Chapter III: Insurgent "Coöperation" (2)

"Commandant Acebedo writes that the Spaniards are about
to surrender because they want to turn over the place; the
Americans want them to leave only the batteries and say that
they will station themselves in said batteries. It appears
that they want to deceive us; they do not want to give us
arms, and if they do not give us arms, we shall attack them
and drive them out. I await your reply." [135]

This is perhaps not quite the kind of coöperation that Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and Merritt had expected.

The truth is that the Insurgents were determined to capture Manila for themselves, not only because of the "war booty," for which they were hungry, but because of the status which they felt that the taking of the capital of the Philippines would assure them. The great importance which they attached to this plan is shown in communications written by Agoncillo, Aguinaldo and others. [136]

Of conditions at this time, Taylor says:--

"On July 7, Aguinaldo appointed Artemio Ricarte and Pantaleón
García to negotiate the surrender of Manila by the Spaniards
to him (Exhibit 155). On July 5 Pantaleón García was planning
to enter Manila by way of Tondo or of Santa Cruz (P.I.R.,
243.7). On the 9th Aguinaldo ordered that rice should be
gathered from the towns of Manila Province for the use of his
troops in the decisive attack upon Manila which he intended
making in a few days (P.I.R., 1087. 5).

"Aguinaldo, finding that his chance of obtaining Manila for himself was growing steadily less, now determined to force himself into the city with the Americans and demand a consideration for the assistance he had rendered them during the siege. It is true he had assisted them, but his assistance had not been intentional. It was the result of the operations he was carrying on for his own ends. The operations of the Filipinos and the Americans were against Spain as a common enemy of both; but the operations were not joint operations, and although their purpose was a common purpose, it was not a mutual one. On August 8 Aguinaldo appointed General Ricarte commander in the operations about Manila, ordered him to respect the property of all foreigners, and told him that in case his troops succeeded in entering Manila they were to carry their flag and plant it there (P.I.R., 703. 2). Judging from an unsigned draft of a letter, he must have warned the foreign consuls in Manila about the same time to gather under the protection of their flags all of their fellow-citizens who had not taken refuge on the vessels in the bay, so that when his troops entered the city no foreign lives would be taken, and no foreign property would be injured. The earnestness with which he urged that all foreigners not Spaniards should take steps to identify themselves and their property shows that he considered the persons and property of Spanish civilians as fair booty of war." [137]

There was certainly no need of Insurgent assistance in the assault on Manila.

The reports which reached Aguinaldo that the surrender of Manila had been agreed upon in advance were correct, as is shown by the following testimony of Admiral Dewey:

"_Senator Patterson_. When did you reach an understanding
with the Spanish commander upon the subject, [138]--how long
before the 12th or 13th of August?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Several days before.

"_Senator Patterson_. To whom did you communicate the
arrangement that you had?

"_Admiral Dewey_. General Merritt and, of course, all of my own
captains--General Merritt, and I think a council of officers on
board of one of the steamers. I think there were several army
officers present when I told the General that; and I may say
here that I do not think General Merritt took much stock in it.

"_Senator Patterson_. What statement did you make to them,
Admiral, in substance?

"_Admiral Dewey_. That the Spaniards were ready to surrender,
but before doing so I must engage one of the outlying forts. I
selected one at Malate, away from the city. [139] They said I
must engage that and fire for a while, and then I was to make
a signal by the international code, 'Do you surrender?' Then
they were to hoist a white flag at a certain bastion; and I
may say now that I was the first one to discover the white
flag. We had 50 people looking for that white flag, but I
happened to be the first one who saw it. I fired for a while,
and then made the signal according to the programme. We could
not see the white flag--it was rather a thick day--but finally
I discovered it on the south bastion; I don't know how long
it had been flying there when I first saw it." [140]

On August 12, the day before Manila surrendered, Buencamino telegraphed Aguinaldo, urging him in the strongest terms to attack that night so that Americans might be obliged to ask him to stop, with the result that the Insurgents would be included in the official negotiations. He further advised Aguinaldo that he must not suspend his attack because the Americans suspended theirs. [141]

General Anderson tells us that, on the evening of August 12, he received an order from General Merritt to notify Aguinaldo to forbid the Insurgents under his command from entering Manila. This notification was delivered to Aguinaldo that night, and was received by him with anger. [142]

On the following morning the Insurgents actually made an independent attack of their own, as planned. [143] It promptly led to trouble with the Americans, and at 8 A.M. Aguinaldo received a telegram from General Anderson sternly warning him not to let his troops enter Manila without the consent of the American commander on the south side of the Pasig River. [144]

Aguinaldo apparently took no action in response to this request, except to direct General Riego de Dios, who was at Cavite, to go with Buencamino without losing a moment and ask for an explanation, in writing if possible. [145]

At 10.50 A.M. he telegraphed General Anderson saying that his troops were being forced, by threats of violence, to retire from positions which they had taken, and asking Anderson to order his troops to avoid difficulty with the Insurgent forces. Aguinaldo said that he had directed his men to aid the American forces if the latter are attacked by a common enemy, but was discreetly silent on the subject of their entering Manila. [146]

