Chapter III

Then I complained that I was now in a greater confusion and more
doubtful difficulty than before. "What is that?" quoth she, "for I
already conjecture what it is that troubleth thee." "It seemeth," quoth
I, "to be altogether impossible and repugnant that God foreseeth all
things, and that there should be any free-will. For if God beholdeth all
things and cannot be deceived, that must of necessity follow which His
providence foreseeth to be to come. Wherefore, if from eternity he doth
not only foreknow the deeds of men, but also their counsels and wills,
there can be no free-will; for there is not any other deed or will, but
those which the divine providence, that cannot be deceived, hath
foreseen. For if things can be drawn aside to any other end than was
foreknown, there will not be any firm knowledge of that which is to
come, but rather an uncertain opinion, which in my opinion were impious
to believe of God. Neither do I allow of that reason with which some
suppose that they can dissolve the difficulty of this question. For they
say that nothing is therefore to come to pass because Providence did
foresee it, but rather contrariwise, because it shall be, it could not
be unknown to Providence, and in this manner the necessity passes over
to the other side. For it is not necessary, they argue, that those
things should happen which are foreseen, but it is necessary that those
things should be foreseen that are to come--as though our problem were
this, which of them is the cause of a thing, the foreknowledge of the
necessity of things to come, or the necessity of the foreknowledge of
things to come, and we were not trying to prove that, howsoever these
causes be ordered, the event of the things which are foreknown is
necessary, even though the foreknowledge seemeth not to confer necessity
of being upon the things themselves. For if any man sitteth the opinion
which thinketh so must needs be true, and again on the other side, if
the opinion that one sitteth be true, he must needs sit. Wherefore,
there is necessity in both, in the one of sitting and in the other of
truth. But one sitteth not because the opinion is true, but rather this
is true because one hath taken his seat. So that though the cause of
truth proceedeth from one part, yet there is a common necessity in both.

And the like is to be inferred of Providence and future things. For even
though they be foreseen because they shall be, yet they do not come to
pass because they are foreseen, notwithstanding it is necessary that
either things to come be foreseen by God, or that things foreseen do
fall out, which alone is sufficient to overthrow free-will. But see how
preposterous it is that the event of temporal things should be said to
be the cause of the everlasting foreknowledge! And what else is it to
think that God doth therefore foresee future things, because they are to
happen, than to affirm that those things which happened long since, are
the cause of that sovereign providence? Furthermore, as when I know
anything to be, it must needs be; so when I know that anything shall be,
it must needs be to come. And so it followeth that the event of a thing
foreknown cannot be avoided. Finally, if any man thinketh otherwise than
the thing is, that is not only no knowledge, but it is a deceitful
opinion far from the truth of knowledge; wherefore, if anything is to be
in such sort that the event of it is not certain or necessary, how can
that be foreknown that it shall happen? For as knowledge is without
mixture of falsity, so that which is conceived by it cannot be otherwise
than it is conceived. For this is the cause why knowledge is without
deceit, because everything must needs be so as the knowledge
apprehendeth it to be. What then? How doth God foreknow that these
uncertain things shall be? For if He judgeth that those things shall
happen inevitably, which it is possible shall not happen, He is
deceived, which is not only impious to think, but also to speak. But if
He supposeth that they shall happen in such sort as they are, so that He
knoweth that they may equally be done and not be done, what
foreknowledge is this which comprehendeth no certain or stable thing? Or
in what is this better than that ridiculous prophecy of Tiresias
"Whatsoever I say shall either be or not be"[172]? or in what shall the
divine providence exceed human opinion, if, as men, God judgeth those
things to be uncertain the event of which is doubtful? But if nothing
can be uncertain to that most certain fountain of all things, the
occurrence of those things is certain, which He doth certainly know
shall be. Wherefore there is no freedom in human counsels and actions,
which the divine mind, foreseeing all things without error or falsehood,
tieth and bindeth to one event. Which once admitted, it is evident what
ruin of human affairs will ensue. For in vain are rewards and
punishments proposed to good and evil, which no free and voluntary
motion of their minds hath deserved. And that will seem most unjust
which is now judged most just, that either the wicked should be punished
or the good rewarded, since their own will leadeth them to neither, but
they are compelled by the certain necessity of that which is to come. By
which means virtues and vices shall be nothing, but rather there will
follow a mixed confusion of all deserts. And--than which there can be
nothing invented more impious--since that all order of things proceedeth
from Providence, and human counsels can do nothing, it followeth that
our vices also shall be referred to the author of goodness. Wherefore
there is no means left to hope or pray for anything, since an unflexible
course connecteth all things that can be desired! Wherefore that only
traffic betwixt God and men of hope and prayer shall be taken away: if
indeed by the price of just humility we deserve the unestimable benefit
of God's grace; for this is the only manner by which it seemeth that men
may talk with God, and by the very manner of supplication be joined to
that inaccessible light before they obtain anything; which if by the
admitting the necessity of future things, they be thought to have no
force, by what shall we be united and cleave to that Sovereign Prince of
all things? Wherefore mankind must needs (as thou saidest in thy verse a
little before), being separated and severed from its source, fail and
fall away.

[172] Hor. _Sat._ ii. 5. 59.