Chapter XXIII: The New Academy (5)

[308] Stob. Ecl. i. 58. See following note. Diog. 138 (according to Chrysippus and Posidonius): τὸν δὴ κόσμον οἰκεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν ... εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ καθάπερ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς. ἀλλ’ ἤδη δι’ ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι’ ὧν δὲ ἧττον. More popularly, ibid. 147: θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀθάνατον λογικὸν τέλειον ἢ νοερὸν ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, κακοῦ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτον, προνοητικὸν κόσμου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ, μὴ εἶναι μέντοι ἀνθρωπόμορφον. εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν δημιοῦργον τῶν ὅλων καὶ ὥσπερ πατέρα πάντων κοινῶς τε καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ τὸ διῆκον διὰ πάντων, ὃ πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις προσονομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. Phæd. Nat. De. (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβείας) Col. 1 and Cic. Nat. De. i. 15, 39, quoting from him: According to Chrysippus, Zeus is κοινὴ χύσις, εἱμαρμένη, ἀνάγκη, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. Col. 3: He considered νόμος to be deity. Cic. l.c.: legis perpetuæ et æternæ vim ... Jovem dicit esse. Themist. De An. 72, b: τοῖς ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος ... διὰ πάσης οὐσίας πεφοιτηκέναι τὸν θεὸν τιθεμένοις, καὶ ποῦ μὲν εἶναι νοῦν, ποῦ δὲ ψυχὴν, ποῦ δὲ φύσιν, ποῦ δὲ ἕξιν. Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 119: No Stoic can doubt hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quæ se et ipsum fabricata sit, et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. Id. N. D. ii. 22, 58: ipsius vero mundi ... natura non artificiosa solum sed plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur, consultrix et provida utilitatum opportunitatumque omnium.... As every nature develops from its stock, sic Natura mundi omnes motus habet voluntarios conatusque et appetitiones, quas ὁρμὰς Græci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet ut nosmet ipsi, qui animis movemur et sensibus, on which account the mens mundi is called πρόνοια. M. Aurel. iv. 40: ὡς ἓν ζῷον τὸν κόσμον μίαν οὐσίαν καὶ ψυχὴν μίαν ἐπέχον συνεχῶς ἐπινοεῖν· πῶς εἰς αἴσθησιν μίαν τὴν τούτου πάντα ἀναδίδοται καὶ πῶς ὁρμῇ μιᾷ πάντα πράσσει. Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. 72. Tertullian, Apol. 21: Hunc enim (λόγον) Zeno determinat factitatorem, qui cuncta in dispositione formaverit, eundem et fatum vocari et Deum et animum Jovis et necessitatem omnium rerum. Hæc Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis affirmat. Similarly Lactant. Inst. iv. 9, 1, 5. Epiphan. Hær. v. 1, p. 12: According to the Stoics, God is νοῦς, residing in the world as its soul, and permeating the μερικαὶ οὐσίαι. Zeus is also spoken of as being the soul of the world by Cornutus, Nat. De. 2; by Plut. Sto. Rep. 39, 2, p. 1052; and by Chrysippus, ibid. 34, 5, p. 1050: ὅτι δ’ ἡ κοινὴ φύσις καὶ ὁ κοινὸς τῆς φύσεως λόγος εἱμαρμένη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ Ζεύς ἐστιν οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀντίποδας λέληθε· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα θρυλεῖται ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. Stob. Ecl. i. 178: Ζήνων ... [τὴν εἱμαρμένην] δυνάμιν κινητικὴν τῆς ὕλης κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως, ἥντινα μὴ διαφέρειν πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν καλεῖν. Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 2: God cares for man; He is kind, beneficent, and loves men. Zeus is called κόσμος as αἴτιος τοῦ ζῇν, εἱμαρμένη, because εἱρομένῳ λόγῳ διοικεῖ all things, ἀδράστεια, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδράσκειν, πρόνοια, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμον οἰκονομεῖ ἕκαστα. Aristocles (Ibid. xv. 14): Primary fire contains the causes and λόγοι of all things; the unchangeable law and destiny of the world supplies their connection. Sen. Benef. iv. 7, 1: Quid enim aliud est natura, quam Deus et divina ratio toti mundo et partibus ejus inserta?... Hunc eundem et fatum si dixeris non mentieris. (Similarly Frag. 122 in Lact. Inst. ii. 8, 23). Id. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 2: God or Jupiter may be equally well spoken of as Destiny, Providence, Nature, the World. Stob. Ecl. i. 178: Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Στωϊκὸς θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο τὴν εἱμαρμένην. Zeus is called κοινὸς νόμος by Diog. vii. 88; by Cleanthes at the end of his hymn (Stob. Ecl. i. 34); likewise Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36 says of Zeno: Naturalem legem divinam esse censet, eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria. Plut. C. Not. 32, 1; Sto. Rep. 38, 3 and 7 (here following Antipater): God must be conceived of as μακάριος, εὐποιητικὸς, φιλάνθρωπος, κηδεμονικὸς, ὠφέλιμος. Muson. (in Stob. Floril. 117, 8): God is the type of every virtue, μεγαλόφρων, εὐεργετικὸς, φιλάνθρωπος, κ.τ.λ. Sen. Ep. 95, 48: Quæ causa est Dis benefaciendi? Natura. Errat, si quis illos putat nocere nolle: non possunt. Further details respecting the beneficent nature of the Gods in Sen. Benef. i. 9; iv. 3–9 and 26–28; Clement. i. 5, 7; Nat. Qu. v. 18, 13. On the divine omniscience; Ep. 83, 1; V. Beat. 20, 5.

[309] According to Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 75, the Stoics divided the argument as to God’s providential care of the world into three parts. The first part went to establish that if there existed Gods, there must also be a care of the world; for Gods could not exist without having something to do, and to care for the world is the noblest thing that can be done. If, moreover, deity is the highest being, the world must be governed by deity. The same conclusion is arrived at from the wisdom and power of deity, which must always busy itself with what is best and highest. Lastly, it is stated, that inasmuch as the stars, heaven, the universe, and all powers in the world are divine, it is clear that everything must be governed by divine reason. The second part proved that the force and skill of nature produced and sustains all things. All the more reason that a universe so skilfully formed and so harmoniously arranged must be directed by a natura sentiens. And since, in its parts, it could not be more beautiful or adapted to its purpose, it must be true of it more than of any human work of art, that it owes its origin to a forming reason. The third part aims at proving, on physico-theological grounds, quanta sit admirabilitas cœlestium rerum atque terrestrium.

