Chapter XXIII: The New Academy (3)

[141] Stob. Ecl. ii. 128: εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τοιούτων, οἷον ἡ τῶν κατὰ μέρος λογικὴ ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ ὑπάρχουσα· ἄλλην δὲ σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τεχνικῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔχον τὸ βέβαιον ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἀρεταί· ἄλλην δὲ (knowledge in a relative sense) ἕξιν φαντασιῶν δεκτικὴν ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου, ἥντινά φασιν ἐν τόνῳ καὶ δυνάμει (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) κεῖσθαι. Diog. vii. 47: αὐτήν τε τὴν ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ ἢ ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. (This explanation, which Herillus used according to Diog. vii. 165, certainly belongs to Zeno.) οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας τὸν σοφὸν ἄπτωτον ἔσεσθαι ἐν λόγῳ.

[142] See p. 80, 4.

[143] This was the object of Plutarch’s treatise περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν. In the same way, the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in Euseb. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 10) throws it in the teeth of Chrysippus that, whilst appealing to generally received opinions, he is always going contrary to them, and that he considers all men, with one or two exceptions, to be fools and madmen.

[144] Diog. 52: ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν λευκῶν, κ.τ.λ. λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.

[145] Sext. Math. viii. 10: οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς λέγουσι μὲν τῶν τε αἰσθητῶν τινα καὶ τῶν νοητῶν ἀληθῆ, οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἀναφορὰν τὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ παρακείμενα τούτοις νοητά.

[146] Sext. l.c. continues: ἀληθὲς γάρ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς τὸ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἀντικείμενόν τινι, καὶ ψεῦδος τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον καὶ μὴ (this μὴ is obviously redundant as appears from Math. viii. 85, 88; xi. 220, where the same definition is given without the μὴ) ἀντικείμενόν τινι, ὅπερ ἀσώματον ἀξίωμα καθεστὼς νοητὸν εἶναι· every sentence containing an assertion or negative, and therefore being opposed to every other. Ibid. viii. 70: ἠξίουν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ κοινῶς ἐν λεκτῷ τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος· λεκτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασὶ τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον· λογικὴν δὲ εἶναι φαντασίαν καθ’ ἣν τὸ φαντασθὲν ἔστι λόγῳ παραστῆσαι. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ἐλλιπῆ καλοῦσι τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελῆ (conceptions and propositions; conf. Diog. vii. 63) ... προσαγορεύουσι δέ τινα τῶν αὐτοτελῶν καὶ ἀξιώματα, ἅπερ λέγοντες ἤτοι ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα. Ibid. 74; Diog. vii. 65: ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστιν, ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος (see Cic. Tusc. I. 7, 14) ἢ πρᾶγμα (better λεκτὸν as Gell. N. A. xvi, 8, 4 reads) αὐτοτελὲς ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῴ· ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός φησιν ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅροις. Aristotle had already observed that the distinction between false and true first appears in judgment. See Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 156, 2; 157, 1.

[147] Sext. Math. vii. 93; ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος, ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου. Conf. Plato, Rep. vi. 508, B.

[148] See Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 231.

[149] Ibid. ii. a, 211.

[150] Diog. 61: ἐννόημα (object of thought) δέ ἐστι φάντασμα διανοίας. οὔτε τί ὂν οὔτε ποιὸν, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τί ὂν καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιόν. Stob. Ecl. i. 332: τὰ ἐννοήματά φησι μήτι τινὰ εἶναι μήτι ποιὰ, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τινὰ καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιὰ φαντάσματα ψυχῆς· ταῦτα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἰδέας προσαγορεύεσθαι ... ταῦτα [ταύτας] δὲ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ φιλόσοφοι φασὶν ἀνυπάρκτους εἶναι, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐννοημάτων μετέχειν ἡμᾶς, τῶν δὲ πτώσεων, ἃς δὴ προσηγορίας καλοῦσι, τυγχάνειν. Although defended by Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. I. 420, 63, the last words as they stand do not appear capable of any passable meaning and are most probably corrupt. Plut. Plac. i. 10, 4: οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωϊκοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδέας ἔφασαν. Simpl. Categ. 26, e: Χρύσιππος ἀπορεῖ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας, εἰ τόδε τι ῥηθήσεται. συμπαραληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν τῶν Στωϊκῶν περὶ τῶν γενικῶν ποιῶν πῶς αἱ πτώσεις κατ’ αὐτοὺς προφέρονται καὶ πῶς οὔτινα τὰ κοινὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς λέγεται. Syrian. on Met. p. 59. (In Petersen’s Philos. Chrys. Fund. 80): ὡς ἄρα τὰ εἴδη ... οὔτε πρὸς τὴν ῥῆσιν τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων συνηθείας παρήγετο, ὡς Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀρχέδημος καὶ οἱ πλείους τῶν Στωϊκῶν ὕστερον ᾠήθησαν ... οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ νοήματά εἰσι παρ’ αὐτοῖς αἱ ἰδέαι, ὡς Κλεάνθης ὕστερον εἴρηκε. Prantl, l.c. takes objection to what Stobæus and Plutarch here say; yet this view is not that the Stoics regarded their conception of the ἐννόημα as identical with Plato’s conception of ideas, but that they asserted that these ideas were only ἐννοήματα—an assertion which had also been made by Antisthenes. Compare what is said on p. 92 respecting the unreality of the λεκτόν, likewise what Sext. Math. vii. 246, quotes, as belonging to the Stoics: οὔτε δὲ ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς εἰσιν αἱ γενικαὶ [φαντασίαι]· ὧν γὰρ τὰ εἴδη τοῖα ἢ τοῖα τούτων τὰ γένη οὔτε τοῖα οὔτε τοῖα· if mankind be divided into Greeks and barbarians, the γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος will be neither one nor the other. The further therefore a conception is removed from individual limitations, the further it is removed from truth.

[151] Diog. vii. 54: ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. Exc. e Joan. Damasc. (Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 236), Nr. 34: Χρύσιππος τὸ μὲν γενικὸν ἡδὺ νοητὸν, τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν καὶ προσπίπτον ἤδη (Petersen, 83 without cause suggests ἡδὺ) αἰσθητόν.

[152] See p. 82, 1.

[153] Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 145.

[154] Stob. Ecl. ii. 128: Knowledge is defined to be ἕξις φαντασιῶν δεκτικὴ ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου, ἥντινά φασιν ἐν τόνῳ καὶ δυνάμει κεῖσθαι.

[155] Here may be noted the objection mentioned by Sext. Math. viii. 463; Pyrrh. ii. 186: The Sceptics cannot deny the possibility of arguing without proving their assertion and thereby practically admitting the possibility. Also another one urged by Antipater against Carneades (Cic. Acad. ii. 9, 28; 34, 109): He who asserts that nothing can be known with certainty must, at least, believe that he can with certainty know this. The replies of the Sceptics to these objections, and the way they turned them in their own favour, will be found in Sext. Math. l.c. and vii. 433.

[156] Chrysippus opposed Arcesilaus, with such success, according to the view of the Stoic School, that Carneades was refuted by anticipation; and it was considered a special favour of Providence that the labours of Chrysippus had occupied an intermediate place between two of the most important Sceptics. Plut. Sto. Rep. i. 4, p. 1059. Diog. 198 mentions a treatise against Arcesilaus.

