Chapter XXIII: The New Academy (2)

[26] Herillus’s native place was Carthage (Diog. vii. 37; 165). If Χαλχηδόνιος is read by Cobet in the last passage, we have again the same confusion between Καλχηδὼν and Καρχηδὼν, which made Xenocrates a Καρχηδόνιος. He came as a boy under Zeno (Diog. 166; Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 129). Diog. l.c. enumerates the writings of Herillus, calling them, however, ὀλιγόστιχα μὲν δυνάμεως δὲ μεστά. Cic. De Orat. iii. 17. 62, speaks of a School bearing his name, but no pupil belonging to it is known.

[27] Citium was his birthplace. His father’s name was Demetrius (Diog. 6; 36), and his own nickname Dorotheus (Suid. Περσ.). According to Diog. 36; Sotion and Nicias in Athen. iv. 162, d; Gell. ii. 18, 8; Orig. C. Cels. iii. 483, d; he was first a slave of Zeno’s, which agrees with his being a pupil and inmate of his house (Diog. 36; 13; Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38; Athen. xiii. 607, e; Pausan. ii. 8, 4). It is less probable that he was presented by Antigonus to Zeno as a copyist (Diog. 36). He subsequently lived at the court of Antigonus (Athen. vi. 251, c; xiii. 607, a; Themist. Or. xxxii., p. 358), whose son Halcyoneus (Ælian, V. H. iii. 17, says falsely himself) he is said to have instructed (Diog. 36), and with whom he stood in high favour (Plut. Arat. 18; Athen. vi. 251, c). He, however, allowed the Macedonian garrison in Corinth to be surprised by Aratus, in 243 B.C., and, according to Pausan. ii. 8, 4; vii. 8, 1, perished on that occasion. The contrary is asserted by Plut. Arat. 23, and Athen. iv. 162, c. In his teaching and manner of life, he appears to have taken a very easy view of the Stoic principles (Diog. 13; 36; Athen. iv. 162, b; xiii. 607, a). It is therefore probable that he did not agree with Aristo’s Cynicism (Diog. vii. 162), and his pupil Hermagoras wrote against the Cynics (Suid. Ἑρμαγ.). Political reasons were at the bottom of Menedemus’ hatred for him (Diog. ii. 143). Otherwise, he appears as a genuine Stoic (Diog. vii. 120; Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38; Minuc. Felix Octav. 21, 3; Philodem. De Mus., Vol. Herc. i. col. 14). Compare p. 39, 2. The treatises mentioned by Diog. 36 are chiefly ethical and political. In addition to these, there was a treatise on Ethics (Diog. 28); the συμποτικὰ ὑπομνήματα, or συμποτικοὶ διάλογοι, from which Athen. (iv. 162, b; xiii. 607, a) gives some extracts; and the Ἱστορία (in Suid.). Whether Cicero’s statement is taken from a treatise omitted by Diogenes, or from that περὶ ἀσεβείας, it is hard to say.

[28] According to the sketch of his life in Buhle (Arat. Opp. i. 3), Aratus was a pupil of Persæus at Athens, in company with whom he repaired to Antigonus in Macedonia, which can only mean that he was, together with Persæus, a pupil of Zeno. Another writer in Buhle (ii. 445) calls him so, mentioning one of his letters addressed to Zeno. Other accounts (Ibid. ii. 431; 442; 446) describe him as a pupil of Dionysius of Heraclea, or of Timon and Menedemus. A memorial of his Stoicism is the introduction to his ‘Phænomena,’ a poem resembling the hymn of Cleanthes. Asclepiades (Vita in Buhle, ii. 429), in calling him a native of Tarsus, is only preferring a better-known Cilician town to one less known.

[29] Hence his name ὁ Μεταθέμενος. On his writings, consult Diog. vii. 166; 37; 23; v. 92; Athen. vii. 281, d; x. 437, e; Cic. Acad. ii. 22, 71; Tusc. ii. 25, 60; Fin. v. 31, 94. Previously to Zeno, he is said to have studied under Heraclides ὁ Ποντικὸς, Alexinus, and Menedemus.

[30] Diog. 177; Plut. Cleomen. 2; 11; Athen. viii. 354, e. Sphærus’ presence in Egypt seems to belong to the time before he became connected with Cleomenes. He was a pupil of Cleanthes (Diog. vii. 185; Athen. l.c.) when he went to Egypt, and resided there at the court of Ptolemy for several years. He had left Egypt by 221 B.C., but was then himself no longer a member of the Stoic School at Athens. It is possible that Sphærus may first have come to Cleomenes on a commission from the Egyptian king. In that case, the Ptolemy referred to must have been either Ptolemy Euergetes or Ptolemy Philadelphus—certainly not Philopator, as Diog. 177 says. If, however, the view is taken that it was Ptolemy Philopator, it may be supposed that Sphærus repaired to Egypt with Cleomenes in 221 B.C. Sphærus’ numerous writings (Diog. 178: Λακωνικὴ πολιτεία also in Athen. iv. 141, 6) refer to all parts of philosophy, and to some of the older philosophers. According to Cic. Tusc. iv. 24, 53, his definitions were in great esteem in the Stoic School.

[31] Athenodorus, a native of Soli (Diog. vii. 38; 100); Callippus of Corinth (Diog. 38); Philonides of Thebes, who went with Persæus to Antigonus (Diog. 9; 38); Posidonius of Alexandria (Diog. 38); Zeno of Sidon, a pupil of Diodorus Cronus, who joined Zeno (Diog. 38; 16; Suid.).

[32] Baguet, De Chrysippo. Annal. Lovan. vol. iv. Lovan. 1822.

[33] Εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος οὐκ ἂν ἦν στοά (Diog. 183). Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 75: Chrysippum, qui fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum, Athen. viii. 335, b.: Χρύσιππον τὸν τῆς στοᾶς ἡγεμόνα. See Baguet, p. 16.

[34] It is recorded (Diog. 179) that he was brought up in early life as a racer, which is an exceedingly suspicious statement, (confer D, 168); and that his paternal property was confiscated (Hecato in Diog. 181). Subsequently, his domestic establishment was scanty, consisting of one old servant (Diog. 185; 181; 183); but whether this was the result of Stoicism or of poverty is not known. The Floril. Monac. (in Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 289) 262 calls him λιτὸς, ἔχων χρήματα πολλά.

[35] According to Apollodorus in Diog. 184, he died c. 205 B.C., in his 73rd year, which would make 281 to 276 the year of his birth. According to Lucian, Macrob. 20, he attained the age of 81, and, according to Valer. Max. viii. 7 ext. 10, completed the 39th book of his logic in his eightieth year.

[36] This is the view of Diog. 179; Plut. De Exil. 14, p. 605; Strabo, xiii. 1. 57, p. 610; xiv. 4, 8, p. 671, and most writers. Alexander Polyhistor, however, in Diog. and Suid. Ζήν. call him a native of Tarsus; and since his father Apollonius migrated from Tarsus to Soli (Strabo, p. 671), it is possible that Chrysippus may have been born in Tarsus.

[37] On this point all authorities are agreed. When and how he came to Athens is not recorded. He subsequently obtained the rights of citizenship there (Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, 2, p. 1034).

[38] Diog. 179. This statement cannot be tested by chronology. Authorities, however, do not look promising.

[39] Diog. Pro. 15. Strabo, xiii. 1, 57, 610.