[310] Stob. Ecl. i. 58: Διογένης καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Οἰνοπίδης τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν [θεὸν λέγουσι] ... Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες, οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφὴν μεταβάλλον δὲ εἰς ὃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσιν ... Ζήνων ὁ Στωϊκὸς νοῦν κόσμον πύρινον. Ib. 64; Plut. Plac. i. 8, 17: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ νοερὸν (Plut. κοινότερον) θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου (a similar definition of nature is given by Zeno in Cic. Nat. De. ii. 22, 57) ἐμπεριειληφός τε πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, καθ’ οὓς ἅπαντα (Pl. ἕκαστα) καθ’ εἱμαρμένην γίνεται, καὶ πνεῦμα ἐνδιῆκον, δι’ ὅλον τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς δὲ προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνον διὰ τὰς τῆς ὅλης, δι’ ἧς κεχώρηκε μεταλλάξεις. Following the same source, Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. c. 5, Schl.: εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν θεὸς πῦρ τεχνικὸν, κ.τ.λ. (the same down to γίνεται) τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ διήκει δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου· ὁ θεὸς εἷς κατ’ αὐτοὺς, Ζεὺς μὲν κατὰ τὸ ζέον τῆς ὕλης ὀνομαζόμενος, Ἥρα δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον τῆς ὕλης μέρος, δι’ ἧς κεχώρηκε, καλούμενος. The latter passage is explained by Diog. 147, who thus continues: Δία μὲν γάρ φασι δι’ ὃν τὰ πάντα· Ζῆνα δὲ καλοῦσι παρ’ ὅσον τοῦ ζῇν αἴτιός ἐστιν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ζῇν κεχώρηκεν. (This, too, in Stob. Ecl. i. 48.) Ἀθηνᾶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς αἰθέρα διάτασιν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ αὐτοῦ. Ἥραν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἀέρα. καὶ Ἥφαιστον κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ. καὶ Ποσειδῶνα κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ ὑγρόν. καὶ Δήμητραν κατὰ τὴν εἰς γῆν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας προσηγορίας ἐχόμενοί τινος ὁμοιότητος ἀπέδοσαν. Plut. C. Not. 48, 2, p. 1085: τὸν θεὸν ... σῶμα νοερὸν καὶ νοῦν ἐν ὕλῃ ποιοῦντες. M. Aurel. 5, 32: τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας διήκοντα λόγον, κ.τ.λ. Porphyr. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 16, 1: τὸν δὲ θεὸν ... πῦρ νοερὸν εἰπόντες. Orig. c. Cels. vi. 71: κατὰ μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ... καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ μέχρι ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἐλαχίστων καταβαίνων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ πνεῦμα σωματικόν. The same combination of nature and mind in the conceptions of God is found in the hymn of Cleanthes (in Stob. Ecl. i. 30), Zeus being described as the ἀρχηγὸς φύσεως, who directs the κοινὸς λόγος ὃς διὰ πάντων φοιτᾷ, by means of πῦρ ἀείζωον.

[311] Stob. Ecl. i. 374: Chrysippus teaches εἶναι τὸ ὂν πνεῦμα κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, ἢ πνεῦμα ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω· πνεῦμα δὲ εἴληπται διὰ τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ἀέρα εἶναι κινούμενον· ἀνάλογον δὲ γίγνεσθαι ἔπειτα [? perhaps: αὐτὸ, or: πυρὸς ἢ] αἰθερὸς, ὥστε καὶ εἰς κοινὸν λόγον πεσεῖν αὐτά. Diog. vii. 137: ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι.

[312] Stob. Ecl. i. 538, on the authority of Zeno; Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40, on that of Cleanthes. Both state that the difference consists in this: Ordinary (ἄτεχνον) fire consumes things; but the πῦρ τεχνικὸν, which constitutes φύσις and ψυχὴ, preserves things. Heraclitus, too, in making primary fire the basis of things, did not mean flame, but warmth, which may be equally well described as atmospheric substance or as ψυχή.

[313] Seneca, De Benefic. iv. 7, 2: God may also be called fatum: nam cum fatum nihil aliud sit quam series implexa causarum, ille est prima omnium causa, ex qua ceteræ pendent. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 1: Vis illum fatum vocare? Non errabis. Hic est, ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa causarum. The same applies to the name of providence and nature. See p. 162, 2.

[314] Stob. Ecl. i. 178 (Plut. Plac. i. 28, 5): Ποσειδώνιος [τὴν εἱμαρμένην] τρίτην ἀπὸ Διός. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν φύσιν, τρίτην δὲ τὴν εἱμαρμένην. Conf. Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125, where prophecy is deduced, according to Posidonius, (1) a Deo, (2) a fato, (3) a natura. Plut. C. Not. 36, 5, p. 1077: λέγει γοῦν Χρύσιππος, ἐοικέναι τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κόσμον (instead of which Heine, Stoic. De Fat. Doct. p. 25, apparently without reason, conjectures: καὶ τῷ μὲν σώματι τὸν κόσμον), τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὴν πρόνοιαν· ὅταν οὖν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται μόνον ἄφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἶτα ὁμοῦ γενομένους ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους. To this maxim of Chrysippus, reference is made by Philo, Incorrup. M. 951, B, where, too, πρόνοια is equivalent to ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου.

[315] According to Chrysippus. A different view is taken by Posidonius. With him Zeus stands for the original force, φύσις for its first, and εἱμαρμένη for its second production.

[316] Plut. l.c. Sen. Ep. 9, 16: [Jupiter] resoluto mundo et Diis in unum confusis, paullisper cessante natura, acquiescit sibi, cogitationibus suis traditus.

[317] Compare, besides what has been already quoted, Cic. Acad. i. 11, 39: (Zeno) statuebat ignem esse ipsam naturam. Diog. vii. 156: δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς τὴν μὲν φύσιν εἶναι πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πνεῦμα πυροειδὲς καὶ τεχνοειδές. Stob. Ecl. i. 180: Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν τοῦ οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικήν; or, according to another definition: εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος, ἢ λόγος, τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων, κ.τ.λ. Instead of λόγος, he also used ἀλήθεια, φύσις, αἰτία, ἀνάγκη, &c.

[318] See p. 143.

[319] Cic. N. D. ii. 11, 30: Atque etiam mundi ille fervor purior, perlucidior mobiliorque multo ob easque causas aptior ad sensus commovendos quam hic noster calor, quo hæc quæ nota nobis sunt, retinentur et vigent. Absurdum igitur est dicere, cum homines bestiæque hoc calore teneantur et propterea moveantur ac sentiant, mundum esse sine sensu, qui integro et puro et libero eodemque acerrimo et mobilissimo ardore teneatur. Conf. Ar. Didymus, in the passage quoted, p. 146, 4, p. 105, 127.

[320] Consol. ad Helviam, 8, 3: Id actum est, mihi crede, ab illo, quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille Deus est potens omnium, sive incorporalis ratio, ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima æquali intentione [= τόνος] diffusus, sive fatum et immutabilis causarum inter se cohærentium series. Conf. p. 153, 1.

[321] Cic. N. D. i. 14: Zeno calls natural law divine, but he also calls the Ether and the all-pervading Reason deity. (We shall come back presently to what he says as to the divinity of the stars.) Cleanthes gives the name of deity to the world, reason, the soul of the world, and ether; Chrysippus to reason, to the soul of the world, to ruling reason, to communis natura, destiny, fire, ether, the universe, and eternal law.

[322] Krische, Forsch. i. 365.

[323] See pp. 153, 2; 153, 4.

[324] Chrysippus. See p. 152, note 1.

[325] Aristocles. See p. 147, note 3.

[326] Mnesarchus, in Stob. i. 60. See p. 148, 1.

[327] Orig. c. Cels. iii. 75, p. 497, A: Στωϊκῶν θεὸν φθαρτὸν εἰσαγόντων καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ λεγόντων σῶμα τρεπτὸν διόλου καὶ ἀλλοιωτὸν καὶ μεταβλητὸν καί ποτε πάντα φθειρόντων καὶ μόνον τὸν θεὸν καταλιπόντων. Ibid. iv. 14: ὁ τῶν Στωϊκῶν θεὸς ὅτε σῶμα τυγχάνων ὅτε μὲν ἡγεμονικὸν ἔχει τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν ὅταν ἡ ἐκπύρωσις ᾖ· ὅτε δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους γίνεται αὐτῆς ὅταν ᾖ διακόσμησις.

