Chapter IX: Turkey and the Slavs (13)

Russia never gave up this policy; indeed, she did not carry out her plans by force of arms, for the other Powers would have opposed them; but she resorted to all possible means to ensure its triumph. She constantly aimed at the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by supporting and grouping the Christian elements included in this empire, especially those of Slavonic race and Orthodox faith; and thus she really partitioned the Empire and bound to herself the old Ottoman provinces now raised to the rank of autonomous States. She acted most cautiously, and in order to carry out her plans peacefully she sought to dismember Turkey gradually and weaken her in order to finally rule over her. It has been rightly said that as early as 1770 the Russians opened the Eastern question exactly as it stands to-day, and already advocated the solution they have always insisted upon.[45]

A century ago Alexander I declared it was time to drive the Turks out of Europe. Talleyrand, in the account he gave of the conversations between that Emperor and the French ambassador, relates that he said one day:

“Now is the time to give the plans laid down by us at Tilsit the
liberal aspect that befits the deeds of enlightened sovereigns. Our
age, still more than our policy, requires that the Turks be driven
into Asia; it will be a noble deed to free these beautiful lands.
Humanity wants the eviction of those barbarians; civilisation
demands it.”

But Napoleon had fully understood the Russian policy, for at the end of his life he said at St. Helena: “I could have shared Turkey with Russia; many a time did I speak about it with the Emperor, Alexander I, but every time Constantinople proved the stumbling-block. The Tsar demanded it, and I could not cede it; for it is too precious a key; it is worth an empire.”

At the memorable sitting of the House of Commons of March 29, 1791, some speakers expressed the anxiety felt in Great Britain, just after Catherine II had annexed the Crimea, lest the Russians should capture the whole of the East. But Fox, the leader of the Liberal party, declared he saw no ground for fear in the constant increase of Muscovite power; he did his best to please the Tsarina, who, on her side, continued to flatter him to obtain what she wanted from England; he recalled that the British themselves had opened the Mediterranean to Russian ships twenty years before, and he had told the French Minister Vergennes, who desired him to protest against the annexation of the Crimea, that Great Britain did not wish to raise any difficulty with Catherine II.

Unfortunately, the Marquis de Villeneuve, Louis XV’s ambassador, and the Comte de Bonneval, who had been converted to Islam, had been the last Frenchmen who had supported the Sublime Porte against the Russian Tsar’s hostility and endeavoured to use Islam as the protector of the liberty of peoples imperilled by the Tsars; and yet this old policy of France had the advantage both of benefiting French trade and counterbalancing the power of the enemies of France.[46] On the other hand, at the Congress of Sistovo in 1791, Sir Robert Murray Keith, who acted as mediator in the conclusion of the Austro-Turkish treaty of peace, recommended his fellow-countrymen “to let the Turks dwindle down in their own dull way.” So now French policy and English policy were going the same way.

During the reign of Charles X, the Polignac Cabinet was willing to sacrifice Constantinople to the Russians in return for the left bank of the Rhine, and in 1828 Chateaubriand, French ambassador at Rome, favoured an alliance with the Tsar in order to obtain the revision of the 1815 treaties, at the cost of Constantinople. Moreover, Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, by destroying the Turco-Egyptian fleet at Navarino on October 20, 1827, with the combined fleets of Great Britain, France, and Russia, furthered the Russian Tsar’s plans.

As the direct capture of the Straits was bound to raise diplomatic difficulties, Nicholas I, on September 4, 1892, summoned a secret council to discuss what policy Russia was to pursue on this point. The opinion which prevailed was expressed in a memorandum drawn up by a former diplomatist, Dimitri Dashkov, then Minister of Justice, and in a draft partition of the Turkish Empire penned by a Greek, Capodistria. This secret committee, dreading the opposition of the Western States, decided to postpone the partition lest, as Great Britain and France refused their consent, it should not finally benefit the designs of Russia and Greece on Constantinople. These secret debates have been summed up in a book published in 1877;[47] and M. Goriainov, in the book he wrote on this question in 1910,[48] thought it proper to praise the consistent magnanimity of the Tsars towards the Turks—whereas the policy which maintained that no reforms would ever be instituted by Turkey of her own free-will if they were not urged on by diplomatic intrigues or international interference, and that “the sick man” could only be restored to health by the intervention of Christendom and under the Orthodox tutelage, was the real cause of the decay of Turkey and the origin of all the intricacies of the Eastern problem.

In 1830 Lord Holland, Fox’s nephew—it will be remembered that on March 29, 1791, Fox had said in the House of Commons he was proud of supporting Russia’s advance to the East, in opposition to William Pitt, who wanted to admit Turkey into the European concert—declared he was sorry, as “a citizen of the world,” that the Russians had not yet settled down in the Golden Horn.

Besides, whereas the Tories felt some anxiety at the territorial development of Russia—without thinking of making use of Turkey to consolidate the position in the East—the Whigs, on the contrary, to use the words of Sir Robert Adair in 1842, thought they could bring the Muscovite Empire into the wake of the United Kingdom.