[157] Plut. Sto. Rep. 10 (see p. 66, 1); Ibid. 47, 12: καὶ μὴν ἔν γε τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς ἀγῶσιν ὁ πλεῖστος αὐτῷ τε Χρυσίππῳ καὶ Ἀντιπάτρῳ πόνος γέγονε περὶ τοῦ μήτε πράττειν μήτε ὁρμᾶν ἀσυγκαταθέτως, ἀλλὰ πλάσματα λέγειν καὶ κενὰς ὑποθέσεις τοῦς ἀξιοῦντας οἰκείας φαντασίας γενομένης εὐθὺς ὁρμᾶν μὴ εἴξαντας μηδὲ συγκατατιθεμένους. Ibid. adv. Col. 26, 3, p. 1122: τὴν δὲ περὶ πάντων ἐποχὴν οὐδ’ οἱ πολλὰ πραγματευσάμενοι καὶ κατατείναντες εἰς τοῦτο συγγράμματα καὶ λόγους ἐκίνησαν· ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς αὐτῆς τελευτῶντες ὥσπερ Γοργόνα τὴν ἀπραξίαν ἐπάγοντες ἀπηγόρευσαν. Epict. (Arrian. Diss. i. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a Sceptic by saying: οὐκ ἄγω σχολὴν πρὸς ταῦτα. Following also the Stoic line, Cic. Acad. ii. 10–12, makes Antiochus argue that Scepticism makes all action impossible.

[158] In Sext. Math. vii. 244, ἀληθεῖς φαντασίαι are, first of all, literally explained to be φαντασίαι, ὧν ἔστιν ἀληθῆ κατηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι· then, under the head of true φαντασίαι, the καταληπτικαὶ and οὐ καταληπτικαὶ are distinguished, i.e., notions which are accompanied by a clear impression of being true, and such as are not; and, in conclusion, φαντασία καταληπτικὴ is defined: ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος. This definition is afterwards more fully explained. The same explanation is given Ibid. 402 and 426; viii. 85; Pyrrh. ii. 4; iii. 242; Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 5, 11; Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 18. Diog. vii. 46: τῆς δὲ φαντασίας τὴν μὲν καταληπτικὴν τὴν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον· καταληπτικὴν μὲν, ἣν κριτήριον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων φασὶ, τὴν γινομένην ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὕπαρχον ἐναπεσφραγισμένην καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην· ἀκατάληπτον δὲ τὴν μὴ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν, μὴ κατ’ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον, τὴν μὴ τρανῆ μηδὲ ἔκτυπον. Ibid. 50.

[159] Sext. Math. viii. 397: ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὡς ἔστι παρ’ αὐτῶν ἀκούειν, καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις, ἥτις διπλοῦν ἔοικεν εἶναι πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ μέν τι ἔχειν ἀκούσιον, τὸ δὲ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ κρίσει κείμενον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαντασιωθῆναι ἀβούλητον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ πάσχοντι ἔκειτο ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ φαντασιοῦντι τὸ οὑτωσὶ διατεθῆναι ... τὸ δὲ συγκαταθέσθαι τούτῳ τῷ κινήματι ἔκειτο ἐπὶ τῷ παραδεχομένῳ τὴν φαντασίαν. Diog. vii. 51; Cic. Acad. i. 14, 40: [Zeno] ad hæc quæ visa sunt, et quasi accepta sensibus assensionem adjungit animorum: quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam. Ibid. ii. 12, 37; De Fato, 19, 43, Chrysippus affirms: visum objectum imprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem sed assensio nostra erit in potestate. Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 1: τὴν γὰρ φαντασίαν βουλόμενος [ὁ Χρύσιππος] οὐκ οὖσαν αὐτοτελῆ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως αἰτίαν ἀποδεικνύειν εἴρηκεν ὅτι· βλάψουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ψευδεῖς φαντασίας ἐμποιοῦντες, ἂν αἱ φαντασίαι ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, κ.τ.λ. Id. 13: αὖθις δέ φησι Χρύσιππος, καὶ τὸν θεὸν ψευδεῖς ἐμποιεῖν φαντασίας καὶ τὸν σοφὸν ... ἡμᾶς δὲ φαύλους ὄντας συγκατατίθεσθαι ταῖς τοιαύταις φαντασίαις. Id. Fragm. De An. 2: οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ τρέπει ἑαυτὴν εἰς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων κατάληψιν καὶ ἀπάτην, κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς. Epictet. in Gell. N. A. xix. 1, 15: visa animi, quas φαντασίας philosophi appellant ... non voluntatis sunt neque arbitrariæ, sed vi quadam sua inferunt sese hominibus noscitandæ; probationes autem, quas συγκαταθέσεις vocant, quibus eadem visa noscuntur ac dijudicantur voluntariæ sunt fiuntque hominum arbitratu: the difference between a wise man and a fool consists in συγκατατίθεσθαι and προσεπιδοξάζειν. The freedom of approbation must, of course, be so understood in harmony with Stoic doctrine of the freedom of the will.

[160] On the difference between the conception of εὔλογον and that of καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, the latter alone being unerring, see Athen. viii. 354, e; Diog. vii. 177.

[161] Compare besides p. 87, 2, Cic. Acad. i. 11, 41: [Zeno] visis (= φαντασίαις) non omnibus adjungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quæ propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, quæ viderentur: id autem visum, cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehensibile (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία). Ibid. ii. 12, 38: ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere ... non potest objectam rem perspicuam non approbare. Conf. Fin. v. 26, 76: percipiendi vis ita definitur a Stoicis, ut negent quidquam posse percipi nisi tale rerum, quale falsum esse non possit. Diog. vii. 54; Sext. Math. vii. 227: κριτήριον τοίνον φασὶν ἀληθείας εἶναι οἱ ἄνδρες οὗτοι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. It was a departure from the older Stoic teaching, to refuse, as the later Stoics did, to allow a conceptional notion to be considered a test of truth, except with the proviso that no contrary proof could be adduced against its truth. Sext. 253: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν Στωϊκῶν κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν καταληπτικὴν ταύτην φαντασίαν· οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προσετίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνστημα, since cases could be imagined in which a faulty view presented itself with the full force of truth. This was equivalent to overthrowing the whole doctrine of a criterion; for how could it be known in any particular case that there was not a negative instance? But it is quite in harmony with the Stoic teaching for a later Stoic (Ibid. 257) to say of conceptional perception: αὕτη γὰρ ἐναργὴς οὖσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μονονουχὶ τῶν τριχῶν, φασι, λαμβάνεται κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἄλλου μηδενὸς δεομένη εἰς τὸ τοιαύτῃ προσπίπτειν, κ.τ.λ. Hence Simpl. Phys. 20, b: ἀνῄρουν τὰ ἄλλα ... πλὴν τὰ ἐναργῆ.

[162] Diog. vii. 54: κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τυγχάνειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δωδεκάτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Βοηθὸς κριτήρια πλείονα ἀπολείπει, νοῦν καὶ αἴσθησιν καὶ ὄρεξιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην (this looks like an approximation to the teaching of the Peripatetics); ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ λόγου κριτήριά φησιν εἶναι αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν ... ἄλλοι δέ τινες τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωϊκῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ περὶ κριτηρίου φησίν. See above p. 76.

[163] See above p. 82, 1.

[164] See above p. 89, 2, and Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 101: neque eos (the Academicians) contra sensus aliter dicimus, ac Stoici, qui multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur. Chrysippus had enquired into the truth of the perceptions of the senses, and of the notions derived from them, in his treatise περὶ συνηθείας, without, however, satisfactorily answering the objections which he quoted against the theory. See p. 46, 2.

[165] See p. 60.

[166] See p. 73, 3.

