Chapter IX: Turkey and the Slavs (6)

In the note signed by the High Commissioners, this occupation was described as a measure of guarantee, with a view to the execution of the treaty that was going to be forced on Turkey. Yet it seemed rather strange that such measures should be taken before the treaty was concluded—or was it because the English, being aware the treaty was unacceptable, thought it necessary to gag the Turks beforehand, or even sought to exasperate them?—for if the Turks offered resistance, then the English would have a right to intervene very sternly, and thus could justify the most unjustifiable measures of repression. What would England and the United States have answered if France had proposed such coercive measures against Germany in addition to those of the armistice? It was stated in this note that the occupation would not last long, and was no infringement upon the Sultan’s sovereignty, that it aimed at rallying the Turks in a common endeavour to restore prosperity to Turkey in accordance with the Sultan’s orders; but it also threatened that, should disorder last longer in Asia Minor, the occupation might be extended and the provisions of the treaty might be made harder, in which case Constantinople would be severed from Turkey.

The _Daily Telegraph_ said about that time:

“The political situation, which has evolved so rapidly, plainly
shows it is not enough for the Americans to keep aloof from the
present events. Their national honour is at stake.

“Public opinion in Great Britain would unanimously side with France
in her operations in Asia Minor, provided France declares herself
willing to accept our co-operation.

“We easily understand that the occupation of Constantinople came
rather as a surprise to France and Italy, especially if we take
into account that this action closely followed another measure of a
similar kind taken by England within the last fortnight.

“It seems that this time our Allies have assumed a slightly
different attitude: official France is still hesitating; public
opinion has changed completely, and the pro-Turkish feeling is on
the wane. If France wants to maintain her prestige in the East
unimpaired, she must associate with any political, naval, or
military measure taken by England.

“The Italian standpoint and interests do not differ much from ours,
or from those of France, but Italian circles plainly advocate a
policy of non-intervention, or an intervention restricted to a
diplomatic action.”

If such proceedings emanating from some American or English circles were hardly a matter of surprise, the attitude of some Frenchmen of note was not so easily accounted for.

M. Hanotaux[23] was led by a strange political aberration and a curious oblivion of all the traditional policy of France—unless he deliberately meant to break off with it, or was blinded by prejudice—when he assigned Constantinople to Greece, because, according to him, to give Constantinople to Greece was “to give it to Europe, and to her worthiest, noblest offspring.”

Now Hellenism owes nothing to Byzantium, and Byzantinism, imbued with Christianity, is but remotely and indirectly connected with the magnificent pagan bloom of Hellenism. Byzantium, as has been shown, was not only the continuation of Rome in its decay: it had also a character of its own. Neither was Byzantinism a mere continuation of Hellenism. It was rather the propagator of Orthodoxy, so that when the Greeks claimed Byzantium, they could not do so on behalf of Hellenism, but merely on behalf of Christianity. There is a confusion here that many people have sought to perpetuate because it serves numerous interests, those of the Greeks, and also those of the Slavs, who owe their culture to Byzantium. But whereas Byzantium chiefly taught barbarous Russia a religion together with the rudiments of knowledge, and opened for her a door to the Old World, she imparted to Arabian civilisation knowledge of the works and traditions of antiquity. Russia, who only borrowed the rites of the Byzantine Church and exaggerated them, did not derive much profit from that initiation; the Turks and Arabs, on the contrary, thanks to their own culture, were able to imbibe the old knowledge bequeathed and handed down to them by Byzantium—leaving aside the religious bequest. Thus they were enabled to exercise a wholesome influence, driving out of Constantinople both Orthodoxy and the Slavs who aimed at the possession of that town.

As to the so-called Hellenism of Asia Minor, it is true that the civilisation of ancient Greece spread over several districts on the coast; but it should be borne in mind that, long before the Greeks, the Egyptians and various Semitic peoples had settled on the coast of Lydia—which up to the seventh century B.C. bore the name of Meonia—and fought there for a long time; and that the Lydians, a hybrid race akin to the Thracians and Pelasgi commingled with ethnic elements coming from Syria and Cappadocia, kept up an intercourse between the Greeks of the coast and Asia[24] till the Cimmerian invasion convulsed Asia Minor in the eighth century. Lastly, the Medes, against whom the Greeks waged three wars, are considered by Oppert,[25] owing to the etymology of the name, to be of Turanian descent.

In fact, the relations between the Turks and the Greeks and the Byzantians are really most involved. We know to-day that some Turkish elements, who were converted to the Greek Church long before the Ottoman Turks embraced Islam, and whose origin is anterior by far to the establishment of the Seljukian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, faithfully served the Byzantine Empire from the fifth century onwards, and were utilised by Justinian for the defence of the Asiatic boundaries of the Empire—which were also the boundaries of Christianity—against the attacks of Eastern nations.

It is difficult to account for the sudden fervid enthusiasm of the Allies for Greece. For two years she adhered to Constantine’s policy, perpetrating many an act of treachery against both the Hellenic people and the Allies, repeatedly violating the Constitution guaranteed by the Powers that had protected her, and slaughtering many French sailors; and then, after her unfriendly conduct towards the Allies under cover of a pro-German neutrality, she had very tardily sided with them. It was surprising, therefore, that Greece, who had displayed her pro-German feelings during a great part of the war, would probably receive some of the most thoroughly Turkish territories of the Ottoman Empire, though she never fought against that Empire even after she had deposed King Alexander’s father, in spite of the deplorable complaisance of some of the Allies.