In June, 1844, the Tsar himself came to London in order to induce Great Britain to approve his Eastern policy, and Russian diplomacy felt so confident she could rely on the support of the English Liberal Cabinet that in 1853 Nicholas I, in the overtures made to Sir Hamilton Seymour, expressed his conviction that he could settle the Turkish problem in ten minutes’ conversation with Lord Aberdeen.

On June 4, 1878, Lord Beaconsfield, who looked upon the part of England in the East as that of a moral protectorate over Islam and a mediator between Europe and Asia, by ensuring the institution of a system of reforms, signed a treaty of alliance with Turkey, by which England pledged herself to protect the Porte against Russian greediness in Asia. Unfortunately, Mr. Gladstone, under the influence of the ideas we have already expounded,[49] soon reversed the Eastern policy of England and unconsciously made his country the Tsar’s ally against Turkey.

Russia, to whom it was now impossible, since the Bulgarians and Rumanians were no longer under Ottoman dominion, to reach the shores of the Bosphorus through Thrace and to conquer Constantinople and the Straits, which had been the aim of her policy for centuries, then turned her designs towards Turkish Armenia and Anatolia, as we have just seen, in order to reach Constantinople through Asia.

Tiutshev, in one of his poems entitled _Russian Geography_, said:

“Moscow, Peter’s town, and Constantine’s town, are the three sacred
capitals of the Russian Empire. But how far do its frontiers extend
to the north and the east, to the south and the west? Fate will
reveal it in the future. Seven inland seas and seven great rivers,
from the Nile to the Neva, from the Elbe to China, from the Volga
to the Euphrates, from the Ganges to the Danube—this is the Russian
Empire, and it will last through untold centuries! So did the
Spirit predict. So did Daniel prophesy!”

And in another place:

“Soon will the prophecy be fulfilled and the fateful time come!
And in regenerated Byzantium the ancient vaults of St. Sophia will
shelter Christ’s altar again. Kneel down before that altar, thou
Russian Tsar, and rise, thou Tsar of all the Slavs.”

The manœuvres in which Great Britain and Russia indulged during the first Balkan crisis in regard to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina are another striking proof of the rivalry between these two nations concerning the Straits, for they plainly show that their possession was still the chief ambition of Russia, and that Great Britain, on the other hand, was still determined to control the Straits directly or indirectly, as she could not possibly seize them openly.

At the time of that annexation, the Western Powers and Russia had proposed that a conference should be summoned to decide the fate of that country. But this proposal did not please Germany, who, though she had a right to be angry with Austria, who had neither consulted nor warned her, yet wanted to reconcile the patronising attitude she had assumed towards Turkey with her obligations as an ally of the Dual Monarchy. So Russia was obliged to submit to the annexation, and the idea of a conference was given up after Prince von Bülow had stated that Germany would back Austria, but that in regard to the indemnity claimed by Turkey as a compensation for the loss of her suzerainty over Bosnia-Herzegovina she would support Turkey. Meanwhile, M. de Tschirschkly, German ambassador at Vienna, did his best both to isolate Austria and to bring her to rely more and more on German friendship by striving to disturb the traditional friendly intercourse between London and Vienna; and he took advantage of the disappointment caused in Austria by the breaking off of the negotiations with Turkey to make England responsible for their failure and embitter the enmity already prevailing between Austria and Russia.

Now at this juncture Russia is reported to have declared her willingness to support Turkey, in return for which she wanted her to open up the Straits to her ships. This secret understanding was revealed to the British Government by Kiamil Pasha, a friend of England, who, at the suggestion of the British embassy, asked Russia whether, in case war should break out, she would take up arms in favour of Turkey. At the same time England hinted to the St. Petersburg Cabinet that she was aware it had opened negotiations, and that, should these negotiations bring about an understanding between Turkey and Russia, the relations between their two countries would be severely strained, and the situation would become critical. And so it turned out that Turkey too submitted to the annexation, and did not insist upon the meeting of the Conference.

Meanwhile Russia had no thought of giving up her designs on Constantinople, as is proved by the revelations made in the Memoirs of Count Witte, the well-known Russian diplomatist and ex-Prime Minister, which were published in the _Daily Telegraph_ in January, 1921. In one of his articles, concerning Nicholas II’s character, we read that a Russo-Turkish war had been planned at the suggestion of M. de Nelidov, at that time Russian ambassador to Turkey.