[167] See Sext. Math. viii. 11: οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τό τε σημαινόμενον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον. ὧν σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φωνὴν ... σημαινόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς δηλούμενον ... τυγχάνον δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον ... τούτων δὲ δύο μὲν εἶναι σώματα, καθάπερ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ἓν δὲ ἀσώματον, ὥσπερ τὸ σημαινόμενον πρᾶγμα καὶ λεκτόν. Sen. Ep. 117, 13, giving it expressly as the teaching of the Stoics, not as his own: Sunt, inquit, naturæ corporum ... has deinde sequuntur motus animorum enuntiativi corporum—for instance, I see Cato walk—corpus est, quod video.... Dico deinde: Cato ambulat. Non corpus est, inquit, quod nunc loquor, sed enuntiativum quiddam de corpore, quod alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii edoctum. Compare also on the λεκτόν Sext. Math. viii. 70 (above p. 83, 2); Pyrrh. iii. 52. Various arguments are used by the Stoics to prove that the voice as opposed to utterance (λεκτὸν) is material, as has been said. p. 74, 5. Illustrative of the distinction between utterance and the process of thought is the assertion (in Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 81) that certainty as being a definite condition of the soul is material, but that truth itself is not material: λέγεται διαφέρειν τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ ἀληθὲς τριχῶς, οὐσίᾳ, συστάσει, δυνάμει· οὐσίᾳ μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀσώματόν ἐστιν, ἀξίωμα γάρ ἐστι καὶ λεκτὸν, ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια σῶμα, ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικὴ, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη πὼς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν (Id. Math. vii. 38, a similar statement is expressly attributed to a Stoic); likewise a similar statement which Sen. Ep. 117, discusses, and at length declares to be a mere quibble, but not till after a lengthy refutation: sapientiam bonum esse, sapere bonum non esse. The statement rests on the assertion that nothing can be a good which does not make itself felt, and nothing can make itself felt which is not material; wisdom is material, because it is mens perfecta, but sapere is incorporale et accidens alteri, i.e. sapientiæ. Accordingly, λεκτὸν (as Ammon. De Inter. 15, b, remarks) is a μέσον τοῦ τε νοήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος· if, however, νόημα be taken to express the thought itself, and not the process of thinking, it becomes identical with λεκτόν. Conf. Simpl. Cat. 3, α, Basil.: τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα καὶ λεκτὰ τὰ νοήματά ἐστιν, ὡς καὶ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἐδόκει. In Plut. Plac. iv. 11, 4, a definition of νόημα or ἐννόημα is given similar to that of λεκτὸν in Sext. Math. viii. 70: φάντασμα διανοίας λογικοῦ ζῴου. See above p. 84, 4. The statement, however, of Philop. Anal. Pr. lx. a, Schol. in Ar. 170, a, 2, cannot be true, that the Stoics called things τυγχάνοντα, thoughts ἐκφορικὰ, and sounds λεκτά, whereas ἐκφορικὸν may be used of thoughts in the same sense as λεκτόν.

[168] See p. 84, 4. This question was raised in the Stoic School itself. Sextus at least, not hesitating to attack the Stoic teaching from this side (Math. viii. 262), speaks of an ἀνήνυτος μάχη in reference to the ὕπαρξις of λεκτὰ, and he remarks (viii. 258): ὁρῶμεν δὲ ὡς εἰσί τινες οἱ ἀνῃρηκότες τὴν ὕπαρξιν τῶν λεκτῶν, καὶ οὐχ οἱ ἑτερόδοξοι μόνον, οἷον οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Βασιλείδην, οἷς ἔδοξε μηδὲν εἶναι ἀσώματον. Probably the question was first raised by later Stoics, when pressed by their opponents. Basilides was the teacher of Marcus Aurelius. Otherwise the existence of λεκτὰ was spoken of as quite natural.

[169] Sext. Math. viii. 70, see above p. 83, 2: τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ἐλλιπῆ καλοῦσι τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελῆ. Various kinds of propositions are then enumerated as being αὐτοτελῆ. Following the same authority, (Diocles? see Diog. 48) Diog. 63, says: φασὶ δὲ τὸ λεκτὸν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν λογικὴν ὑφιστάμενον. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν λέγουσιν εἶναι αὐτοτελῆ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, τὰ δὲ ἐλλιπῆ. ἐλλιπῆ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὰ ἀναπάρτιστον ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφορὰν, οἷον Γράφει· ἐπιζητοῦμεν γὰρ, Τίς; αὐτοτελῆ δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπηρτισμένην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφορὰν, οἷον Γράφει Σωκράτης. Prantl in saying, p. 438, that the Stoics divide judgments (ἀξιώματα) into complete and incomplete, is inaccurate. Only λεκτὰ are so divided, but λεκτὸν has a wider meaning than that of a logical judgment. ἀξιώματα are only one form of λεκτὰ αὐτοτελῆ.

[170] Plut. Qu. Plat. x. 1, 2, p. 1008. A judgment (πρότασις or ἀξίωμα) ἐξ ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος συνέστηκεν, ὧν τὸ μὲν πτῶσιν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ, τὸ δὲ κατηγόρημα καλοῦσιν. The terms πτῶσις and κατηγόρημα belonging to the Stoic terminology, the Stoics must be meant by οἱ διαλεκτικοί. In the first class of words they distinguish ὄνομα and προσηγορία, limiting ὄνομα to proper names, and understanding by προσηγορία all general terms, whether substantives or adjectives (Diog. 58; Bekker’s Anecd. ii. 842). According to Stob. Ecl. i. 332, πτῶσις was only used to express προσηγορία. Diog. 192, mentions two books of Chrysippus περὶ τῶν προσηγορικῶν. For the meaning of κατηγόρημα or ῥῆμα, the verb, consult Diog. 58 and 64; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14; Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, 21; Porphyr. in Ammon. De Inter. 37, a. According to Apollon. De Construct. i. 8, ῥῆμα was used in strict accuracy only for the infinitive, other forms being called κατηγορήματα.

[171] The distinction between ὄνομα and κατηγόρημα was somewhat bluntly referred to this logical and metaphysical antithesis by the Stoics, as may be seen in Stob. Ecl. i. 336: αἴτιον δ’ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι’ ὃ, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον κατηγόρημα.... Ποσειδώνιος ... τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον οὔτε ὂν οὔτε σῶμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ κατηγόρημα. Hence for the latter the names σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα. See following note.

[172] In nouns the cases were distinguished, the nominative, according to Ammon. l.c. being called ὄνομα, and the other five cases πτώσεις· a statement, however, which does not agree with the common use of those terms. In Diog. 65, the cases (γενικὴ, δοτικὴ, αἰτιατικὴ) are called πλάγιαι πτώσεις. Chrysippus wrote a distinct treatise on the five cases, Diog. 192. Similar were the divisions of the κατηγόρημα. According to Diog. 65, the Stoics distinguished between transitive verbs (ὀρθὰ), such as ὁρᾷ, διαλέγεται· passive verbs (ὕπτια), such as ὁρῶμαι· neuter verbs (οὐδέτερα), such as φρονεῖν, περιπατεῖν· and verbs which, with a passive form, do not express a passive relation (ἀντιπεπονθότα), κείρεσθαι, πείθεσθαι, &c. Consult on this point Philo, De Cherub. 121, c; Orig. C. Cels. vi. 57. On the ὀρθὰ and ὕπτια, also Dionys. Thrax, § 15, p. 886, Bekk.; Simpl. Categ. 79, α, ζ; Diog. 191; and respecting all three divisions, Lersch, ii. 196; Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachw. i. 294. They also distinguished between σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα—a verb, when used with a nominative, being called σύμβαμα or κατηγόρημα, and παρασύμβαμα when used with an oblique case; περιπατεῖ is a σύμβαμα, μεταμέλει a παρασύμβαμα, περιπατεῖ requiring a nominative (Σωκράτης), μεταμέλει requiring a dative (Σωκράτει). If an oblique case is necessary to complete a sentence, besides the subject, the verb is called ἔλαττον ἢ σύμβαμα or ἔλαττον ἢ κατηγόρημα, as in the sentence Πλάτων φιλεῖ, φιλεῖ is so called; for these words only make a complete sentence by the addition of an object thus: Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίωνα. If this is necessary with a παρασύμβαμα, it is called ἔλαττον ἢ παρασύμβαμα· such, for instance, is the word μέλει, for to complete the sentence it is not enough to say Σωκράτει μέλει, but the object must be added, as in the sentence: Σωκράτει μεταμέλει Ἀλκιβιάδους. This difference is explained by Porphyr. in Ammon. l.c., 36, b, whom Lersch, ii. 31, misunderstands and then blames. See Diog. 64 where the text is evidently corrupt. Without great temerity we might substitute for the meaningless οἷον τὸ διὰ πέτρας πλεῖν—τὰ δὲ παρασυμβάματα, which at least gives a better meaning than the proposals of R. Schmidt, Sto. Gramm. 66, 91, and Lersch, l.c. 33. Apollon. De Const. iii. 32, p. 299, Bekk.; Suid. σύμβαμα (very inaccurate); Priscian, xviii. p. 1118, who, in his equally inaccurate account, has ἀσυμβάματα. The example which Lucian, Vit. Auct. 21 employs to ridicule the Stoic hair-splitting anent σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα proves, of course, nothing.