Finally, the very day after the occupation of Constantinople, General Milne, who commanded the British troops of occupation, enjoined the Salih Pasha Cabinet to resign under pretence that it no longer enjoyed the Sovereign’s confidence. The Grand Vizier refused to comply with the English general’s request, as the Government had the confidence of the Chamber and the Sovereign need not apply to the commander of the forces of occupation for permission to communicate with his Ministers. After incarcerating a good many deputies, senators, and political men, as has just been seen, the general gave the Grand Vizier to understand that orders had been given for the arrest of the Ministers in case they should attempt to go to their departments. In order to spare his country another humiliation, Salih Pasha handed in his resignation to the Sultan, who, following the advice of England, charged Damad Ferid to form another Cabinet.

It requires all the reasons that have been previously given to enable us to understand why England threatened and humbled Turkey to such an extent—the only Power left in the East that could be a factor for moderation and peace.

Mustafa Kemal never recognised the Damad Ferid Cabinet, and only after the latter had resigned and Ali Riza Pasha had been appointed Grand Vizier did he consent, in order to avoid another conflict with the Sultan, to enter into negotiations with the Constantinople Government. Salih Pasha was charged by the Minister to carry on the negotiations with the Nationalists, and repaired to Amasia. There it was agreed—first, that the National Organisation should be officially recognised as a lawful power which was necessary to the defence of the rights of the country, and should have full liberty of action side by side with the Government; secondly, that the Cabinet should avoid taking any decision sealing the fate of the country before Parliament met; thirdly, that some appointments should be made in agreement with the National Organisation, after which the latter should not interfere in the administration of the country.

Besides, as Mustafa Kemal said later on in a speech made before the Angora Assembly, though the Sultan had been represented by some as lacking energy, not maintaining the dignity of the Imperial throne, and not being a patriot, yet the reason why he had fallen under English tutelage was that he had seen no other means to save both the existence of Turkey and his throne.

The question whether Parliament should meet at Constantinople or in a province brought on a first disagreement between the Government and Mustafa Kemal, who finally yielded. But, owing to the occupation of Constantinople, Parliament soon found itself in a precarious condition, and the National Organisation decided to hold its sittings at Angora.

After all these events a deputy, Riza Nour, at the sitting of March 18, 1920, raised a protest against the occupation of Constantinople and the incarceration of some members of Parliament by the Allies, which measures were an insult to the dignity of the Turkish Parliament, and a contravention of the constitutional laws and the law of nations. This motion, carried unanimously by the Ottoman Chamber and signed by the Vice-President, M. Hussein Kiazim—the President, for fear of being prosecuted by the British authorities, having left his official residence—was forwarded to the Allied and neutral Parliaments, and the Ottoman Chamber adjourned _sine die_ till it was possible for the deputies to carry out their mandate safely.

Ahmed Riza, former President of the Chamber and Senate of the Ottoman Empire—who, after the failure of Damad Ferid’s mission to Paris, had addressed an open letter to M. Clémenceau on July 17, 1919, almost the anniversary day of the Constitution—joined in that protest and commented upon the treatment some members of Parliament had undergone, as follows:

“It is contrary to all parliamentary rights and principles
throughout the world and to the legal dispositions that guarantee
the inviolability and immunity of all members of the Turkish
Parliament to arrest representatives of the nation while they
are carrying out their mandate. So the armed Interference of
the foreigner with our Chamber cannot be in any way excused or
accounted for.

“Such an arbitrary intrusion, especially on the part of England,
that is looked upon as the founder of the parliamentary system,
will bring everlasting shame to British civilisation.

“After the illegal arrest of several of its members, the Turkish
Parliament adjourned _sine die_, as a token of protest, till the
deputies are able to carry out their mandate freely and safely.

“A note communicated to the Press makes out that some deputies had
been returned under the pressure of the Nationalists and that,
as the Christian elements had had no share in the elections, the
session was illegal.

“Now, it should be noticed that these elements abstained from
voting at the last elections of their own free will, and that since
the armistice no representative of the Christian communities has
taken an official part in the public functions in the Imperial
Palace. The Nationalist forces cannot be held responsible for this.

“Neither is it the Nationalists’ fault if the French authorities in
Cilicia arbitrarily prevented the inhabitants of that district from
holding the parliamentary election, thus depriving the people of
their most sacred rights, and violating the terms of the armistice.

“The acknowledgment of the validity of the mandates of the new
members by the unanimity of their colleagues, the official opening
of Parliament by the speech from the throne, the good wishes and
greetings of the Sultan to the deputies, bear witness that the
assembly legally represented the wishes of the nation and had the
Sovereign’s approbation.

“Besides, these are strictly internal questions in which the
Allies’ interests are not at all concerned, and with which
foreigners have no right to interfere.

“At such a solemn hour it would be an utter denial of justice if
the Ottoman deputies were not able to discuss the fundamental
stipulations of the intended Peace Treaty which is to seal the
future fate of their country.

“Who is to examine the Peace Treaty to-day, and who is to
give its assent to it now the nation has been deprived of its
representatives?

“Of what value will be a treaty thus worked out secretly, behind
closed doors, and concluded in such conditions? How can the
signature of the members of the Government be considered as binding
the nation? For the new Ministry does not yet represent the Ottoman
nation, since no motion of confidence has hitherto been carried by
a chamber which does not sit; and so it cannot be looked upon as
being legally constituted.

