Chapter IX: Turkey and the Slavs (7)

“As to the would-be oppression which the Christians are supposed to
have endured in the Empire, let us merely consider that, whereas in
Europe the Christians mutually slaughtered each other mercilessly
and unceasingly in the name of their sacred Faith, and the
unfortunate Jews were cruelly driven away and tortured in the name
of the same Faith, the Turks, on the contrary, after ruling for a
thousand years over Turkish Asia with many vicissitudes, not only
tolerated the presence of millions of Christians in their large,
powerful Empire, but even granted them without any restriction,
under the benefit of Turkish laws and customs, all possibilities
to subsist, develop, and become rich, often at the expense of the
ruling race; and they offered a wide paternal hospitality to many
wretched people banished from Christian Europe.

“To-day Greece, trampling upon justice and right, lays an
iniquitous claim to the noble, sacred land of Turkish Thrace and
Asia. Yet can she show the same example of tolerance, and give a
strict account of her home policy towards the non-Greek elements,
especially concerning the condition and fate of the 300,000 Turks
who, before 1883, peopled the wide, fertile plains of Thessaly,
of the hundreds of thousands of Moslem Albanians, subjects of
the Empire, of the 150,000 Moslems in Crete, and of the 800,000
Moslems in Macedonia, whose unfortunate fate it was to pass under
her dominion?

“I need not dwell at length on this painful subject, which will be
an eternal shame to modern civilisation, for the victorious Powers
know a great deal more—after the inter-Allied inquiry held four
months ago in Smyrna—about the ‘gentle and fatherly’ manner in
which thousands of Mussulmans were slaughtered and exterminated by
the descendants of the civilisation of ancient Greece, who invaded
that essentially Turkish province during the armistice under
pretence of restoring order.”

And after recalling the figures of the various elements of the population of the Turkish Empire after the 1914 statistics, he concluded:

“Such figures speak but too eloquently, and the painful events
that drenched with blood the unfortunate Ottoman land since the
armistice raise only too much horror. So the Turkish people most
proudly and serenely awaits the righteous, humane, and equitable
sanction of the victorious Powers that have assumed before history
the heavy responsibility of placing the whole world on a lasting
basis of justice, concord, and peace.

“God grant they may choose the best way, the only way, that will
lead them to respect, as they solemnly pledged themselves to do,
the ethnic, historical, and religious rights of the Ottoman nation
and its Sultan, who is, at the same time, the supreme head of the
350 million Mussulmans throughout the world.”

On the same date (April 20, 1920) the Indian Caliphate delegation addressed a note to the president of the Allied Supreme Council at San Remo, to the English, French, Italian Prime Ministers, and to the Japanese ambassador. In this note they summed up their mandate with the Allied and Associated Powers, and insisted again on the claims they had previously laid before Mr. Lloyd George in the course of the interview mentioned previously.

“Firstly, the Mussulmans of India, in common with the vast majority
of their co-religionists throughout the world, ask that, inasmuch
as independent temporal sovereignty, with its concomitants of
adequate military and economic resources, is of the essence of
the institution of the Khilafat, the Empire of the Khalifa shall
not be dismembered under any pretext. As the Sultan of Turkey is
recognised by the vast majority of Mussulmans as Khalifa, what
is desired is that the fabric of the Ottoman Empire shall be
maintained intact territorially on the basis of the _status quo
ante bellum_, but without prejudice to such political changes as
give all necessary guarantees consistent with the dignity and
independence of the sovereign State for the security of life and
property, and opportunities of full autonomous development for
all the non-Turkish communities, whether Muslim or non-Muslim,
comprised within the Turkish Empire. But on no account is a Muslim
majority to be placed under the rule of a non-Muslim minority
contrary to the principle of self-determination. In behalf of this
claim, the delegation draw the attention of the Supreme Council
to the declaration of the British Prime Minister, equally binding
on all the Allied and Associated Powers, when on January 5, 1918,
he said: ‘Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital,
or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which
are predominantly Turkish in race,’ and to President Wilson’s
twelfth point in his message to Congress, dated January 8, 1918,
on the basis of which the armistice with Turkey was concluded, and
which required ‘that the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman
Empire should be assured of secure sovereignty; that the other
nationalities now under Turkish rule should be assured security of
life and autonomous development.’ The delegation submit that any
departure from the pledges and principles set forth above would be
regarded by the people of India, and the Muslim world generally,
as a breach of faith. It was on the strength of these and similar
assurances that tens of thousands of India Mussulmans were induced
to lay down their lives in the late war in defence of the Allied
cause.

“Secondly, we have to submit that the most solemn religious
obligations of the Muslim Faith require that the area known as the
Jazirat-ul-Arab, or the ‘Island of Arabia,’ which includes, besides
the Peninsula of Arabia, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, shall
continue to be, as heretofore for the last 1,300 years, under
exclusively Muslim control, and that the Khalifa shall similarly
continue to be the Warden and Custodian of the Holy Places and
Holy Shrines of Islam—namely, Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Nejef,
Kerbela, Samarra, Kazimain, and Baghdad, all situated within the
Jazirat-ul-Arab.

Any encroachment upon these sanctuaries of Islam by the
inauguration of non-Muslim control in whatever guise or form,
whether a protectorate or mandate, would be a direct violation of
the most binding religious injunctions of Islam and the deepest
sentiment of Muslims all the world over, and would, therefore, be
utterly unacceptable to the Mussulmans of India and the rest of
the Indian community. In this connection, apart from the religious
obligations to which we refer, the delegation would draw the
attention of the Supreme Council to the proclamation issued by
the Government of India, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty’s
Government, as also the Governments of France and Russia, on
November 2, 1914, in which it was specifically declared that ‘no
question of a religious character was involved’ in this war, and it
was further categorically promised that ‘the Holy Places of Arabia,
including the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the port of Jedda,
will be immune from attack or molestation.’”