Fifteen minutes later, at 11.05, he received a reply to his telegram to General Riego de Dios, in which that officer communicated the views of Araneta [147] and Buencamino, who had been unable to find General Anderson. This important communication follows:--

"Most urgent. Araneta and Buencamino having been consulted in
regard to your telegram of to-day, they confirm capitulation,
and in regard to the telegraphic note of General Anderson
they are of the opinion, first that we should continue
hostilities while we ask for an explanation; second, that
explanation should be in the following terms: Inquire reason
for note and ask why our troops are not to enter Manila without
permission of the American commander; third, in case the (terms
of?) capitulation is given as the reason, to answer that we
do not suspend our attempt to enter Manila. Its capitulation
is not favourable to our independence. General Anderson is not
here. General Merritt is probably in Manila. Only Admiral Dewey
is in the Bay. We ask authorization to express our explanation
in the proposed terms and to have a conference with Admiral
Dewey in order to have our claims reach General Merritt." [148]

An endorsement written by Mabini and signed by Aguinaldo on the above paper reads:--

"I authorize every assertion of right, but state that we
believe that we have the right to enter Manila without
permission as we have a part in the surrender of the
Spaniards. They would not have surrendered if our troops had
not cut off their retreat to the interior. Besides but for us
the landing of troops would have cost them much blood. Obtain
an answer as soon as possible in order to lay a protest before
the consuls in case it is necessary." [149]

Naturally, trouble followed. At 1.30 P.M. General Ricarte telegraphed to Aguinaldo:--

"Americans wish to put us out. Give directions." [150]

Apparently about the same hour he wired more at length, as follows:--

"Most urgent. American troops rearguard our trenches. Mabolo
and San José warn us that they will fire on us when the time
comes. Impossible to remain there without disagreeing with
them. Since 5 o'clock this morning we have been furiously
attacking. Americans firing incessantly, Spaniards silent. No
losses yet." [151]

At 3.52 he wired again:--

"General Pío del Pilar informs me of the following: 'Come here,
if possible, as our soldiers at the barrio of Concepción
are not allowed to go out and we are prohibited to move
on any farther. We it was who succeeded in capturing that
place. Come here or there will be trouble, since they are
driving me away, and refusing to listen to what I say.' I am
at this very moment going to aforesaid place." [152]

At 5 P.M. another was sent by Ricarte to Aguinaldo as follows:--

"Colonel San Miguel arrived here from Ermita. Regional
Exposition, Agricultural College and other buildings are
ours. Our flag flies already at Ermita. Colonel Agapito Donzón
with his troops is in the Pérez building, Paco. Colonels Julian
Ocampo and Isidoro Tolentino are in the convent of Ermita. All
houses without flag are guarded by our soldiers." [153]

At 6.15 P.M. he telegraphed as follows:--

"I inform you that the chiefs of our troops have reported to
me that our flag at Singalong church (_visita_) was removed by
the Americans and they hoisted theirs instead, not allowing
us to approach thereto. General Pío del Pilar is at present
at the barrio of Concepción. Americans prohibited him to move
on any farther. How can he enter Manila?" [154]

No attention was paid to General Anderson's request that the Insurgent troops should not enter Manila without permission. They crowded forward with and after the American forces. Coming out on Bagumbayan drive, they found American and Spanish troops confronting each other but not firing, the former on the drive, the latter on the neighbouring city wall. A flag of truce was waving from the south bastion, nevertheless the Insurgents fired on the Spanish forces, provoking a return fire which killed and wounded American soldiers. Of this incident General Greene has said:--

"At this point the California regiment a short time before
had met some insurgents who had fired at the Spaniards on the
walls, and the latter, in returning the fire, had caused a loss
in the California regiment of 1 killed and 2 wounded." [155]

Some of these matters must have come to the attention of General Anderson, for he sent Aguinaldo a telegram, received by the latter at 6.35 P.M., as follows:--

"Dated Ermita Headquarters 2nd Division 13 to
Gen. Aguinaldo. Commanding Filipino Forces.--Manila,
taken. Serious trouble threatened between our forces. Try
and prevent it. Your troops should not force themselves in
the city until we have received the full surrender then we
will negotiate with you.

"_Anderson_, commanding." [156]

It appears that the Insurgent troops took the suburb of Santa Ana, and captured Spanish and Filipino officers and men. [157]

In view of the known facts, how absurd becomes the following contention of Aguinaldo, advanced in his "Reseña Verídica:--

"Our own forces could see the American forces land on the beach
of the Luneta and of the Paseo de Santa Lucía. The Spanish
soldiers, who were on the walls of the city, drew the attention
of every one because they did not fire on the former, a mystery
which was explained at nightfall of that day, by the news of
the capitulation of the place by General Señor Jáudenes [158]
to the American General, Mr. Merritt, a capitulation which
the American Generals claimed for themselves, an infraction of
what had been agreed upon with Admiral Dewey, in regard to the
formation of plans for the attack and taking of Manila by the
two armies, American and Filipino, together and in combination.

