Chapter XII

Then I said that I did very well like of Plato's doctrine, for thou dost
bring these things to my remembrance now the second time, first, because
I lost their memory by the contagion of my body, and after when I was
oppressed with the burden of grief. "If," quoth she, "thou reflectest
upon that which heretofore hath been granted, thou wilt not be far from
remembering that which in the beginning thou confessedst thyself to be
ignorant of." "What?" quoth I. "By what government," quoth she, "the
world is ruled." "I remember," quoth I, "that I did confess my
ignorance, but though I foresee what thou wilt say, yet I desire to hear
it more plainly from thyself." "Thou thoughtest a little before that it
was not to be doubted that this world is governed by God." "Neither do I
think now," quoth I, "neither will I ever think, that it is to be
doubted of, and I will briefly explicate the reasons which move me to
think so. This world could never have been compacted of so many divers
and contrary parts, unless there were One that doth unite these so
different things; and this disagreeing diversity of natures being united
would separate and divide this concord, unless there were One that
holdeth together that which He united. Neither would the course of
nature continue so certain, nor would the different parts hold so well-
ordered motions in due places, times, causality, spaces and qualities,
unless there were One who, Himself remaining quiet, disposeth and
ordereth this variety of motions. This, whatsoever it be, by which
things created continue and are moved, I call God, a name which all men
use."[141]

"Since," quoth she, "thou art of this mind, I think with little labour
thou mayest be capable of felicity, and return to thy country in safety.
But let us consider what we proposed. Have we not placed sufficiency in
happiness, and granted that God is blessedness itself?" "Yes truly."
"Wherefore," quoth she, "He will need no outward helps to govern the
world, otherwise, if He needed anything, He had not full sufficiency."
"That," quoth I, "must necessarily be so." "Wherefore He disposeth all
things by Himself." "No doubt He doth," quoth I. "But it hath been
proved that God is goodness itself." "I remember it very well," quoth I.
"Then He disposeth all things by goodness: since He governeth all things
by Himself, whom we have granted to be goodness. And this is as it were
the helm and rudder by which the frame of the world is kept steadfast
and uncorrupted." "I most willingly agree," quoth I, "and I foresaw a
little before, though only with a slender guess, that thou wouldst
conclude this." "I believe thee," quoth she, "for now I suppose thou
lookest more watchfully about thee to discern the truth. But that which
I shall say is no less manifest." "What?" quoth I. "Since that God is
deservedly thought to govern all things with the helm of goodness, and
all these things likewise, as I have showed, hasten to goodness with
their natural contention, can there be any doubt made but that they are
governed willingly, and that they frame themselves of their own accord
to their disposer's beck, as agreeable and conformable to their ruler?"
"It must needs be so," quoth I, "neither would it seem an happy
government, if it were an imposed yoke, not a desired health." "There is
nothing then which, following nature, endeavoureth to resist God."
"Nothing," quoth I. "What if anything doth endeavour," quoth she, "can
anything prevail against Him, whom we have granted to be most powerful
by reason of His blessedness?" "No doubt," quoth I, "nothing could
prevail." "Wherefore there is nothing which either will or can resist
this sovereign goodness." "I think not," quoth I. "It is then the
sovereign goodness which governeth all things strongly, and disposeth
them sweetly." "How much," quoth I, "doth not only the reason which thou
allegest, but much more the very words which thou usest, delight me,
that folly which so much vexed me may at length be ashamed of herself."

"Thou hast heard in the poets' fables," quoth she, "how the giants
provoked heaven, but this benign fortitude put them also down, as they
deserved. But wilt thou have our arguments contend together? Perhaps by
this clash there will fly out some beautiful spark of truth." "As it
pleaseth thee," quoth I. "No man can doubt," quoth she, "but that God is
almighty." "No man," quoth I, "that is well in his wits." "But," quoth
she, "there is nothing that He who is almighty cannot do." "Nothing,"
quoth I. "Can God do evil?" "No," quoth I, "Wherefore," quoth she, "evil
is nothing, since He cannot do it who can do anything." "Dost thou mock
me," quoth I, "making with thy reasons an inextricable labyrinth,
because thou dost now go in where thou meanest to go out again, and
after go out, where thou camest in, or dost thou frame a wonderful
circle of the simplicity of God? For a little before taking thy
beginning from blessedness, thou affirmedst that to be the chiefest good
which thou saidst was placed in God, and likewise thou provedst, that
God Himself is the chiefest good and full happiness, out of which thou
madest me a present of that inference, that no man shall be happy unless
he be also a God. Again thou toldest me that the form of goodness is the
substance of God and of blessedness, and that unity is the same with
goodness, because it is desired by the nature of all things; thou didst
also dispute that God governeth the whole world with the helm of
goodness, and that all things obey willingly, and that there is no
nature of evil, and thou didst explicate all these things with no
foreign or far-fetched proofs, but with those which were proper and
drawn from inward principles, the one confirming the other."

"We neither play nor mock," quoth she, "and we have finished the
greatest matter that can be by the assistance of God, whose aid we
implored in the beginning. For such is the form of the Divine substance
that it is neither divided into outward things, nor receiveth any such
into itself, but as Parmenides saith of it:

In body like a sphere well-rounded on all sides,[142]

it doth roll about the moving orb of things, while it keepeth itself
unmovable. And if we have used no far-fetched reasons, but such as were
placed within the compass of the matter we handled, thou hast no cause
to marvel, since thou hast learned in Plato's school that our speeches
must be like and as it were akin to the things we speak of.

[141] _Vide supra, Tr._ iv. (pp. 56 ff.).

[142] Cf. _Frag._ 8. 43 (Diels, _Vorsokratiker_, i. p. 158).