred that the transportation requested had not been furnished.

Obviously General Anderson was informed that Aguinaldo had given orders against furnishing the transportation desired, for on July 21 he wrote the Adjutant-General of the Army as follows:--

"Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an
elaborate system of military government, under his assumed
authority as Dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being
given us, except by his order. As Go this last, I have written
to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox
carts, fuel, and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be
filled, and that he must aid in having them filled."

On July 23 General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--

"_General_: When I came here three weeks ago I requested Your
Excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means
of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight
the cause of your people. So far we have received no response.

"As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make
requisition on you for five hundred horses and fifty oxen and
ox carts. If you cannot secure these I will have to pass you
and make requisition directly on the people.

"I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience.

"I remain with great respect, etc." [113]

To this letter, Aguinaldo replied as follows:--

"Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to
manifest to Your Excellency that I am surprised beyond measure
at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the non-receipt
of any response relative to the assistance that you have asked
of me in the way of horses, carabaos, and carts, because I
did reply through the bearer that I was disposed to issue
proper orders whenever you advised me of the number of these,
giving me notice in advance.

"I have sent orders to the nearest provinces in order that
within the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale,
but I cannot assure Your Excellency that we will have the
number of 500 that you need, because there are not many horses
in this vicinity, owing to deaths from epizoötic diseases in
January, February, and March last.

"Whenever we have them collected, I shall have the pleasure
to advise Your Excellency.

"I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that
I shall place at your disposition when you need them, provided
you give me previous notice four days in advance." [114]

General Anderson replied:--

"Your favour of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions
for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory I regret that
there should have been any misunderstanding about it. The
people to whom we applied even for the hiring of carromatas,
etc., told our people that they had orders to supply nothing
except by your orders. I am pleased to think that this was
a misapprehension on their part." [115]

From this series of communications it appears that it took three weeks, and a very direct threat to seize transportation, to bring about Aguinaldo's promise of assistance in securing it. What help had he given, meanwhile, in other matters?

On July 14, 1899, General Anderson wrote asking him to assist American officers in making reconnaissance of the approaches to Manila, and to favor them with his advice. [116]

On July 19, 1899, he again wrote Aguinaldo asking him to allow Major J. F. Bell, [117] who was gathering information for General Merritt, to see maps, and further requesting him to place at Bell's disposal any available information about the force of the enemy and the topography of the country. [118]

On July 21 he wrote again asking for passes for a Lieutenant E. I. Bryan and party, who were making a reconnaissance. [119]

Such records as I have been able to find do not show what response, if any, Aguinaldo made to these several requests, but General Anderson's original views as to the willingness of the Insurgents to coöperate with him underwent an early change, for on July 18, 1898, in a letter to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army he makes the following statement:--

"The Insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself Dictator
and self-appointed President. He has declared martial law
and promulgated a minute method of rule and administration
under it.

"We have observed all official military courtesies, and he
and his followers express great admiration and gratitude to
the great American republic of the north, yet in many ways
they obstruct our purposes and are using every effort to take
Manila without us.

"I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with
the Spanish authorities, as his confidential aide is in
Manila." [120]

This suspicion was entirely justified, as we shall see later.

On July 24 Aguinaldo wrote a letter to General Anderson in effect warning him not to disembark American troops in places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spaniards without first communicating in writing the places to be occupied and the object of the occupation. [121]

Aguinaldo's assumption of civil authority on July 15, 1899, did not pass unnoticed. On July 21 General Anderson wrote the Adjutant-General of the army concerning it:--

"His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let
him know verbally that I could, and would, not recognize it,
while I did not recognize him as a military leader. It may
seem strange that I have made no formal protest against
his proclamation as Dictator, his declaration of martial
law, and publication and execution of a despotic form of
government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish it,
at Admiral Dewey's request, and also for fear of wounding
the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let
it be known in every other way that we do not recognize the
Dictatorship. These people only respect force and firmness. I
submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated
the natives. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have
a civilization of their own; and although insignificant in
appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a tropical people
they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do more
work in a given time than a regiment of volunteers."

Because he was invited as general rather than as president, Aguinaldo refused to attend a parade and review on the 4th of July. This fact is, in itself, an answer to his claim that the Americans were tacitly recognizing his pretensions.

After referring to this incident, Blount says:--

"On subsequent anniversaries of the day in the Philippines
it was deemed wise simply to prohibit the reading of our
declaration before gatherings of the Filipino people. It
saved discussion." [122]

This statement is incorrect. I myself was present the following year when the declaration was read on the Luneta to a considerable gathering of Filipinos among whom were many school children, and it has often been read since.

The landing of American troops at Parañaque and their going into camp near that town on July 15 caused much excitement, and a lively interchange of telegrams between Insurgent officers followed. [123]

They were suspicious of the intentions of the Americans, [124] and trouble soon began.

On July 16 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"An American has come here who says that he is a Colonel of
the Army whom we should obey; and that it is your desire. We
did not listen to him, awaiting your order."