"This inexplicable line of conduct on the part of the American
officers was made clearer by the telegrams, which General
Anderson addressed to me, from Maytubig on the said 13th day,
requesting that I should order our troops not to enter Manila,
which request was refused, inasmuch as it was contrary to what
was agreed upon, and to the high ends of the Revolutionary
Government, which, on taking upon itself the immense work of
besieging Manila, during the two months and a half, sacrificing
thousands of lives and millions in material interests, could
not surely have done so with any object other than that of
capturing Manila and the Spanish garrison which with firmness
and tenacity defended that place." [159]

On August 14 Aguinaldo telegraphed General Anderson as follows:--

"My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila,
have always been promised that they could appear in it,
as you know and cannot deny, and for this reason, and on
account of the many sacrifices made of money, and lives, I
do not consider it prudent to issue orders to the contrary,
as they might be disobeyed against my authority. Besides, I
hope that you will allow the troops to enter because we have
given proofs many times of our friendship, ceding our positions
at Parañaque, Pasay, Singálon and Maytubig. Nevertheless,
if it seems best to you, and in order to enter into a frank
and friendly understanding and avoid any disagreeable conflict
before the eyes of the Spaniards, I will commission Don Felipe
Buencamino and others, who will to-day go out from our lines
and hold a conference with you, and that they will be safe
during the conference." [160]

Aguinaldo and his associates pressed the demand for joint occupation. On August 13 Admiral Dewey and General Merritt informed the government that since the occupation of Manila and its suburbs the Insurgents outside had been insisting on this, and asked how far they might proceed in enforcing obedience in the matter.

They were informed by a telegram dated August 17 that the President of the United States had directed:--

"That there must be no joint occupation with the
Insurgents. The United States in the possession of Manila city,
Manila bay and harbor must preserve the peace and protect
persons and property within the territory occupied by their
military and naval forces. The insurgents and all others
must recognize the military occupation and authority of the
United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed
by the President. Use whatever means in your judgment are
necessary to this end." [161]

This left the military and naval commanders no option in the premises, and in any event dual occupation was out of the question because of the lawlessness of the Insurgent troops.

At this very time they were looting the portions of the city which they occupied, and as is abundantly shown by their own records were not confining their attacks to Spaniards, but were assaulting their own people and raiding the property of foreigners as well. [162] The continuation of such a condition of affairs was manifestly impossible.

The Insurgents promptly demanded their share in the "war booty," and asked certain other extraordinary concessions as follows:--

"(4) Our sacrifices in coöperating in the siege and taking
of Manila being well known, it is just that we should share
in the war booty.

"(5) We demand for our use the palace of Malacañang and the
Convents of Malate, Ermita and Paco or San Fernando de Dilao.

"(6) We demand that the civil offices of Manila be filled
by North Americans and never by Spaniards; but if General
Merritt should require some Filipinos we should be pleased if
he will grant our President, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, the favour
of recommending select and skilled Filipinos. The jurisdiction
of the authorities of Manila shall not be recognized beyond
the municipal radius.

"(7) The American forces shall not approach nor penetrate
our military positions without permission of the respective
commanders thereof and shall evacuate all the positions
which they occupy at the present time beyond the municipal
radius; Spaniards who pass our lines without permission of
the commander will be considered as spies.

* * * * *

"(10) Lastly we state clearly that our concessions and
petitions do not signify on our part that we recognize the
sovereignty of North America in these islands, as they are
made necessary by the present war." [163]

Under the instructions of the President these demands could not be acceded to. Nor could they have been acceded to had there been no such instructions. In this connection the following extract from General Jáudenes's cablegram for June 8th to his home government is highly significant:--

"Population of suburbs have taken refuge in walled city from
fear of outrages of insurgents, preferring to run risks of
bombardment, which has not yet begun." [164]

It would seem that the population of the suburbs did not have a high idea of Insurgent discipline.

That their apprehensions were not groundless is shown by a passage in a letter sent the following day to Governor-General Augustin by Buencamino:--

"Manila being surrounded by land and by sea, without hope of
assistance from anywhere, and Señor Aguinaldo being disposed to
make use of the fleet in order to bombard, if Your Excellency
should prolong the struggle with tenacity, I do not know,
frankly, what else to do other than to succumb dying, but
Your Excellency knows that the entrance of 100,000 Indians,
[165] inflamed with battle, drunk with triumph and with
blood, will produce the hecatomb from which there will not
be allowed to escape either women, children, or Peninsular
friars,--especially the friars; and, I believe that the rights
of humanity, imperilled in such a serious way, should be well
considered by Your Excellency, for however dear glory and
military duty may be, although worth as much or more than
existence itself there is no right by which they should be
won at the cost of the rights of humanity, and the latter
outweigh every consideration and all duty." [166]

Don Felipe knew his own people. He also knew, none better, what they had in mind at this time.

As it was the Insurgent forces made the most of such opportunity as they had, and their own records show it.