“In the latter period of the year 1896, writes Count Witte, there
was a massacre of Armenians in Constantinople, preceded by a
similar massacre in Asia Minor. In October, His Majesty returned
from abroad, and Nelidov, our ambassador to Turkey, came to St.
Petersburg. His arrival gave rise to rumours about various measures
which were going to be taken against Turkey. These rumours forced
me to submit to His Majesty a memorandum, in which I stated my
views on Turkey, and advised against the use of force. On November
21 (December 3) I received a secret memoir drafted by Nelidov. The
ambassador spoke in vague terms about the alarming situation in
Turkey, and suggested that we should foment incidents which would
create the legal right and the physical possibility of seizing the
Upper Bosphorus. Nelidov’s suggestion was discussed by a special
conference presided over by His Majesty. The ambassador insisted
that a far-reaching upheaval was bound to occur in the near future
in the Ottoman Empire, and that to safeguard our interests we must
occupy the Upper Bosphorus. He was naturally supported by the War
Minister and the Chief of Staff, General Oberouchev, for whom the
occupation of the Bosphorus and, if possible, of Constantinople,
was a veritable _idée fixe_. The other Ministers refrained from
expressing their opinion on the subject, so that it fell to my lot
to oppose this disastrous project, which I did with vigour and
determination. I pointed out that the plan under consideration
would eventually precipitate a general European war, and shatter
the brilliant political and financial position in which Emperor
Alexander III left Russia.

“The Emperor at first confined himself to questioning the members
of the Conference. When the discussion was closed he declared that
he shared the ambassador’s view. Thus the matter was settled, at
least in principle—namely, it was decided to bring about such
events in Constantinople as would furnish us with a serious pretext
for landing troops and occupying the Upper Bosphorus. The military
authorities at Odessa and Sebastopol were instructed immediately
to start the necessary preparations for the landing of troops
in Turkey. It was also agreed that at the moment which Nelidov
considered opportune for the landing he would give the signal by
sending a telegram to our financial agent in London, requesting
him to purchase a stated amount of grain. The dispatch was to be
immediately transmitted to the Director of the Imperial Bank and
also to the Minister of the Navy.”

M. de Nelidov went back to Constantinople to carry out this plan, and war seemed so imminent that one of the secretaries of the director of the Imperial Bank “kept vigil all night long, ready to receive the fateful telegram,” and was instructed to transmit it to the director.

“Fearing the consequences of the act, I could not refrain from
sharing my apprehensions with several persons very intimate
with the Emperor, notably Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich and
Pobiedonostzev.... I do not know whether it was the influence of
these men or the influence of that Power which rules the whole
world and which we call God, but His Majesty changed his mind
and instructed Nelidov, soon after the latter’s departure for
Constantinople, to give up his designs.”

After the attack by the Turkish ships on October 29 and 30, the Emperor Nicholas, on November, 1914, issued a manifesto to his people, which, though sibylline in tone, plainly asserted Russia’s designs on Constantinople and showed that she meant to avail herself of circumstances to carry them out.

“The Turkish fleet, led by Germans, has dared treacherously to
attack our Black Sea coast. We, with all the peoples of Russia,
feel quite confident that Turkey’s rash intervention will only
hurry on her doom, and open to Russia the way to the solution of
the historical problem bequeathed to us by our forefathers on the
shores of the Black Sea.”[50]

In the course of an audience which Nicholas II granted to M. Maurice Paléologue, French ambassador, at Tsarkoie-Selo on November 21, 1914, and in the course of which he laid down the main lines of the peace which he thought should be dictated to the Central Powers, he considered how the settlement of the war would affect the other nations, and declared:

“In Asia Minor I shall have naturally to take care of the
Armenians; I could not possibly replace them under the Turkish
yoke. Shall I have to annex Armenia? I will annex it only if the
Armenians expressly ask me to do so. Otherwise, I will grant them
an autonomous régime. Lastly, I shall have to ensure for my Empire
the free passage of the Straits....

“I have not quite made up my mind on many points; these are such
fateful times! Yet I have arrived at two definite conclusions:
first, that the Turks must be driven out of Europe; secondly,
that Constantinople should henceforth be a neutral town, under an
international régime. Of course, the Mussulmans would have every
guarantee for the protection of their sanctuaries and shrines.
Northern Thrace, up to the Enos-Midia line, would fall to Bulgaria.
The rest of the country, between this line and the coast, with
the exception of the Constantinople area, would be assigned to
Russia.”[51]

About the end of 1914, according to M. Maurice Paléologue, public opinion in Russia was unanimous on this point, that—

“The possession of the Straits is of vital interest to the Empire
and far exceeds in importance all the territorial advantages
Russia might obtain at the expense of Germany and Austria.... The
neutralisation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be an
unsatisfactory, mongrel compromise, pregnant with dangers for the
future.... Constantinople must be a Russian town.... The Black Sea
must become a Russian lake.”[52]

In the formal statement of the Government policy read on February 9, 1915, at the opening of the Duma, after mention had been made of the victories gained by the Russian armies over Turkey, the following sentence occurred: “Brighter and brighter does the radiant future of Russia shine before us in yonder place, on the shores of the sea which washes the battlements of Constantinople.”

Sazonov only hinted at the question of the Straits in the speech which followed, but he declared: “The day is drawing near when the economic and political problems arising from the necessity for Russia to have free access to the open sea will be solved.”