[173] There is nothing whatever on record which serves to show the position held by the categories. By several, definition and division were treated of most improperly under the head of language.

[174] According to Diog. 60, Bekker, Anecd. ii. 647, ὅρος was defined by Chrysippus as ἰδίου (which must be read in Diog. in place of καὶ) ἀπόδοσις· by Antipater as λόγος κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν (Anecd. ἀνάγκην) ἀπαρτιζόντως ἐκφερόμενος, i.e. a proposition in which the subject and the collective predicates may be interchanged. Ὁρισμὸς gives in detail what ὄνομα gives collectively (Simpl. Categ. 16, β). An imperfect ὅρος is called ὑπογραφή. Instead of the Aristotelian τί ἦν εἶναι, the Stoics were content with the τί ἦν of Antisthenes (Alex. Top. 24, m). Like Prodicus, they laid great stress on distinguishing accurately the conceptions of words of similar meaning, χαρὰ, τέρψις, ἡδονὴ, εὐφροσύνη (Alex. Top. 96). The relation of γένος to εἶδος is also explained: γένος is defined to be the summing up of many thoughts (ἀναφαιρέτων ἐννοημάτων· which might mean thoughts which, as integral parts of a conception, cannot be separated from it; only this explanation would not agree with what follows, according to which one would more likely think of the different species included in the genus. Prantl p. 422 suggests ἀναφορητῶν, which, however, requires explanation); εἶδος as τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ γένους περιεχόμενον (Diog. 60). γενικώτατον is ὃ γένος ὂν γένος οὐκ ἔχει· εἰδικώτατον ὃ εἶδος ὂν εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει (Diog. 61; conf. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 138). As to διαίρεσις, ὑποδιαίρεσις, and ἀντιδιαίρεσις (division into contradictories) nothing new is stated; but μερισμὸς has a special notice (Diog. 61). Lastly, if Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 213 (the previous definition of dialectic is found, as was stated on p. 73, 3, in Alcinous Isag. 3, and he also mentions c. 5 three of the four kinds of division, giving two others instead of the fourth) refers to the Stoics, four kinds of division are enumerated. The reference of the 8 διαιρέσεις mentioned by Prantl, p. 423, on the authority of Bekker’s Anecd. ii. 679 to a Stoic source is much more doubtful. There is little that is new in the Stoic discussion of Opposition, and the same may be said of what Simpl. (Categ. 100, β and δ; 101, ε; 102, β) quotes from Chrysippus (περὶ τῶν κατὰ στέρησιν λεγομένων) on the subject of στέρησις and ἕξις. Conf. Diog. vii. 190.

[175] Petersen, Philos. Chrysipp. Fund. pp. 36–144, is invaluable for its careful collection of authorities, but in its attempt to construct the Stoic system on the categories it indulges in many capricious combinations. Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. i. 217; Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, i. 426. Our authorities for the knowledge of the Stoic doctrine of the categories are besides a few notices in other writers principally Simplicius, on the Categories, and Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 25–30.

[176] The Stoics attack the Aristotelian categories for being too numerous, and endeavour to show that they do not include every kind of expression (as if, rejoined Simplicius, Categ. 5, α, this were the point at all). Compare Simpl. Categ. 5, α; 15, δ; 16, δ, who quotes these as objections raised by Athenodorus and Cornutus, the former of whom lived in the time of Augustus, the latter in the reign of Nero. Observations of these writers on some of the Aristotelian categories are given, Ibid. 47, ζ, 91, α.

[177] That this was intended by Aristotle to be the position of the categories appears by the way in which he introduced them; and also by his observations (Phys. v. 2) on the various kinds of motion—which are based entirely on the view that the categories are coordinate.

[178] It will thus be understood how the ancients could at one time speak of ὂν, at another of τί, as being the highest conception of the Stoics. The former is found in Diog. 61: γενικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὃ γένος ὂν γένος οὐκ ἔχει, οἷον τὸ ὄν. Sen. Ep. 58, 8: Nunc autem genus illud primum quærimus, ex quo ceteræ species suspensæ sunt, a quo nascitur omnis divisio, quo universa comprehensa sunt; after noticing the distinction between what is material and what is immaterial, he proceeds: quid ergo erit, ex quo hæc deducantur? illud ... quod est [τὸ ὂν] ... quod est aut corporale est aut incorporale. Hoc ergo genus est primum et antiquissimum et, ut ita dicam, generale [τὸ γενικώτατον]. It is, however, more usual to find τί. Thus Plotin. Enn. vi. 1, 25: κοινὸν τὶ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἓν γένος λαμβάνουσι. Alex. Aphrod. Top. 155; Schol. 278, b, 20: οὕτω δεικνύοις ἂν ὅτι μὴ καλῶς τὸ τὶ οἱ ἀπὸ στοᾶς γένος τοῦ ὄντος (τὶ as the genus, of which ὂν is a species) τίθενται· εἰ γὰρ τὶ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὂν ... ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοι νομοθετήσαντες αὐτοῖς τὸ ὂν κατὰ σωμάτων μόνων λέγεσθαι διαφεύγοιεν ἂν τὸ ἠπορημένον· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ τὶ γενικώτερον αὐτοῦ φασιν εἶναι κατηγορούμενον οὐ κατὰ σωμάτων μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσωμάτων. Schol. in Arist. 34, b, 11. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 86: τὸ τὶ, ὅπερ φασὶν εἶναι πάντων γενικώτατον. Math. x. 234: The Stoics affirm τῶν τινῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα. Sen. l.c. 13: Stoici volunt superponere huic etiamnunc aliud genus magis principale ... primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur quid, for in rerum, inquiunt, natura quædam sunt, quædam non sunt: examples of the latter are centaurs, giants, and similar notions of unreal things. Ritter, iii. 566, remarks, with justice, that the older teaching must have placed the conception of Being at the head; otherwise the objection could not have been raised, that what has not being is thus made an object of thought. Probably the change was made by Chrysippus, although it is not definitely proved by Stob. Ecl. i. 390. Petersen confuses the two views, in thinking (p. 146) that the Stoics divided Something into Being and Not Being, and subdivided Being again into what is material and what is not material. In other respects, too, he confounds the Stoic teaching with the consequences, whereby Plotinus l.c. and Plut. Comm. Not. 30, sought to refute it.

[179] See previous note and p. 92, 2.

[180] The Stoics appear to have regarded them as γενικώτατα or πρῶτα γένη, rather than as categories. Conf. Simpl. Categ. 16, δ (in other places as 51, β; 79, β, he is speaking for himself and not of the Stoic categories); Marc. Aurel. vi. 14; κατηγορία did not suit them so well because of their use of κατηγόρημα. See p. 95, 1.

[181] Simpl. 16, δ: οἱ δέ γε Στωϊκοὶ εἰς ἐλάττονα συστέλλειν ἐξιοῦσι τὸν τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀριθμόν ... ποιοῦνται γὰρ τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα· εἰς ὑποκείμενα καὶ ποιὰ καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα καὶ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα. Plot. En. vi. 1, 25; Plut. Comm. Not. 44, 6. p. 1083.