In the suburbs of Manila they sacked and committed outrages, threatening people with their arms, and this was still going on a week after the fall of Manila. [167]

General Pío del Pilar was believed to be responsible for much of this misconduct, and Mabini proposed that as it was necessary for him to leave the vicinity of Manila, and they could not remove him by force, he be promoted. [168]

Some time during this month Sandico wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--

"The Americans have already heard of the frequent cases
of kidnapping (_dukut_) occurring in Tondo, San Sebastián
and San Miguel. Last night some of ours were surprised in
the act of kidnapping a person. I have also heard that many
persons are asking for contributions of war. I tell them [169]
that you know nothing of all this and that if some persons
are kidnapped it is due to the hate of the natives for the
Spanish spies and secret police, which is great." [170]

Evidently Sandico continued to interest himself in the matter of preventing disorder, for on September 24, 1898, he wrote Aguinaldo from Manila as follows:--

"By authority of General Don Pío del Pilar and accompanied
by the War Auditor, Señor Urbano, we entered a prison where
the individuals Mariano de la Cruz and Mariano Crisóstomo
were kept. They were almost prostrated. They had lately
been released from Bilibid where they had been confined
for political crimes. On being asked the reason for their
imprisonment they began by showing us their bodies from which
blood still issued as the result of the barbarous treatment
received from Major Carmona who, by the way, is the same
person of whom I spoke to you in one of my previous letters;
I declared to you then that he had assaulted, revolver in hand,
a man in the middle of one of the most frequented streets of
the suburb of Paco on pure suspicion.

"The prisoners in question stated that if they admitted the
accusations made against them it was for fear of greater
punishments promised by said Major. The officer of the guard
took the liberty of striking with his fist the one who dared
to express himself so.

"Before such a spectacle Major Bell found himself forced to
tell them that brutal acts are not precisely a recommendation
for a country that wished to be free and that they, the
Americans, do not arrest any one without just cause. [171]

"I take the liberty of calling your attention to the matter
in question and other abuses in order that the measures you
may think fit be adopted to remedy this evil. In fact, we are
making a target of ourselves in the sight of all nations,
especially so in that of the Americans who note any act of
ours and judge us secretly now in order to do so later in
public. To make light of this is to plant a seed of future
injury to us, because many will desire to place themselves
under the protection of the American flag, seeing that ours
refuses to defend the citizens' individual rights.

"I, for my part, ask that Major Carmona be arrested together
with his accomplices in the matter so that it may serve as
a lesson not only for him but also for those who think like
him." [172]

Obviously Sandico's protest of September 24 did not produce the desired result, for on September 28 he wrote Aguinaldo a long letter complaining that in Manila personal security did not exist, people were being tortured and murdered, kidnapping and theft were very frequent, and these abuses were being committed by Filipino officers and men. Some of the things which had come to his knowledge were of such a nature that he preferred to speak to Aguinaldo privately about them. [173]

Murder, pillaging, torture of prisoners, kidnapping, theft--these are not pleasant things, but they continued to occur, and Aguinaldo, who apparently desired to prevent them, was powerless to do so. He did not dare discipline General Pío del Pilar, nor remove him from the vicinity of Manila, and the soldiers of that officer continued to work their will on their own unfortunate and helpless people.

Aguinaldo at first flatly refused to direct the disorderly Insurgent forces to leave Manila. The American commander showed great forbearance and negotiations continued.

On August 16, 1898, the Diplomatic Commission (Buencamino and Gregorio Araneta) telegraphed Aguinaldo that a clause in a proposed agreement requiring prior permission of Insurgent officers before American troops could pass or approach their lines had greatly displeased General Anderson who declined to treat until after the withdrawal of Noriel's troops from Manila. [174]

Aguinaldo's reply, sent on August 17, 1898, shows that he had already made up his mind to fight the Americans, for it contains the following significant words: "The conflict is coming sooner or later and we shall gain nothing by asking as favours of them what are really our rights." [175]

While negotiations were pending General Merritt sent Major J. F. Bell to Aguinaldo with a letter and also with a memorandum in which were the words:--

"In case you find Aguinaldo inclined to be generous in his
arrangements with us, you may communicate to him as follows:
..."

There follow six paragraphs, of which the third is of special importance. It reads as follows:--

"(3) That I have every disposition to represent liberally
the Government at Washington, which I know is inclined to
deal fairly with him and his people; but not knowing what the
policy of that Government will be, I am not prepared to make
any promises, except that in the event of the United States
withdrawing from these islands care will be taken to leave
him _in as good condition as he was found by the forces of
the Government_. [176]

Relative to the italicized portion of this statement Major Bell says:--

"I was pressed to explain further just what meaning General
M. meant to convey by the underscored portion of this remark,
but I replied that I had repeated the language General M. had
used to me, and I preferred they should seek any further
explanation from him, lest I might unwittingly fall into error
if I undertook to explain his meaning myself. Their lack of
definiteness and my unwillingness to comment upon the language
seemed to arouse their apprehensions and suspicions. They
have been trying ever since to obtain in writing some definite
promise on this subject." [177]

Aguinaldo ordered that the machinery of the water works be started up at once, a thing which was very necessary as Manila was suffering from lack of water. I should be glad if I could leave this matter here, but I cannot, for Major Bell elsewhere makes the further statement:--

"Attention is invited to General Merritt's promise made known
to Aguinaldo by me verbally, namely, that in the event of the
United States withdrawing from these islands, care would be
taken to leave Aguinaldo in as good condition as he was found
by the forces of the Government. From a remark the General
made to me I inferred he intended to interpret the expression
'forces of the Government' to mean the naval forces, should
future contingencies necessitate such an interpretation." [178]

Let us hope that Major Bell misunderstood General Merritt's intention. If this is not the case, I must say in all frankness that in my opinion it was General Merritt's intention to indulge in sharp practice.