[328] Besides the quotations already given from Chrysippus on p. 153, 2, and Cleanthes on p. 155, 1, compare Phædr. Nat. De. (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβείας), Col. 5: Διογένης δ’ ὁ Βαβυλώνιος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τὸν κόσμον γράφει τῷ Διῒ τὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν, ἢ περιέχειν τὸν Δία καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ψυχήν. Cic. N. De. ii. 17, 45: Nothing corresponds better to the idea of God, quam ut primum hunc mundum, quo nihil fieri excellentius potest, animantem esse et Deum judicem. Ibid. 13, 34: Perfect reason Deo tribuenda, id est mundo. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 3; Vis illum vocare mundum? Non falleris. Ipse enim est hoc quod vides totum, suis partibus inditus et se sustinens et sua. Ibid. Prolog. 13: Quid est Deus? Mens universi. Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum et quod non vides totum. Sic demum magnitudo sua illi redditur, qua nihil majus excogitari potest, si solus est omnia, opus suum et extra et intra tenet. Diog. vii. 148: οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μέν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν. Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1 and 3: ὅλον δὲ τὸν κόσμον σὺν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσι προσαγορεύουσι θεόν.... διὸ δὴ καὶ Ζεὺς λέγεται ὁ κόσμος. Orig. c. Cels. v. 7: σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι θεὸν Στωϊκοὶ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον. The arguments given, p. 144, for the existence of God are based on the supposition that God is the same as the World. The existence of God is proved by showing the reasonableness of the world. Aratus gives a poet’s description of the Stoic pantheism at the beginning of the Phænomena: Zeus is the being of whom streets and markets, sea and land, are full, whose offspring is man, and who, out of regard for man, has appointed signs in the heavens to regulate the year. The same idea is contained in the well-known lines of Virgil, Georg. iv. 220; Æn. vi. 724. The round figure of the Stoic deity, Sen. Ep. 113, 22; De M. Claud. 8, 1, has also reference to the world as God. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 17, 46.

[329] Stob. Ecl. i. 444: κόσμον δ’ εἶναι φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων· ἢ τὸ ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων σύστημα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων. λέγεται δ’ ἑτέρως κόσμος ὁ θεὸς, καθ’ ὃν ἡ διακόσμησις γίνεται καὶ τελειοῦται. Diog. vii. 137: λέγουσι δὲ κόσμον τριχῶς· αὐτόν τε τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἁπάσης οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιὸν, ὃς δὴ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος δημιουργὸς ὢν τῆς διακοσμήσεως κατὰ χρόνων τινὰς περιόδους ἀναλίσκων εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ γεννῶν. καὶ αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ τρίτον τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. καὶ ἔστι κόσμος ἢ (according to the first meaning of the word) ὁ ἰδίως ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας, (universal substance in its definite quality) ἢ (second meaning) ὥς φησι Ποσειδώνιος ... σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων, ἢ (third meaning) σύστημα ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων. Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1: κόσμος is the name for τὸ ἐκ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας ποιὸν, and for τὸ κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν τὴν τοιαύτην καὶ διάταξιν ἔχον. In the former sense, the world is eternal, and the same as God; in the latter, created, and subject to change. Compare also the quotations from the mathematician Diodorus, in Ach. Tat. Isag. c. 6. p. 129, b.

[330] See p. 148. The two ideas blend. Thus Seneca, Nat. Qu. Prol. 13, says God must be the Reason of the world and must also be the universe itself; and he continues: Quid ergo interest, inter naturam Dei et nostram? Nostri melior pars animus est, in illo nulla pars extra animum est. Totus est ratio, &c.

[331] The connection of the two, like the connection between soul and body, and the argument quoted by Tertullian from Zeno on p. 148, 1, is κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων. See p. 135.

[332] Stob. Ecl. i. 60: Βόηθος τὸν αἰθέρα θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο.

[333] Diog. 143: Βόηθος δέ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῷον τὸν κόσμον. The words of Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, C—ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ τοὺς ἀντιδοξοῦντας ὁ θεὸς—imply the same, but these words evidently are not taken from Boëthus.

[334] Diog. 148: Βόηθος δὲ ἐν τῇ περὶ φύσεως οὐσίαν θεοῦ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν· which must be understood in the same sense as the corresponding statements of other Stoics: the ἡγεμονικὸν of the world resides in the purest part of the ether. Yet, inasmuch as the world is no living being, nor is deity the soul of the world, it must, according to the view of Boëthus, act upon it from without. This is expressly stated in Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, B, God is described as the charioteer guiding the world, and παριστάμενος the stars and elements. But this passage, beginning at καὶ μήποτ’ εἰκότως, is evidently Philo’s own expansion of what he has just quoted from Boëthus.

[335] Diog. vii. 136: κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὑτὸν ὄντα [τὸν θεὸν] τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου τοιοῦδε ὑπολιπέσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ ἐνεργὸν αὐτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἑξῆς γένεσιν, κ.τ.λ. Seneca, Nat. Quæst. iii. 13, 1: Fire will consume the world: hunc evanidum considere, et nihil relinqui aliud in rerum natura, igne restincto, quam humorem. In hoc futuri mundi spem latere. Stob. Ecl. i. 372 and 414, 5. See pp. 161, 2; 164, 2.

[336] Stob. i. 370: Ζήνωνα δὲ οὕτως ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαρρήδην· τοιαύτην δεήσει εἶναι ἐν περιόδῳ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διακόσμησιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας. ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς τροπὴ εἰς ὕδωρ δι’ ἀέρος γένηται τὸ μέν τι ὑφίστασθαι καὶ γῆν συνίστασθαι, ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν διαμένειν ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἀτμιζομένου ἀέρα γίνεσθαι, ἐκ τινος δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος πῦρ ἐξάπτειν. Diog. vii. 142: γίνεσθαι δὲ τὸν κόσμον ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς ἡ οὐσία τραπῇ δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὑγρότητα, εἶτα τὸ παχυμερὲς αὐτοῦ συστὰν ἀποτελεσθῇ γῆ τὸ δὲ λεπτομερὲς ἐξαερωθῇ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐπιπλέον λεπτυνθὲν πῦρ ἀπογεννήσῃ; εἶτα κατὰ μίξιν ἐκ τούτων φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα καὶ ἄλλα γένη. Chrys. in Plut. St. Rep. 41, 3, p. 1053: ἡ δὲ πυρὸς μεταβολή ἐστι τοιαύτη· δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ τρέπεται· κἀκ τούτου γῆς ὑφισταμένης ἀὴρ ἐνθυμιᾶται· λεπτυνομένου δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος ὁ αἰθὴρ περιχεῖται κύκλῳ. The same writer observes, in the Scholia on Hesiod’s Theogony, v. 459, ὅτι καθύγρων ὄντων τῶν ὅλων καὶ ὄμβρων καταφερομένων πολλῶν τὴν ἔκκρισιν τούτων Κρόνον ὠνομάσθαι. Conf. Clemens, Strom. v. 599, C, and Stob. i. 312.

[337] Stob. Ecl. i. 442, also affirms that the creation of the universe begins with earth.