[40] Diog. vii. 183. It is possible, as Ritter, iii. 524, supposes, that he was for some time doubtful about Stoicism, whilst he was under the influence of the Academic Scepticism, and that during this time he wrote the treatise against συνήθεια. This is possible, but not probable. But that he should have separated from Cleanthes, and have set up a school in the Lyceum in opposition to him, is unlikely, and does not follow from the words of Diog. 179; 185.

[41] Diog. 184; iv. 62. Cic. Acad. ii. 27, 87. Plut. Sto. Rep. p. 10, 3, 1036. These passages refer particularly to Chrysippus’ six books κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας. On the other hand, his pupil Aristocreon, in Plut. l.c. 2, 5, commends him as being τῶν Ἀκαδημιακῶν στραγγαλίδων κοπίδα. (Conf. Plut. Comm. Not. i. 4, p. 1059).

[42] When a learner, he is said to have used these words to Cleanthes: ‘Give me the principles; the proofs I can find myself.’ Subsequently it was said of him: ‘If the Gods have any logic, it is that of Chrysippus’ (Diog. 179). See Cic. N. D. i. 15, 30, where the Epicurean calls him Stoicorum somniorum vaferrimus interpres: ii. 6, 16; iii. 10, 25: Divin. i. 3, 6: Chrysippus acerrimo vir ingenio. Senec. Benefic. i. 3, 8; 4, 1, complains of his captiousness. Dionys. Hal. Comp. Verb. 68, calls him the most practical logician, but the most careless writer. Krische, Forsch. i. 445.

[43] Diog. 180. Athen. xiii. 565, a. Damasc. V. Isid. 36. Cic. Tusc. i. 45, 108.

[44] Diog. 179; 183.

[45] Diog. 185, mentions it as deserving of especial notice, that he refused the invitation of Ptolemy to court, and dedicated none of his numerous writings to a prince.

[46] Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 143. Diog. 179. Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, 1, p. 1034. According to the latter passage, Antipater had written a special treatise περὶ τῆς Κλεάνθους καὶ Χρυσίππου διαφορᾶς.

[47] Quid enim est a Chrysippo prætermissum in Stoicis? Cic. Fin. i. 2, 6.

[48] According to Diog. 180, there were not fewer than 750. Conf. Valer. Max. viii. 7, ext. 10; Lucian, Hermotim. 48.

[49] This appeared to the Epicureans disparaging to the honour of their master. Hence the charge that Chrysippus had written against Epicurus in rivalry (Diog. x. 26, and the criticism of Apollodorus in Diog. vii. 181).

[50] Baguet, pp. 114–357, discusses the subject very fully, but omits several fragments. As to his logical treatises, of which alone there were 311 (Diog. 198), see Nicolai, De logicis Chrysippi libris: Quedlinb. 1859. Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 404. Petersen (Philosoph. Chrysip. Fundamenta: Hamburg, 1827, 321) attempts a systematic arrangement of all the known books.

[51] See Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 50; Dionys. Hal. See above 46, 3; Diog. vii. 180; x. 27. Galen, Differ. Puls. ii. 10; vol. viii. 631 K; Hippocr. et Plat. Plac. ii. 2; iii. 2; vol. v. 213, 295, 308, 312, 314, and Baguet, 26. See also Plut. Sto. Rep. 28, 2; and Bergk, Commentat. de Chrys. lib. περὶ ἀποφατικῶν: Cassel, 1841.

[52] The circumstances of his death are related differently in Diog. 184; but both stories are untrustworthy. The story of the ass is also told in Lucian, Macrob. 25 of Philemon; the other version in Diog. iv. 44; 61 of Arcesilaus and Lacydes. On the statue of Chrysippus in the Ceramicus see Diog. vii. 182; Cic. Fin. i. 11, 39; Pausan. i. 17, 2; Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 5.

[53] In Stob. Floril. 40, 8, mention is made of the honourable position enjoyed by the Athenian Chremonides, who had been banished from his country. The banishment of Chremonides being placed in the year 263 B.C., Teles’ treatise περὶ φυγῆς must have been written between 260 and 250 B.C. This is further proved by the fact that there is no reference in the fragments preserved to persons or circumstances later than this date. The philosophers to whom reference is made are the Cynics Diogenes, Crates, Metrocles, Stilpo, Bio the Borysthenite, Zeno, and Cleanthes (95, 21), the latter being called ὁ Ἄσσιος.

[54] Floril. 5, 67; 40, 8; 91, 33; 93, 31; 98, 72; 108, 82 and 83.

[55] According to Suid., he was born c. 275 B.C., and died in his 80th year.

[56] See p. 41, 2.

[57] Conf. Diog. 54: ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτόν ... κριτήριά φησιν εἶναι αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν. That he was junior to Aratus appears by his commentary on Aratus’ poem. See Appendix to Geminus, Elem. Astron. (Petavii Doctr. Temp. III. 147). The Vita Arati (Von Buhle’s Aratus, vol. ii. 443), probably confounding him with the Peripatetic Boëthus, calls him a native of Sidon.

[58] We shall have occasion to prove this in speaking of his views of a criterion, and of his denial of a conflagration and destruction of the world. Nevertheless, he is frequently appealed to as an authority among the Stoics. Philo, Incorruptib. M. 947, C, classes him among ἄνδρες ἐν τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς δόγμασιν ἰσχυκότες.

[59] This follows from the great importance of Chrysippus, and the esteem in which he was held from the very first, and is confirmed by the number of persons to whom he wrote treatises. See the list from Diog. 189 in Fabric. Bibl. iii. 549. It is, however, ambiguous whether πρὸς means to or against.

[60] Aristocreon, the nephew of Chrysippus, is the only pupil who can be definitely mentioned by name. See Diog. vii. 185; Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 5, p. 1033.

[61] What is known of this philosopher is limited to the statements in Diog. 35; Suid. Ζήν. Διοσκ.; Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 13, 7; Arius Didymus, Ibid. xv. 17, 2; that he was a native of Tarsus (in Suid. τινὲς say of Sidon, evidently confounding him with the Zeno mentioned p. 44, 3); that he was the son of Dioscorides, the pupil and follower of Chrysippus; that he left many pupils, but few writings; and that he doubted a conflagration of the world.

[62] According to Diog. vi. 81; Lucian, Macrob. 20, he was a native of Seleucia on the Tigris; but he is sometimes called a native of Babylon (Diog. vii. 39; 55; Cic. N. D. i. 15, 41; Divin. i. 3, 6; Plut. De Exil. 14, p. 605). Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6, calls him a pupil of Chrysippus; and Acad. ii. 30, 98, the instructor of Carneades in dialectic. Plut. Alex. Virt. 5, p. 328, calls him a pupil of Zeno (of Tarsus). Zeno, he says, Διογένη τὸν Βαβυλώνιον ἔπεισε φιλοσοφεῖν. Diog. vii. 71, mentions a διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη of his; and, vii. 55 and 57, a τέχνη περὶ φωνῆς. Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6, speaks of a treatise on divination. Athen. iv. 168, e, of a treatise περὶ εὐγενείας, xii. 526. d, of a work περὶ νόμων—the same work probably which, according to Cic. Legg. iii. 5, 14, was written ‘a Dione Stoico.’ Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51, calls him ‘magnus et gravis Stoicus;’ Seneca, De Ira, iii. 38, 1, mentions a trait showing great presence of mind. Diogenes was, without doubt, aged in 156 B.C. (Cic. De Senec. 7, 23). According to Lucian, he attained the age of 88, and may therefore have died 150 B.C.