Obviously, the American naval forces did not find Aguinaldo in any "condition," in the sense in which General Merritt uses the term. On the contrary, they brought him from Hongkong and assisted him in starting a revolution. The negotiations in question were relative to the positions held by the Insurgents at the time the negotiations took place, and General Merritt's promise could not legitimately be interpreted to refer to anything else.

Had Aguinaldo accepted his offer, a most embarrassing situation would have resulted. General Merritt was obviously not authorized to make such a proposition in the first instance, and the only honourable course left open to him would have been to advise Washington of his improper action and beg the Government to support him in it and thus save the honour of the country.

Fortunately, Aguinaldo did not act upon the promise nor accept the offer. On the contrary, he promptly and indignantly denied that he was committed to anything, and sought to impose new conditions which were not acceded to.

Meanwhile some one doubtless got hold of General Merritt and called his attention to the fact that in making this offer he had grossly exceeded his authority, for in his reply to Aguinaldo's protest General Merritt says:--

"So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event
of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain
are concerned, it is utterly impossible for me as the military
representative only of the United States to make any promises
such as you request. As you have already been informed, you
may depend upon the good will of the Americans out here and
the Government, of which you already know the beneficence,
to determine these matters in the future." [179]

Coming, as this statement did, after the offer made in the memorandum hereinbefore referred to, it must have aroused the suspicions of Aguinaldo and his associates, and in my opinion Merritt's conduct in making such a proposal in the first instance was inexcusable.

Before he could terminate the negotiations which followed he was called away, and turned this matter, together with other unfinished business, over to his successor, General E. S. Otis.

On August 31, 1898, the latter official wrote to Aguinaldo as follows:--

"_General Aguinaldo, Bacoor_:

"Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply to
your letter of August 27 within four days, I desire to state
that he was unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity
to reply. Being unacquainted with the situation, I must take
time to inform myself before answering, which I will do at
the earliest opportunity.

"_Otis_."

On September 8 General Otis wrote Aguinaldo a long letter fully discussing the whole situation in the light of the complete information which he had meanwhile obtained. Since so much has been made of this incident by Blount and others, I invite attention to the following extracts from General Otis's letter, which embody a fair and judicial statement of the conditions which existed:--

"You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the
city of Manila, to which you promise to retire your troops,
and name as conditions precedent: First, protection to your
shipping by the United States Navy, and the free navigation of
your vessels within the waters in United States occupation;
second, restitution to your forces of all positions which
are now occupied by your troops, in the event that treaty
stipulations between the United States and Spain surrender to
the last-named government the territory occupied by the former;
and thirdly, that United States troops now occupying positions
beyond the lines you name shall retire within the same.

"A discussion of your proposition to hold, jointly, with
the United States Government, the city of Manila, involves
consideration of some of the other concessions you desire to
be made, and to that I will at once refer. I wish to present
the matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect,
although, from remarks contained in former correspondence,
I am of the opinion that you are fully aware how untenable
the proposition is. The United States and Spain were and
are belligerent parties to a war, and were so recognized
by the civilized world. In the course of events the entire
city of Manila, then in full possession of Spanish forces,
was surrendered to the first-named belligerent power. The
articles of agreement and capitulation gave the United States
Government full occupancy of the city and defences of Manila,
and that Government obligated itself to insure the safety
of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the city
to the best of its ability. By all the laws of war and all
international precedents the United States authority over
Manila and its defences is full and supreme, and it cannot
escape the obligations which it has assumed.

* * * * *

"But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my
Government to hold and administer the affairs of the city
of Manila and its suburbs (I thus conclude from expressions
contained in former correspondence and from my appreciation of
your intellectual attainments), you base your proposition--a
joint occupation--upon supposed equitable grounds, referring
to the sacrifices your troops have made and the assistance they
have rendered the American forces in the capture of Manila. It
is well known they have made personal sacrifices, endured
great hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten
that my Government has swept the Spanish navy from the seas
of both hemispheres; sent back to Spain the Spanish army and
navy forces, recently embarked for your destruction, and the
secure holding of the Philippine possessions; that since May
1 last its navy has held the city of Manila at its mercy,
but out of consideration of humanity refused to bombard it,
preferring to send troops to demand surrender, and thereby
preserve the lives and property of the inhabitants? Is it
forgotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the
retention of Spanish armed men in its European possessions
has opened up to you the ports of the Island of Luzon and
held Spain helpless to meet its refractory subjects?