Evgraf Kovalevsky, deputy of Moscow, stated in his turn: “The Straits are the key of our house, so they must be handed over to us, together with the Straits area.”

Then, M. Miliukov, after thanking M. Sazonov for his declaration, concluded his speech in these terms:

“We are happy to hear that our national task will soon be
completed. We now feel confident that the possession of
Constantinople and the Straits will be ensured in due time, through
diplomatic and military channels.”

The question of Constantinople captivated public opinion at that time, and in February, 1915, it engrossed the minds of all prominent men in Russia. Public feeling agreed with the declarations we have just read, that a victorious peace must give Constantinople to Russia.

At the beginning of March, M. Sazonov could not refrain from raising this question with the ambassadors of France and Great Britain, and asked them to give him an assurance that the Governments of London and Paris would consent after the war to the annexation of Constantinople by Russia.[53]

On March 3, at the dinner given in honour of General Pau, Nicholas II talked on the same subject to M. Paléologue. The Emperor, after recalling the conversation he had had with him in November of the previous year, in the course of which he had said France could rely upon Russia, and telling him he had not altered his mind, said:

“There is a point, however, about which recent events compel me to
say a few words; I mean Constantinople. The question of the Straits
engrosses the Russian mind more and more every day. I consider I
have no right to impose on my people the dreadful sacrifices of
the present war without granting as a reward the fulfilment of
their age-long aspirations. So I have made up my mind, sir. I do
not want half-measures to solve the problem of Constantinople and
the Straits. The solution I pointed out to you in November last
is the only possible one, the only practical one. The city of
Constantinople and Southern Thrace must be incorporated into my
Empire; yet I have no objection, as far as the administration of
the city is concerned, to a special régime making allowance for
foreign interests. You know that England has already sent me her
approval. If any minor difficulties should arise, I rely on your
Government to help me to smooth them.”[54]

On March 8, M. Paléologue told M. Sazonov that he had just received a telegram from M. Delcassé, and was in a position to give him the assurance that he could rely on the French Government’s friendly offices in settling the questions of Constantinople and the Straits according to the wishes of Russia. M. Sazonov thanked him very warmly, and added these significant words: “Your Government has done the Alliance a priceless service ... a service the extent of which perhaps you do not realise.”[55] On the 15th the French Government, having examined the conditions of peace which the Allies meant to impose on Turkey, informed the Russian Government of the compensations France required in Syria.

On March 16, after being received by the Emperor at the General Headquarters at Baranovitchi, the Grand Duke Nicholas, speaking as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, had a formal conversation with M. Paléologue, speaking as French ambassador, and requested him to inform his Government that he considered the immediate military co-operation of Rumania and Italy as an imperative necessity. The French ambassador suggested that the Russian claims on Constantinople and the Straits would, perhaps, prevent Rumania and Italy joining the Allies. Upon which the Grand Duke answered: “That’s the business of diplomacy. I won’t have anything to do with it.”[56]

Finally, the following letter of M. Koudashev to M. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, printed in the collection of secret documents of the Russian Foreign Office published in December, 1917,[57] shows how deeply the leaders of Russia and the Russian people had this question at heart, that it commanded all their foreign policy, and that they were determined to use any means, to resort to any artifice, in order to solve it in conformity with their wishes. No wonder, then, as we pointed out at the beginning of this book, that Turkey, being fully aware of the Russian enmity, should have consented to stand by the side of Germany in a war in which her very existence was at stake.

IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS,
_February_ 5, 1916 (o.s.).

“Most honoured Serguey Dmitrievich,—At the request of General
Alexiev, I waited on him to discuss how the capture of Erzerum
could be best exploited.

“Such an event obviously points to a certain state of mind in
Turkey which we should turn to account. If a separate peace with
Turkey was to be contemplated, it should be borne in mind that
such favourable circumstances are not likely to occur again within
a long time. It would undoubtedly be our advantage to start the
negotiations after a victory which the enemy rightly or wrongly
fears will be attended with a new catastrophe.

“Considering that our forces on the secondary front of Caucasus
are insignificant and it is impossible to take away one soldier
from the chief centre of operations, it would be most difficult, in
General Alexiev’s opinion, to derive full profit from the glorious
success of our Caucasian army in a strictly military sense.

“Though he does not wish to advocate an immediate peace with
Turkey, the general desires me to bring to your knowledge some of
his views concerning this eventuality that the situation created by
our recent success may be carefully considered and fully utilised.

“According to him, it would be most important to specify the war
aims of Russia. Though the brigadier-general is fully aware this
is a question to be settled by the Government, yet he thinks his
opinion might be of some weight.

“In the course of our conversation, we have come to the following
conclusions:

“Whatever may have been our prospects at the time when Turkey
entered into the war, of securing compensations at the cost of
the latter country when peace is concluded, we must own that our
expectations will not be fulfilled during the present war. The
longer the war lasts, the more difficult it will be for us to
secure the possession of the Straits. General Alexiev and General
Danilov agree on this point. I refer you to my letters of December,
1914, and January, 1915, as to Danilov’s opinion.