[182] Instead of ὑποκείμενον, the Aristotelian category of being, οὐσία, was substituted by some, not only without the School, but also by Posidonius, who in Stob. Ecl. i. 434 distinguishes οὐσία and ποιὸς the change of the one and the other. Similarly his fellow-disciple Mnesarchus.

[183] Porphyr. in Simpl. 12, δ: ἥ τε γὰρ ἄποιος ὕλη ... πρῶτόν ἐστι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σημαινόμενον. Plot. 588, B: ὑποκείμενα μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα τάξαντες καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἄλλων προτάξαντες. Galen, Qu. Qual. S. Incorp. 6, xix. 478: λέγουσι μόνην τὴν πρώτην ὕλην ἀΐδιον τὴν ἄποιον. Compare following note. It would seem to follow, as a matter of course, from the Stoic belief in immaterial properties, see p. 106, 4, that the Stoics also believed in immaterial substances (Petersen, 60); but as such a view would be at variance with their belief that reality only belongs to material things, and is nowhere mentioned by any authority, although obviously inviting the criticism of opponents, it is safer to suppose that they never went so far as to state the belief in words.

[184] Simpl. 44, δ: ἔοικε Στωϊκῇ τινι συνηθείᾳ συνεπέσθαι, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι νομίζων, τὰς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς ἀνυποστάτους ἡγούμενος. Diog. 150. Stob. Ecl. i. 322 (see below 101, 2) and 324: ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον εἶναι, καθ’ ὅσον οὐδὲν ἀποτεταγμένον ἴδιον ἔχει σχῆμα οὐδὲ ποιότητα κατ’ αὐτήν [καθ’ αὑτὴν]· ἀεὶ δ’ ἔν τινι σχήματι καὶ ποιότητι εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὕλης, τὴν οὖσαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον. Simpl. Phys. 50: τὸ ἄποιον σῶμα τὴν πρωτίστην ὕλην εἶναί φασιν. Further particulars on matter hereafter.

[185] Porphyr. in Simpl. Cat. 12, δ: διττόν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐ μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους. Dexipp. See following note.

[186] Diog. 150: οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην. So thought Zeno and Chrysippus: ὕλη δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἧς ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται. καλεῖται δὲ διχῶς οὐσία τε καὶ ὕλη, ἥ τε τῶν πάντων καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρος. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὅλων οὔτε πλείων οὔτε ἐλάττων γίνεται, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ πλείων καὶ ἐλάττων. Stob. Ecl. i. 322: (Ζήνωνος·) οὐσίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν ἀΐδιον καὶ οὔτε πλείω γιγνομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ μέρη ταύτης οὐκ ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ διαμένειν, ἀλλὰ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ συγχεῖσθαι. The same was held by Chrysippus, according to Stob. Ecl. i. 432, who says: Posidonius held that there were four varieties of change, those κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν (water to air), κατὰ σύγχυσιν (chemical combination), and κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν, the latter also called τὴν ἐξ ὅλων μεταβολήν. τούτων δὲ τὴν κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν γίγνεσθαι (the elements, according to the Stoics, changing into each other) τὰς δὲ ἄλλας τρεῖς περὶ τοὺς ποιοὺς λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γιγνομένους. ἀκολούθως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις συνβαίνειν. τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν οὔτ’ αὔξεσθαι οὔτε μειοῦσθαι ... ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν (which may be understood, not of individual properties, but of individually determined things) οἷον Δίωνος καὶ Θέωνος, καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ μειώσεις γίγνεσθαι. (These words are explained by Prantl, 432, thus: qualitative determination admits increase or decrease of intensity; but the use of the terms αὔξησις and μείωσις, and indeed the whole context no less than the passage quoted from Diogenes, prove that they refer rather to the increase or diminution of substance in the individual thing.) διὸ καὶ παραμένειν τὴν ἑκάστου ποιότητα ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς ἀναιρέσεως.... ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν δύο μὲν εἶναί φασι τὰ δεκτικὰ μόρια (individual things have two component parts, which are capable of change), τὸ μέν τι κατὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν τὸ δέ τι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποίου. τὸ γὰρ [ἰδίως ποιὸν] ὡς πολλάκις λέγομεν τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι. Porphyr. See previous note. Dexipp. in Cat. 31, 15, Speng.: ὡς ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον διττὸν, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους, ἓν μὲν τὸ λεγόμενον πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, ὡς ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη ... δεύτερον δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποιὸν ὃ κοινῶς ἢ ἰδίως ὑφίσταται, ὑποκείμενον γὰρ καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. Plut. Comm. Not. 44, 4, p. 1083 (the Stoics assert) ὡς δύο ἡμῶν ἕκαστός ἐστιν ὑποκείμενα, τὸ μὲν οὐσία, τὸ δὲ [ποιόν]. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ῥεῖ καὶ φέρεται, μήτ’ αὐξόμενον μήτε μειούμενον, μήτε ὅλως οἷόν ἐστι διαμένον, τὸ δὲ διαμένει καὶ αὐξάνεται καὶ μειοῦται καὶ πάντα πάσχει τἀναντία θἀτέρῳ συμπεφυκὸς καὶ συνηρμοσμένον καὶ συγκεχυμένον, καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μηδαμοῦ παρέχον ἅψασθαι. The latter is the individual thing itself, the former the material thereof, in reference to which Plutarch had just said: τὰ λήμματα συγχωροῦσιν οὗτοι, τὰς [μὲν] ἐν μέρει πάσας οὐσίας ῥεῖν καὶ φέρεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἐξ αὑτῶν μεθείσας, τὰ δὲ ποθὲν ἐπιόντα προσδεχομένας· οἷς δὲ πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισιν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ πλήθεσιν, ταῦτα μὴ διαμένειν, ἀλλ’ ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις προσόδοις, ἐξαλλαγὴν τῆς οὐσίας λαμβανούσης. That it should be said of this perpetually changing material μήτ’ αὐξόμενον μήτε μειούμενον may appear strange; but the meaning is this: it can only be said of an individual thing that it increases and diminishes in so far as it remains one and the same subject, an ἰδίως ποιὸν during the change; but the material itself, which is ever changing, cannot be regarded as the one identical subject of increase and diminution. This idea is expanded by Alex. Aphro. Quæst. Nat. I. 5.

[187] ποιὸν or ποιότης, and also ποιὸς (sc. λόγος). According to Simpl. 55. α, many Stoics assign a threefold meaning to ποιόν. The first, which is also the most extensive meaning, includes every kind of quality, whether essential or accidental—the πὼς ἔχον as well as the ποιόν. In the second meaning ποιὸν is used to express permanent qualities, including those which are derivative and non-essential—the σχέσεις. In the third and narrowest sense it expresses τοὺς ἀπαρτίζοντας (κατὰ τὴν ἐκφορὰν) καὶ ἐμμόνως ὄντας κατὰ διαφορὰν ποιοὺς, i.e. those qualities which faithfully represent essential attributes in their distinctive features. The substantive ποιότης is only used in the last sense.

[188] Simpl. 57, ε (the passage is fully discussed by Petersen, 85, and Trendelenburg, 223): οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ποιότητος τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων λέγουσι διαφορὰν εἶναι οὐσίας οὐκ ἀποδιαληπτὴν (separable, i.e., from matter) καθ’ ἑαυτὴν, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἓν νόημα καὶ ἰδιότητα [sc. μίαν] ἀπολήγουσαν οὔτε χρόνῳ οὔτε ἰσχύϊ εἰδοποιουμένην, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐξ αὐτῆς τοιουτότητι, καθ’ ἢν ποιοῦ ὑφίσταται γένεσις. In place of ἓν νόημα Petersen, 85, with the approval of Trendelenburg and Prantl (438, 96), reads ἐννόημα. To me, Brandis Schol. 69, a, 32, appears to retain it with reason, the meaning being that ποιότης constitutes no independent unity, but only a unity of conception. Non-essential qualities are by the Stoics excluded from the category of ποιὸν, and reckoned under that of πὼς ἔχον.