[63] It was often supposed, on the strength of Cic. N. D. i. 15, 41, Divin. i. 3, 6, that Diogenes was the immediate successor of Chrysippus. The words, however, consequens or subsequens, by no means necessarily imply it. On the authority of Arius, Eusebius, and Suidas, it would seem that Zeno was the successor of Chrysippus, and that Diogenes followed Zeno.

[64] Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51, only calls him his pupil; but it is clear that he taught in Athens from Plut. Ti. Gracch. c. 8, as Zumpt, Ueber die philos. Schulen in Athen. Abh. d. Berl. Acad. 1842, Hist. phil. kl. p. 103, already remarks; and Plut. Tranq. An. 9, p. 469, seems to imply that he continued to live at Athens after leaving Cilicia. The same fact is conveyed by the mention of Diogenists and Panætiasts at Athens (Athen. v. c. 2, p. 186, a); by the charge brought against Antipater (Plut. Garrul. c. 23, p. 514; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 6; Cic. Acad ii. 6, 17, and the fragment from Acad. Post. I. in Non. p. 65), that he never ventured to dispute with Carneades; and by Diog. iv. 65; Stob. Floril. 119, 19. According to these two authorities, he voluntarily put an end to his own life. In Acad. ii. 47, 143, Cicero calls him and Archedemus ‘duo vel principes dialecticorum, opiniosissimi homines.’ It appears from Off. iii. 12, 51, where he is also called ‘homo acutissimus,’ that he pronounced a severer judgment on several moral questions than Diogenes. Sen. Ep. 92, 5, reckons him among the magnos Stoicæ sectæ auctores. Epictet. Diss. iii. 21, 7, speaks of the φορὰ Ἀντιπάτρου καὶ Ἀρχεδήμου. See Van Lynden, De Panætio, 33; and Fabric. Biblioth. iii. 538 for his numerous lost treatises.

[65] Cic. l.c.; Strabo xiv. 4, 14, p. 674, Epictet. l.c.; Diog. vii. 55. It does not follow that they were cotemporaries, but only that their writings and philosophy were the same. We have otherwise no accurate information as to the date of Archedemus. Passages where he is mentioned may be found in Fabric. Bibl. III. 540. He also appears to be meant in Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol. in Arist. 505, a, 45. In Diog. 134, he appears to be placed between Chrysippus and Posidonius. In Plut. De Exil. 14, 605, he follows Antipater. According to this authority he established a school in Babylon, and because he came there from Athens, Plutarch appears to have considered him an Athenian.

[66] Apollodorus of Athens, the compiler of the Βιβλιοθήκη, a well-known grammarian, is also mentioned as a pupil of Diogenes (Scymnus, Chius Perieges. v. 20). His chronicle, dedicated to Attalus II., Philadelphus of Pergamum (158–138 B.C.), and probably drawn up 144 B.C., would seem to corroborate this assertion. Panætius, whose pupil he is elsewhere called (Suid. Ἀπολλόδ.), was himself a pupil of Diogenes’ successor, Antipater (Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6), and can hardly have been older than Apollodorus.

Another grammarian belonging to the School of Diogenes is Zenodotus (Diog. vii. 30), supposing him to be identical with the Alexandrian Zenodotus (Suid. Ζηνόδ.). A third is perhaps the celebrated Aristarchus, whom Scymnus calls a fellow-disciple of Apollodorus. A fourth, Crates of Mallos, called by Strabo, xiv. 5, 16, p. 676, the instructor of Panætius, by Suid. a Stoic philosopher, who in Varro, Lat. ix. 1, appeals to Chrysippus against Aristarchus.

Antipater’s pupils are Heraclides of Tarsus (Diog. vii. 121); Sosigenes (Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142); C. Blossius of Cumæ (Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8, 17 and 20; Val. Max. iv. 7, 1; Cic. Læl. 11, 37). Eudromus, mentioned by Diog. vii. 39, appears to belong to the time between Chrysippus and Panætius. Between Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes, Diog. vii. 84, names a certain Apollodorus, the author, probably, of the fragments in Stob. Ecl. i. 408 and 520. Possibly, however, he may be identical with the Apollodorus mentioned by Cic. N. D. i. 34, 93, and consequently a cotemporary of Zeno. In Diog. vii. 39, he is called Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Ἔφιλλος, instead of which Cobet reads Ἀπολλόδωρος καὶ Σύλλος. Apollodorus the Athenian, mentioned by Diog. vii. 181, is without doubt the Epicurean, known to us also from Diog. x. 2 and 25. Krische, Forsch. 26, thinks even that the passages in Cicero refer to him.

The age of Diogenes of Ptolemais (Diog. vii. 41), of Œnopides mentioned by Stob. Ecl. i. 58; Macrob. Sat. i. 17, together with Diogenes and Cleanthes, and of Nicostratus, mentioned by Philodemus περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς Tab. I. 2 and perhaps by Artemidorus Oneirocrit. I. 2 Sch. is quite unknown. Nicostratus, however, must have written before the middle of the first century before Christ. He is probably distinct from the Nicostratus who wrote on the Aristotelian categories in an adverse spirit, and is referred to by Simpl. in Categ. Schol. in Arist. 40, a; 24, b, 16; 41, b, 27; 47, b, 23; 49, b, 43; 72, b, 6; 74, b, 4; 81, b, 12; 83, a, 37; 84, a, 28; 86, b, 20; 87, b, 30; 88, b, 3 and 11; 89, a, 1; 91, a, 25; b, 21. For this Nicostratus used the treatise of a certain Roman Lucius, whereas Roman treatises on the Categories can hardly have existed before the time of Philodemus, a cotemporary of Cicero. However, both Lucius and Nicostratus appear to have been Stoics.

[67] Already Simpl. in Cat. Schol. in Arist. 49, a, 16, says: παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς, ὧν ἐφ’ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐπιλέλοιπεν.

[68] Plut. Plac. Pro. 2: οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ ἔφασαν, τὴν μὲν σοφίαν εἶναι θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην· τὴν δὲ φιλοσοφίαν ἄσκησιν τέχνης ἐπιτηδείου· ἐπιτήδειον δ’ εἶναι μίαν καὶ ἀνωτάτω τὴν ἀρετήν· ἀρετὰς δὲ τὰς γενικωτάτας τρεῖς, φυσικὴν, ἠθικὴν, λογικὴν, κ.τ.λ. See also Diog. vii. 92.

[69] In Seneca, Ep. 89, 4, wisdom is the highest good for the human mind, and philosophy is a striving after wisdom: wisdom is defined to be the knowledge of things human and divine; philosophy to be studium virtutis, or studium corrigendæ mentis. This striving after virtue cannot be distinguished from virtue itself: Philosophia studium virtutis est, sed per ipsam virtutem. Seneca further observes (Fr. 17, in Lactant. Inst. iii. 15): Philosophia nihil aliud est quam recta vivendi ratio, vel honeste vivendi scientia, vel ars rectæ vitæ agendæ. Non errabimus, si dixerimus philosophiam esse legem bene honesteque vivendi, et qui dixerit illam regulam vitæ, suum illi [nomen] reddidit. Plut. see previous note.

[70] See Diog. vii. 46: αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀρετὴν ἐν εἴδει περιέχουσαν ἀρετὰς, κ.τ.λ.