“The defeat of the chief enemy and the restoration of the parts
of the Empire we have lost should be our chief war aim. Our most
important enemy is Germany, for there cannot be any question that
at the present time it is more important for us to recover the
Baltic Provinces than take possession of the Straits. We must
by all means defeat Germany. It is a difficult task, which will
require great efforts and sacrifices. The temporary abandonment of
some of our hopes should be one of these sacrifices.

“Considering the advantages a separate peace with Turkey would
bring us, we might offer it to her without injuring our real
‘interests’—the occupation of the Straits being merely postponed—on
the basis of the _status quo ante bellum_, including the
restoration of the Capitulations and the other rights acquired by
the treaties. We should also demand the dismissal of the Germans,
with a promise on our side to defend Turkey in case of German
reprisals. If a separate peace could be concluded with Turkey on
such a basis, all our Caucasian army would be available. We could
send it to Bessarabia and thus—who knows?—bring Rumania to our
side, or, if Turkey asks for it, send it to defend Constantinople.
England would heave a sigh of relief when the dangers of the
Egyptian campaign and of the Muslim movement thus vanished. She
would then be able to send her Egyptian army—nine divisions—to
Salonika and Kavala, bar the way definitely to the Bulgarians and
liberate Serbia with the help of the French, the Italians, and the
reconstituted Serbian Army. If Turkey were no longer our enemy,
the situation in the Balkans would be quite altered, and we should
be able to keep in touch with our Allies by clearing the southern
route of Europe. In short, the advantages of a separate peace with
Turkey are innumerable. The chief result would be the defeat of
Germany, the only common war aim of all the Allies. No doubt, we
all—they as well as we—will have to waive some of our cherished
schemes. But we are not bound to give them up for ever. If we carry
on the war with Turkey, we delude ourselves with the hope our ideal
can be fulfilled. If we interrupt the war with that country, we
postpone for a time the fulfilment of our wishes. But in return
for this, we shall defeat Germany, the only thing which can secure
a lasting peace for all the Allies and a political, military, and
moral superiority for Russia. If a victory over Germany gives us
back the paramount situation we enjoyed after the Napoleonic wars,
why could not the glorious period of the treaties of Adrianople and
Hunkiar-i-Skelessi occur again? In concluding that treaty we should
have only to take care not to offend the Western Powers, and yet
meet the requirements of Russia.

“Perhaps I have stated General Alexiev’s opinions too unreservedly,
as I wished to give this report a definite form. Though the
brigadier-general does not wish to be the advocate or promoter of
the idea of a separate peace with Turkey, I am sure he looks upon
this as a highly profitable scheme.

“Of course, many difficulties will have to be overcome in the
conclusion of such a peace; but is not every matter of importance
attended with difficulties? Public opinion should be warned that
we cannot possibly secure the fulfilment of all our wishes at
once, that it is impossible for us to shake off German hegemony,
reconquer the shores of the Baltic, and the other provinces now in
the hands of the enemy, and at the same time take Constantinople.
The conquest of Tsarigrad in the present circumstances must
necessarily raise many a political and moral question. The Turks,
too, will have to be convinced. But they may be influenced both
by logical and pecuniary arguments. If once the question of the
loss of their capital is waived, it will be pretty easy for us to
convince them that the Germans merely want their help for selfish
purposes without any risk to themselves. If some of them turned a
deaf ear to logical arguments, we might resort to more substantial
arguments, as has always been the way with Turkey.

“But the discussion of such details is still premature. For the
present, the important points are:

“1. Plainly to define our real war aim.

“2. To decide, in connection with this aim, whether a separate
peace with Turkey should not be contemplated at once.

“3. To prepare public opinion—the Duma is to meet tomorrow—and our
Allies for such a turn of events.

“I want to conclude this long letter by stating that General
Alexiev and I share the feelings of all Russians in regard
to Constantinople, that we do not disregard the ‘historical
call of Russia,’ in the solution of the Eastern question,
but that we are actuated by the sincere wish to clarify the
situation by distinguishing what is possible at the present time
from those aspirations whose fulfilment is momentarily—only
momentarily—impossible.”

It is obvious that if, at the beginning of the war, General Kuropatkine maintained that it was a military necessity to occupy part of Turkey, it was because the only aim of Russia in entering into the conflict was the conquest of Constantinople.