“Whatever may happen, the nation alone can decide its own fate. If,
at such a serious juncture, when its very existence is at stake,
it were not able to defend its own cause and its own rights freely
through the peaceful vote of its own mandatories, it would be
looked upon by the whole of mankind as the victim of most unfair
treatment, the responsibility of which will one day be determined
by history.”

During Abdul Hamid’s reign Ahmed Riza had of his own will gone into exile, and from Paris he had wielded great influence over the movement that led to the revolution of 1908. But when the Young Turk Government had practically become dictatorial and had yielded to the pressure that drove it towards Germany, he realised that policy was a failure and was leading the Empire to ruin; then, though he had been one of the promoters of the movement, he protested repeatedly in the Senate, of which he was a member, against the illegal doings of the Government and its foolhardy policy. As President of the “National Block”—which, though not a political party properly speaking, aimed at grouping all the conservative constitutional elements friendly to the Entente—he seemed likely to play an important part in public life again when, about the middle of August, 1919, it was rumoured that the Damad Ferid Government was about to take action against him and his political friends; and soon after it was made known that he intended to go to Italy or France till the reopening of the Ottoman Parliament. After staying in Rome, where he had conversations with some political men of note in order to establish an intellectual entente between Italians and Turks, he settled in Paris.

The English censorship, which gagged the Turkish newspapers, went so far as to prevent them from reprinting extracts from French newspapers that were favourable to the Ottoman cause. It brought ridicule upon itself by censuring the Bible; in an article in the _Univers Israélite_, reprinted by the _Aurore_, which quoted and commented on three verses of chapter xix. of Isaiah, the censor cut off the first of these verses, which may be interpreted as foreshadowing a League of Nations, but in which he was afraid the reader might find a hint at a connection between Egypt and Asia and at the claims of the Turkish and Egyptian Nationalists. This is the verse, which any reader could easily restore: “In that day shall there be a highway out of Egypt to Assyria, and the Assyrian shall come into Egypt and the Egyptian into Assyria, and the Egyptians shall serve with the Assyrians.”

Footnotes:

21: Cf. the _Matin_, June 17, 1920, an interview of M. Paul
Benazet, ex-chairman of the Committee of War Estimates; and the
_Œuvre_, July 8, 1920.

22: Cf. the _Matin_, June 21, 1920, and M. Fribourg’s speech in the
second sitting of June 25, 1920.

23: _Figaro_, March 18, 1920.

24: Radet, _La Lydie et le monde grec au temps des Mermnades_
(Paris, 1893).

25: Oppert, _Le Peuple des Mèdes_.

VI

THE TREATY WITH TURKEY

In the course of the debate on the foreign policy of England which opened on Thursday, March 25, on the third reading of the Finance Bill, Mr. Asquith, speaking of the Turkish problem as leader of the Opposition, urged that the Ottoman Government should no longer hold in Europe the political power that belonged to it before the war. He urged, however, that the Sultan should not be relegated to Asia Minor, where he would quite escape European control. He proposed, therefore, that the Sultan should be, as it were, “vaticanised”—that is to say, he should remain in Constantinople, but should only retain his spiritual power as Caliph, as the Pope does in Rome.

The Great Powers or the League of Nations would then be entrusted with the political power in Constantinople, and if the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles were neutralised or internationalised, the presence of the Sultan in Constantinople would not be attended with any serious danger.

As to Mesopotamia, Mr. Asquith objected to the _status quo ante bellum_. As the frontiers of that region were not quite definite, sooner or later, he thought, if England remained there, she would be driven to advance to the shores of the Black Sea, or even the Caspian Sea, and she had not adequate means for the present to do so. So it was better for her to confine her action within the Basra zone.

The Prime Minister, rising in response, first remarked that the cause of the delays in the negotiations with Turkey and the settlement of peace was that the Allies had thought it proper to wait for the decision of America, as to the share she intended to take in the negotiations. He recalled that the Allies had hoped the United States would not only assume the protection of Armenia properly speaking, but of Cilicia too, and also accept a mandate for the Straits of Constantinople, and went on as follows:

“If we had not given time for America to make up her mind it
might have suspected the Allies wanted to take advantage of some
political difficulty to partition Turkey; and it is only when the
United States definitely stated she did not intend to take part in
the Conference that the Allies proceeded to take definite decisions
with regard to the Turkish peace. I think that it is due to the
Allies to make that explanation.”

Mr. Lloyd George went on to state that the Allies had contemplated maintaining only the spiritual power of the Sultan, but unfortunately this scheme did not seem likely to solve the difficulties of the situation. For Constantinople had to be administered at the same time, and it is easier to control the Sultan and his Ministers in Constantinople than if they were relegated to Asia Minor.

Then, resorting to the policy of compromise which bore such bad fruits in the course of the Peace Conference, Mr. Lloyd George, in order not to shut out the possibility of reverting to the opposite opinion, added that if it was proved that the Allies’ control weakened the power of the Sultan in Asia Minor, it would always be possible to consider the question afresh—but he hoped that would not be necessary.

As to the question of Asia Minor and the distribution of the mandates, he declared:

“If America had accepted the responsibility for controlling
Armenia, the French, who, under what is called the Sykes scheme,
had Cilicia assigned to their control, were quite willing to hand
it over to American control. The British, French, and Italians are
quite agreed on the subject, but we have not yet seen a sign. We
have only received telegrams from America, asking us to protect the
Armenians; we have had no offers up to the present to undertake the
responsibility.... We are hoping that France will undertake that
responsibility, but it is a good deal to ask of her. We have also
got our responsibility, but we cannot take too much upon our own
shoulders....