[71] Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 6: δεῖ γὰρ τούτοις [sc. τοῖς φυσικοῖς] συνάψαι τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, οὐκ οὔσης ἄλλης ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν ἀμείνονος οὐδ’ ἀναφορᾶς, οὐδ’ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκεν τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας παραληπτῆς οὔσης ἢ πρὸς τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν διάστασιν.

[72] Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 3, 2: ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσι φιλοσόφοις ἐπιβάλλειν μάλιστα τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, οὗτοί μοι δοκοῦσι διαμαρτάνειν ὑπονοοῦντες διαγωγῆς τινος ἕνεκεν δεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τούτῳ παραπλησίου, καὶ τὸν ὅλον βίον οὕτω πως διελκύσαι· τοῦτο δ’ ἔστιν, ἂν σαφῶς θεωρηθῇ, ἡδέως. Διαγωγὴ had, it is true, been treated by Aristotle, whose school is here referred to, as an end in itself; but Aristotle had carefully distinguished διαγωγὴ from ἡδονή.

[73] p. 19.

[74] Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 129: Herillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo dissenserit, et quam non multum a Platone. Fin. ii. 13, 43: Herillus autem ad scientiam omnia revocans unum quoddam bonum vidit. iv. 14, 36: In determining the highest good, the Stoics act as one-sidedly, as if ipsius animi, ut fecit Herillus, cognitionem amplexarentur, actionem relinquerent. v. 25, 73: Sæpe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto mirabiliter est laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia. Hoc uno captus Herillus scientiam summum bonum esse defendit, nec rem ullam aliam per se expetendam. Diog. vii. 165: Ἥριλλος ... τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἐπιστήμην. Ibid. vii. 37. With less accuracy, it is asserted by Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 918, that we are raised to the society of the gods, κατὰ Ἥριλλον, ἐπιστήμῃ.

[75] Sen. Ep. 89, 8: Nam nec philosophia sine virtute est nec sine philosophia virtus. Ibid. 53, 8: We all lie in the slumber of error: sola autem nos philosophia excitabit ... illi te totum dedica.

[76] Lact. Inst. vii. 7: Ad virtutem capessendam nasci homines, Ariston disseruit. See Stob. Ecl. 4, 111.

[77] Plut. De Audiendo, c. 8, p. 42: οὔτε γὰρ βαλανείου, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίστων, οὔτε λόγου μὴ καθαίροντος ὄφελός ἐστιν.

[78] Stob. Floril. 82, 15. Diog. vii. 161.

[79] Stob. Floril. 82, 11.

[80] Ibid. 7.

[81] Diog. vii. 162: μάλιστα δὲ προσεῖχε Στωϊκῷ δόγματι τῷ τὸν σόφον ἀδόξαστον εἶναι.

[82] See Diog. vii. 163.

[83] Aristo (in the Ὁμοιώματα) in Stob. Floril. 82, 16: ὁ ἐλλέβορος ὁλοσχερέστερος μὲν ληφθεὶς καθαίρει, εἰς δὲ πάνυ σμικρὰ τριφθεὶς πνίγει· οὕτω καὶ ἡ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λεπτολογία.

[84] Stob. l.c. 4, 110.

[85] See following note and Cic. Acad. ii. 39, 123: Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum (sc. physicorum) sciri putat posse.

[86] Diog. vii. 160: τόν σε φυσικὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν λογικὸν ἀνῄρει, λέγων τὸν μὲν εἶναι ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, τὸν δ’ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, μόνον δὲ τὸν ἠθικὸν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Stob. Floril. 80, 7: Ἀρίστων ἔφη τῶν ζητουμένων παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τὰ μὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ δὲ μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ δ’ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς. πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ, μὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ τὰ διαλεκτικά· μὴ γὰρ συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν βίου· ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς δὲ τὰ φυσικά· ἀδύνατα γὰρ ἐγνῶσθαι καὶ οὐδὲ παρέχειν χρείαν. Minuc. Fel. Octav. 13, and Lactant. Ins. iii. 20, attribute this utterance to Socrates. According to Cic. De Nat. De. I. 14, 37, Aristo expressed doubts about the existence of a God.

[87] Sext. Math. vii. 13: καὶ Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος οὐ μόνον, ὥς φασι, παρῃτεῖτο τήν τε φυσικὴν καὶ λογικὴν θεωρίαν διὰ τὸ ἀνωφελὲς καὶ πρὸς κακοῦ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπου τινὰς συμπεριέγραψε καθάπερ τόν τε παραινετικὸν καὶ τὸν ὑποθετικὸν τόπον· τούτους γὰρ εἰς τίτθας ἂν καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς πίπτειν·—(almost a literal translation is given of these words by Seneca, Ep. 89, 13)—ἀρκεῖσθαι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μακαρίως βιῶναι τὸν οἰκειοῦντα μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν λόγον, ἀπαλλοτριοῦντα δὲ κακίας, κατατρέχοντα δὲ τῶν μεταξὺ τούτων, περὶ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ πτοηθέντες κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. Seneca, Ep. 94, 1: Eam partem philosophiæ, quæ dat propria cuique personæ præcepta ... quidam solam receperunt ... sed Ariston Stoicus e contrario hanc partem levem existimat et quæ non descendat in pectus usque; at illam habentem præcepta [? ad vitam beatam] plurimum ait proficere ipsa decreta philosophiæ constitutionemque summi boni, quam qui bene intellexit ac didicit, quid in quaque re faciendum sit, sibi ipse præcepit. This is then further expanded following Aristo.

[88] Seneca, § 12, asks for whom should such exhortations be necessary—for him who has right views of good and evil, or for him who has them not? Qui non habet, nihil a te adjuvabitur; aures ejus contraria monitionibus tuis fama possedit; qui habet exactum judicium de fugiendis petendisque, scit, quid sibi faciendum sit, etiam te tacente; tota ergo pars ista philosophiæ submoveri potest. In § 17, he continues: A madman must be cured, and not exhorted; nor is there any difference between general madness and the madness which is treated medically.

[89] Diog. vii. 39.

[90] Logical treatises, those περὶ λέξεων, λύσεις καὶ ἔλεγχοι, περὶ λόγου—and if there were a rhetoric (see p. 40, 3) the τέχνη—physical treatises, those περὶ ὅλου and περὶ οὐσίας. Diog. 4, 39.

[91] Plut. Sto. Rep. 8, 2: ἔλυε δὲ σοφίσματα καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν, ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην, ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς. That he occasionally not only solved but propounded sophisms is proved by the fallacy quoted Ibid. i. Conf. Diog. vii. 25

[92] See above p. 36.

[93] According to Diog. 32, he declared at the beginning of his Polity the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία to be useless—a testimony worth very little; for it is a moot point, in what sense Zeno made this statement. Perhaps he was only anxious to exclude those studies from the narrower sphere of philosophy (as Sen. Ep. 88). Perhaps his Polity was nearer Cynicism than any other of his writings.

[94] Proofs will be given later.