After pointing out that these were the lowest possible claims the Mussulmans could set forth, the note went on as follows:

“But the Mussulmans of India have already submitted to the British
Government that a Turkish settlement made in disregard of their
religious obligations, on respect for which their loyalty has
always been strictly conditional, would be regarded by Indian
Mussulmans as incompatible with their allegiance to the British
Crown. This is a contingency which the Mussulmans of India, in
common with all their compatriots, constituting a population of
over three hundred millions, naturally view with the keenest
apprehension and anxiety, and are most earnestly desirous of
preventing by every means in their power. We believe that the
British Government, at any rate, is fully apprised of the range
and intensity of public feeling that has been aroused in India
on this question, and we content ourselves, therefore, by simply
stating here that the Khilafat movement represents an unprecedented
demonstration of national feeling and concern. Only on March 19
last, the day when the delegation was received by the British Prime
Minister, all business was suspended throughout the continent
of India by Mussulmans and Hindus alike, as a reminder and
reaffirmation of the Muslim case in respect of the future of the
Khilafat. This unprecedented yet peaceful demonstration involved a
loss of millions to the public at large, and was undertaken solely
with the object of impressing the authorities and others concerned
with the universality of Indian and Muslim sentiment on the
question. If, notwithstanding all constitutional and loyal
representations which the Mussulmans of India have put forward
on behalf of the obligation imposed upon them by their Faith, a
settlement is imposed upon Turkey which would be destructive of the
very essentials of the Khilafat, a situation would arise in which
it would be futile to expect peace and harmony to prevail in India
and the Muslim world.

“The delegation, therefore, feel it their duty most solemnly to
urge upon the Supreme Council the desirability of endeavouring to
achieve a peace settlement with the Ottoman Empire which would
be in consonance with the most binding religious obligations and
overwhelming sentiments of so large and important a section of the
world community.”

As a consequence of what has just been said:

“The delegation would beg, even at this late hour, that the Supreme
Council will defer taking any final decisions on this question
in order to afford to them an opportunity, such as they have
repeatedly applied for, of laying their case before the Council.
In answer to our request to be allowed to appear before the
Supreme Council, the British Secretary to the Council intimated to
us that only the accredited Governments of the territories with
whose future the Peace Conference is dealing are allowed to appear
before it, and that at the request of the British Government the
official delegation of India had already been heard. But we have
already represented that the Turkish settlement, involving as it
does the question on the Khilafat, in the preservation of which
the Mussulmans of the world are so vitally interested, does not
obviously seem to be a question on which the Peace Conference
should hear only the Governments of territories with whose future
they are dealing. In fact, the concern of the Muslim world for the
future of the Khilafat, which is the most essential institution
of Islam, transcends in importance the interests of the various
Governments that are being set up in different parts of the
Khilafat territories; and the delegation trusts that no technical
objection will be allowed to stand in the way of doing justice and
securing peace.”

And, finally, the note concluded:

“With reference to the official delegation of India, which the
Supreme Council has already heard, the Indian Khilafat delegation
would invite the attention of the Council to the fact that, so far
at least, the State and the nation are not one in India, and the
delegation submit that a nation numbering more than 315 millions of
people is entitled to a hearing before a final decision is taken
on a question that has incontestably acquired a national status.
The delegation hope that they may, without may disrespect to the
members comprising the official delegation of India, also refer to
the fact that no Indian Mussulman was represented on the delegation
in spite of Muslim protest.”

In a second telegram, dated April 24, 1920, the Indian Caliphate delegation, after the reply made to them by the British secretary of the Supreme Council at San Remo on April 20, expressed their deep regret that—

“the Council, while giving a hearing to a number of delegations
representing at best microscopic populations inhabiting meagre
areas and permitting the Premier of Greece, which was not at war
with Turkey, to take part in the discussions relating to the
Turkish settlement, should have ignored the claims of a nation
numbering more than 315 millions of people inhabiting the vast
sub-continent of India even to a hearing, and should have denied
the right of several hundred millions more in the rest of the
world professing the Muslim Faith to express their views on the
question involving the disintegration of the Khilafat. In the name
of our compatriots and co-religionists, we deem it to be our duty
once more to point out to the Government of Great Britain and to
her Allies, that it would be perfectly futile to expect peace and
tranquillity if, to the humiliating disregard of the overwhelming
national sentiment of India, which would in any case lessen the
value of citizenship of the British Empire to the Indian people,
is added, as a result of the secret diplomacy of a few persons,
however exalted and eminent, who are now settling the fate of Islam
behind closed doors, a contemptuous disregard of the most binding
and solemn religious obligations imposed on the Muslims by their
Faith.”

The delegation did not conceal their disappointment at the way they had been received by the Allied representatives and the little attention paid to the objections they had set forth. Yet they had viewed the Ottoman question from a lofty standpoint, and had brought forward powerful arguments in favour of Turkey. While the Indian delegation were setting forth the Turkish claims before the Peace Conference, the Press, public opinion, and political circles which had been influenced in some degree by the coming of the delegates evinced more sympathy for Turkey, and the deliberations of the Conference seemed likely to assume a more favourable attitude towards Turkey. Yet the Conference, in this case as in many others, and in spite of the warnings it had received, kept to its first resolutions, though everything seemed to invite it to modify them.

On May 6 the Ottoman delegation arrived in Paris. It comprised the former Grand Vizier Tewfik Pasha; Reshid Bey, Minister of the Interior; Fakhr ed Din Bey, Minister of Public Education; and Dr. Jemil Pasha, Minister of Public Works, accompanied by seventeen advisers and five secretaries.