“With regard to the Republic of Erivan, which is Armenia, it
depends entirely on the Armenians themselves whether they protect
their independence.... I am told that they could easily organise
an army of above 40,000 men. If they ask for equipment, we shall
be very happy to assist in equipping their army. If they want the
assistance of officers to train that army, I am perfectly certain
there is no Allied country in Europe that would not be willing to
assist in that respect.”[26]

Finally, with, respect to Mesopotamia, Mr. Lloyd George urged “it would be a mistake to give up Baghdad and Mosul.”

“I say that, after incurring the enormous expenditure which we have
incurred in freeing this country from the withering despotism of
the Turk, to hand it back to anarchy and confusion, and to take
no responsibility for its development, would be an act of folly
quite indefensible.... They have been consulted about their wishes
in this respect, and I think, almost without exception, they are
anxious that we should stay here, though they are divided about the
kind of independent Government they would like....

“We have no right, however, to talk as if we were the mandatory of
Mesopotamia when the treaty with Turkey has not yet been signed.
It is only on the signing of that treaty that the question of
mandatories will be decided, but when that time comes we shall
certainly claim the right to be the mandatory power of Mesopotamia,
including Mosul.”

In its leading article, _The Times_, criticising the attitude Mr. Lloyd George had taken in the debate on the Mesopotamian question, wrote on March 27:

“The Prime Minister made statements, about the future of
Mesopotamia which require further elucidation. He said that when
the Treaty of Peace with Turkey has been finally decided, the
British Government would ‘claim the right’ to be the ‘mandatory
Power’ for Mesopotamia, including the vilayet of Mosul....

“Judging from some passages in his speech, even Mr. Lloyd George
himself has never grasped the full and dangerous significance of
the adventure he now advocates....

“The Prime Minister’s reply conveyed the impression that he has
only the very haziest idea about what he proposes to do in this
region, which has been the grave of empires ever since written
history began.”

After pointing out the dangers of a British mandate over Mesopotamia, including the vilayet of Mosul, _The Times_ thought, as had been suggested by Mr. Asquith, that England should confine her direct obligations to the zone of Basra, and pointed out that it was only incidentally and almost in spite of himself that Mr. Asquith had been driven in 1915 to occupy the larger part of Mesopotamia.

“Mr. Asquith says—and he is entirely right—that if we hold a line
in the mountains of Northern Kurdistan we shall sooner or later
be driven to advance to the shores of the Black Sea, or even to
the Caspian. His view is in complete accord with every lesson to
be derived from our history as an Empire. We have never drawn one
of these vague, unsatisfactory frontiers without being eventually
compelled to move beyond it. We cannot incur such a risk in the
Middle East, and the cost in money and the strain upon our troops
are alike prohibitive factors.”[27]

The next day, in a similar debate in the French Chamber, M. Millerand, being asked to give information about the leading principles of the French Government in the negotiations that were being carried on in regard to the Turkish treaty, made the following statement, which did not throw much light on the question:

“First of all the Supreme Council deems it necessary to organise
a Turkey that can live, and for this purpose—this is the only
resolution that was made public and the only one that the British
Government disclosed in the House of Commons—for this purpose it
has seemed fit to maintain a Sultan in Constantinople.

“The same principle implies that Turkey will include, together with
the countries inhabited mainly by Moslems, the economic outlets
without which she could not thrive.

“In such a Turkey France, whose traditional prestige has been
enhanced by victory, will be able to exercise the influence she is
entitled to by the important moral and economic interests she owns
in Turkey.

“This idea is quite consistent with an indispensable clause—the
war has proved it—viz., the freedom of the Straits, which must
necessarily be safeguarded by an international organisation. It is
also consistent with the respect of nationalities, in conformity
with which some compact ethnic groups who could not possibly
develop under Turkish sovereignty will become independent, and
other guarantees will be given for the protection of minorities.

“We have in Turkey commercial and financial interests of the first
order. We do not intend that any of them should be belittled; we
want them to develop safely and fully in the future. We shall see
to it especially that the war expenditures of Turkey shall not
curtail the previous rights of French creditors.

“In the districts where France owns special interests, these
interests must be acknowledged and guaranteed. It goes without
saying that the Government intends to base its claims on the
agreements already concluded with the Allies.”

At the sitting of March 27, after a speech in which M. Bellet asked that the Eastern question should be definitely settled by putting an end to Turkish sovereignty in Europe and Asia Minor, M. P. Lenail revealed that the Emir Feisal received two million francs a month from the English Government and as much from the French Government; he wondered why he was considered such an important man, and demanded the execution of the 1916 agreements, which gave us a free hand in Cilicia, Syria, and the Lebanon. Then M. Briand, who had concluded these agreements, rose to say:

“It is time we should have a policy in Syria and Cilicia. If we are
not there, who will be there? The 1916 agreements were inspired,
not only by the wish of safeguarding the great interests of France
and maintaining her influence in the Mediterranean, but also
because the best qualified representatives of the peoples of those
countries, who groaned under the Turkish yoke, entreated us not
to forsake them. And it is under these circumstances that in the
middle of the war, urging that a long-sighted policy always proves
the best, we insisted on the settlement of these questions.

“Thus were Syria and Cilicia, with Mosul and Damascus, of course,
included in the French zone.