[95] The Catalogue in Diog. 174, περὶ λόγου 3 B. (Mohnike Cleanth. 102, believes this work was a treatise on life according to reason. The title is against this view, and it is also improbable, inasmuch as treatises by Sphærus and Chrysippus bearing the same title, are exclusively logical), mentions logical treatises περὶ λόγου, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, περὶ ἰδίων, περὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, περὶ διαλεκτικῆς, περὶ κατηγορημάτων. To these may be added, from Athen. 467, d; 471, b, the rhetorical treatises περὶ τρόπων and περὶ μεταλήψεως. Of greater importance were the physical and theological treatises: περὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήνωνος φυσιολογίας (2 B.); τῶν Ἡρακλείτου ἐξηγήσεις (4 B.); πρὸς Δημόκριτον, περὶ θεῶν, περὶ μαντικῆς (Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6); περὶ γιγάντων (in Plut. De Flum. 5, 3); and the μυθικὰ (Athen. xiii. 572, e), which is probably identical with the ἀρχαιολογία of Diogenes.

[96] Diog. 41.

[97] Diog. vii. 178, mentions (1) logical and rhetorical writings: περὶ τῶν Ἐρετρικῶν φιλοσόφων, περὶ ὁμοίων, περὶ ὅρων, περὶ ἕξεως, περὶ τῶν ἀντιλεγομένων (3 B.), περὶ λόγου, τέχνη διαλεκτική (2 B.), περὶ κατηγορημάτων, περὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν; (2) treatises on science: περὶ κόσμου (2 B.), περὶ στοιχείων, περὶ σπέρματος, περὶ τύχης, περὶ ἐλαχίστων, πρὸς τὰς ἀτόμους καὶ τὰ εἴδωλα, περὶ αἰσθητηρίων, περὶ Ἡρακλείτου (5 B.), περὶ μαντικῆς. That Sphærus’ definitions were particularly valued, has been already seen, 44, 2.

[98] Chrys. in the 3rd B., περὶ θεῶν (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 4); οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εὑρεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδ’ ἄλλην γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ δεῖ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μέλλομέν τι ἐρεῖν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. The same writer, in φυσικαὶ θέσεις (Ibid. 5): οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλως οὐδ’ οἰκειότερον ἐπελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐδ’ ἐπὶ εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου διοικήσεως. Further details above p. 47, 2.

[99] Sext. Math. vii. 17; Diog. 40.

[100] The chief divisions of the logic of the Stoics (Diog. 42, 46) are considered important for special purposes. The doctrine περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων is of use, helping us to truth, by making us examine our notions; ὁρικὸν, because it leads to the knowledge of things by means of conceptions; διαλεκτικὴ (which includes the whole of formal logic), because it produces ἀπροπτωσία (= ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ), ἀνεικαιότης (= ἰσχυρὸς λόγος πρὸς τὸ εἰκὸς, ὥστε μὴ ἐνδιδόναι αὐτῷ), ἀνελεγξία (= ἰσχὺς ἐν λόγῳ, ὥστε μὴ ἀπάγεσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἀντικείμενον), ἀματαιότης (= ἕξις ἀναφέρουσα τὰς φαντασίας ἐπὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον). Its value is therefore chiefly negative, as a preservative from error. See Seneca, Ep. 89, 9: Proprietates verborum exigit et structuram et argumentationes, ne pro vero falsa subrepant. Sext. Math. vii. 23: ὀχυρωτικὸν δὲ εἶναι τῆς διανοίας τὸν διαλεκτικὸν τόπον; Pyrrh. ii. 247: ἐπὶ τὴν τέχνην τὴν διαλεκτικήν φασιν ὡρμηκέναι οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ (the Stoics), οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ γνῶναί τι ἐκ τίνος συνάγεται, ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δι’ ἀποδεικτικῶν λόγων τὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ κρίνειν ἐπίστασθαι.

[101] This may be seen in Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 134–203, 229; Math. viii. 300; as well as from the catalogue of the writings of Chrysippus in Diogenes.

[102] The only part which is censured by Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 10, 1) is the sceptical logic, which leaves contradictions unsolved: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐποχὴν ἄγουσι περὶ πάντων ἐπιβάλλει, φησὶ, τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ συνεργόν ἐστι πρὸς ὃ βούλονται· τοῖς δ’ ἐπιστήμην ἐνεργαζομένοις, καθ’ ἣν ὁμολογουμένως βιωσόμεθα τὰ ἐναντία στοιχειοῦν.

[103] Cic. Parad. Proœm.: Cato autem perfectus mea sententia Stoicus ... in ea est hæresi, quæ nullum sequitur florem orationis neque dilatat argumentum: minutis interrogatiunculis, quasi punctis, quod proposuit efficit. Cic. Fin. iv. 3, 7: Pungunt quasi aculeis interrogatiunculis angustis, quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil commutantur animo. See also Diog. vii. 18, 20.

[104] In Sextus Empiricus, Διαλεκτικοὶ is their ordinary name. It is also found in Plut. Qu. Plat. x. 1, 2, p. 1008. Cic. Top. 2, 6; Fin. iv. 3, 6.

[105] After the example of the Megarians, the Stoics were in the habit of putting their arguments in the form of questions. Hence the terms λόγον ἐρωτᾶν (Diog. vii. 186), interrogatio (Sen. Ep. 82, 9; 85, 1; 87, 11), interrogatiuncula (Cic.), which are employed even when the arguments were not in this form.

[106] See p. 48, 1.

[107] Called μέρη, according to Diog. 39 also τόποι, εἴδη, γένη.

[108] Diog. 39: τριμερῆ φασιν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μέν τι φυσικὸν, τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν. οὕτω δὲ πρῶτος διεῖλε Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐν τῷ περὶ λόγου καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ αʹ περὶ λόγου καὶ ἐν τῇ αʹ τῶν φυσικῶν, καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Ἔφιλλος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν εἰς τὰ δόγματα εἰσαγωγῶν, καὶ Εὔδρομος ἐν τῇ ἠθικῇ στοιχειώσει, καὶ Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος, καὶ Ποσειδώνιος. Sext. Math. vii. 16. Sen. Ep. 89, 9; 14. The six divisions enumerated by Cleanthes (Diog. 41)—Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology (Diog. 41) may be easily reduced to three.

[109] According to Diog. 40, the first place was assigned to Logic, the second to Science, the third to Ethics, by Zeno, Chrysippus, Archedemus, Eudemus, and others. The same order, but inverted, is found in Diogenes of Ptolemais, and in Seneca, Ep. 89, 9. The latter, however, observes (Nat. Qu. Prol. 1) that the difference between that part of philosophy which treats about God, and that which treats about man, is as great as the difference between philosophy and other departments, or even as between God and man. On the other hand, Apollodorus places Ethics in the middle, as also Cleanthes does, and likewise Panætius and Posidonius, if it is certain that they began with science. This appears, however, only to have reference to their order in discussion (see Sext. Math. vii. 22, probably on the authority of Posidonius). A few (Diog. 40) asserted that the parts could be so little separated, that they must be always treated together. The statement of Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 1), that Logic must come first, and be followed by Ethics and Science, so that the theological part may form the conclusion, only refers to the order in which they ought to be taught.

[110] In Diog. 39; Sext. Math. vii. 17; Philo, Mut. Nom. p. 1055, E. Hösch. (589 M); De Agricul. 189, D (302), philosophy is compared to an orchard, Logic represents the fence, Science the trees. Ethics the fruit; so that Ethics are the end and object of the whole. Philosophy is also compared to a fortified town, in which the walls are represented by Logic, but in which the position of the other two is not clear; to an egg, Logic being the shell, and, according to Sextus, Science being the white and Ethics the yolk, but the reverse according to Diogenes. Dissatisfied with this comparison, Posidonius preferred to compare philosophy to a living creature, in which Logic constitutes the bones and muscles, Science the flesh and blood, and Ethics the soul. But Diogenes has another version of this simile, according to which Science represents the soul; and Ritter iii. 432, considers the version of Diogenes to be the older of the two.