On the previous Thursday, before they left Constantinople, the Sultan had received the delegates, and had a long conversation with each of them.

The draft of the treaty was handed to the delegates on the expected date, May 11.

We refer the reader to this document, which contains thirteen chapters; some of the most important provisions are so laboriously worded that they may give rise to various interpretations, and it is impossible to sum them up accurately.

Several clauses of that draft called forth many objections, and we shall only deal with the most important ones.

The treaty assigned to Greece all the Turkish vilayet of Adrianople or Eastern Thrace—that is to say, the territory which includes Adrianople, the second town and former capital of the Ottoman Empire, and the burial-place of Selim the Conqueror. It only left to European Turkey a mere strip of land near Constantinople up to the Chatalja lines. Besides, this region is entirely included in the “Zone of the Straits” to be controlled by a Commission of the Powers which includes Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria, but excludes Turkey herself.

Now, according to the official census of March, 1914, the Adrianople vilayet which includes Kirk Kilisse, Rodosto, and Gallipoli, had a population of 360,400 Turks—_i.e._, 57 per cent. of the inhabitants—as against 224,680 Greeks, or 35·5 per cent., and 19,888 Armenians. In addition, though in Eastern Thrace the Moslem populations are mingled with numerous Greek elements, the majority of the people are Mussulmans. Out of the 673,000 inhabitants of Thrace, 455,000 are Mussulmans.

It is noteworthy that after 1914 a good number of the Greeks in that vilayet emigrated into Macedonia, where they were replaced by the Mussulmans expelled by the Greek administration, and that out of the 162,000 Orthodox Greeks amenable to the Greek Patriarch, 88,000 are Gagavous—that is to say, are of Turkish descent and speak Turkish.

Out of about 4,700,000 acres of land which make up the total area of the Adrianople vilayet, 4,000,000 acres, or 84 per cent., are in Moslem hands, and the Orthodox Greeks hardly possess 600,000 acres.

The Moslem population of Western Thrace, which is no longer under Turkish sovereignty, rises to 362,000 souls, or 69 per cent., against 86,000 Greeks, or 16·5 per cent., and if the figures representing the Moslem population in both parts of Thrace are counted, we get a total number of 700,000 Mussulmans—_i.e._, 62·6 per cent.—against 310,000 Greeks, or 26 per cent.

Mr. Lloyd George had already guaranteed to Turkey the possession of that region on January 5, 1918, when he had solemnly declared: “Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race,” and he had repeated this pledge in his speech of February 25, 1920.

Yet a month after he declared to the Indian Caliphate delegation, as has been seen above, that the Turkish population in Thrace was in a considerable minority, and so Thrace should be taken away from Turkish rule. If such was the case, it would have been logical to take from Turkey the whole of Thrace.

As the Indian delegation inquired at once on what figures the Prime Minister based his Statements he answered:

“It is, of course, impossible to obtain absolutely accurate figures
at the present moment, partly because all censuses taken since
about the beginning of the century are open to suspicion from
racial prejudice, and partly because of the policy of expulsion
and deportation pursued by the Turkish Government both during
and before the war. For instance, apart from the Greeks who were
evicted during the Balkan wars, over 100,000 Greeks were deported
into Anatolia from Turkish Thrace in the course of these wars,
while about 100,000 were driven across the frontiers of Turkish
Thrace. These refugees are now returning in large numbers. But
after the study of all the evidence judged impartially, the best
estimate which the Foreign Office could make is that the
population of Turkish Thrace, in 1919, was 313,000 Greeks and
225,000 Turks.... This is confirmed by the study of the Turkish
official statistics in 1894, the last census taken before the
Greco-Turkish war, after which ... all censuses as to races
in these parts became open to suspicion. According to these
statistics, the population of Turkish Thrace and of the part of
Bulgarian Thrace ceded to the Allies by the treaty of Neuilly was:
Greeks, 304,500: Mussulmans, 265,300; Bulgarians, 72,500.”

On receipt of this communication, the delegation naturally asked to what region the Greeks “who were evicted during the Balkan wars” had migrated, and to what extent, according to the Foreign Office estimates, “counter-migration of Turks had taken place into what is the present Turkish Thrace,” when Macedonia was made, on the authority of Englishmen themselves, “an empty egg-shell” and when the Greeks and Bulgarians had decided to leave no Turks in the occupied territories, to make a “Turkish question” within the newly extended boundaries of Greece and Bulgaria. It was natural that part of the Turkish population driven away from Macedonia should settle down in the Turkish territory conterminous to Eastern Thrace, as it actually did.

With regard to the “100,000” Greeks “deported into Anatolia from Turkish Thrace during the course of these wars,” and the “100,000 driven across the frontiers of Turkish Thrace,” the delegation asked to what part of Anatolia the deportees had been taken, and to what extent this deportation had affected the proportion of Turkish and Greek populations in that part of Anatolia. It would certainly be unfair to make Turkish Thrace preponderatingly Greek by including in its Greek population figures of Greek deportees who had already served to swell the figures of the Greek population in Anatolia. Under such circumstances, as the figures which the Prime Minister considered as reliable on January 5, 1918, had been discarded since and as the figures of a quarter of a century ago were evidently open to discussion, the delegation proposed that the Supreme Council should be given a complete set of figures for every vilayet, and if possible for every sanjak or kaza, of the Turkish Empire as it was in 1914. But the Prime Minister’s secretary merely answered that it was impossible to enter into a discussion “on the vexed question of the population statistics in these areas.”

As to Smyrna, the statistics plainly show that, though there is an important Greek colony at Smyrna, all the region nevertheless is essentially Turkish. The figures provided by the Turkish Government, those of the French Yellow Book, and those given by Vital Cuinet agree on this point.