The same distinction between what is essential and what is not essential is indicated in the terms ἕξις and σχέσις· ποιότητες, or essential properties, being called essential forms (ἕξεις or ἑκτά); non-essential qualities being called features or varieties (σχέσεις). See Simpl. 54, γ; 55, ε. In determining essential attributes, these, according to Simpl. 61, β (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 43), are essential, not when they happen to be permanent, but when they spring from the nature of the object to which they belong: τὰς μὲν γὰρ σχέσεις ταῖς ἐπικτήτοις καταστάσεσι χαρακτηρίζεσθαι τὰς δὲ ἕξεις ταῖς ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἐνεργείαις. A more limited meaning, that of local position, is given to σχέσις in Stob. Ecl. i. 410.

The distinction between ἕνωσις and συναφὴ also belongs here. That, the oneness of which depends on an essential quality, is ἡνωμένον· everything else is either συνημμένον or ἐκ διεστώτων. Sext. Math. ix. 78 (also in vii. 102): τῶν τε σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡνωμένα τὰ δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων· ἡνωμένα μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως κρατούμενα, καθάπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα· συνάφεια applies to chains, houses, ships, &c.; combination ἐκ διεστώτων to flocks and armies. Seneca, Ep. 102, 6, Nat. Qu. ii. 2, says the same. Conf. Alex. De Mixt. 143: ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸ ἓν σῶμα ὑπὸ μιᾶς ὥς φασιν ἕξεως συνελέσθαι [l. συνέχεσθαι]. Simpl. 55, ε: τὰς γὰρ ποιότητας ἑκτὰ λέγοντες οὗτοι [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν ἡνωμένων μόνων ἑκτὰ ἀπολείπουσιν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ συναφὴν, οἷον νεὼς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ διάστασιν, οἷον στρατοῦ, μηδὲν εἶναι ἑκτὸν μηδὲ εὑρίσκεσθαι πνευματικόν τι ἓν ἐπ’ αὐτῶν μηδὲ ἕνα λόγον ἔχον ὥστε ἐπί τινα ὑπόστασιν ἐλθεῖν μιᾶς ἕξεως.

Those ἕξεις which admit of no increase or diminution (ἐπίτασις, and ἄνεσις) are called διαθέσεις or permanent forms. Virtues, for instance, which, according to the Stoics, always exist in a perfect form where they exist at all, are διαθέσεις, but arts are only ἕξεις. Simpl. Categ. 61, β; 72, δ; 73, β; Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28; 76, a, 12, 24; Stob. Ecl. ii. 98 and 128. Conf. Petersen 91. A different view was taken by Aristotle of the relations of these expressions.

[189] Syrian. on Arist. Metaph. 21, p. 90 in Petersen: καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τοὺς κοινοὺς ποιοὺς πρὸ τῶν ἰδίων ποιῶν ἀποτίθενται. Stob. Ecl. i. 434; see above p. 101, 2. Simpl. De An. 61, a, explains ἰδίως ποιὸς by ἀτομωθὲν εἶδος. Diog. vii. 138; Plut. C. Not. 36. 3.

[190] Besides the passages already quoted in note 2 on p. 101, from Plutarch and Stobæus, see Sext. Pyrrh. i. 57: τὰ κιρνάμενα (the intermingling materials,—the question here is the possibility of mingling) ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ ποιοτήτων συγκεῖσθαί φασιν. Porphyry in Simpl. Categ. 12, δ disputes this view himself. The Stoics, therefore, clearly distinguish ἕξις, or essential form, from the subject to which it belongs; and Philo must have been following the Stoics when he said (Nom. Mutat. 1063, D): ἕξεις γὰρ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς ποιῶν ἀμείνους, ὡς μουσικὴ μουσικοῦ, κ.τ.λ. They also distinguish between a thing and its οὐσία. Stob. Ecl. i. 436: μὴ εἶναί τε τοὐτὸν τό τι ποιὸν ἰδίως καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐξ ἧς ἔστι τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι γε μήδ’ ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ μόνον οὐ ταὐτὸν, διὰ τὸ καὶ μέρος εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχειν τόπον, τὰ δ’ ἕτερα τινῶν λεγόμενα δεῖν καὶ τόπῳ κεχωρίσθαι καὶ μήδ’ ἐν μέρει θεωρεῖσθαι. Conf. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 170; Math. ix. 336: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ οὔτε ἕτερον τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος οὔτε τὸ αὐτό φασιν ὑπάρχειν· and Seneca, Ep. 313, 4. Mnesarchus, a fellow disciple of Posidonius, accordingly compares the relation of an individual thing to its οὐσία with that of a statue to the material of which it is composed. Since the ἰδίως ποιὸς distinguishes a thing from every other, there follows as a matter of course, what is asserted circumstantially and in detail by Chrysippus (in Philo, Incorrupt. M. 951, B), ὅτι δύο εἰδοποιοὺς [= ἰδίως ποιοὺς] ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἀμήχανον συστῆναι.

[191] L.c. 222.

[192] This may be seen from the passages quoted in note 2 on the previous page.

[193] Plut. St. Rep. 43, 4, p. 1054: τὴν ὕλην ἀργὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ἀποφαίνουσι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας πνεύματα οὔσας καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις οἷς ἂν ἐγγένωνται μέρεσι τῆς ὕλης εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα καὶ σχηματίζειν. It is a carrying out of the Stoic teaching (as Simpl. 57, ε, remarks) for Plotinus to reduce ποιότης to the class-conception of δύναμις (Enn. vi. 1, 10, 574, β). But the Stoic definition of δύναμις (quoted by Simpl. 58, α—ἡ πλειόνων ἐποιστικὴ συμπτωμάτων, with the additional words καὶ κατακρατοῦσα τῶν ἐνεργειῶν—does not directly refer to ποιότης. Ποιότης may also be connected with the λόγος σπερματικός. See Plotin. i. 29, 593, A: εἰ δὲ τὰ ποιὰ ὕλην ποιὰν λέγοιεν, πρῶτον μὲν οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῖς ἔνυλοι ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν ὕλῃ γενόμενοι σύνθετόν τι ποιήσουσιν ... οὐκ ἄρα αὐτοὶ εἴδη οὐδὲ λόγοι. Diog. vii. 148: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις [= ποιότης] ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη, κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς, κ.τ.λ.

[194] Plut. Ibid. § 2: (Χρύσιππος) ἐν τοῖς ἕξεων οὐδὲν ἄλλο τὰς ἕξεις πλὴν ἀέρας εἶναί φησιν· ὑπὸ τούτων γὰρ συνέχεται τὰ σώματα, καὶ τοῦ ποιὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι αἴτιος ὁ συνέχων ἀήρ ἐστιν, ὃν σκληρότητα μὲν ἐν σιδήρῳ, πυκνότητα δ’ ἐν λίθῳ, λευκότητα δ’ ἐν ἀργύρῳ καλοῦσιν. Simpl. 69. γ: ἡ τῶν Στωϊκῶν δόξα λεγόντων, σώματα εἶναι τὰ σχήματα ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα ποιά. Ibid. 67, ε; 56, δ: πῶς δὲ καὶ πνευματικὴ ἡ οὐσία ἔσται τῶν σωματικῶν ποιοτήτων αὐτοῦ τοῦ πνεύματος συνθέτου ὄντος, κ.τ.λ.

[195] Alex. Aphr. De An. 143, b: πῶς δὲ σωζόντων ἐστὶ τὴν περὶ κράσεως κοινὴν πρόληψιν τὸ λέγειν καὶ τὴν ἕξιν τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν μεμίχθαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ τὸ φῶς τῷ ἀέρι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι. Ibid. 144, α, the saying is quoted against the Stoics: μεμίχθαι τῇ ὕλῃ τὸν θεόν.