[338] Stob. l.c.: Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πώς φησιν· ἐκφλογισθέντος τοῦ παντὸς συνίζειν τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ πρῶτον, εἶτα τὰ ἐχόμενα ἀποσβέννυσθαι δι’ ὅλου. τοῦ δὲ παντὸς ἐξυγρανθέντος, τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρὸς, ἀντιτυπήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ μέσου, τρέπεσθαι πάλιν εἰς τοὐναντίον (the probable meaning is, that the last remains of the original fire begin a motion in the opposite direction) εἶθ’ οὕτω τρεπόμενον ἄνω φησὶν αὔξεσθαι· καὶ ἄρχεσθαι διακοσμεῖν τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τοιαύτην περίοδον ἀεὶ καὶ διακόσμησιν ποιουμένου τοῦ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσίᾳ τόνου (for this favourite expression of Cleanthes, see p. 127, 5; 128, 2) μὴ παύεσθαι [διακοσμούμενον τὸ ὅλον]. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἑνός τινος τὰ μέρη πάντα φύεται ἐκ σπερμάτων ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μέρη, ὧν καὶ τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις φύεται. καὶ ὥσπερ τινὲς λόγοι τῶν μερῶν εἰς σπέρμα συνιόντες μίγνυνται καὶ αὖθις διακρίνονται γενομένων τῶν μερῶν, οὕτως ἐξ ἑνός τε πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἓν συγκρίνεσθαι, (conf. Heraclit. in vol. i. 467, 1), ὁδῷ καὶ συμφώνως διεξιούσης τῆς περιόδου. A few further details are supplied by Macrob. Sat. i. 17. The myth respecting the birth of Apollo and Artemis is referred to the formation of the sun and moon. Namque post chaos, ubi primum cœpit confusa deformitas in rerum formas et elementa nitescere, terræque adhuc humida substantia in molli atque instabili sede nutaret: convalescente paullatim æthereo calore atque inde seminibus in eam igneis defluentibus (the connection of Zeus, i.e., of Ether, with Leto, the Earth) hæc sidera edita esse creduntur; et solem maxima caloris vi in superna raptum; lunam vero humidiore et velut femineo sexu naturali quodam pressam tepore inferiora tenuisse, tanquam ille magis substantia patris constet, hæc matris. The statement that besides other things plants and animals had their origin in the intermingling of elements (Stob. and Diog.) must be understood in the sense of generatio æquivoca. Lactant. Inst. vii. 4, says the Stoics make men grow like sponges out of the earth, and Sext. Math. ix. 28 says the Stoics speak of the earth-born men of prehistoric ages.

[339] There must always be some remainder of heat or fire, as Cleanthes and Chrysippus avowed, or else there would be no active life-power from which a new creation could emanate. Philo, Incorrupt. M. 964, C, observes that, if the world were entirely consumed by fire at the ἐκπύρωσις, the fire itself would be extinguished, and no new world would be possible. διὸ καί τινες τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ... ἔφασαν, ὅτι μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν, ἐπειδὰν ὁ νέος κόσμος μέλλῃ δημιουργεῖσθαι, σύμπαν μὲν τὸ πῦρ οὐ σβέννυται, ποσὴ δέ τις αὐτοῦ μοῖρα ὑπολείπεται.

[340] Chrys. in Plut. l.c. 41, 6: διόλου μὲν γὰρ ὢν ὁ κόσμος πυρώδης εὐθὺς καὶ ψυχή ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἡγεμονικόν. ὅτε δὲ μεταβαλὼν εἰς τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναπολειφθεῖσαν ψυχὴν τρόπον τινὰ εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν μετέβαλεν ὥστε συνεστάναι ἐκ τούτων, ἄλλον τινὰ ἔσχε λόγον.

[341] Nemes. Nat. Hom. C. 2, p. 72: λέγουσι δὲ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μὲν εἶναι δραστικὰ τὰ δὲ παθητικά· δραστικὰ μὲν ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ, παθητικὰ δὲ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ. Plut. Com. Not. 49, 2. See above p. 127, 5. From this passage a further insight is obtained into two points connected with the Stoic philosophy, which have been already discussed. It can no longer appear strange that the active power, or deity (and likewise the human soul), should at one time be called Fire, at another Air-Current, for both represent equally the acting force; and the statement that properties are atmospheric currents—as, indeed, the whole distinction of subject-matter and property—follows from this view of things.

[342] The Stoics, according to Diog. 141, where, however, there is apparently a lacuna in the text, prove that the world (διακόσμησις, not κόσμος, in the absolute sense, see p. 158, 1) will come to an end, partly because it has come into being, and partly by two not very logical inferences: οὗ τὰ [vulgo οὗ τε τὰ, Cobet: οὗ τά τε] μέρη φθαρτά ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὰ δὲ μέρα τοῦ κόσμου φθαρτὰ, εἰς ἄλληλα γὰρ μεταβάλλει· φθαρτὸς ἄρα ὁ κόσμος· and εἴ τι ἐπιδεκτικόν ἐστι τῆς ἐπὶ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς, φθαρτόν ἐστι· καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἄρα· ἐξαυχμοῦται γὰρ καὶ ἐξυδατοῦται. Conf. Alex. Meteora, 90. In Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 2, p. 1054, Chrysippus asserts that the οὐσία is immortal, but to κόσμος belongs a ὥσπερ ἀφθαρσία.

[343] Plut. Sto. Rep. 39, 2, p. 1052: [Χρύσιππος] ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ προνοίας τὸν Δία, φησὶν, αὔξεσθαι μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὑτὸν ἅπαντα καταναλώσῃ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ θάνατος μέν ἐστι ψυχῆς χωρισμὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ οὐ χωρίζεται μὲν, αὔξεται δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὑτὴν ἐξαναλώσῃ τὴν ὕλην, οὐ ῥητέον ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν κόσμον. Stob. Ecl. i. 414 (according to Numenius: see Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1): Ζήνωνι καὶ Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν οἷον εἰς σπέρμα τὸ πῦρ (Philo, Incorrupt. M. 956, B, expresses himself against this description) καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν διακόσμησιν οἷα πρότερον ἦν. Seneca, Consol. ad Marciam, gives a graphic description of the end of the world, which recalls the language of the Revelation. Compare, on the subject of ἐκπύρωσις, Diog. vii. 142, 137 (see above p. 158, 1); Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1; Plut. Com. Not. 36 (see p. 153, 2); Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 25, p. 53; Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 119; N. D. ii. 46, 118; Sen. Consol. ad Polyb. i. 2; Alex. Aphr. in Meteor. 90, a. In the last-named passage, it is urged by the Stoics, in support of their view, that even now large tracts of water are dried up or else take the place of dry land. Simpl. Phys. iii. b; De Cœlo; Schol. in Arist. 487, b, 35 and 489, a, 13; Justin. Apol. i. 20; ii. 7; Orig. c. Cels. iii. 75, 497, a; vi. 71. Since at the ἐκπύρωσις everything is resolved into deity, Plut. C. Not. 17, 3, p. 1067, says: ὅταν ἐκπυρώσωσι τὸν κόσμον οὗτοι, κακὸν μὲν οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν ἀπολείπεται, τὸ δ’ ὅλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τηνικαῦτα καὶ σοφόν.

[344] Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1: ἀρέσκει δὲ τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης, ἐξαεροῦσθαι πάντα κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰς μεγίστας, εἰς πῦρ αἰθερῶδες ἀναλυομένων πάντων. According to Philo, Incorrupt. M. 954, E, Cleanthes called this fire φλόξ, Chrysippus αὐγή. Respecting ἄνθραξ, φλόξ, αὐγή, see ibid. 953, E. The observations on p. 151 respecting the identity of πῦρ, πνεῦμα, αἰθὴρ apply here.