According to the French Yellow Book, the total population of the vilayet included 78·05 per cent. Turks against 14·9 per cent. Greeks.

M. Vital Cuinet gives a total population of 1,254,417 inhabitants (971,850 Turks and 197,257 Greeks), and for the town of Smyrna 96,250 Turks against 57,000 Greeks.

According to the last Ottoman statistics in 1914 the town of Smyrna, where the Greek population had increased, had 111,486 Turks against 87,497 Greeks; but in the whole vilayet there were 299,097 Greeks—_i.e._, 18 per cent.—against 1,249,067 Turks, or 77 per cent., and 20,766 Armenians.

From the 299,097 Greeks mentioned in the statistics we should deduct the 60,000 or 80,000 Greeks who were expelled from the vilayet, by way of reprisal after the events of Macedonia in January to June, 1914. The latter, according to the agreement between Ghalib Kemaly Bey, Turkish minister at Athens, and M. Venizelos (July, 1914), come under the same head as the Greeks of Thrace and Smyrna who were to be exchanged for the Mussulmans of Macedonia.

Mr. Lloyd George’s secretary, whom the Indian delegation also asked, in reference to Smyrna, on what figures he based his statements, answered on behalf of the Prime Minister:

“The pre-war figures for the sanjak of Smyrna, according to the
American estimates, which are the most up-to-date and impartial,
give the following result: Greeks, 375,000; Mussulmans, 325,000;
Jews, 40,000; and Armenians, 18,000. These figures only relate
to the sanjak of Smyrna, and there are other kazas in the
neighbourhood which also show a majority of Greeks.”

Now, according to the official Turkish figures, the sanjak of Smyrna had, before the war, 377,000 Mussulmans as against 218,000 Greeks, while during the war the Muslim figure rose to 407,000 and the Greek figure was considerably reduced. Only in the kazas of Urla, Shesmeh, Phocœa, and Kara-Burun in the sanjak of Smyrna, are there Greek majorities; but in no other kaza, whether of Magnesia, Aidin, or Denizli, is the Greek element in a majority. Moreover, the Greek minority is important only in the kaza of Seuki in the sanjak of Aidin; everywhere else it is, as a rule, less than 10 per cent., and only in two kazas is it 15 or 16 per cent.

The treaty recognises Armenia as a free and independent State, and the President of the United States is to arbitrate on the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis. Now, though everybody—including the Turks—acknowledges that as a principle it is legitimate to form an Armenian State, yet when we consider the nature of the population of these vilayets, we cannot help feeling anxious at the condition of things brought about by this decision.

As a matter of fact, in Erzerum there are 673,000 Mussulmans, constituting 82·5 per cent. of the population, as against 136,000 Armenians, or 16·5 per cent. In Trebizond the Mussulmans number 921,000, or 82 per cent. of the population, as against 40,000 Armenians, or 23·5 per cent. In the vilayet of Van the Muslim population is 179,000, or 69 per cent., and the Armenian population 67,000, or 26 per cent. In Bitlis the Mussulmans number 310,000, or 70·5 per cent., as against 119,000 Armenians, constituting 27 per cent. Thus, in these four vilayets the Mussulmans number 2,083,000, and the Armenians 362,000, the average being 80 per cent. against 13 per cent.

On the other hand, it is difficult to prove that Turkey has persistently colonised these territories. The only fact that might countenance such an assertion is that at various times, especially after the Crimean war, many Tatars sought shelter in that part of the Empire, and that in 1864, and again in 1878, Circassians, escaping from the Russian yoke, took refuge there after defending their country. The number of the families that immigrated is estimated about 70,000. Turkey encouraged them to settle down there all the more willingly as they were a safeguard to her against the constant threat of Russia. But as early as 1514, at the time of the Turkish conquest, the Armenians were inferior in number, owing to the Arabian and Persian pressure that repeatedly brought about an exodus of the native population northwards and westwards, and because some Persian, Arabian, Seljukian, Turkish, and Byzantine elements slowly crept into the country. In 1643 Abas Schah, after his victorious campaign against Turkey, drove away nearly 100,000 Armenians, and later on a huge number of Armenians emigrated into Russia of their own free will after the treaty of Turkmen-Tchai in 1828.

It is noteworthy that an Armenian Power first came into existence in the second century before Christ. It consisted of two independent States, Armenia Major and Armenia Minor. After the downfall of Tigrane, King of Armenia Major, defeated by the Romans, Rome and Persia fought for the possession of those regions, and, finally, divided them. Later on there were various Armenian States, which were more or less independent, but none of them lasted long except the State of Armenia Minor, which lasted from the twelfth century to the fourteenth, till Selim II conquered that territory, where the Arabs, the Persians, the Seljukian Turks, and the Byzantines had already brought the Armenian dominion to an end.

Therefore the numerical majority of Mussulmans in Armenia has not been obtained or maintained, as has been alleged, by the “Turkish massacres”; it is the outcome of more complex causes—which, of course, is no excuse for the tragic events that took place there. As the Conference did not seem to pay any attention either to the figures of M. Vital Cuinet (_Turquie d’Asie_, Paris, 1892), or to the figures published by the French Government in the Yellow Book of 1897, based upon the data furnished by the Christian Patriarchates, or to the figures given by General Zeleny to the Caucasian Geographical Society (_Zapiski_, vol. xviii., Tiflis, 1896), the Indian delegation asked that a report should be drawn up by a mixed Moslem and non-Moslem Commission, consisting of men whose integrity and ability were recognised by their co-religionists; but this suggestion met with no better success than the international inquiry already suggested by the delegation in regard to the population of every vilayet in Thrace.