* * * * *

"Apart from all legal and equitable considerations, and
those having their origin in personally conceived ideas of
justice, I wish respectfully to call your attention to the
impracticability of maintaining a joint occupation of Manila
and its suburbs, and in this I know that I shall have the
approval of your excellent judgment. It would be extremely
difficult to prevent friction between our respective forces,
which might result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we may
for continued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity,
irresponsible members of our organizations, by careless or
impertinent action, might be the means of inciting grave
disturbances; and in this connection I call to your attention
the recent shooting affair at Cavite, which still requires
investigation. There might also arise conflict of authority
between our subordinate officers. Even now, within precincts
in entire actual possession of our troops, I find that permits
are given to citizens, who are styled local presidents, to make
arrests, to carry arms, etc., in violation of our instructions
and authority, and that several cases of kidnapping have
taken place. In pursuance of our obligations to maintain,
in so far as we can, domestic tranquillity, our officers have
arrested suspected parties, and they have asserted (with what
element of truth I know not) that the insurgent forces are the
offenders. I have declined to accept their statements, as I
prefer to believe the contrary, although it would appear that
officers connected with those forces have issued the permits
to which I allude. Such interference with our administration
of civil affairs must eventually result in conflict.

"... And here permit me to remark upon a view of the subject
you have advocated in support of the plea for dual occupation
of the city's suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance,
should have a share in the booty resulting from the conquest
of the city, on account of hardships endured and assistance
rendered. The facts on which you base your conclusion granted,
your conclusion, under the rules of war which are binding on my
Government, does not follow, for it has never recognized the
existence of spoils of war, denominated 'booty,' as have many
European governments. No enemy's property of any kind, public
or private, can be seized, claimed by, or awarded to, any of
its officers or men, and should they attempt to appropriate
any of it for their individual benefit, they would be very
severely punished through military tribunals, on which have
been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. The enemy's
money and property (all that is not necessary to be expended in
administering local affairs in the enemy's territory) must be
preserved for final arbitrament or settlement by and between
the supreme authorities of the nations concerned. My troops
cannot acquire booty nor any individual benefit by reason of
the capture of an enemy's territory. I make this comment,
believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect to
individual advantages which occupation bestows.

"I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the
concessions you ask us to make as conditions precedent to the
retirement of your forces to the lines indicated by your note
of the 27th ultimo.

"The first is: Protection to your shipping and free navigation
to your vessels. Neither the extent of protection nor the limit
of free navigation you request is understood. Certainly you
could not mean protection on the high seas, or in the ports
not in the rightful possession of the United States. That,
as you are fully aware, could only be effected by treaty,
or guarantee, following international recognition of
the belligerent rights of the Philippine revolutionary
government. While the existing armistice continues, the
United States are in rightful possession, in so far as the
navigable waters of the Philippine Islands are concerned, only
of the bay of Manila and its navigable tributaries. Within the
same all vessels of trade and commerce and the war vessels
of recognized national powers sail freely as long as the
sovereignty of my Government is not assailed nor the peace of
the locality threatened. In this respect, whatever concessions
are extended by way of relaxation of trade restrictions,
incident to war, to the citizens of these islands will be
extended to all alike, and discrimination in this regard
is neither intended nor permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises
supervision over all naval matters, and they are in no way
related to the duties conferred upon me by law. Nor would
it avail should I seek his consent for greater latitude of
action, for even if disposed to grant special concessions he
could not do so, and I doubt if the supreme authority of my
Government could now, under the prevailing truce with Spain,
invest him with the requisite powers to do so and at the same
time preserve its international obligations.

"The second concession named by you is restitution of positions
in the city of Manila to your forces, in case the treaty
of peace remands to Spain the territory surrendered under
the late capitulatory articles; and the third and last is a
promise to retire our troops within the lines indicated by
you, as the lines on which you desire your troops to remain
permanently. These propositions, having a kindred nature,
may be considered together, and, indeed, have already been
impliedly answered. From previous statements of facts and
logical conclusions made and stated in this communication,
concerning the nature of the obligations resting on the United
States with regard to the territory to which they have the
legal right of possession under contracting articles with
Spain, it is evident that neither in law or morals can the
concessions be made. I would be powerless to grant them in any
aspect of the case, being nothing more than an agent to carry
out the instructions of the executive head of my Government and
not being vested with discretionary power to determine matters
of such moment. In the present instance I am not only powerless
to accede to your request, but have been strictly enjoined
by my Government, mindful of its international promises and
national honour, which it has never broken nor sacrificed,
not to accede joint occupation of the city and suburbs of
Manila and am directed specially to preserve the peace and
protect persons and property within the territory surrendered
under the terms of the Spanish capitulation. These mandates
must be obeyed.

"Thus have I endeavoured with all candor and sincerity,
holding nothing in reserve, to place before you the situation
as understood by me, and I doubt not by the Republic
which I represent. I have not been instructed as to what
policy the United States intends to pursue in regard to its
legitimate holdings here, and hence I am unable to give you
any information on the subject. That it will have a care
and labor conscientiously for the welfare of your people I
sincerely believe. It remains for you, beneficiaries of its
sacrifices, to adopt a course of action which will manifest
your good intentions and show to the world the principles
which actuate your proceedings.