[345] This is, at least, the import of the general principle (assigned to Chrysippus by Stob. Ecl. i. 314) expressed by Heraclitus, that, in the resolution of earth and water into fire, the same steps intervene, in a retrograde order, as in their generation.

[346] See p. 147, 1.

[347] Plut. Com. Not. 31, 10: ἐπαγωνιζόμενος ὁ Κλεάνθης τῇ ἐκπυρώσει λέγει τὴν σελήνην καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα τὸν ἥλιον ἐξομοιῶσαι [leg. -ειν] πάντα ἑαυτῷ καὶ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς ἑαυτόν.

[348] It is expressly asserted that everything, without exception, is liable to this destiny; neither the soul nor the Gods are exempt. Conf. Sen. Cons. ad Marc. 26, 7: Nos quoque felices animæ et æterna sortitæ (the words are put in the mouth of a dead man) cum Deo visum sit iterum ista moliri, labentibus cunctis, et ipsæ parva ruinæ ingentis accessio, in antiqua elementa vertemur. Chrysippus says of the Gods, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 38, 5: Some of the Gods have come into being and are perishable, others are eternal: Helios and Selene, and other similar deities, have come into being; Zeus is eternal. In Philo, Incorrupt. M. 950, A, Orig. c. Cels. iv. 68, Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420, Com. Not. 31, 5, p. 1075, it is objected that, at the general conflagration, the Gods will melt away, as though they were made of wax or tin. According to Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, Tab. i. 1, Vol. Hercul. vi. 1, even Zeno restricted the happy life of the Gods to certain lengthy periods of time.

[349] Arius, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 19: ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο δὲ προελθὼν ὁ κοινὸς λόγος καὶ κοινὴ φύσις μείζων καὶ πλείων γενομένη τέλος ἀναξηράνασα πάντα καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀναλαβοῦσα ἐν τῇ πάσῃ οὐσίᾳ γίνεται (it occupies the room of the whole substance) ἐπανελθοῦσα εἰς τὸν πρῶτον ῥηθέντα λόγον καὶ εἰς ἀνάστασιν [? κατάστασιν] ἐκείνην τὴν ποιοῦσαν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν μέγιστον, καθ’ ὃν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς μόνης εἰς αὐτὴν πάλιν γίνεται ἡ ἀποκατάστασις (the same in Philop. Gen. et Corr. B. ii. Schl. p. 70), ἐπανελθοῦσα δὲ διὰ τάξιν ἀφ’ οἵας διακοσμεῖν ὡσαύτως ἤρξατο κατὰ λόγον πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν διεξαγωγὴν ποιεῖται. See p. 161. According to Nemes. Nat. Hom. c, 38, p. 147, conf. Censorin. Di. Nat. 18, 11, the ἐκπύρωσις takes place when all the planets have got back to the identical places which they occupied at the beginning of the world, or, in other words, when a periodic year is complete. The length of a periodic year was estimated by Diogenes (Plut. Pl. i. 32, 2; Stob. Ecl. i. 264) at 365 periods, or 365 × 18,000 ordinary years. Plut. De Ei ap. D. 9, g, E, p. 389 mentions the opinion, ὅπερ τρία πρὸς ἓν, τοῦτο τὴν διακόσμησιν χρόνῳ πρὸς τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν εἶναι. Inasmuch as it had been previously said that the duration of κόρος (i.e. ἐκπύρωσις) was longer, and that therefore Apollo, who represents the state of perfect unity, was honoured nine months with the pæan, whilst Dionysus, torn to pieces by the Titans, the emblem of the present world of contraries, was only honoured for three with the dithyramb, some mistake seems to have crept in. Probably we ought either to read ὅπερ πρὸς τρία ἕν, or to transpose the passage from διακόσμησιν to ἐκπύρωσιν.

[350] The belief in changing cycles is a common one in the older Greek philosophy. In particular, the Stoics found it in Heraclitus. The belief, however, that each new world exactly represents the preceding one is first met with among the Pythagoreans, and is closely connected with the theory of the migration of souls and a periodic year. Eudemus, in a passage which has generally been lost sight of in describing Pythagorean teaching, had taught (in Simpl. Phys. 173): εἰ δέ τις πιστεύσειε τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ὡς πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀριθμῷ κἀγὼ μυθολογήσω τὸ ῥαβδίον ἔχων ὑμῖν καθημένοις οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὁμοίως ἕξει, καὶ τὸν χρόνον εὔλογόν ἐστι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι (in that case the time must be the same as the present time). The Stoics appear to have borrowed this view from the Pythagoreans (unless with other Orphic-Pythagorean views it was known to Heraclitus), and it commended itself to them as being in harmony with their theory of necessity. Hence they taught: μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν πάλιν πάντα ταὐτὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γενέσθαι κατ’ ἀριθμὸν, ὡς καὶ τὸν ἰδίως ποιὸν πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναί τε καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐκείνῳ τῷ κόσμῳ (Alex. Anal. Pr. 58, b). τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος, δῆλον, ὡς οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον, καὶ ἡμᾶς μετὰ τὸ τελευτῆσαι πάλιν περιόδων τινῶν εἰλημμένων χρόνον εἰς ὃν νῦν ἐσμεν καταστήσεσθαι σχῆμα (Chrysippus, περὶ Προνοίας, in Lactant. Inst. vii. 23. Conf. Seneca, Ep. 36, 10: Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies). This applies to every fact and to every occurrence in the new world, at the παλιγγενεσία or ἀποκατάστασις (as the return of a former age is called): thus there will be another Socrates, who will marry another Xanthippe, and be accused by another Anytus and Meletus. Hence M. Aurel. vii. 19, xi. 1, deduces his adage, that nothing new happens under the sun. Simpl. Phys. 207, b; Philop. Gen. et Corr. B. ii. Schl. p. 70; Tatian. c. Græc. c, 3, 245, d; Clemens, Strom. v. 549, D; Orig. c. Cels. iv. 68; v. 20 and 23; Nemes. l.c.; Plut. Def. Or. 29, p. 425. Amongst other things, the Stoics raised the question, Whether the Socrates who would appear in the future world would be numerically identical (εἷς ἀριθμῷ) with the present Socrates or not? (Simpl. l.c.)—the answer being, that they could not be numerically identical, since this would involve uninterrupted existence, but that they would be alike without a difference (ἀπαράλλακτοι). Others, however, chiefly among the younger Stoics, appear to have held that there might be noticeable differences between the two. (Orig. v. 20, 592, c.) This remark appears to have given rise to the false notion (Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21; Epiphan. Hær. v. p. 12, b) that the Stoics believed in the transmigration of souls. The remark made by Nemes., that the Gods know the whole course of the present world, from having survived the end of the former one, can only apply to one highest God, who, however, does not require such empirical knowledge. The other deities will not have survived the general conflagration.

[351] Ar. Didym. l.c. continues: τῶν τοιούτων περιόδων ἐξ ἀϊδίου γινομένων ἀκαταπαύστως. οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ἀρχῆς αἰτίαν καὶ [del.] πᾶσιν οἷόν τε γινέσθαι, οὔτε τοῦ διοικοῦντος αὐτά. οὐσίαν τε γὰρ τοῖς γινομένοις ὑφεστάναι δεῖ πεφυκυῖαν ἀναδέχεσθαι τὰς μεταβολὰς πάσας καὶ τὸ δημιουργῆσον ἐξ αὐτῆς, κ.τ.λ. Conf. Philop.: ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἄν τις, ὥς φησιν Ἀλέξανδρος, πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἡ αὐτὴ ἀεὶ διαμένει, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ, διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν οὐχὶ κατὰ περίοδόν τινα πλείονος χρόνου ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὕλης τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔσται; ὅπερ τινές φασι κατὰ τὴν παλιγγενέσιαν καὶ τὸν μέγαν ἐνιαυτὸν συμβαίνειν, ἐν ᾧ πάντων τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποκατάστασις γίνεται. See M. Aurel. v. 32.