The chapter dealing with the protection of minorities plainly shows how much influence the aforesaid Protestant Anglo-American movement had on the wording of the treaty. In none of the four previous treaties are included such stipulations as those contained in the Turkish treaty, and there is a great difference in this respect between the Bulgarian treaty and the Turkish treaty. The latter, under the term “minority,” only considers the condition of the Christians, and ensures to them privileges and power in every respect over the Mussulmans.

As the Permanent Committee of the Turkish Congress at Lausanne remarked in its critical examination of the treaty:

“Whereas in the Bulgarian treaty freedom of conscience and religion
is guaranteed so far as is consistent with morality and order, this
clause does not occur in the Turkish treaty.

The Turkish treaty states that all interference with any religious
creed shall be punished in the same way; in the Bulgarian treaty
this clause is omitted, for here it would imply the protection of a
non-Christian religion.”

In regard to Article 139, that “Turkey renounces formally all right of suzerainty or jurisdiction of any kind over Moslems who are subject to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other State,” the Indian Caliphate delegation raised an objection in a letter addressed to Mr. Lloyd George, dated July 10, 1920:

“It is obvious that Turkey has, and could have, no ‘rights of
suzerainty or jurisdiction’ over Mussulmans who am not her
subjects; but it is equally obvious that the Sultan of Turkey, as
Khalifa, has, and must continue to have so long as he holds that
office, his very considerable ‘jurisdiction’ over Muslims who are
’subject to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other State.’
The law of Islam clearly prescribes the character and extent of the
‘jurisdiction’ pertaining to the office of Khalifa, and we cannot
but protest most emphatically against this indirect, but none the
less palpable, attempt on the part of Great Britain and her allies
to force on the Khalifa a surrender of such ‘jurisdiction,’ which
must involve the abdication of the Khalifa.”

The delegation also considered that Article 131, which lays down that “Turkey definitely renounces all rights and privileges, which, under the treaty of Lausanne of October 12, 1912, were left to the Sultan in Libya,” infringes “rights pertaining to the Sultan as Caliph, which had been specially safeguarded and reserved under the said treaty of Lausanne.” It also expressed its surprise that “this categorical and inalienable requirement of the Muslim Faith, supported as it is by the unbroken practice of over thirteen hundred years, was totally disregarded by Articles 94 to 97 of the Peace Treaty, read in conjunction with Articles 22 and 132,” which cannot admit of any non-Muslim sovereignty over the Jazirat-ul-Arab, including Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia.

Referring again to the objection the British Prime Minister pretended to base on the proclamation of the Emir Feisal, King of Syria, and on the Arabs’ request to be freed from Turkish dominion, the Indian Caliphate delegation in the same letter answered Mr. Lloyd George, who had asked them in the course of his reception “whether they were to remain under Turkish domination merely because they were Mohammedans”:

“We would take the liberty to remind you that if the Arabs, who are
an overwhelmingly large majority in these regions, have claimed
independence, they have clearly claimed it free from the incubus
of so-called mandates, and their claim to be freed from Turkish
dominion is not in any way a claim to be subjected to the ‘advice
and assistance’ of a mandatory of the principal Allied Powers.
If the principle of self-determination is to be applied at all,
it must be applied regardless of the wishes and interests of
foreign Powers covetously seeking to exploit regions and peoples
exposed to the danger of foreign domination on account of their
unprotected character. The Arab Congresses have unequivocally
declared that they want neither protectorates nor mandates nor any
other form of political or economic control; and the delegation,
while reiterating their view that an amicable adjustment of Arab
and Turkish claims by the Muslims themselves in accordance with
Islamic law is perfectly feasible, must support the Arab demand for
complete freedom from the control of mandatories appointed by the
Allies.

“With regard to the Hejaz, Article 98, which requires Turkey not
only to recognise it as a free and independent State, but to
renounce all rights and titles there, and Article 99, which makes
no mention of the rights and prerogatives of the Khalifa as Servant
of the Holy Places, are, and must ever be, equally unacceptable to
the Muslim world.”

On the other hand, as the Jewish question and the Eastern question are closely connected and have assumed still more importance owing to the Zionist movement, the treaty forced on Turkey concerns the Jews in the highest degree.

It must be borne in mind that if Sephardic Judaism has been gradually smothered by Turkish sovereignty, the Ottoman Empire has proved most hospitable to the Jews driven away by Christian fanaticism, and that for five centuries the Jews have enjoyed both tolerance and security, and have even prospered in it. So the Jews naturally feel anxious, like the Moslems in the provinces wrested from the old Ottoman Empire, when, following the precedent of Salonika, they see Greece annex the region of Adrianople and Smyrna; and they have a right to ask whether Greece, carried away by a wild imperialism, will not yield to her nationalist feeling and revive the fanaticism of religious struggles. So the Allies, foreseeing this eventuality, have asked Greece to take no action to make the Jews regret the past; but as the Greek anti-Semitic feeling is rather economic than religious in character, it is to be feared that the competition of the two races in the commercial struggle will keep up that feeling. The annexation of Thrace would probably concern 20,000 Jews—13,000 at Adrianople, 2,000 at Rodosto, 2,800 at Gallipoli, 1,000 at Kirk Kilisse, 1,000 at Demotica, etc. Great Britain having received a mandate for Palestine—that is to say, virtually a protectorate—on the condition of establishing “a national home for the Jews”—whatever the various opinions of the Jews with regard to Zionism may be—a question is now opened and an experiment is to be tried which concerns them deeply, as it is closely connected with Judaism.