[111] See Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 13.

[112] Diog. 41: τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος φασὶν ἔνιοι εἰς δύο διαιρεῖσθαι ἐπιστήμας, εἰς ῥητορικὴν καὶ διαλεκτικήν ... τήν τε ῥητορικὴν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ εὖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξόδῳ λόγων καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν τοῦ ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει λόγων. Sen. Ep. 89, 17: Superest ut rationalem partem philosophiæ dividam: omnis oratio aut continua est aut inter respondentem et interrogantem discissa; hanc διαλεκτικὴν, illam ῥητορικὴν placuit vocari. Cic. Fin. ii. 6, 17; Orat. 32, 113. Quintil. Inst. ii. 20, 7. According to these passages, Rhetoric was by Zeno compared to the palm of the hand, and Dialectic to the fist: quod latius loquerentur rhetores, dialectici autem compressius. The Stoics agree with Aristotle in calling rhetoric ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ (Sop. in Hermog. v. 15, Walz.). See Prantl, Gesch. der Log. i. 413.

[113] Diog. 41: Some divide logic into rhetoric and dialectic: τινὲς δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ὁρικὸν εἶδος, τὸ περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων· ἔνιοι δὲ τὸ ὁρικὸν περιαιροῦσι. (We have no reason to read as Ménage does περιδιαιροῦσι, or to conjecture, as Meibom and Nicolai, De Log. Chrys., Lib. 23, do, παραδιαιροῦσι.) According to this passage, ὁρικὸν must be identical with the doctrine of a criterium. In a subsequent passage, however, the two are distinguished; the doctrine of a criterium is said to be useful for the discovery of truth: καὶ τὸ ὁρικὸν δὲ ὁμοίως πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας· διὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐνοιῶν τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνεται. We may therefore suppose that in the passage first quoted the words should be τὸ ὁρικὸν εἶδος καὶ τὸ περὶ κανόνων, κ.τ.λ. In this case, we may understand by ὁρικὸν not only the theory of definition—a theory to which Aristotle devoted a separate section at the end of his Analytics (Anal. Post. ii.)—but besides a theoretical disquisition on the formation of definitions, a collection of definitions of various objects. Such collections are found in the treatises of Chrysippus (Diog. 199, 189): περὶ τῶν ὅρων ζʹ. ὅρων διαλεκτικῶν στʹ. ὅρων τῶν κατὰ γένος ζʹ. ὅρων τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας αβʹ. ὅρων τῶν τοῦ ἀστείου βʹ. ὅρων τῶν τοῦ φαύλου βʹ. ὅρων τῶν ἀναμέσων βʹ; besides the further treatises περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῖς ὅροις ἀντιλεγομένων ζʹ. Πιθανὰ εἰς τοὺς ὅρους βʹ. The treatise περὶ εἰδῶν καὶ γενῶν βʹ may also be included here; perhaps also that περὶ τῶν κατηγορημάτων πρὸς Μητρόδωρον ιʹ. πρὸς Πάσυλον περὶ κατηγορημάτων δʹ, Diog. 191.

[114] No description of their system can dispense with this fundamental enquiry, which had been already instituted by Zeno. It appears, however, to have been treated by several writers as a branch of dialectic. Diog. 43 says that the branch of dialectic which treats of σημαινόμενα may be divided εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν τόπον καὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων ὑφισταμένων λεκτῶν. (See Nicolai p. 23.) Compare with this the words of Diocles, in Diog. 49: ἀρέσκει τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως προτάττειν λόγον, καθότι τὸ κριτήριον ᾧ ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν πραγμάτων γινώσκεται, κατὰ γένος φαντασία ἐστὶ καὶ καθότι ὁ περὶ συγκαταθέσεως καὶ ὁ περὶ καταλήψεως καὶ νοήσεως λόγος προάγων τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας συνίσταται. According to this passage, the branch of dialectic which treated of φαντασία included the theory of knowledge. Diog. 53, Petersen’s conjecture is singular (Phil. Chrys. Fund. p. 25) that the theory of knowledge may have been understood by Chrysippus under the name rhetoric.

[115] Our information on this head is very small. In the words: ῥητορικὴ verba curat et sensus et ordinem, a division of rhetoric is implied by Seneca, which differs in little, except in the position of the chief parts, from that of Aristotle. A fourth part is added to the three others by Diog. 43—on Delivery—εἶναι δ’ αὐτῆς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἴς τε τὴν εὕρεσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν φράσιν, καὶ εἰς τάξιν καὶ εἰς τὴν ὑπόκρισιν. Diogenes also claims for the Stoics the Aristotelian distinction between three ways of speaking—συμβουλευτικὸς, δικανικὸς, ἐγκωμιαστικός—and four parts in a speech: προοίμιον, διήγησις, τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιδίκους, ἐπίλογος. Definitions of διήγησις and παράδειγμα are given from Zeno by the anonymous author in Spengel, Rhet. Gr. i. 434, 23; 447, 11. The same author (Ibid. 454, 4) says that, according to Chrysippus, the ἐπίλογος must be μονομερής. The Stoic definition of rhetoric has been already given, p. 70, 1. Another—τέχνη περὶ κόσμου καὶ εἰρημένου λόγου τάξιν—is attributed to Chrysippus by Plut. Sto. Rep. 28, 1. Cic. Fin. iv. 3, 7, observes, in reference to the Stoic rhetoric, and in particular to that of Chrysippus, that such was its nature that si quis obmutescere concupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat—that it dealt in nothing but words, being withal scanty in expressions, and confined to subtleties. This neglect of the truly rhetorical element appears already in the quotations from Plut. Sto. Rep. 28, 2. We have not the slightest reason to complain, as Prantl does, p. 413, of the purely rhetorical value of dialectic with the Stoics.

[116] See p. 70, 1, Alex. Aphr. Top. 3: οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὁριζόμενοι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ εὖ λέγειν ὁρίζονται, τὸ δὲ εὖ λέγειν ἐν τῷ ἀληθῆ καὶ προσήκοντα λέγειν εἶναι τιθέμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ ἴδιον ἡγούμενοι τοῦ φιλοσόφου, κατὰ τῆς τελεωτάτης φιλοσοφίας φέρουσιν αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μόνος ὁ φιλόσοφος κατ’ αὐτοὺς διαλεκτικός. Aristotle had used the term dialectic in another sense, but with Plato it expressed the mode of procedure peculiar to a philosopher.

[117] See Anon. Prolegg. ad Hermog. Rhet. Gr. vii. 8, W.: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τὸ εὖ λέγειν ἔλεγον τὸ ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

[118] Diog. 42: ὅθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν [τὴν διαλεκτικὴν] ὁρίζονται, ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. (The same, p. 62, quoted from Posidonius, and in Sext. Math. xi. 187, and Suid. Διαλεκτική.) οὐδετέρων being probably used, because dialectic deals not only with judgments, but with conceptions and interrogations. Conf. Diog. 68.