“Shall we always pursue a merely sentimental policy in those
countries?

“If we wanted Mosul, it is on account of its oil-bearing lands; and
who shall deny that we need our share of the petroleum of the world?

“As for Cilicia, a wonderfully rich land, if we are not there
to-morrow, who will take our place? Cilicia has cotton, and many
other kinds of wealth; when we shall see other States in our place,
then shall we realise what we have lost, but it will be too late!

“It has been said that it will be difficult for us to settle there.
As a matter of fact, the difficulties which are foreseen look
greater than they are really; and some of these difficulties may
have been put forward to dissuade us from going there.

“It remains that the 1916 agreements are signed; they are based on
our time-honoured rights, our efforts, our friendships, and the
summons of the peoples that hold out their arms to us. The question
is whether they shall be countersigned by facts.

“The name of the Emir Feisal has been put forward. It is in
our zone he has set up his dominion; why were we not among the
populations of that country at the time? If we had been there, the
Emir Feisal would have received his investiture from us by our
authority; instead of that, he was chosen by others. Who is to be
blamed for it?

“Britain knows the power of parliaments of free peoples; if our
Parliament makes it clear that it really wants written treaties to
be respected, they will be respected.”

Mr. Wilson had been asked by a note addressed to him on March 12, 1920, to state his opinion about the draft of the Turkish settlement worked out in London, and at the same time to appoint a plenipotentiary to play a part in the final settlement. His answer was handed to M. Jusserand, French ambassador, on March 24; he came to the conclusion finally that Turkey should come to an end as a European Power.

In this note President Wilson declared that though he fully valued the arguments set forward for retaining the Turks in Constantinople, yet he thought that the arguments against the Turks, based on unimpeachable considerations, were far superior to the others. Moreover, he recalled that the Allies had many a time declared that Turkish sovereignty in Europe was an anomalous thing that should come to an end.

Concerning the southern frontiers to be assigned to Turkey, he thought they should follow the ethnographic boundaries of the Arabian populations, unless it were necessary to alter them slightly; in which case the American Government would be pleased—though that did not imply any criticism—to be told for what reasons new frontiers had been proposed.

Mr. Wilson was pleased to see that Russia would one day be allowed to be represented in the International Council that was going to be instituted for the government of Constantinople and the Straits, as he felt sure that any arrangement would be stillborn that did not recognise what he thought was a vital interest to Russia. For the same reason he was pleased that the condition of the Straits in wartime had not yet been settled, and was still under discussion; he thought no decision should be taken without Russia giving her consent.

Turning to the territorial question, he said:

“In regard to Thrace, it seems fair that the part of Eastern Thrace
that is beyond the Constantinople area should belong to Greece,
with the exception of the northern part of this province; for the
latter region has undoubtedly a Bulgarian population, and so, for
the sake of justice and equity, the towns of Adrianople and Kirk
Kilisse, together with their surrounding areas, must be given to
Bulgaria. Not only are the arguments set forth by Bulgaria quite
sound from an ethnic and historical point of view, but her claims
on this territory seem to deserve all the more consideration as
she had to cede some wholly Bulgarian territories inhabited by
thousands of Bulgarians on her western frontier merely that Serbia
might have a good strategic frontier.”

He was chiefly anxious about the future of Armenia. He demanded for her an outlet to the sea, and the possession of Trebizond. He went on thus:

“With regard to the question whether Turkey should give up her
rights over Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine, Syria, and the Islands,
the American Government recommends the method resorted to in the
case of Austria—namely, that Turkey should place these provinces
in the hands of the Great Powers, who would decide on their fate.

“As to Smyrna, this Government does not feel qualified to express
an opinion, for the question is too important to be solved with the
limited information possessed by the Government.”

Finally, the President declared he did not think it necessary for his ambassador to be present at the sittings of the Supreme Council; yet he insisted on being informed of the resolutions that would be taken.

The _Philadelphia Ledger_, when this note was sent, commented on Mr. Wilson’s opinion as to the Turkish problem, and especially the fate of Constantinople, and did not disguise the fact that he favoured the handing over of Constantinople to Russia, in accordance with the inter-Allied agreements of 1915, 1916, and 1917.

“Mr. Wilson wants Turkey to be expelled from Europe, and the right
for democratic Russia to have an outlet to the Mediterranean to be
recognised. Thus, to a certain extent, Mr. Wilson will decide in
favour of the fulfilment of the secret promises made by the Allies
to Russia in the course of the war.

“Mr. Wilson’s opinion is that Bolshevism is about to fall, and
next autumn the new Russia that he has constantly longed for and
encouraged will come into being. It is calculated that if America
gives her support to Russia at this fateful juncture, Russia will
throw herself into the arms of America, and this understanding
between the two countries will be of immense importance.”

After the Allies had occupied Constantinople and addressed to the Porte a new collective note requesting the Ministry officially to disown the Nationalist movement, affairs were very difficult for some time. As the Allies thought the Ottoman Cabinet’s answer to their note was unsatisfactory, the first dragomans of the English, French, and Italian commissioners on the afternoon of April 1 again called upon the Ottoman Premier.

Owing to the unconciliatory attitude of the English, who made it impossible for it to govern the country, the Ministry resigned. The English required that the new Cabinet should be constituted by Damad Ferid Pasha, on whom they knew they could rely.