In the course of the reception by Mr. Lloyd George of the Indian Caliphate delegation, M. Mohammed Ali told the British Prime Minister in regard to the Jewish claims in Palestine:

“The delegation have no desire to cause an injustice to the Jewish
community, and I think Islam can look back with justifiable pride
on its treatment of this community in the past. No aspiration of
the Jewish community which is reasonable can be incompatible with
Muslim control of the Holy Land, and it is hoped that the Ottoman
Government will easily accommodate the Jewish community in such
aspirations of theirs as are reasonable.

“Some responsible propagandists of the Zionist movement, with whom
I have had conversations, frankly admit: ‘We do not want political
sovereignty there; we want a home; the details can be arranged and
discussed.’ I asked them: ‘Do you mean that Great Britain herself
should be the sovereign Power there, or should be the mandatory?’
and they said: ‘No, what we want is an ordinary, humanly speaking
reasonable guarantee that opportunities of autonomous development
would be allowed to us.’ We, ourselves, who have been living in
India, are great believers in a sort of Federation of Faiths. I
think the Indian nationality, which is being built up to-day, will
probably be one of the first examples in the world of a Federation
of Faiths, and we cannot rule out the possibility of development
in Palestine on the lines of ‘cultural autonomy.’ The Jews are,
after all, a very small minority there, and I do not believe for
one moment that Jews could be attracted there in such large numbers
as the Zionist enthusiasts sometimes think. I would say the same
thing of an Armenian State, without desiring to say one word which
would be considered offensive to any class of people. Because we,
ourselves, have suffered so many humiliations, we do not like
ourselves to say anything about other people that they would
resent. If the Allied Powers brought all the Armenians together and
placed them all in a contiguous position, excluding the present
Kurdish community from them, no matter what large slice of land you
gave them, I think they would very much like to go back to the old
status....

“In the same way I would say of the Jewish community, that they are
people who prosper very much in other lands, and although they have
a great hankering after their home, and no community is so much
bound up with a particular territory as the Jewish community is,
still, I must say that we do not fear there will be any great
migration of such a character that it will form a majority over
the Muslim population. The Jewish community has said: ‘We have no
objection to Turkish sovereignty remaining in that part of the
world so long as we are allowed to remain and prosper there and
develop on our own lines, and have cultural autonomy.’”

M. Mohammed Ali, in his letter to Mr. Lloyd George, dated July 10, 1920, also observed that—

“With regard to Palestine in particular, the delegation desire to
state that Article 99, embodying the declaration of the British
Government of November 2, 1917, is extremely vague, and it is not
clear in what relation the so-called national home for the Jewish
people, which is proposed to be established in Palestine, would
stand to the State proposed to be established there. The Mussulmans
of the world are not ashamed of their dealings with their Jewish
neighbours, and can challenge a comparison with others in this
respect; and the delegation, in the course of the interview with
you, endeavoured to make it clear that there was every likelihood
of all reasonable claims of Jews in search of a home being accepted
by the Muslim Government of Palestine. But if the very small Jewish
minority in Palestine is intended to exercise over the Muslim, who
constitute four-fifths of the population, a dominance now, or in
the future, when its numbers have swelled after immigration, then
the delegation must categorically and emphatically oppose any such
designs.”

* * * * *

The telegram in which Tewfik Pasha informed Damad Ferid of the conditions of the treaty, and which the latter communicated to the Press, was printed by the _Peyam Sabah_, surrounded with black mourning lines. Ali Kemal, though he was a supporter of the Government and could not be accused of anglophobia, concluded his article as follows:

“Better die than live blind, deaf, and lame. We have not given up
all hope that the statesmen, who hold the fate of the world in
their hands and who have officially proclaimed their determination
to act equitably, will not allow this country, which has undergone
the direst misfortunes for years and has lost its most sacred
rights, to suffer a still more heinous injustice.”

All the Constantinople newspapers, dealing at full length with the conditions, unanimously declared that the treaty was unacceptable. The _Alemdar_, another pro-English newspaper, said:

“If the treaty is not altered it will be difficult to find a man
willing to sign it.”

Another newspaper, the _Ileri_, wrote:

“The anguish which depressed our hearts while we were anxiously
waiting seems a very light one compared to the pang we felt when we
read the treaty.”

The aforesaid _Peyam Sabah_, after a survey of the conditions, came to this conclusion:

“Three lines of conduct are open to the Turkish people:

“To beg for mercy and make the Powers realise that the loss of
Smyrna will be a great blow to Turkey and will bring no advantage
to Greece, and that the Chatalja frontier will be a cause of
endless hostility between the various races.

“To sign the treaty and expect that the future will improve the
condition of Turkey; but who in Turkey could sign such a treaty?

“To oppose passive resistance to the execution of the conditions of
peace, since all hope of armed resistance must be given up.”

Public opinion unanimously protested against the provisions of the treaty, but fluctuated and hesitated as to what concessions could be made.

Damad Ferid, receiving a number of deputies who had stayed at Constantinople and wanted to go back to the provinces, told them that he saw no objection to their going away, and that orders to that effect had been given to the police. Then he is said to have declared that they might tell their mandatories that he would never sign a treaty assigning Smyrna and Thrace to Greece and restricting Turkish sovereignty to Constantinople, and that on this point there was no difference of opinion between him and the Nationalists. He also informed them that in due time he would hold fresh elections, and the treaty would be submitted for approval to the new Chamber.

The Grand Vizier, who had asked Tewfik Pasha to let him see the note which was being prepared by the Turkish delegation at Versailles, was, on his side, elaborating the draft of another answer which was to be compared with that of the delegation, before the wording of the Turkish answer to the Peace Conference was definitely settled.

But the occupation of Lampsaki, opposite to Gallipoli, by the Turkish Nationalists, together with the Bolshevist advance in Northern Persia and Asia Minor, made things worse, and soon became a matter of anxiety to England.