[352] According to Philo (Incorrupt. M. 947, C), besides Posidonius and Panætius, his instructor (Diog. vii. 142; Stob. Ecl. i. 414), Boëthus asserted, in opposition to the ordinary Stoic teaching, the eternity of the world. Philo adds that this was also the view of Diogenes of Seleucia in his later years. Moreover, Zeno of Tarsus, on the authority of Numenius (in Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 19, 2), considered that the destruction of the world by fire could not be proved (φασὶν ἐπισχεῖν περὶ τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως τῶν ὅλων). But these statements are elsewhere contradicted. Diogenes mentions Posidonius as one who held the destruction of the world by fire. The testimony of Diogenes is confirmed by Plut. Pl. Phil. ii. 9, 3 (Stob. Ecl. i. 380; Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 40. See Achill. Tatian, Isag. 131, C), who says that Posidonius only allowed so much empty space outside the world as was necessary for the world to be dissolved in at the ἐκπύρωσις. The difference between his view and the older Stoical view which Bake (Posidon. Rel. 58) deduces from Stob. i. 432, is purely imaginary. Antipater, according to Diogenes, also believed in a future conflagration. Little importance can be attached to the statement in Cic. N. D. ii. 46, 118, respecting Panætius, addubitare dicebant; whereas the words of Stob. are: πιθανωτέραν νομίζει τὴν ἀϊδιότητα τοῦ κόσμου; and those of Diog.: ἄφθαρτον ἀπεφήνατο τὸν κόσμον.

Boëthus emphatically denied the destruction of the world, his chief reasons (in Philo, l.c. 952, C) being the following:—(1) If the world were destroyed, it would be a destruction without a cause, for there is no cause, either within or without, which could produce such an effect. (2) Of the three modes of destruction, those κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατὰ ἀναίρεσιν τῆς ἐπεχούσης ποιότητος (as in the crushing of a statue), κατὰ σύγχυσιν (as in chemical resolution), not one can apply to the world. (3) If the world ceased to exist, the action of God on the world, in fact, His activity would altogether cease. (4) If everything were consumed by fire, the fire must go out for want of fuel. With that, the possibility of a new world is at an end.

The resolution of the world into indefinite vacuum, attributed by Plut. Plac. ii. 9, 2, to the Stoics in general, is no doubt the same as the condensation and expansion of matter. Ritter, iii. 599 and 703, supposes it to be a misapprehension of the real Stoic teaching. How Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 391, and Schleiermacher, Gesch. d. Philos. p. 129, in view of the passages quoted, can absolutely deny that the Stoics held a periodic destruction of the world, is hard to comprehend.

[353] The flood and its causes are fully discussed by Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 27–30. Rain, inroads of the sea, earthquakes, are all supposed to contribute. The chief thing, however, is, that such a destruction has been ordained in the course of the world. It comes cum fatalis dies venerit, cum adfuerit illa necessitas temporum (27, 1), cum Deo visum ordiri meliora, vetera finiri (28, 7); it has been fore-ordained from the beginning (29, 2; 30, 1), and is due, not only to the pressure of the existing waters, but also to their increase, and to a changing of earth into water (29, 4). The object of this flood is to purge away the sins of mankind, ut de integro totæ rudes innoxiæque generentur [res humanæ] nec supersit in deteriora præceptor (29, 5); peracto judicio generis humani exstructisque pariter feris ... antiquus ordo revocabitur. Omne ex integro animal generabitur dabiturque terris, homo inscius scelerum: but this state of innocence will not last long. Seneca (29, 1) appeals to Berosus, according to whom the destruction of the world by fire will take place when all the planets are in the sign of the Crab, its destruction by water when they are in the sign of the Capricorn. Since these signs correspond with the summer and winter turns of the sun, the language of Seneca agrees with that of Censorin. Di. Nat. 18, 11, evidently quoted from Varro, conf. Jahn, p. viii: Cujus anni hiems summa est cataclysmus ... æstas autem ecpyrosis. Conf. Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c, 25, p. 53: When one element gains the supremacy over the others, the course of the world will come to an end, by ἐκπύρωσις, if the element is fire; εἰ δ’ ἄθρουν ὕδωρ ἐκραγείη, κατακλυσμῷ τὸν κόσμον ἀπολεῖσθαι.

[354] For the former view, the language of Heraclitus and Censorinus tells, for the latter that of Seneca.

[355] Diog. vii. 149: καθ’ εἱμαρμένην δέ φασι τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι Χρύσιππος, κ.τ.λ. ἔστι δ’ εἱμαρμένη αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρομένη ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν ὁ κόσμος διεξάγεται. A. Gell. vi. 2, 3: (Chrysippus) in libro περὶ προνοίας quarto εἱμαρμένην esse dicit φυσικήν τινα σύνταξιν τῶν ὅλων ἐξ ἀϊδίου τῶν ἑτέρων τοῖς ἑτέροις ἐπακολουθούντων καὶ μετὰ πολὺ μὲν οὖν ἀπαραβάτου οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης συμπλοκῆς. Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125 (according to Posidonius): Fatum, or εἱμαρμένη, was called ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causa causæ nexa rem ex se gignat. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 36: Quid enim intelligis fatum? existimo necessitatem rerum omnium actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat. De Prov. 5, 8: Irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditor et rector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. Semper paret, semper jussit.

[356] Conf. p. 152 and Stob. Ecl. i. 180 (Plut. Plac. i. 28), Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικήν.

[357] Hence Chrysippus’ definition (Plut. and Stob.): εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος ἢ λόγος (Plut. νόμος) τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων· ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται. Instead of λόγος, Chrysippus also used ἀλήθεια, αἰτία, φύσις, ἀνάγκη. Theodoret. Cur. Gr. Aff. vi. 14, p. 87: Chrysippus assigns the same meaning to εἱμαρμένον and κατηναγκασμένον, explaining εἱμαρμένη to be κίνησις ἀΐδιος συνεχὴς καὶ τεταγμένη; Zeno defines it (as Stob. i. 178, also says) as δύναμις κινητικὴ τῆς ὕλης; also as φύσις or πρόνοια; his successors as λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων, or as εἱρμὸς αἰτίων. (The same in Plut. Plac. i. 28, 4. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 36, p. 143.) Even τύχη, he continues, is explained as a deity (or as Simpl. Phys. 74, b, has it as a θεῖον καὶ δαιμόνιον); but this supposes it to be essentially identical with εἱμαρμένη. Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 34, 8, p. 1050: τῆς γὰρ κοινῆς φύσεως εἰς πάντα διατεινούσης, δεήσει πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν γινόμενον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τῶν μορίων ὁτῳοῦν, κατ’ ἐκείνην γενέσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον, κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἀκωλύτως· διὰ τὸ μήτ’ ἔξωθεν εἶναι τὸ ἐνστησόμενον τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ μήτε τῶν μερῶν μηδὲν ἔχειν ὅπως κινηθήσεται ἢ σχήσει ἄλλως [ἢ] κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν. Cleanthes, Hymn. (in Stob. Ecl. i. 30) v. 12, 18; M. Aurel. ii. 3. See p. 151, 1.