[196] Plut. C. Not. 36, 3: λέγουσιν οὗτοι καὶ πλάττουσιν ἐπὶ μιᾶς οὐσίας δύο ἰδίως γενέσθαι ποίους (this follows from their hypothesis, but it is distinctly denied by Chrysippus in thesis. See p. 104, 2) καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἕνα ποιὸν ἰδίως ἔχουσαν ἐπιόντος ἑτέρου δέχεσθαι καὶ διαφυλάττειν ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρους.

[197] Simpl. 70, ε: καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ ποιότητας ποιοτήτων ποιοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν (? ἑκτῶν) ποιοῦντες ἑκτὰς ἕξεις [l. ἑκτὰ καὶ ἕξεις or ἕξεις only]. The context shows that the meaning of these words is that given above. The conception of a property is compounded of several attributes, and, therefore, a property of several subordinate properties. If λευκὸν is a χρῶμα, the διακριτικὸν ὄψεως is the ἕξις, or form of λευκὸν.

[198] This follows of necessity, quite independently of the above-quoted language of Alexander, from the Stoic doctrine of the material nature of properties and of the mingling of materials. For if that intermingling of materials in which each one retains its properties (μῖξις and κρᾶσις in contrast to chemical combination παράθεσις and σύγχυσις) is defined to be the complete interpenetration of one material by another, without passing into a third (Stob. Ecl. i. 376; Alex. De Mixt. 142, a; Plut. C. Not. 37, 2); if, moreover, properties are said to be material; and in all cases when they are combined, each property retains its own peculiarity, and yet is inherent in the subject-matter and in every other property belonging to the same subject-matter; it follows that this relation can only be explained by supposing a mutual interpenetration of properties with each other and with their subject-matter.

[199] The proof of this will be given subsequently. Meantime compare the remarks, p. 92, 2; 94, 1 on the λεκτόν.

[200] Simpl. 56, δ, and 54, β: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ τῶν μὲν σωμάτων σωματικὰς, τῶν δὲ ἀσωμάτων ἀσωμάτους εἶναι λέγουσι τὰς ποιότητας. Only the σωματικαὶ ποιότητες are πνεύματα, see p. 105, 2; incorporeal properties are called ἑκτὰ, to distinguish them from ἕξεις (essential forms). Dexipp. in Cat. 61. 17, Speng.: θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν Στωϊκῶν χωριζόντων τὰς ἕξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ἑκτῶν· ἀσώματα γὰρ μὴ παραδεχόμενοι καθ’ ἑαυτὰ, ὅταν ἐρεσχελεῖν δέον ᾖ ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαλήψεις ἔρχονται. But this use of terms appears not to have been universal among the Stoics (Simpl. Categ. 54, γ), with whom different views prevailed touching the extent of the conception of ἑκτόν. According to this passage it was Antipater who wished to include under ἑκτὰ, the κοινὰ συμπτώματα σωμάτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων.

[201] Conf. Simpl. 57, ε, who after giving the definition of quality, quoted p. 103, 1, continues: ἐν δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνων λόγον κοινὸν εἶναι σύμπτωμα σωμάτων τε καὶ ἀσωμάτων, οὐκέτι ἔσται γένος ἢ ποιότης, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρως μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἑτέρως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων αὕτη ὑφέστηκε.

[202] Simpl. 44, δ: ὁ δὲ τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν κάθισιν μὴ προσποιούμενος (including sc. τοῖς οὖσιν) ἔοικε Στωϊκῇ τινι συνηθείᾳ συνέπεσθαι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι νομίζων, τὰς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς ἀνυποστάτους ἡγούμενος καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα αὐτὰ ἀποκαλῶν ὡς ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἔχοντα αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πὼς ἔχειν.

[203] Dexipp. in Cat. 41, 20, Speng.: εἰ δέ τις εἰς τὸ πὼς ἔχον συντάττοι τὰς πλείστας κατηγορίας, ὥσπερ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ποιοῦσιν. Plotin. vi. 1, 30, 594, A: πῶς δὲ ἓν τὸ πὼς ἔχον, πολλῆς διαφορᾶς ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσης; πῶς γὰρ τὸ τρίπηχυ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἰς ἓν [γένος θετέον], τοῦ μὲν ποσοῦ τοῦ δὲ ποιοῦ ὄντος; πῶς δὲ τὸ ποτὲ καὶ τὸ ποῦ; πῶς δὲ ὅλως πὼς ἔχοντα τὸ χθὲς καὶ τὸ πέρυσι καὶ τὸ ἐν Λυκείῳ καὶ ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ; καὶ ὅλως πῶς δὲ ὁ χρόνος πὼς ἔχον; ... τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν πῶς πὼς ἔχον ... καὶ ὁ πάσχον οὐ πὼς ἔχον ... ἴσως δ’ ἂν μόνον ἁρμόσει ἐπὶ τοῦ κεῖσθαι τὸ πὼς ἔχον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔχειν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν οὐ πὼς ἔχον ἀλλὰ ἔχον. Simpl. Categ. 94, ε: The Stoics included ἔχειν under πὼς ἔχον. In saying as Simpl. 16, δ, does that the Stoics omitted ποσὸν, time, and place, it must be meant that they did not treat these conceptions as separate categories. What they did with them Simpl. explains l.c. εἰ γὰρ τὸ πὼς ἔχον νομίζουσιν αὐτοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα περιλαμβάνειν. Trendelenburg, 229, with justice, observes that, wherever the species-forming difference lies in ποσὸν as in mathematical conceptions, there ποσὸν comes under ποιόν.

[204] Simpl. 42, ε: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς γένους δύο κατὰ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον ἀριθμοῦνται, τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρός τι τιθέντες, τὰ δ’ ἐν τοῖς πρός τί πως ἔχουσι, καὶ τὰ μὲν πρός τι ἀντιδιαιροῦντες τοῖς καθ’ αὑτὰ, τὰ δὲ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα τοῖς κατὰ διαφοράν. (Ibid. 44, β: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ νομίζουσι πάσης τῆς κατὰ διαφορὰν ἰδιότητος ἀπηλλάχθαι τὰ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα.) Sweet and bitter belong to τὰ πρός τι· to the other class belong δεξιὸς, πατὴρ, &c., κατὰ διαφορὰν δέ φασι τὰ κατά τι εἶδος χαρακτηριζόμενα. Every καθ’ αὑτὸ is also κατὰ διαφορὰν (determined as to quality), and every πρός τί πως ἔχον is also a πρός τι, but not conversely. Conf. 43, β. εἰ δὲ δεῖ σαφέστερον μεταλαβεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα, πρός τι μὲν λέγουσιν ὅσα κατ’ οἰκεῖον χαρακτῆρα διακείμενά πως ἀπονεύει πρὸς ἕτερον (or, according to the definition in Sext. Math. viii. 454: πρός τι ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑτέρῳ νοούμενον), πρός τι δέ πως ἔχοντα ὅσα πέφυκε συμβαίνειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ συμβαίνειν ἄνευ τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ μεταβολῆς καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως μετὰ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἐκτὸς ἀποβλέπειν, ὥστε ὅταν μὲν κατὰ διαφοράν τι διακείμενον πρὸς ἕτερον νεύσῃ, πρός τι μόνον τοῦτο ἔσται, ὡς ἡ ἕξις καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις· ὅταν δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐνοῦσαν διαφορὰν κατὰ ψιλὴν δὲ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν θεωρῆται, πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα ἔσται· ὁ γὰρ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ δεξιὸς ἔξωθεν τινῶν προσδέονται, πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν· διὸ καὶ μηδεμιᾶς γινομένης περὶ αὐτὰ μεταβολῆς γένοιτ’ ἂν οὐκέτι πατὴρ, τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀποθανόντος, ὁ δὲ δεξιὸς τοῦ παρακειμένου μεταστάντος· τὸ δὲ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν οὐκ ἂν ἀλλοῖα γένοιτο εἰ μὴ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ἡ περὶ αὐτὰ δύναμις. In this sense, therefore, πρός τι belongs to ποιὸν, being composed (as Simpl. 43, α, says) of ποιὸν and πρός τι. On the other hand, πρός τί πως ἔχον only expresses, to quote Herbart, an accidental relation. Prantl’s quotation (I. 437, 108) from Simpl. 44, β, we have no special reason to refer to the Stoics.