[119] This is the meaning of the Stoic distinction between λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικὸς, a distinction subsequently employed by Philo and the Fathers, and really identical with that of Aristotle (Anal. Post i. 10, 76 b, 24): οὐ πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. On this distinction see Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 72, p. 142: διπλοῦς ὁ λόγος· τούτων δ’ οἱ φιλόσοφοι (the Stoics are meant) τὸν μὲν ἐνδιάθετον καλοῦσι, τὸν δὲ προφορικόν. ὁ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἔνδον λογισμῶν ἐστιν ἐξάγγελος, ὁ δ’ ὑπὸ τοῖς στέρνοις καθεῖρκται. φασὶ δὲ τούτῳ χρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ θεῖον. Sext. Math. viii. 275 (conf. Pyrrh. i. 76): οἱ δὲ Δογματικοὶ ... φασὶν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος οὐχὶ τῷ προφορικῷ λόγῳ διαφέρει τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ... ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ. The Stoics alone can be meant by the νεώτεροι in Theo. Smyrn. Mus. c. 18, who are contrasted with the Peripatetics for using the terms λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός. They are also referred to by Plut. C. Prin. Phil. 2, 1, p. 777: τὸ δὲ λέγειν, ὅτι δύο λόγοι εἰσὶν, ὁ μὲν ἐνδιάθετος, ἡγεμόνος Ἑρμοῦ δῶρον, ὁ δ’ ἐν προφορᾷ, διάκτορος καὶ ὀργανικὸς ἕωλόν ἐστι. The double form of Hermes is explained by Heraclitus as referring to the twofold λόγος—Ἑρμῆς Χθόνιος represents λόγον ἐνδιάθετον, and the heavenly Hermes (διάκτορος) represents the προφορικόν. The distinction passed from the Stoics to others, like Plut. Solert. An. 19, 1, p. 973; Galen, Protrept. i. 1.

[120] Diog. 43: τὴν διαλεκτικὴν διαιρεῖσθαι εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν σημαινομένων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπον. Ibid. 62: τυγχάνει δ’ αὕτη, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός φησι, περὶ σημαίνοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα. Seneca l.c.: διαλεκτικὴ in duas partes dividitur, in verba et significationes, i.e. in res, quæ dicuntur, et vocabula, quibus dicuntur. The distinction between τὸ σημαῖνον and τὸ σημαινόμενον, to which τὸ τυγχάνον (the real object) must be added as a third, will be hereafter discussed in another place. A much narrower conception of dialectic, and more nearly approaching to that of the Peripatetics, is to be found in the definition given by Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 213. The division there given is also found in the Platonist Alcinous, Isag. c. 3, as Fabricius has pointed out. It appears, therefore, not to belong to the Stoic School, but, at most, to a few of its later members.

[121] Seneca continues: Ingens deinde sequitur utriusque divisio, without, however, giving it.

[122] There is much which is open to doubt in Petersen’s attempt (Phil. Chrys. Fund. 221) to settle these divisions. At the very beginning, his reference of the words in Sext. Math. viii. 11 to the parts of logic is unhappy. Nicolai (De Logic. Chrys. Lib. 21) has acted with greater caution, but even much of what he says is doubtful.

[123] Diog. 55.

[124] Diog. 44: εἶναι δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἴδιον τόπον καὶ τὸν προειρημένον περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς, ἐν ᾧ δείκνυται ἡ ἐγγράμματος φωνὴ καὶ τίνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, καὶ περὶ σολοικισμοῦ καὶ βαρβαρισμοῦ καὶ ποιημάτων καὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμμελοῦς φωνῆς καὶ περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ περὶ ὅρων κατά τινας καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ λέξεων. The theory of the determination and division of conceptions occupies such an important place in the section περὶ φωνῆς, that we might feel disposed to suppose some mistake in the authority. Still, from the later authorities, pp. 60–62, it is seen that by many it is usually so represented.

[125] Further particulars may be obtained in Schmidt’s Stoicorum Grammatica (Halle, 1839); Lersch, Sprachphilosophie der Alten; Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft, i. 265–363; Nicolai, De Log. Chrys. Lib. 31. This part of dialectic began with enquiries into the voice and speech. Voice is defined to be sound and speech, to be air in motion, or something hearable—ἀὴρ πεπληγμένος ἢ τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς; the human voice as ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διάνοιας ἐκπεμπομένη, is distinguished from the sounds of other animals, which are ἀὴρ ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς πεπληγμένος (Diog. 55; Simpl. Phys. 97; Sext. Math. vi. 39; Gell. N. A. vi. 15, 6). That the voice is something material is proved in various ways (Diog. 55; Plut. Plac. iv. 20, 2; Galen, Hist. Phil. 27). The voice, in as far as it is ἔναρθρος, or composed of letters, is called λέξις; in as far as it expresses certain notions, it is λόγος (Diog. 56; Sext. Math. i. 155). A peculiar national mode of expression (λέξις κεχαραγμένη ἐθνικῶς τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς ἢ λέξις ποταπὴ) was called διάλεκτος (Diog. 56). The elements of λέξις are the 24 letters, divided into 7 φωνήεντα, 6 ἄφωνα, and 11 semivowels (Diog. 57); the λόγος has 5 parts, called στοιχεῖα by Chrysippus—ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον—to which Antipater added the μεσότης, or adverb (Diog. 57; Galen, De Hippocrat. et Plat. viii. 3; Lersch, ii. 28; Steinthal, 291). Words were not formed by caprice, but certain peculiarities of things have been imitated in the chief sounds of which they are composed. These peculiarities can therefore be discovered by etymological analysis (Orig. c. Cels. i. 24; Augustin. Dialect. c. 6; Opp. T. I. Ap. 17, c.). (Chrysippus, however, observes (in Varro, L. Lat. ix. 1) that the same things bear different names, and vice versâ, and (in Gell. N. A. xi. 12, 1) that every word has several meanings.) See Simpl. Cat. 8, ζ. Five advantages and two disadvantages of speech are enumerated Diog. 59; Sext. Math. i. 210; and poetry (Diog. 60), various kinds of amphibolia (Diog. 62; Galen, De Soph. P. Dict. c. 4), the formation of conceptions, and division, are treated of.

[126] Diog. vii. 54.

[127] The statements of Zeno and Cleanthes, for instance, in reference to φαντασία, prove that these Stoics deduced their theory of knowledge from general principles respecting notions. They therefore started from the data supplied by the senses. A passage in Zeno, explaining the relations of various forms of knowledge, shows that even Zeno required progress to be from perception to conception and knowledge, and that he distinguished these states only by the varying strength of conviction which they produced.

[128] Plut. Plac. iv. 12. Diog. vii. 50. Nemes. Nat. Hom. 76. Φαντασία is πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἑαυτό τε καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός, in the same way, it is added, that light shows other things as well as itself; φανταστὸν is τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν φαντασίαν, and therefore πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν δύνηται κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν. Φαντασία is distinguished from φανταστικόν, because no φανταστὸν corresponds to φανταστικόν· it is διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς, πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπ’ οὐδενὸς φανταστοῦ γινόμενον· and the object of such an empty perception is a φάντασμα. Compare also Sext. Math. vii. 241: διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς is called φαντασία τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν. Impressions wholly unfounded, which give the impression of being actual perceptions, are called by Diog. 51, ἐμφάσεις αἱ ὡσανεὶ ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων γινόμεναι. In a wider sense, φαντασία means any kind of notion.