[358] It has been already demonstrated that all these ideas pass into one another.

[359] Plut. Com. Not. 34, 5, p. 1076: εἰ δὲ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστόν ἐστι τῶν μερῶν ἔχειν ἄλλως ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὴν Διὸς βούλησιν, κ.τ.λ. Conf. Sto. Rep. 34, 2: οὕτω δὲ τῆς τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομίας προαγούσης, ἀναγκαῖον κατὰ ταύτην, ὡς ἄν ποτ’ ἔχωμεν, ἔχειν ἡμᾶς, εἴτε παρὰ φύσιν τὴν ἰδίαν νοσοῦντες, εἴτε πεπηρωμένοι, εἴτε γραμματικοὶ γεγονότες ἢ μουσικοὶ ... κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον τὰ παραπλήσια ἐροῦμεν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀτεχνιῶν, ὡς ἔφην ... οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλως τῶν κατὰ μέρος γενέσθαι, οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον, ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον. Ibid. 47, 4 and 8. Cleanth. Hymn. v. 15:

οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαῖμον,
οὔτε κατ’ αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον οὔτ’ ἐνὶ πόντῳ,
πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις.

[360] See the quotations on p. 161, 1; 161, 2; 164, 2; 144, 1; 148; 145, 2, from Diog. vii. 136; Stob. Ecl. i. 372 and 414; Cic. N. D. ii. 10, 28; 22, 58; Sext. Math. ix. 101: M. Aurel. iv. 14: ἐναφανισθήσῃ τῷ γεννήσαντι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικὸν κατὰ μεταβολήν. Ibid. 21: αἱ ψυχαὶ ... εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων σπερματικὸν λόγον ἀναλαμβανόμεναι.

[361] See on p. 151, 1, the definition of deity from Stob.; Plut. Athenag.; M. Aurel. ix. 1: ὥρμησεν [ἡ φύσις] ἐπὶ τήνδε τὴν διακόσμησιν συλλαβοῦσά τινας λόγους τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ δυνάμεις γονίμους ἀφωρίσασα, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. vi. 24: Alexander and his groom ἐλήφθησαν εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοῦ κόσμου σπερματικοὺς λόγους. Diog. vii. 148: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ αὑτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. 157: μέρη δὲ ψυχῆς λέγουσιν ὀκτὼ, τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν σπερματικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ λογιστικόν.

[362] As the primary fire or ether is called the seed of the world (p. 161, 1), so, according to Chrysippus (in Diog. 159), the σπέρμα in the seed of plants and animals is a πνεῦμα κατ’ οὐσίαν.

[363] σπερματικὸς λόγος is also used to express the seed or the egg itself. Thus, in Plut. Quæst. Conviv. ii. 3, 3 and 4, it is defined as λόγος ἐνδεὴς γενέσεως.

[364] See p. 101, 2.

[365] This is particularly manifest, not only in the history of the world, but also in the doctrine of the constant change of the elements.

[366] Heine, Stoicorum de Fato Doctrina (Naumb. 1859), p. 29.

[367] Compare what the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 7) and Stob. (Ecl. i. 180) observe on the derivations of εἱμαρμένη, πεπρωμένη, Χρεὼν (Heine, p. 32, 1, suggests on the strength of Theodoret, Cur. Gr. Affect. vi. 11, p. 87, 4, who transcribes the quotation from Eusebius, τὸν χρόνον κατὰ τὸ χρεών. We ought rather to read, according to Theod. Gaisf., τὸ χρεὼν κατὰ τὸ χρέος), Μοῖραι, Κλωθώ: and the quotations p. 170, 1; 171, 1; also Ps. Arist. De Mundo, c. 7. The argument for Providence, drawn from the consensus gentium in Sen. Benef. iv. 4, follows another tack.

[368] Homeric passages, which he was in the habit of quoting in Eus. l.c. 8, 1.

[369] See Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 76.

[370] The two are generally taken together. Compare the quotations on p. 145, 4.

[371] See p. 83, 2; 110, 3; Aristotle and the Peripatetics thought differently. See Simpl. Cat. 103, β.

[372] Cic. De Fato, 10, 20.

[373] Alex. De Fato, p. 92, Orel.: τὸ δὲ λέγειν εὔλογον εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ ἐσόμενα προειδέναι ... καὶ τοῦτο λαμβάνοντας κατασκευάζειν πειρᾶσθαι δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε γίνεσθαι καὶ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε εὔλογον.

[374] Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 162; De Fato, 3, 5 (unfortunately the previous exposition is wanting); Diogenian (in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 1): Chrysippus proves, by the existence of divination, that all things happen καθ’ εἱμαρμένην; for divination would be impossible, unless things were foreordained. Alex. De Fato, c. 21, p. 96: οἱ δὲ ὑμνοῦντες τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὑτῶν λόγον μόνον σώζεσθαι λέγοντες αὐτὴν καὶ ταύτῃ πίστει τοῦ πάντα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην γίνεσθαι χρώμενοι, κ.τ.λ.

[375] Plut. De Fato, 11, p. 374: κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἐναντίον [λόγον] μάλιστα μὲν καὶ πρῶτον εἶναι δόξειε τὸ μηδὲν ἀναιτίως γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ προηγουμένας αἰτίας· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φύσει διοικεῖσθαι τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, σύμπνουν καὶ συμπαθῆ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ ὄντα. Then come the considerations confirmatory of that view—divination, the wise man’s acquiescence in the course of the world, the maxim that every judgment is either true or false. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 35, p. 139: εἰ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτίων περιεστηκότων, ὥς φασιν αὐτοὶ, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι.

[376] Alex. De Fato, c. 22, p. 72: ὅμοιόν τε εἶναί φασι καὶ ὁμοίως ἀδύνατον τὸ ἀναιτίως τῷ γίνεσθαί τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος.

[377] Alex. l.c. p. 70: φασὶ δὴ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε ἕνα ὄντα ... καὶ ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικούμενον ζωτικῆς τε καὶ λογικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς ἔχειν τὴν τῶν ὄντων διοίκησιν ἀΐδιον κατὰ εἱρμόν τινα καὶ τάξιν προϊοῦσαν; so that everything is connected as cause and effect, ἀλλὰ παντί τε τῷ γινομένῳ ἕτερόν τι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἠρτημένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀπ’ ἀνάγκης ὡς αἰτίου, καὶ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἔχειν τι πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ᾧ ὡς αἰτίῳ συνήρτηται· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀναιτίως μήτε εἶναι μήτε γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ ἀπολελυμένον τε καὶ κεχωρισμένον τῶν προγεγονότων ἁπάντων· διασπᾶσθαι γὰρ καὶ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μηκέτι τὸν κόσμον ἕνα μένειν ἀεὶ, κατὰ μίαν τάξιν τε καὶ οἰκονομίαν διοικούμενον, εἰ ἀναίτιός τις εἰσάγοιτο κίνησις. See Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125; De Fato, 4, 7; M. Aurel. x. 5.

[378] In Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 164, the Stoic says: Nec vero universo generi hominum solum, sed etiam singulis a Diis immortalibus consuli et provideri solet.

[379] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 46: Singulis non adest [Jupiter], et tamen vim et causam et manum omnibus dedit. Cic. N. D. 66, 167: Magna Dii curant, parva negligunt. Ibid. iii. 35, 86: At tamen minora Dii negligunt ... ne in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant. Sic enim dicitis.