Indeed, a secret agreement had already been concluded, on September 12, 1919, between Mr. Fraster, Mr. Nolan, and Mr. Churchill, on behalf of Great Britain, and Damad Ferid Pasha on behalf of the Imperial Ottoman Government. The existence of this agreement was questioned at the time, and was even officially denied in the _Stambul Journal_, April 8, 1920, but most likely there was an exchange of signatures between them. According to this agreement,[28] the Sultan practically acquiesced in the control of Great Britain over Turkey within the limits fixed by Great Britain herself. Constantinople remained the seat of the Caliphate, but the Straits were to be under British control. The Sultan was to use his spiritual and moral power as Caliph on behalf of Great Britain, to support British rule in Syria, Mesopotamia, and the other zones of British influence, not to object to the creation of an independent Kurdistan, and to renounce his rights over Egypt and Cyprus.

Damad Ferid agreed to do so, with the co-operation of the party of the Liberal Entente. If the information given by the Press is reliable, it seems that the composition of the new Cabinet was endangered at the last moment through the opposition of one of the Allied Powers; yet it was constituted at last.

The members of the new Cabinet, headed by Damad Ferid Pasha, who was both Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister, were: Abdullah Effendi, Sheik-ul-Islam; Reshid Bey, an energetic man, an opponent of the Union and Progress Committee, who was Minister of the Interior; and Mehmed Said Pasha, who became Minister of Marine and provisionally Minister of War. The last-named Ministry had been offered to Mahmoud Mukhtar Pasha, son of the famous Ghazi Mukhtar, who broke off with the Committee of Union and Progress in 1912, was dismissed from the army in 1914 by Enver, and was ambassador at Berlin during the first three years of the war; but he refused this post, and also handed in his resignation as a member of the Paris delegation; so the Grand Vizier became War Minister too. The Minister for Public Education was Fakhr ed Din Bey, one of the plenipotentiaries sent to Ouchy to negotiate the peace with Italy. Dr. Jemil Pasha, who had once been prefect of Constantinople, became Minister of Public Works, and Remze Pasha Minister of Commerce.

The investiture of the new Cabinet took place on Monday, April 5, in the afternoon, with the usual ceremonies. The Imperial rescript ran as follows:

“After the resignation of your predecessor, Salih Pasha,
considering your great abilities and worth, we hereby entrust
to you the Grand Vizierate, and appoint Duri Zade Abdullah Bey
Sheik-ul-Islam.

“The disturbances that have been lately fomented, under the name of
nationalism, are endangering our political situation, which ever
since the armistice had been gradually improving.

“The peaceful measures hitherto taken against this movement have
proved useless. Considering the recent events and the persistence
of this state of rebellion, which may give rise to the worst evils,
it is now our deliberate wish that all those who have organised
and still support these disturbances shall be dealt with according
to the rigour of the law; but, on the other hand, we want a free
pardon to be granted to all those who, having been led astray,
have joined and shared in the rebellion. Let quick and energetic
measures be taken in order to restore order and security throughout
our Empire, and strengthen the feelings of loyalty undoubtedly
prevailing among all our faithful subjects to the Khilafat and the
throne.

“It is also our earnest desire that you should endeavour to
establish trustful and sincere relations with the Great Allied
Powers, and to defend the interests of the State and the nation,
founding them on the principles of righteousness and justice. Do
your utmost to obtain more lenient conditions of peace, to bring
about a speedy conclusion of peace, and to alleviate the public
distress by resorting to all adequate financial and economic
measures.”

The Sheik-ul-Islam in a proclamation to the Turkish people denounced the promoters and instigators of the Nationalist movement, and called upon all Moslems to gather round the Sultan against the “rebels.”

The Grand Vizier issued an Imperial decree condemning the Nationalist movement, pointing out to Mustafa Kemal the great dangers the country ran on account of his conduct, wishing for the restoration of friendly relations between Turkey and the Allies, and warning the leaders of the movement that harsh measures would be taken against them. The Ottoman Government, in a proclamation to the population—which had no effect, for most of the Turks thought it was dictated by foreign Powers—denounced all the leaders and supporters of the Nationalist movement as guilty of high treason against the nation. The proclamation stated:

“The Government, though eager to avoid bloodshed, is still more
eager to save the nation, which is running into great danger. So
it will not hesitate to resort to strict measures against those
who might refuse to go back to their duty according to the high
prescriptions of the Sherif, as is ordered by the Imperial rescript.

“With this view, the Government proclaims:

“First, anyone who, without realising the gravity of his act,
has allowed himself to be driven by the threats or misleading
instigations of the ringleaders, and has joined the insurrectionist
movement, gives tokens of repentance within a week and declares his
loyalty to the Sovereign, shall enjoy the benefit of the Imperial
pardon.

“Secondly, all the leaders and instigators of the movements,
together with whosoever shall continue to support them, shall be
punished according to the law and the Sherif’s orders.

“Lastly, the Government cannot in any way allow any act of cruelty
or misdemeanour to be committed in any part of the Empire either
by the Moslem population against other elements, or by non-Moslem
subjects against the Moslem population. So it proclaims that
whosoever shall commit such acts, or countenance them, or be party
to them, shall be severely punished individually.”

A Parliamentary commission set off to Anatolia in order to call upon Mustafa Kemal to give up his hostility to the Entente and lay down arms with the least delay.

Moreover, the Government decided to send some delegates in order to make inquiries and point out to the leaders of the Nationalist movement the dangerous consequences of their stubbornness and open rebellion.