In an article entitled “_La Neutralisation des Dardanelles et du Bosphore_,” which was written at the beginning of the war, M. Miliukov confirmed the Russian designs on the Black Sea and consequently on all the part of Europe and Asia Minor contiguous to it. He recalled that, by the former treaties concluded with Russia before the European nations had interfered in the Eastern question—those of 1798, 1805, and 1833—the Porte had granted Russian warships the free passage of the Straits, though the Black Sea was still closed to the warships of any other Power, and that when the treaties of 1841, 1856, and 1871 had laid down the principle of the closure of the Straits, Russia had always preferred this state of things to the opening of the Black Sea to the warships of all nations. This article throws a light on the policy pursued by Russia and the propaganda she is still carrying on in the hope of bringing about the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire. So the writer recognised that it was the duty of Russia to oppose the dispossession of Turkey and that, if the Straits passed under Russian sovereignty, they ought not to be neutralised.

Taking up this question again in an interview with a correspondent of _Le Temps_ in April, 1917, M. Miliukov stated that the map of Eastern Europe, as it ought to be drawn up by the Allies, involved “the liquidation of the Turkish possessions in Europe, the liberation of the peoples living in Asia Minor, the independence of Arabia, Armenia, and Syria, and finally, the necessity of recognising Turkey’s right to the possession of the Straits.” Nobody knows what was to become of the Turks in such a solution, or rather it is only too plain that “the liquidation of the Turkish possessions in Europe” meant that Russia would take possession of the Straits and rule over the Turkish territories in Asia Minor.

Though both the Conservatives and the Bolshevists in Russia were plainly drawing nearer to Germany, M. Miliukov, who seemed to forget the pro-German leaning of Tsardom and the tendency he himself openly displayed, came to this conclusion:

“The Straits to Russia—that, in my opinion, is the only way out of the difficulty. The neutralisation of the Straits would always involve many serious dangers to peace, and Russia would be compelled to keep up a powerful war fleet in the Black Sea to defend our coasts. It would give the warships of all countries a free access to our inland sea, the Black Sea, which might entail untold disasters. Germany wants the Straits in order to realise her dreams of hegemony, for her motto is ‘Berlin-Baghdad,’ and we, Russians, want the Straits that our importation and exportation may be secure from any trammels or threats whatever. Nobody can entertain any doubt, therefore, as to which Power is to own the Straits; it must be either Germany or Russia.”

Prince Lvov, M. Sazonov, M. Chaikovsky, and M. Maklakov, in a memorandum addressed to the President of the Peace Conference on July 5, 1919, on behalf of the Provisional Government of Russia, stated the Russian claims with regard to Turkey, and the solution they proposed to the question of the Straits and Constantinople was inspired by the agreements of 1915 and showed they had not given up anything of their ambition. For, though they had no real mandate to speak of the rights of New Russia they declared:

“New Russia has, undoubtedly, a right to be associated in the task
of regeneration which the Allied and Associated Powers intend to
assume in the former Turkish territories.

“Thus, the question of the Straits would be most equitably settled
by Russia receiving a mandate for the administration of the Straits
in the name of the League of Nations. Such a solution would
benefit both the interests of Russia and those of the whole world,
for the most suitable régime for an international road of transit
is to hand over its control to the Power which is most vitally
interested in the freedom of this transit.

“This solution is also the only one which would not raise any of
the apprehensions which the Russian people would certainly feel if
the aforesaid mandate were given to any other Power or if a foreign
military Power controlled the Straits.

“For the moment, Russia, in her present condition, would be
satisfied if the control of the Straits were assigned to a
provisional international administration which might hand over its
powers to her in due time, and in which Russia in the meantime
should hold a place proportionate to the part she is called upon to
play in the Black Sea.

“As to Constantinople, Russia cannot think for one moment of ceding
this city to the exclusive administration of any other Power. And
if an international administration were established, Russia should
hold in it the place that befits her, and have a share in all that
may be undertaken for the equipment, exploitation, and control of
the port of Constantinople.”

Some documents, which were found by the Bolshevists in the Imperial Record Office, concerning the conferences of the Russian Staff in November, 1913, and which have just been made public, testify to the continuity of the aforesaid policy and the new schemes Russia was contemplating. It clearly appears from these documents that M. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, had represented to the Tsar the necessity of preparing not only plans of campaign, but a whole organisation for the conveyance by rail and sea of the huge forces which were necessary to capture Constantinople, and that the Crown Council was of opinion this plan should be carried out in order to bring the Russians to Constantinople and secure the mastery of the Straits.

At the present time, forty or fifty thousand[58] Russian emigrants, fleeing before the Bolshevists, have reached Pera and have settled down in it; others are arriving there every day, who belong to the revolutionary socialist party—an exiled party temporarily—or who are more or less disguised Bolshevist agents. It is obvious that all these Russians will not soon leave Constantinople, which they have always coveted, especially as the Bolshevists have by no means renounced the designs of the Tsars on this city or their ambitions in the East.

Not long ago, according to the _Lokal Anzeiger_,[59] a prominent member of the Soviet Government declared that, to safeguard the Russian interests in the East and on the Black Sea, Constantinople must fall to Russia.