* * * * *

"It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am
compelled by my instructions to direct that your armed forces
evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs
and defences, and that I shall be obliged to take action with
that end in view within a very short space of time should you
decline to comply with my Government's demands; and I hereby
serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn
beyond the line of the city's defences before Thursday,
the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible
action, and that my Government will hold you responsible for
any unfortunate consequences which may ensue.

* * * * *

"In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred
freely with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this
communication and am delegated by him to state that he fully
approves of the same in all respects; that the commands of
our Government compel us to act as herein indicated, and
that between our respective forces there will be unanimity
and complete concert of action."

This calm and temperate discussion of the situation, coupled with the firm statement of intention with which it closed, produced a decided effect on Aguinaldo. Concerning the events to which it led, General Otis has made this statement:--

"On September 13, a commission sent by Aguinaldo and consisting
of three members, one of whom was the treasurer and another
the attorney-general of the insurgent government, called
for the purpose of discussing the subject of my letter of
the 8th. They asked me to withdraw it and simply request
in writing that the insurgent troops retire to the line
designated by General Merritt, which I refused to do, stating
that unless they withdrew as directed we would be obliged to
resort to force. They then asked that I withdraw the letter
and issue a request unaccompanied by any threat to use force,
as Aguinaldo was fearful that he would be unable to remove
his troops upon a demand. To which I replied that the letter
of the 8th instant would stand. They then said that as the
demands of that letter must remain unchanged, the insurgents
would withdraw as directed therein, but that if I would express
in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the
lines which I designated--something which he could show to the
troops and induce them to think that he was simply acting upon
a request from these headquarters--he would probably be able to
retire his men without much difficulty; that, of course, they
themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which would
be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note
of request, whereupon I furnished them with the following:--

"'_Office U. S. Military Governor in the_

"'_Philippine Islands_,

"'_Manila_, P. I., September 13, 1898.

"'_The Commanding General of the Philippine Forces_:

"'_Sir_: Referring to my communication of September
8, I have the honour to inform you that I have had a
most agreeable conversation with certain gentlemen who
are in the interests of your revolutionary government
upon the matters therein contained. We have discussed
at length the complications now existing, which will
exist, and will doubtless increase, while our troops
continue to occupy jointly certain districts of the
city of Manila. I have urged upon them the necessity
of the withdrawal of your troops in order that the
friendly relations which have always been maintained
by and between them and the forces of the United
States Government may be perpetuated. I am sure that
the gentlemen fully appreciate my sentiments and
will clearly report them to you. May I ask you to
patiently listen to their report of our conversation?

"'It is my desire that our friendly intercourse and
mutual amicable relations be continued; that they be
not jeopardized if we can by consistent action avoid
it, and such, I am certain, is the desire of yourself
and associates.

"'May I ask, therefore, that you withdraw your troops
from Manila?

"'Permit me to add in conclusion that I have that
confidence in your ability and patriotism which will
lead you to accede to this request.

"'I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

(Signed) "'_E. S. Otis_,

"'Major-General, U. S. V.,

"'United States Military Governor in the Philippines.'

"In reply to which, on the 16th, the following was received:--

"'_Malolos, Bulacan_, September 16, 1898.

"'_The Commanding General of the American Forces_:

"'_My Dear Sir_: Referring to your esteemed
communication, dated the 13th instant, I have the
honour to inform you that I have given appropriate
orders that my troops should abandon their most
advanced positions within some of the suburbs, and
that they should retire to points where contact with
yours would be more difficult, in order to avoid all
occasion for conflict.

"'I hope that by these presents you will be fully
convinced of my constant desire to preserve amicable
relations with the American forces, even at the risk
of sacrificing a part of the confidence placed in my
government by the Philippine people.

"'A consideration of my many occupations will serve to
excuse me for not having answered with the promptness
desired.

"'Your very respectful servant,

(Signed) "'_Emilio Aguinaldo_.'

"On the evening of the 15th the armed insurgent organizations
withdrew from the city and all of its suburbs, as
acknowledged by their leaders, excepting from one small
outlying district. This certain agents of Aguinaldo asked
on the previous day to be permitted to retain for a short
time, on the plea that the general officer in command [180]
would not obey instructions, and they proposed to remove his
men gradually by organizations and thereafter to punish him
for his disobedience. The withdrawal was effected adroitly,
as the insurgents marched out in excellent spirits, cheering
the American troops." [181]

I have given the facts thus fully for the reason that this is the one instance I have found in which a promise was made, fortunately in the form of an offer which was not accepted, and then withdrawn. It has seemed to me that the reasons why General Merritt should never have made it, and why General Otis could not possibly have renewed it, should be fully set forth.

On September 7, 1898, General Otis had cabled to Washington that Admiral Dewey and he considered conditions critical, and that the number of armed Insurgents in the city was large and rapidly increasing. He stated that on the 8th he would send a notification to Aguinaldo that unless the latter's troops were withdrawn beyond the line of the suburbs of the cry before September 15 he would be obliged to resort to forcible action and that the United States would hold Aguinaldo responsible for any unfortunate consequences which might ensue.

Aguinaldo still hoped to obtain recognition of his government by the United States, but did not consider such recognition probable, and pushed preparations to attack if a favorable opportunity should offer.