The first delegation was to include an aide-de-camp of the War Minister, and an Allied superior officer. Another delegation was to consist of members of Parliament, among whom were Youssouf Kemal Bey, member for Sivas; Vehbi Bey, member for Karassi; Abdulla Azmi Bey, member for Kutahia; and Riza Nuri, member for Sinope, the very man who had brought in a motion against the occupation of Constantinople and the arrest of some members of the Ottoman Parliament, and who was credited with having said: “Anatolia has a false conception of the occupation of Constantinople. We are going to give clear explanations of the seriousness of the situation in order to avoid disastrous consequences. We are going to tell Anatolia the ideas of the Government about the interests of the nation.”

An Imperial decree prescribed the dissolution of the Chamber, and the members before whom it was read left the Chamber quietly.

But it was obvious that the Damad Ferid Pasha Cabinet no longer represented the country, and that in the mind of most Turks it could no longer express or uphold the free will of the Turkish people, whose hidden or open sympathies, in view of the foreigner’s threat, were given to the Nationalist movement.

* * * * *

It must be owned that the Turkish Nationalist movement had at the outset co-operated with some questionable elements and had been mixed up with the intrigues of the former members of the Committee of Union and Progress. But it now became impossible, in order to belittle it, to look down upon it as a mere plot or insurrectionary movement. In consequence of the successive events that had taken place since the armistice and of the attitude of the Allies, especially England, after the occupation of Constantinople, carried out under British pressure with the approbation of the French Government notwithstanding the protest of the French Press, and in view of the provisions that were likely to be included in the Peace Treaty, Turkish patriotism, which could not allow Turkey to be destroyed and meant to maintain her traditional rights, had tacitly joined that movement. Besides, Mustafa Kemal, who, at the very outset, had been a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, had soon disagreed with Enver, and it should be borne in mind that he was his enemy during the greater part of the war, as he was an opponent of the German Marshal Falkenhayn. Some people have tried to make out there was only personal enmity between them, and have denied the possibility of political opposition; but the very fact that their enmity would have ruined any common political designs they might have had proves there were no such designs.

So Mustafa Kemal did not seem greatly moved by the measures mentioned in the manifesto issued by the Government under pressure of the foreign occupation and amidst the perturbation caused by recent events.

At the end of March Mustafa Kemal warned the Sultan that, in consequence of the occupation of Constantinople, he broke off all connection with the central Government, which henceforth was quite under foreign control. In a proclamation issued to the Mussulmans, he declared it was necessary to form a new independent Ottoman State in Anatolia and to appoint an assistant Sheik-ul-Islam. The reason he gave was that the Sultan could no longer be looked upon as Caliph, for it is a fundamental principle of Islam that the Caliph must be an independent Sovereign, and, since the Allied occupation of Constantinople, he no longer enjoyed his freedom of action. In that appeal, which was not intended for the Mussulmans of Algeria, Tunis, Morocco, and Tripoli, for it seemed to be aimed at Great Britain alone, he regarded the occupation of Constantinople as a new crusade against Islam.

According to news from Nationalist sources, Mustafa Kemal formed a Cabinet, in which he was War Minister of the new Anatolian Government.

It was said at the time he had proclaimed Viceroy of Anatolia and nahib—_i.e._, the Sultan’s representative in Anatolia—Prince Jemal ed Din, a member of the Imperial Family, son of the late Prince Shevket Effendi, and general inspector of the recruiting service; but the official circles of Constantinople never believed that the prince had allowed him to use his name.

At the same time he had a Constituent Assembly elected, which he intended to convene at Angora. This assembly consisted of the members of Parliament who had been able to escape from Constantinople and of deputies chosen by delegated electors and met on April 23 at Angora, where all sorts of people had come from quite different regions: Constantinople, Marash, Beyrut, Baghdad, etc. The National Assembly of Angora meant to be looked upon as a Constituent Assembly, and strove to introduce wide reforms into the administrative and financial organisation of the Empire. It elected a rather large committee, which styled itself the Government Council, and it included General Mustafa Kemal, Jemal ed Din Chelebi, from Konia, as first Vice-President, and Jelal ed Din Arif Bey as second Vice-President, etc.

The members of the Government which was instituted at Angora when the Great National Assembly met in this town were: General Mustafa Kemal Pasha, President; Bekir Samy Bey, Foreign Affairs; Jamy Bey, Interior; General Feizi Pasha, National Defence; General Ismail Fazil Pasha, Public Works; Youssouf Kemal Bey, National Economy; Hakki Behij Bey, Finance; Dr. Adnan Bey, Public Education; Colonel Ismet Bey, Chief of Staff.

The Sheik of the Senussi, who had joined the National movement, and owing to his prestige had influenced public opinion in favour of this movement, was not appointed, as has been wrongly said, Sheik-ul-Islam; religious affairs were entrusted to a member of a Muslim brotherhood belonging to the National Assembly.

According to the information it was possible to obtain, the political line of conduct adopted by the Nationalists was not only to organise armed resistance, but also to carry on a strong political and religious propaganda, both in Turkey and in foreign countries.

No official letter from Constantinople was to be opened by the functionaries, who, if they obeyed the Constantinople Government, were liable to capital punishment. The religious authorities in the provinces and the heads of the great Muslim brotherhoods were called upon to protest against the _fetva_ by which the Sheik-ul-Islam of Constantinople had anathematised the Nationalists.

But the chief difficulty for the Nationalists was how to raise money.