[205] Trendelenburg, 220, considers that these genera are in so far subordinate to one another, that the previous one continues in the next, but with the addition of a fresh determination; a better name for the second category would be ὑποκείμενα ποιά· for the third, ὑποκείμενα ποιά πως ἔχοντα· for the fourth, ὑποκείμενα ποιὰ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα. In support of this, he refers to Simpl. 43, α: ἕπεται δὲ αὐτοῖς κἀκεῖνο ἄτοπον τὸ σύνθετα ποιεῖν τὰ γένη ἐκ προτέρων τινῶν καὶ δευτέρων ὡς τὸ πρός τι ἐκ ποιοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρός τι. Plut. C. Not. 44, 6: τέτταρά γε ποιοῦσιν ὑποκείμενα περὶ ἕκαστον, μᾶλλον δὲ τέτταρα ἕκαστον ἡμῶν. Plot. Enn. vi. 1, 29, 593, A: ἄτοπος ἡ διαίρεσις ... ἐν θατέρῳ τῶν εἰδῶν τὸ ἕτερον τιθεῖσα, ὥσπερ ἂν [εἴ] τις διαιρῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν λέγοι, τὴν δὲ γραμματικὴν καὶ ἄλλο τι· if ποιὰ are to be ὕλη ποιὰ, they are composed of ὕλη and εἶδος or λόγος. See p. 48, 2.

[206] See p. 103, 1.

[207] See p. 107, 2; Plotin. vi. 1, 30: Why are πὼς ἔχοντα enumerated as a third category, since πάντα περὶ τὴν ὕλην πὼς ἔχοντα; the Stoics would probably say that ποιὰ are περὶ τὴν ὕλην πὼς ἔχοντα, whereas the πὼς ἔχοντα, in the strict sense of the term, are περὶ τὰ ποιά. Yet since the ποιὰ themselves are nothing more than ὕλη πως ἔχουσα, all categories must be ultimately reduced to ὕλη.

[208] Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, i. 440–467.

[209] In Diog. 66; Sext. Math. viii. 70; Ammon. De Interp. 4, a (Schol. in Arist. 93, a; 22, b, 20); Simpl. Cat. 103, α; Boëth. De Interp. 315; Cramer, Anecd. Oxon. iii. 267, conf. I. 104, a distinction is drawn between ἀξίωμα (a judgment), ἐρώτημα (a direct question, requiring Yes or No), πύσμα (an enquiry), προστακτικὸν, ὁρκικὸν, ἀρατικὸν (wishes), εὐκτικὸν (a prayer), ὑποθετικὸν (a supposition), ἐκθετικὸν (as ἐκκείσθω εὐθεῖα γραμμὴ), προσαγορευτικὸν (an address), θαυμαστικὸν, ψεκτικὸν, ἐπαπορητικὸν, ἀφηγηματικὸν (explanatory statements), ὅμοιον ἀξιώματι (a judgment with something appended, as: ὡς Πριαμίδῃσιν ἐμφερὴς ὁ βουκόλος! by Sextus called Πλεῖον ἢ ἀξίωμα). Ammon. in Waitz, Arist. Orig. i. 43, speaks of ten forms of sentences held by the Stoics, mentioning, however, only two, προστακτικὸς and ἐβκτικός (so reads the MS. Waitz suggests ἐφεκτικὸς, more probably it is εὐκτικός). Diog. 191, mentions treatises of Chrysippus on interrogatory and hortatory sentences. On the relation of an oath to ἀξίωμα light is thrown by Simpl. l.c., also by Chrysippus’ distinction between ἀληθορκεῖν and εὐορκεῖν ψευδορκεῖν and ἐπιορκεῖν in Stob. Floril. 28, 15.

[210] Diog. 65: ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστιν ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος. Questions and other similar sentences are neither true nor false (Ibid. 66 and 68). This definition of a judgment is constantly referred to, see p. 83, 2, by Simpl. Cat. 103, α; Cic. Tusc. i. 7, 14; De Fato, 10, 20; Gell. N. A. xvi. 8, 8; Schol. in Arist. 93, b, 35. The purport of the expression λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς, λεκτὸν ἀποφαντὸν (in Diog. 65; Gell. xvi. 8, 4; Ammon. De Interp. 4, a; Schol. in Arist. 93, b, 20) is the same.

[211] Sext. Math. viii. 93: τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωμάτων πρώτην σχεδὸν καὶ κυριωτάτην ἐκφέρουσι διαφορὰν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καθ’ ἣν τὰ μέν ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἁπλᾶ τὰ δ’ οὐχ ἁπλᾶ. Ibid. 95 and 108. Diog. 68 gives the definitions of both.

[212] Sext. l.c., by whom Diog. must be corrected, see p. 113, 3.

[213] Diog. 69: ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὐχ ἁπλοῖς τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὸ παρασυνημμένον καὶ τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον καὶ τὸ αἰτιῶδες καὶ τὸ διεζευγμένον καὶ τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ ἧττον. Further details presently respecting the συνημμένον and διεζευγμένον. For the παρασυνημμένον—a conditional sentence, the first part of which is introduced by ἐπειδὴ—see Diog. 71 and 74; for the συμπεπλεγμένον, the characteristic of which is the καὶ and καὶ, see Diog. 72; Sext. Math. viii. 124; Gell. N. A. xvi. 8 and 9; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 13; Dexipp. in Cat. 27, 3, Speng.; (Schol. in Arist. 44. a, 9—Prantl, 446, says this passage is not quite correct; it only implies that the term συμπλοκὴ was confined to a copulative judgment); for the αἰτιῶδες, which is characterised by a διότι, and therefore is not identical with the παρασυνημμένον, Diog. 72 and 74; for the διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον and the διασαφοῦν τὸ ἧττον, Diog. 72; conf. Cramer, Anecd. Oxon. i. 188; Apollon. Synt. (Bekker’s Anecd. ii.), 481. These are only some of the principal forms of composite judgments, their number being really indefinite. Chrysippus estimated that a million combinations might be formed with ten sentences. The celebrated mathematician, Hipparchus however, proved that only 103,049 affirmative and 310,952 negative judgments could be formed with that material (Plut. Sto. Rep. 29, 5, p. 1047; Qu. Symp. viii. 9, 3, 11, p. 732).

[214] There is no notice of a division of judgments into general and particular. Instead of that, Sext. (Math. viii. 96) distinguishes ὡρισμένα as οὗτος κάθηται, ἀόριστα as τὶς κάθηται, and μέσα as ἄνθρωπος κάθηται, Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ. When the subject stood in the nominative, ὡρισμένα were called καταγορευτικὰ (Diog. 70); the others κατηγορικά· a καταγορευτικὸν is οὗτος περιπατεῖ· a κατηγορικὸν, Δίων περιπατεῖ.

[215] An affirmative judgment was called καταφατικὸν, a negative ἀποφατικὸν, by Chrysippus in the fragment about to be quoted, and Simpl. Cat. 102, δ, ζ. Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 266, Oud. renders these terms by dedicativa and abdicativa. For the manner in which they expressed negative sentences, see Boëth. De Interp. 373; Schol. in Arist. 120.

[216] Diog. 69 gives an example of ἀρνητικὸν, οὐδεὶς περιπατεῖ· one of particular negation, στερητικὸν—ἀφιλάνθρωπός ἐστιν οὗτος· one of double negation, ὑπεραποφατικὸν—as, οὐχὶ ἡμέρα οὐκ ἐστί.