[380] Cicero uses the following argument to show that the providential care of God extends to individuals:—If the Gods care for all men, they must care for those in our hemisphere, and, consequently, for the cities in our hemisphere, and for the men in each city. The argument may be superfluous, but it serves to show that the care of individuals was the result of God’s care of the whole world. M. Aurel. vi. 44: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐβουλεύσαντο περὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐμοὶ συμβῆναι ὀφειλόντων οἱ θεοὶ, καλῶς ἐβουλεύσαντο ... εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐβουλεύσαντο κατ’ ἰδίαν περὶ ἐμοῦ, περί γε τῶν κοινῶν πάντως ἐβουλεύσαντο, οἷς κατ’ ἐπακολούθησιν καὶ ταῦτα συμβαίνοντα ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ στέργειν ὀφείλω. Similarly, iv. 28. It will be seen that the Stoics consider that the existence of divination, which served as a proof of special providence, was caused by the connection of nature.

[381] As Alex. c. 28, p. 88, fitly observes.

[382] The great majority of the Stoic answers to πολλὰ ζητήματα φυσικά τε καὶ ἠθικὰ καὶ διαλεκτικά, which (according to Plut. De Fato, c. 3) were called forth by the theory of destiny, in all probability belong to him.

[383] See p. 171, 3, Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 23, 2, p. 1045. He assigned as a general reason τὸ γὰρ ἀναίτιον ὅλως ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον. Hence the Stoic definition of τύχη is αἰτία ἀπρονόητος καὶ ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ in Plut. De Fato. c. 7, p. 572; Plac. i. 29, 3 (Stob. Ecl. i. 218); Alex. De Fato, p. 24; Simpl. Phys. 74, 6. See p. 171, 1.

[384] Alex. l.c. The Stoics assert that things are possible which do not take place, if in themselves they can take place, and διὰ τοῦτο φασὶ μηδὲ τὰ γενόμενα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, καίτοι ἀπαραβάτως γινόμενα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι, ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῖς δυνατὸν γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. Cic. Top. 15, 59: Ex hoc genere causarum ex æternitate pendentium fatum a Stoicis nectitur.

[385] Alex. De Fato, c. 10, p. 32; Cic. De Fato, 17, 39); 18, 41, and above, p. 115, 2. Hence Plut. Plac. (similarly Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 39, p. 149): ἃ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι κατ’ ἀνάγκην, ἃ δὲ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τύχην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον, which is evidently more explicit than the language used by Stob. Ecl. i. 176, and the statement of Theodoret on p. 171, 1.

[386] See p. 115, 2. Opponents such as Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 46, and Alex., pointed out how illusory this attempt was. According to the latter, he fell back on the simple result, maintaining that, in the case of things happening καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, there is nothing to prevent the opposite from coming about, so far as the causes which prevent this from happening are unknown to us.

[387] See above, p. 171, 3.

[388] Chrysipp. in Gell. N. A. vii. 2, 6; Alex. De Fato, c. 36, p. 112.

[389] Gell. l.c.; Alex. c. 13; Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 35, p. 138, 140. Alex. c. 33 (on which see Heine, p. 43) gives a long argument, concluding with the words: πᾶν τὸ καθ’ ὁρμὴν γινόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς οὕτως ἐνεργοῦσιν εἶναι. Nemes. appeals to Chrysippus, and also to Philopator, a Stoic of the second century A.D. Of him he remarks, that he has consistently attributed τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν to lifeless objects.

[390] Cic. De Fato, 18, 41: In order to avoid necessitas, or to uphold fate, Chrysippus distinguishes causæ principales et perfectæ from causæ adjuvantes, his meaning being that everything happens according to fate, not causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adjuvantibus. Conf. Cic. Top. 15, 59. Although these causes may not be in our power, still it is our will which assents to the impressions received. Œnomaus (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 3, and 10) charges Chrysippus with making a ἡμίδουλον of the will, because he laid so great a stress on its freedom.

[391] Gell. vii. 2, 13: Cic. l.c.

[392] Alex. c. 34, p. 106, puts in the mouth of the Stoics: τὰ μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἐνεργήσει μόνον, τὰ δὲ πράξει τὰ λογικὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἁμαρτήσεται, τὰ δὲ κατορθώσει. ταῦτα γὰρ τούτοις κατὰ φύσιν μὲν, ὄντων δὲ καὶ ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ κατορθωμάτων, καὶ τῶν τοιαύτων φύσεων καὶ ποιοτήτων μὴ ἀγνοουμένων, καὶ ἔπαινοι μὲν καὶ ψόγοι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ κολάσεις.

[393] Alex. c. 26, p. 82.

[394] Alex. c. 32, p. 102.

[395] The arguments usual among the Stoics in after times may, with great probability, be referred to Chrysippus.

[396] Alex. c. 35: λέγουσι γάρ· οὐκ ἔστι τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ πεπρωμένη· (It never happens that there is a εἱμαρμένη but not a πεπρωμένη) οὐδὲ ἔστι πεπρωμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ αἶσα· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν αἶσα, οὐκ [οὐδὲ] ἔστι δὲ νέμεσις· οὐκ ἔστι μὲν νέμεσις, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ νόμος· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν νόμος, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν ποιητέον ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον· ἀλλὰ ἀπαγορεύεται μὲν τὰ ἁμαρτανόμενα, προστάττεται δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι μὲν τοιαύτη ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ κατορθώματα· ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔστιν ἁμαρτήματα καὶ κατορθώματα, ἔστιν ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἔστι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐπαινετὸν, τὸ δὲ αἰσχρὸν ψεκτόν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ ψεκτόν. What is praiseworthy deserves τιμὴ or γέρως ἀξίωσις, and what is blameworthy merits κόλασις or ἐπανόρθωσις.

[397] Alex. c. 37, p. 118: A second argument ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς παλαίστρας is the following:—οὐ πάντα μὲν ἔστι καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἀκώλυτος καὶ ἀπαρεμπόδιστος ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κόσμος· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν κόσμος, οὐκ εἰσὶ δὲ θεοί· (for κόσμος, according to the definitions of Chrysippus, is the whole, including gods and men. See p. 158, 1) εἰ δέ εἰσι θεοὶ, εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ οἱ θεοί· ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, ἔστιν ἀρετή· ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ, ἔστι φρόνησις· ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ποιητέων τε καὶ οὐ ποιητέων· ἀλλὰ ποιητέα μὲν ἔστι τὰ κατορθώματα, οὐ ποιητέα δὲ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, κ.τ.λ. οὐκ ἄρα πάντα μὲν γίνεται καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ γεραίρειν καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν.

[398] Cic. De Fato, 12, 28; Diogenian. (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 16); Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37. Things which were determined by the co-operation of destiny alone Chrysippus called συγκαθειμαρμένα (confatalia). The argument by which he was confuted, which Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 489, erroneously attributes to the Stoics themselves, went by the name of ἀργὸς λόγος (ignava ratio). Besides the ἀργὸς λόγος, Plut. De Fato, c. 11, p. 574, mentions the θερίζων and the λόγος παρὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην as fallacies which could only be refuted on the ground of the freedom of the will. The last-named one, perhaps, turned on the idea (Œnomaus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 12) that man might frustrate destiny if he neglected to do what was necessary to produce the foreordained results. According to Ammon. De Inter. 106, a, Lucian, Vit. Auct. 22, the θερίζων was as follows:—Either you will reap or you will not reap: it is therefore incorrect to say, perhaps you will reap.