Before occupying ourselves with these preparations, let us briefly review the results of our investigations as to Insurgent coöperation with the American forces up to this time.

Taylor has made the following excellent summary of the case:--

"Up to this time Aguinaldo had continued a desultory
warfare with the Spanish troops in Manila. That none of his
attacks were very serious is shown from the Spanish reports
of casualties; but although he had failed to secure the
surrender of the city to himself, he had kept its garrison
occupied and within their works. The American force on land
was now strong enough to begin offensive operations. So
far the relations between the Americans and Aguinaldo had
not been really friendly. They were in his way, and yet he
could not break with them, for he hoped to use them for the
attainment of the designs which he had by this time frankly
declared. The Americans had listened to these declarations,
and had not answered them, nor was it possible to answer
them. The American forces were there under the instructions
of the President to make war on Spain and to establish a
military government in the Philippines. Aguinaldo had declared
himself a dictator and the Philippines independent. To have
recognized him in his civil capacity, to have dealt with him
in his civil capacity, would have meant a recognition of his
government by the military commander in the field--a thing
impossible and unlawful. Officers of the United States forces
are not empowered to recognize governments; that function is
reserved to the President of the United States; and in this
case he, in his orders to the Secretary of War, dated May 19,
copies of which were forwarded to General Merritt for his
guidance, informed him that the army of occupation was sent
to the Philippines 'for the twofold purpose of completing the
reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter and of giving
order and security to the islands while in the possession
of the United States.' These instructions contemplated the
establishment of a military government in the archipelago by
military officials of the United States.

* * * * *

"it is true that in spite of the date of these instructions
General Merritt in San Francisco had received no copy of
them on August 28, three days after the departure of General
Anderson, and what that officer knew of them could only have
been what General Merritt remembered of the contents of an
unsigned copy of them shown him at the White House, but they
were in accordance with the practice of the United States
Government in occupying conquered territory, that practice
General Anderson well knew, and his relations with Aguinaldo
were guided by it.

* * * * *

"It has been claimed that Aguinaldo and his followers received
the impression at this time from their conversation with
American officers that the United States would undoubtedly
recognize the independence of the Philippines, and that the
cooperation of the insurgents was due to this impression. There
was no cooperation. That he attempted in vain to secure the
surrender of Manila to himself was not cooperation. That
he refrained from attacking the Americans and occasionally
permitted them to be furnished supplies, for which they paid,
was not cooperation. The fact that for a time their plans and
his plans were parallel does not mean cooperation. Aguinaldo
was forced by the exigencies of the situation, by the necessity
of strengthening his hold upon the people, by the necessities
of his operations against the Spaniards, to make Spaniards
and natives alike believe that all that he did was with
the aid of the Americans by whom he would be supported in
all his acts. He needed their support, and if he could not
obtain that he needed the appearance of their support for the
attainment of his ends; and this he was forced to purchase by
compliance, or apparent compliance, with their demands. But
his compliance with them, as all American officers serving
there well knew, was never willing, was never complete,
and was never given except under pressure. It is true that
writers upon the subject, speaking with the confidence which is
born of insufficient and incomplete information, assure their
readers that any government but that of the United States, any
colonial administrators but Americans, would have been able to
obtain the hearty cooperation of Aguinaldo and his followers by
judicious concessions to them at this time. The only concession
which would have obtained that hearty cooperation would have
been the recognition of the independence of the Philippines
under a United States protectorate, of Aguinaldo clothed with
the plenitude of the powers of the Katipúnan as dictator, and
a promise to promptly withdraw from the islands. This promise
the Government of the United States could not make. Until the
ratification of a treaty of peace with Spain the insurgents of
the Philippine Islands were rebellious subjects of Spain, and
with them, except as fighting men, no relations could be had.

* * * * *

"No report of operations or returns of strength were rendered
by Aguinaldo at this or any other time to any American
commander, and no American commander ever rendered such
returns to him. At the time of General Merritt's arrival, and
until Manila was occupied by the Americans, the insurgents and
United States troops were united solely by the fact that they
had Manila as a common objective. Conditions were such that
the Americans, in order to obtain its surrender, had to avoid
doing anything which might cause the insurgents to attack them
and perhaps make terms with Spain; while Aguinaldo and his
followers, in order to accomplish the surrender of Manila to
themselves, had to maintain such relations with the Americans
as would induce the Spaniards to believe that their fleet
was at his disposal, [182] and also such apparent harmony
and cooperation with them in the execution of their plans
that the recalcitrant among the Filipinos would be forced to
believe that the Americans would in all ways use their forces
to support Aguinaldo in the attainment of his desires.

"General Merritt saw this and the necessity for immediately
taking such steps as would lead to his occupation of
Manila. With the arrival of the third expedition he was able
to pass through the insurgent lines between Camp Dewey and
Manila, for he had sufficient force to accept no refusal
from Aguinaldo.

"In his report he said that the insurgents had obtained
positions of investment opposite the Spanish lines along
their full extent, and that on the bay front their lines ran
within 800 yards of San Antonio Abad. The approaches to the
beach and village of Pasay were in their possession.