After the text of the Peace Treaty had been presented to the Turks, and when the latter had the certainty that their fears were but too well grounded, it appeared clear that the decisions taken by the Allies would be certain to bring about a coalition of the various parties, and that all Turks, without any distinction of opinion, would combine to organise a resistance against any operation aiming at taking from them Eastern Thrace—where the Bulgarian population was also averse to the expulsion of the Turkish authorities—at assigning Smyrna and the Islands to Greece, and at dismembering the Turkish Empire.

Colonel Jafer Tayar, who commanded the Adrianople army corps and had openly declared against the Sultan’s Government since the latter was at war with the Nationalists, had come to Constantinople at the beginning of May, and it was easy to guess for what purpose. Of course, it had been rumoured, after he left Constantinople, that the Government was going to appoint a successor to him, but nothing of the kind had been done, and he still kept his command. When he came back to Adrianople, not only had no conflict broken out between him and the troops under his command, but he had been given an enthusiastic greeting. As soon as it was known that the San Remo Conference had decided to give Thrace to Greece, up to the Chatalja lines, resistance against Greek occupation was quickly organised. Jafer Tayar, an Albanian by birth—he was born at Prishtina—became the leader of the movement. He hurriedly gathered some contingents made up of regular soldiers and volunteers, and put in a state of defence, as best he could, the ports of the western coast of the Marmora. Jafer Tayar wondered why Thrace was not granted the right of self-determination like Upper Silesia or Schleswig, or autonomy under the protection of France, whose administration in Western Thrace had proved equitable and had given satisfaction to that province. In face of this denial of justice, he had resolved to fight for the independence of Thrace.

It was soon known that the Moslem population of Adrianople had held a meeting at the beginning of May, in which, after a speech by Jafer Tayar, all the people present had pledged themselves to fight for the liberty of Thrace. A similar demonstration took place at Gumuljina. A congress including above two hundred representatives of the whole of Western Thrace had been held about the same time at Adrianople.

In Bulgaria a movement of protest was also started, and on Sunday, May 9, numerous patriotic demonstrations were held in all the provincial towns.

On May 16 the inhabitants of Philippopolis and refugees from Thrace, Macedonia, and the Dobruja living at that time in the town, held a meeting of several thousand people, and without any distinction of religion, nationality, or political party carried the following motion against the decision taken by the San Remo Conference to cede Thrace to Greece:

“They enter an energetic protest against the resolution to cede
Thrace to Greece, for that would be a flagrant injustice and an
act of cruelty both to a people of the same blood as we, and to
the Bulgarian State itself; they declare that the Bulgarian people
cannot, of their own free will, accept such a decision of the San
Remo Conference, which would be a cause of everlasting discord
in the Balkans—whereas the victorious Powers of the Entente have
always professed to fight in order to restore peace to those
regions; and they entreat the Governments, which have come to
this decision, to cancel it and to raise Thrace to the rank of
an autonomous, independent State under the protection of all the
Powers of the Entente, or one of them.”

On May 25—that is to say, two days before the Greek occupation—a few “Young Turk” and Bulgarian elements proclaimed the autonomy of Western Thrace, and formed a provisional Government to oppose the occupation. At the head of this Government were Tewfik Bey, a Young Turk, Vachel Georgieff, and Dochkoff, Bulgarian komitadjis. But the latter were expelled by General Charpy before the Greek troops and authorities arrived, and the Greek Press did its best to misrepresent that protest against Greek domination. They set off to Adrianople, taking with them the treasury and seals of the Moslem community, and were greeted by Jafer Tayar.

On the other hand, the resistance of the Turkish Nationalists was becoming organised, and as soon as the conditions of peace were known new recruits joined Mustafa Kemal’s forces.

The Nationalist elements, owing to the attitude of the Allies towards Turkey, were now almost thrown into the arms of the Russian Bolshevists, who carried on an energetic propaganda in Asia Minor and offered to help them to save their independence, though they did so to serve their own interests.

Damad Ferid, Mustafa Kemal’s personal enemy, who stood halfway between the Allied Powers and the Nationalists, believed that if he did not displease the Allies, he could pull his country out of its difficulties.

Before the draft of the treaty was handed to the Turks, the Ottoman Government had already begun to raise troops to fight the Nationalists. They were to be placed under command of Marshal Zeki, who had formerly served under Abdul Hamid. It was soon known that this military organisation had been entrusted by the Turkish War Minister to the care of British officers at whose instigation the first contingents had been sent to Ismid, which was to be the Turkish base.

It was soon announced that Damad Ferid Pasha’s troops, who had remained loyal and were commanded by Ahmed Anzavour Pasha and Suleyman Shefik Pasha, had had some hard fighting with the rebels in the Doghandkeui and Geredi area, east of Adabazar, which they had occupied, and that the Nationalists, whose casualties had been heavy, had evacuated Bolu. The information was soon contradicted, and at the beginning of the last week of April it became known that Anzavour and his troops had just been utterly defeated near Panderma, and that this port on the Marmora had fallen into the Nationalists’ hands. Ahmed Anzavour had had to leave Panderma for Constantinople on board a Turkish gunboat, and Mustafa Kemal now ruled over all the region round Brusa, Panderma, and Balikesri. Moreover, in the Constantinople area, a great many officers and soldiers were going over to the Nationalists in Anatolia.

It should be kept in mind that Ahmed Anzavour, though he was of Circassian descent, was unknown in his own country. He had been made pasha to command the Government forces against the Nationalists with the help of the Circassians, who are numerous in the Adabazar region, and to co-operate with the British against his fellow-countrymen, who merely wished to be independent.