On the back of the telegram is written the following:--

"Reply.--You should not obey. What this American Colonel says
is a lie. Be cautious so as not to be deceived. You should
require from him proof. Be always vigilant, but upright,
also all of the officers and soldiers must be strict and not
timid." [125]

Obviously there was no real coöperation between American and Filipino troops at this time. General Anderson ignored General Aguinaldo's request for information as to places where American troops were to land in Filipino territory and the objects of disembarking them.

The Americans proceeded with their plans for the attack upon Manila, and it became desirable to occupy some of the Insurgent trenches. On July 29 Arévalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"In conference with General Greene I asked for an official
letter, a copy of which I send you: 'Headquarters 2nd Brigade,
U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Camp Dewey, near Manila, July 29th,
1898. _El Señor Noriel, General de Brigade_. Sir: In pursuance
of our conversation of yesterday and the message which Captain
Arévalo brought to me during the night, I beg to inform you
that my troops will occupy the intrenchments between the Camino
Real and the beach, leaving camp for that purpose at 8.00
o'clock this morning. I will be obliged if you will give the
necessary orders for the withdrawal of your men. Thanking you
for your courtesy, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient
servant, _F. V. Greene, Brigadier General_, commanding.'" [126]

This clear direct declaration of intention by General Greene is the actual transaction referred to by Blount as "Jockeying the Insurgents out of their trenches." He bases his statements concerning the matter on a newspaper report.

The attitude of the army officers in the matter of obtaining permission to occupy the trenches needed in preparing for the assault on the city could not have been more correct.

On August 10 General Merritt gave the following emphatic instructions relative to the matter:--

"No rupture with Insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask
Insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy
their trenches, but if refused not to use force."

On the same day General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, asking permission to occupy a trench facing blockhouse No. 14, in order to place artillery to destroy it. The permission was granted on the following day.

During the early part of August, Aguinaldo seems to have avoided conferences with American officers. On the second of the month Mabini wrote him how he had put off Admiral Dewey's aid with a false statement that he did not know Aguinaldo's whereabouts. [127]

The landing of American troops at Parañaque for the assault on Manila led to the concentration of Insurgent troops at the neighbouring town of Bacoor. [128]

On August 8 Fernando Acevedo [129] wrote to General Pío del Pilar that the Americans were going to attack the next day and that,--

"It is requisite and necessary before their attack takes place
to-morrow, that you to-morrow or to-night annihilate them,
sparing none, for the way they have deceived us, and will
again without fail, in the contract signed by Sr. Emilio;
and convince yourself, my friend, that it is necessary to do
this; and when it is done the whole world will wonder and say
that we have done well, and will not be able to give out that
the people here are fools spending the time sucking their
fingers." [130]

Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of the proposed American attack on the 13th instant, as is shown by the following letter:--

"(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2. Expeditionary. Office of
the Lieutenant-Colonel. Private.)

"_Señor Don Artemio Ricarte_: [131]

"My Dear Sir: I have received to-day your kind letter giving
warning of the attack on Manila, and I thank you for your
personal interest in me, which, on my part, I reciprocate. I
assure you that I am yours, most truly and sincerely,

"_Luis Martinez Alcobendas_.

"_Singalon_, August 10, 1898." [132]

According to Taylor, this was not the first occurrence of this sort. He says:--

"The officers of the United States Army who believed that
the insurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American
movements were right. Sastrón has printed a letter from Pío
del Pilar, dated July 30, to the Spanish officer commanding
at Santa Ana, in which Pilar said that Aguinaldo had told him
that the Americans would attack the Spanish lines on August 2
and advised that the Spaniards should not give way, but hold
their positions. Pilar added, however, that if the Spaniards
should fall back on the walled city and surrender Santa Ana
to himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo's
information was correct, and on August 2 eight American
soldiers were killed or wounded by the Spanish fire." [133]

Taylor continues:--

"And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans. It
is not probable that these were the only two such letters
written. Aguinaldo had by this time found out that although he
could defeat the scattered Spanish detachments, he could not
defeat the Spanish force holding the lines of Manila. He did
not want the Americans in the Philippines. They were in his
way, and he had already made up his mind that if they did not
give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force. He
saw very early that it was extremely improbable that he should
obtain from them what he wanted; accordingly all losses both
among Spaniards and Americans would, from Aguinaldo's point
of view, inure to his benefit. The best possible thing for
him would be to hold his own force intact while they wore
each other out. The Spanish losses, small as they were,
occurred in front of the American lines, not in front of the
Filipinos. There is no reason, accordingly, for believing
that the Filipinos suffered heavily. To arrange that the
Spaniards should inflict losses upon the Americans, while he
saved his own men, showed ingenuity on the part of Aguinaldo;
but it was decidedly not the conduct of an ally." [134]

The feeling toward the American troops at this time is further shown by a telegram from General Pío del Pilar, sent from San Pedro Macati on August 10, 1898:--