Being thus invaded by Russian elements of all kinds, Constantinople seems doomed to be swallowed up by Russia as soon as her troubles are over, whether she remains Bolshevist or falls under a Tsar’s rule again; then she will turn her ambition towards the East, which we have not been able to defend against the Slavs, and England will find her again in her way in Asia and even on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

On the other hand, as Germany is endeavouring to come to an understanding with Russia and as the military Pan-Germanist party has not given up hope of restoring the Kaiser to the throne, if the Allies dismembered Turkey—whose policy is not historically linked with that of Germany, and who has no more reason for being her ally now, provided the Allies alter their own policy—they would pave the way to a union of the whole of Eastern Europe under a Germano-Russian hegemony.

Again, the Turks, who originally came from Asia, are now a Mediterranean people owing to their great conquests and their wide extension in the fifteenth century, and though in some respects these conquests may be regretted, they have on the whole proved beneficial to European civilisation, by maintaining the influence of the culture of antiquity. Though they have driven back the Greeks to European territories, they have not, on the whole, attempted to destroy the traditions bequeathed to us by antiquity, and the Turk has let the quick, clever Greek settle down everywhere. His indolence and fatalism have made him leave things as they were. What would have happened if the Slavs had come down to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea? The Bulgars and Southern Slavs, though they were subjected to Greco-Latin influences, displayed much more activity and were proof against most of these influences. But the Turks checked the Slavs’ advance to the south; and, were it only in this respect, they have played and still play a salutary part of which they should not be deprived.

The new policy pursued by France towards Turkey becomes the more surprising—coming after her time-honoured Turkish policy and after the recent mistakes of her Russian policy—as we see history repeat itself, or at least, similar circumstances recur. Even in the time of the Romans the events of Syria and Mesopotamia were connected with those of Central Europe; as Virgil said: “Here war is let loose by Euphrates, there by Germany.” Long after, Francis I, in order to check the ambitious designs of Charles V, Emperor of Germany, who, about 1525, dreamt of subduing the whole of Europe, sought the alliance of Soliman. The French king, who understood the Latin spirit so well and the great part it was about to play in the Renaissance, had foreseen the danger with which this spirit was threatened by Germany.

Moreover, a recent fact throws into light the connection between the German and Russian interests in the Eastern question, and their similar tendencies. For Marshal von der Goltz was one of the first to urge that the Turkish capital should be transferred to a town in the centre of Asia Minor.[60] Of course, he professed to be actuated only by strategic or administrative motives, for he chiefly laid stress on the peculiar geographical situation of the capital of the Empire, which, lying close to the frontier, is directly exposed to a foreign attack. But did he not put forward this argument merely to conceal other arguments which concerned Germany more closely? Though the Germans professed to be the protectors of Islam, did not the vast Austro-German schemes include the ejection of the Turks from Europe to the benefit of the Slavs, notwithstanding the declarations made during the war by some German publicists—M. Axel Schmidt, M. Hermann, M. Paul Rohrbach—which now seem to have been chiefly dictated by temporary necessities?

Thus the Turkish policy of the Allies is the outcome of their Russian policy—which accounts for the whole series of mistakes they are still making, after their disillusionment with regard to Russia.

For centuries, Moscow and Islam have counterpoised each other: the Golden Horde having checked the expansion of Russia, the latter did her best to bring about the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. It had formerly been admitted by the Great Powers that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire should not be infringed upon, for it was the best barrier to Russia’s claims on the Straits and her advance towards India. But after the events of the last war, England, reversing her traditional policy, and the Allies, urged on by Pan-Russian circles, have been gradually driven to recognise the Russian claims to Constantinople in return for her co-operation at the beginning of the war.

The outcome of this policy of the Allies has been to drive both the new States, whose independence they persistently refused to recognise, and the old ones, whose national aspirations they did not countenance, towards Bolshevism, the enemy of the Allies; it has induced them, in spite of themselves, to come to understandings with the Soviet Government, in order to defend their independence. England in this way runs the risk of finding herself again face to face with Russia—a new Russia; and thus the old Anglo-Russian antagonism would reappear in another shape, and a more critical one. Sir H. Rawlinson[61] denounced this danger nearly half a century ago, and now once more, though in a different way, “India is imperilled by the progress of Russia.”

However, there is no similarity between Pan-Turanianism and Bolshevism, though an attempt has been made in press polemics or political controversies to confound the one with the other. They have no common origin, and the utter incompatibility between Bolshevism and the spirit of Western Europe exists likewise to another extent and for different reasons between Bolshevism and the spirit of the Turks, who, indeed, are not Europeans but Moslems, yet have played a part in the history of Europe and thus have felt its influence. The Turks—like the Hungarians, who are monarchists and have even sought to come to an understanding with Poland—have refused to make an alliance with the Czecho-Slovaks, who have Pan-Slavic tendencies; and so they cannot become Bolshevists or friendly to the Bolshevists. But, if the Allies neither modify their attitude nor give up the policy they have pursued of late years, the Turks, as well as all the heterogeneous peoples that have broken loose from old Russia, will be driven for their own protection to adopt the same policy as new Russia—the latter being considered as outside Europe; and thus the power of the Soviet Government will be reinforced.