Suleyman Shefik Pasha resigned, and some defections took place among the troops under his command.

About the same time, the emergency military court had sentenced to death by default Mustafa Kemal, Colonel Kara Yassif Bey, Ali Fuad Pasha, who commanded the 20th army corps, Ahmed Rustem Bey, ex-ambassador at Washington, Bekir Sami Bey, Dr. Adnan Bey, ex-head of the sanitary service, and his wife, Halidé Edib Hanoum, all impeached for high treason as leaders of the Nationalist movement.

Yet, despite all the measures taken by Damad Ferid and the moral and even material support given to him by the Allies, what could be the outcome of a military action against the Nationalists? How could the Ottoman Government compel the Turks to go and fight against their Anatolian brethren in order to force on them a treaty of peace that it seemed unwilling to accept itself, and that sanctioned the ruin of Turkey?

In some Turkish circles it was wondered whether a slightly Nationalist Cabinet co-operating with the Chamber would not have stood a better chance to come to an understanding with Anatolia and induce her to admit the acceptable parts of the treaty; for should Damad Ferid, who was not in a good position to negotiate with the Nationalists, fail, what would be the situation of the Government which remained in office merely because the Allies occupied Constantinople?

Of course, the Foreign Office proclaimed that foreign troops would be maintained in every zone, and that the treaty would be carried out at any cost. Yet the real Ottoman Government was no longer at Constantinople, where Damad Ferid, whose authority did not extend beyond the Ismid-Black Sea line, was cut off from the rest of the Empire; it was at Sivas. As no Government force or Allied army was strong enough to bring the Nationalist party to terms, it was only in Anatolia that the latter Government could be crushed by those who, with Great Britain, had conspired to suppress 12 million Turks and were ready to sacrifice enough soldiers to reach this end.

On the other hand, it soon became known that at Angora the question of the Caliph-Sultan had been set aside, and even the Sultan’s name was now being mentioned again in the _namaz_, or public prayer offered every Friday—that is to say, all the parties had practically arrived at an understanding.

Besides, as most likely Greece would have to face difficulties, if not at once, at least in a comparatively short time, inspired information, probably of Greek origin, already intimated that the Supreme Council would decide whether France, England, and Italy would have to support Greece—though one did not see why France and Italy should defray the expenses of that new adventure by which England first, and Greece afterwards, would benefit exclusively.

On Saturday, May 22, the very day on which a Crown Council met under the Sultan’s presidency to examine the terms of the treaty, over 3,000 people held a meeting of protest at Stambul, in Sultan Ahmed Square. Some journalists, who were well known for their pro-English feelings—such as Ali Kemal, an ex-Minister, editor of the _Sabah_; Refi Jevad, editor of the _Alemdar_; Mustafa Sabri, a former Sheik-ul-Islam—and some politicians delivered speeches. The platform was draped with black hangings; the Turkish flags and school banners were adorned with crêpe. After the various speakers had explained the clauses of the treaty and showed they were not acceptable, the following motions were passed:

“First, in contradiction to the principle of nationalities, the
treaty cuts off from the Empire Thrace, Adrianople, Smyrna,
and its area. In case the Allied Powers should maintain their
decisions—which seems most unlikely—we want these regions to be
given local autonomy.

“Secondly, now the Arabian territories have been cut off from the
Ottoman Empire, the Turks, in accordance with the principle of
nationalities, should be freed from all fetters and bonds hindering
their economic development on the path to progress and peace. To
maintain the Capitulations and extend them to other nations is
tantamount to declaring the Turks are doomed to misery and slavery
for ever.

“Thirdly, the Turks, relying on the fair and equitable feelings of
the Allied Powers, require to be treated on the same footing as the
other vanquished nations.

“Fourthly, the Turkish people, feeling sure that the peace
conditions are tantamount to suppressing Turkey as a nation, ask
that the treaty should be modified so as to be made more consistent
with right and justice.

“Fifthly, the aforesaid resolutions shall be submitted to the
Allied High Commissioners and forwarded to the Peace Conference.”

These resolutions were handed after the meeting to M. Defrance, the senior Allied High Commissioner, who was to forward them to the Peace Conference.

As the difficulties increased, and more important and quicker communications with the Ottoman delegation in Paris were becoming necessary, the Cabinet thought of sending the Grand Vizier to Paris. Upon the latter’s advice, and probably at the instigation of the English, several members of the dissolved Chamber set off to Anatolia in order to try and bring about an understanding between Damad Ferid and the Nationalists, for the conditions of the treaty, as was to be expected, had now nearly healed the rupture between the Central Government and the Turkish Nationalists, especially as the Anglo-Turkish Army was unable to carry out the treaty and Damad Ferid and his supporters were neither willing nor able to enforce it. Even the English had sent delegates to Mustafa Kemal, who had refused to receive them.

The Grand Vizier, after reviewing the troops at Ismid, found they were not strong enough, and requested the headquarters merely to stand on the defensive. Indeed, after a slight success in the Gulf of Ismid, the Government forces found themselves in a critical condition, for the Anatolian troops had occupied Kum Kale, close to the Dardanelles, and Mustafa Kemal had concentrated forces in that region.

The Chamber, which had been dissolved at Constantinople, resumed its sittings at Angora. It criticised the Allies’ policy with regard to Turkey, especially the policy of England, at whose instigation Constantinople had been occupied and military measures had been taken on the coasts of the Black Sea.

In the speech he delivered at the first sitting of the Chamber, Mustafa Kemal showed that the English occupation of Constantinople had been a severe blow at the prestige of the Caliph and Sultan. “We must do our best,” he said, “to free the Sultan and his capital. If we do not obey his orders just now, it is because we look upon them as null and void, as he is not really free.”