[129] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: οἱ Στωϊκοί φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ χάρτης (χάρτην as Galen, H. Phil. 24, vol. xix. reads), ἐνεργῶν εἰς ἀπογραφήν. εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται· πρῶτος δὲ ὁ τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τρόπος ὁ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. See p. 79, 2. Orig. c. Cels. vii. 37, 720, b, says that they taught αἰσθήσει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰ καταλαμβανόμενα καὶ πᾶσαν κατάληψιν ἠρτῆσθαι τῶν αἰσθήσεων.

[130] Plut. Comm. Not. 47: φαντασία τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ. The same in Diog. vii. 45 and 50. That this was also the view of Diogenes appears from what follows.

[131] Sext. Math. vii. 228: Κλεάνθης μὲν γὰρ ἤκουσε τὴν τύπωσιν κατὰ εἰσοχήν τε καὶ ἐξοχὴν ὥσπερ καὶ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων γινομένην τοῦ κηροῦ τύπωσιν. Conf. Ibid. vii. 372; viii. 400.

[132] Sext. vii. 229, continues: Χρύσιππος δὲ ἄτοπον ἡγεῖτο τὸ τοιοῦτον·—according to this view, it would be necessary for the soul to receive at once many different forms, if it had to retain different notions at the same time—αὐτὸς οὖν τὴν τύπωσιν εἰρῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὑπενόει ἀντὶ τῆς ἑτεροιώσεως, ὥστε εἶναι τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον· φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ψυχῆς. Objection had, however, been raised to this definition, on the ground that not every change of the soul gives rise to a perception, and therefore the Stoics had defined a perception more accurately: φαντασία ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ ὡς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ, which was equivalent to saying φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ· or else in Zeno’s definition of φαντασία as τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ they had taken ψυχὴ in a restricted sense for τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, which really comes to the same thing. Even this definition had, however, been found too wide, and hence ἑτεροίωσις was limited to change in feeling (ἑτεροίωσις κατὰ πεῖσιν). But the definition is still too wide, as Sextus already remarked; for a perception is not the only feeling of change in the soul. A more accurate definition has already been quoted, 77, 1. The statements in Sext. Math. vii. 372; viii. 400; Diog. vii. 45 and 50; Alex. Aphro. De Anim. 135, b; Boëth. De Interpret, ii. 292 (Schol. in Arist. 100), are in agreement with the above remarks.

[133] Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 19, 2: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητά ἐστι τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ, καὶ τούτοις ἐκποιεῖ λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ πάθη ἐστὶν αἰσθητὰ σὺν τοῖς εἴδεσιν, οἷον λύπη καὶ φόβος καὶ τὸ παραπλήσια, ἀλλὰ καὶ κλοπῆς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔστιν αἰσθέσθαι· καὶ καθόλου ἀφροσύνης καὶ δειλίας καὶ ἄλλων οὐκ ὀλίγων κακιῶν· οὐδὲ μόνον χαρᾶς καὶ εὐεργεσιῶν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν κατορθώσεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν. This passage must not be understood to mean that the conceptions of good and evil, as such, are objects of sensation (Ritter, iii. 558). The only objects of that kind are individual moral states and activities. The general conceptions derived from them are, according to the Stoic theory of knowledge, only obtained by a process of abstraction.

[134] Plut. Plac. iv. 11, 2: αἰσθανόμενοι γάρ τινος οἷον λευκοῦ ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ μνήμην ἔχουσιν, ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνήμαι γένωντα τότε φασὶν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν.

[135] Diog. vii. 52: ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν, ὡς λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων καὶ τραχέων καὶ λείων· λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους· τῶν γὰρ νοουμένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ περίπτωσιν (immediate contact) ἐνοήθη, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ὁμοιότητα, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετάθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ σύνθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἐναντίωσιν ... νοεῖται δὲ καὶ κατὰ μετάβασιν (transition from the sensuous to the super-sensuous) τινὰ, ὡς τὰ λεκτὰ καὶ ὁ τόπος. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 42: Comprehensio [= κατάληψις] facta sensibus et vera illi [Zenoni] et fidelis videbatur: non quod omnia, quæ essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret, quodque natura quasi normam scientiæ et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur. Ibid. Fin. iii. 10, 33: Cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu (experience) aliquid cognitum sit, aut conjunctione, aut similitudine, aut collatione rationis: hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni notitia facta est. Sext. (Math. iii. 40; ix. 393) also agrees with the Stoic doctrine of the origin of conceptions, in saying that all our ideas arise either κατ’ ἐμπέλασιν τῶν ἐναργῶν or κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν (cf. Diog. vii. 53), and in the latter case either by comparison, or actual combination, or analogy.

[136] Diog. l.c. Compare the passage quoted from Seneca, 81, 2.

[137] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: τῶν δ’ ἐννοιῶν αἱ μὲν φυσικαὶ γίνονται κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους (according to the context, this must mean by memory and experience, but perhaps the author of the Placita has been careless in his extracts here) καὶ ἀνεπιτεχνήτως· αἱ δ’ ἤδη δι’ ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας· αὗται μὲν οὖν ἔννοιαι καλοῦνται μόναι, ἐκεῖναι δὲ καὶ προλήψεις. Diog. vii. 51: [τῶν φαντασιῶν] αἱ μέν εἰσι τεχνικαὶ, αἱ δὲ ἄτεχνοι.

[138] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: ὁ δὲ λόγος καθ’ ὃν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοὶ ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα (the first seven years of life). Comm. Not. 3, 1, says that to the Stoics belonged τὸ παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας καὶ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀφ’ ὧν μάλιστα τὴν αἵρεσιν ... καὶ μόνην ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει λέγουσιν. Sen. Epist. 117, 6: multum dare solemus præsumtioni (πρόληψις) omnium hominum; apud nos argumentum veritatis est, aliquid omnibus videri. Frequent instances will occur of appeals to communes notitiæ and consensus gentium.

[139] Diog. vii. 53: φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν. 54: ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. In the same strain Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 17) speaks of ἔμφυτοι προλήψεις of good and evil. In Plut. Frag. De Anim. vii. 6, T. V. 487 Wytt., the question is asked, How is it possible to learn what is not already known? The Stoics reply, By means of φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι.

[140] Compare Cic. Fin. iii. 10: hoc quarto [collatione rationis] boni notitia facta est; cum enim ab iis rebus, quæ sunt secundum naturam, adscendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notitiam boni pervenit. Similarly Sen. Ep. 120, 4, replying to the question, Quomodo ad nos prima boni honestique notitia pervenerit? observes, Hoc nos natura docere non potuit: semina nobis scientiæ dedit, scientiam non dedit ... nobis videtur observatio collegisse [speciem virtutis], et rerum sæpe factarum inter se collatio: per analogiam nostri intellectum et honestum et bonum judicant. The notion of mental health and strength has grown out of corresponding bodily notions; the contemplation of virtuous actions and persons has given rise to the conception of moral perfection, the good points being improved upon, and defects being passed over, the experience of certain faults which resemble virtues serving to make the distinction plainer. Even belief in a God was produced, according to Diog. vii. 52, by ἀπόδειξις. See p. 80, 1. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 792: οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ λέγουσι μὲν εὐθὺς ἐμφύεσθαι τὸν λόγον, ὕστερον δὲ συναθροίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ φαντασιῶν περὶ δεκατέσσαρα ἔτη.