We have been among the first to show both the danger and the inanity of Bolshevism; and now we feel bound to deplore that policy which merely tends to strengthen the Bolshevists we want to crush. Our only hope is that the influence of the States sprung from old Russia or situated round it on Soviet Russia—with which they have been obliged to come to terms for the sake of self-defence—will complete the downfall of Bolshevism, which can only live within Russia and the Russian mind, but has already undergone an evolution, owing to the mistakes of the Allies, in order to spread and maintain itself.

As to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, it seems that far from solving the Eastern question, it is likely to bring about many fresh difficulties, for it is a political mistake as well as an injustice.

This dismemberment, impudently effected by England, is not likely to turn to her advantage. Of course, owing to the treaty, British hegemony for the present extends over Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Kurdistan, and is likely to prevail over the international régime foreshadowed by the same treaty; but the organisation which Great Britain wants thus to enforce on the East, if ever it is effective, seems most precarious. For, even without mentioning Turkey, which does not seem likely to submit to this scheme, and where the Nationalist movement is in open rebellion, or Armenia, whose frontiers have not been fixed yet, the condition of Kurdistan, which England coveted and had even at one moment openly laid claim to, is still uncertain; the Emir Feisal, who is indebted to her for his power, is attempting to get out of her hand; finally, by putting Persia under her tutelage, she has roused the national feeling there too, and broken of her own accord the chain she intended to forge all round India, after driving Germany out of Asia Minor and capturing all the routes to her Asiatic possessions.

Now it is questionable whether Great Britain—in spite of the skill with which her administration has bent itself to the ways of the very various peoples and the liberal spirit she has certainly evinced in the organisation of the Dominions belonging to the British Empire, the largest empire that has ever existed—will be powerful enough to maintain her sovereignty over so many peoples, each of which is proud of its own race and history, and to organise all these countries according to her wish.

As to France, she is gradually losing the moral prestige she once enjoyed in the East, for the advantages she has just gained can only injure her, and also injure the prestige she still enjoys in other Moslem countries; whereas, by pursuing another policy, she might have expected that the German defeat would restore and heighten her prestige.

It follows from all this that the Turkish problem, as we have endeavoured to describe it—considering that for centuries an intercourse has been maintained between the Moslem world and Mediterranean Europe, and that a Moslem influence once made itself felt on Western civilisation through Arabic culture—cannot be looked upon as a merely Asiatic problem. It is a matter of surprise that Islam, five centuries after Christ, should have developed in the birthplace of Christianity, and converted very numerous populations, whose ways and spirit it seems to suit. One cannot forget either that Islam acted as a counterpoise to Christianity, or that it played an important part in our civilisation by securing the continuance and penetration of Eastern and pagan influences. So it is obvious that nowadays the Turkish problem is still of paramount importance for the security of Western civilisation, since it concerns all the nations round the Mediterranean Sea, and, moreover, all the Asiatic and African territories inhabited by Moslems, who have always been interested in European matters and are even doubly concerned in them now.[62]

Footnotes:

45: Albert Sorel, _La Question d’Orient au XVIIIᵉ siècle_, pp. 81,
85, 277.

46: Albert Vandal, _Une ambassade française en Orient sous Louis
XV_, pp. 4, 8, 331, 447.

47: Martens, _Étude historique sur la politique russe dans la
question d’Orient_, 1877.

48: Goriainov, _Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles_, 1910, pp. 25-27.

49: See _supra_, p. 114.

50: _Daily Telegraph_, January 5, 1921.

51: _Revue des Deux Mondes_, March 15, 1921, pp. 261, 262: Maurice
Paléologue. “La Russie des Tsars pendant la guerre.”

52: _Ibid._, pp. 274, 275.

53: _Revue des Deux Mondes_, April 1, 1921, p. 573.

54: _Revue des Deux Mondes_, April 1, 1921, pp. 574, 575.

55: _Ibid._

56: _Ibid._, pp. 578, 579.

57: The editor was M. Markine.

58: Now there are about 200,000.

59: August 10, 1920.

60: Von der Goltz, “Stärke und Schwäche des turkischen Reiches,” in
the _Deutsche Rundschau_, 1897.

61: H. Rawlinson, _England and Russia in the East_ (1875).

62: The French edition of this book bears the date August, 1920.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BILLING AND SONS, LTD., GUILDFORD AND ESHER

Transcriber’s Notes:

The original spelling, accentuation, punctuation, and hyphenation has been retained, except for a small number of apparent printer’s errors.

‘Ali-Hayar-Midhat’ corrected to read ‘Ali-Haydar-Midhat’ in Footnote 7.

‘General Imail Fazil Pasha’ corrected to read ‘General Ismail Fazil Pasha’ on folio page 185.

‘Abderhaman Youssef Pasha’ corrected to read ‘Abdurrahman Youssef Pasha’ on folio page 343.