On behalf of that National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal addressed to M. Millerand the following letter, in which he vehemently protested against the occupation of Constantinople and laid down the claims of the Ottoman people:

“I beg to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that, owing
to the unjustifiable occupation of Constantinople by the Allied
troops, the Ottoman people looks upon its Khalifa, together with
his Government, as prisoners. So general elections have been held,
and on April 23, 1920, the Grand National Assembly held its first
sitting, and solemnly declared it would preside over the present
and future destiny of Turkey, so long as her Khalifa Sultan and her
Eternal City should remain under the dominion and occupation of
foreigners.

“The Grand National Assembly has done me the honour to charge me to
bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency the earnest protest of
its members against that arbitrary deed, which violates the terms
of the armistice, and has once more confirmed the Ottoman people
in its pessimism as to the results of the Peace Conference. Not
long ago our Parliament—though a Parliament has always been looked
upon as a holy sanctuary by all civilised nations—was violated in
the course of a sitting; the representatives of the nation were
wrested from the bosom of the assembly by the English police like
evildoers, notwithstanding the energetic protest of the Parliament;
many a senator, deputy, general, or man of letters, was arrested at
his home, taken away handcuffed, and deported; lastly, our public
and private buildings were occupied by force of arms, for might had
become right.

“Now the Ottoman people, considering all its rights have been
violated and its sovereignty encroached upon, has, by order of its
representatives, assembled at Angora, and appointed an Executive
Council chosen among the members of the National Assembly, which
Council has taken in hand the government of the country.

“I have also the honour to let Your Excellency know the desiderata
of the nation, as expressed and adopted at the sitting of April 29,
1920.

“First, Constantinople, the seat of the Khilafat and Sultanry,
together with the Constantinople Government, are henceforth looked
upon by the Ottoman people as prisoners of the Allies; thus all
orders and _fetvas_ issued from Constantinople, so long as it
is occupied, cannot have any legal or religious value, and all
engagements entered upon by the would-be Constantinople Government
are looked upon by the nation as null and void.

“Secondly, the Ottoman people, though maintaining its calm and
composure, is bent upon defending its sacred, centuries-old rights
as a free, independent State. It expresses its wish to conclude a
fair, honourable peace, but declares only its own mandatories have
the right to take engagements in its name and on its account.

“Thirdly, the Christian Ottoman element, together with the foreign
elements settled in Turkey, remain under the safeguard of the
nation; yet they are forbidden to undertake anything against the
general security of the country.

“Hoping the righteous claims of the Ottoman nation will meet with a
favourable reception, I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance
of the deep respect with which I have the honour to be Your
Excellency’s most humble, most obedient servant.”

On the eve of the San Remo Conference, which met on April 18, 1920, Ahmed Riza Bey, ex-President of the Chamber and Senator of the Ottoman Empire, who kept a keen lookout on the events that were about to seal the fate of his country, though he had been exiled by the Damad Ferid Ministry, addressed another letter to the President of the Conference, in which he said;

“The Turks cannot in any way, in this age of liberty and
democracy, acknowledge a peace that would lower them to the level
of an inferior race and would treat them worse than the Hungarians
or Bulgarians, who have lost comparatively small territories,
whereas Turkey is to be utterly crippled. We want to be treated
as a vanquished people, not as an inferior people or a people
in tutelage. The victors may have a right to take from us the
territories they conquered by force of arms; they have no right to
intrude into our home affairs. The Turkish people will willingly
grant concessions of mines and public works to the foreigners who
offer it the most profitable conditions; but it will never allow
the arbitrary partition of the wealth of the nation. To get riches
at the expense of an unfortunate nation is immoral; it is all the
more unfair as the responsibility of Turkey in the world war is
comparatively slight as compared with that of Austria-Germany and
Bulgaria. In respect of the crimes and atrocities against Armenia
and Greece which the Turks are charged with, we deny them earnestly
and indignantly. Let a mixed international commission be formed,
and sent to hold an impartial inquiry on the spot, and we pledge
ourselves to submit to its decisions. Till such an inquiry has
proved anything to the contrary, we have a right to look upon all
charges brought against us as slanders or mere lies.

“The Sublime Porte had already, on February 12, 1919, addressed to
the High Commissioners an official note requesting that neutral
States should appoint delegates charged to inquire into facts and
establish responsibilities; but the request of the Ottoman Cabinet
has hitherto been in vain, as well as that of the League for
National Ottoman Unity made on March 17 of the same year.

“Yet the report of the international Commission of Inquiry
assembled at Smyrna, which proved the charges of cruelty brought
against the Turks were unfounded, should induce the Allies, in the
name of justice, to hold an inquiry into the massacres supposed to
have taken place in Cilicia and elsewhere.

“I hope Your Excellency will excuse me if this letter is not
couched in the usual diplomatic style, and will consider that when
the life and rights of his nation are so grievously endangered it
is most difficult for a patriot to keep his thoughts and feelings
under control.”

As early as April 19, the San Remo Conference, which seemed to have come to an agreement about the main lines of the treaty to be submitted to Turkey, but had not yet settled the terms of this treaty, decided to summon the Ottoman plenipotentiaries to Paris on May 10.

In a note sent on April 20, 1920, to M. Nitti, as president of the San Remo Conference, Ghalib Kemaly Bey, formerly Ottoman minister plenipotentiary to Russia, now living in Rome, wrote:

“In order to justify the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire it has
been asserted that the Turks are not able to administer a large
country inhabited by various races, and they have been especially
charged with hating and oppressing the Christian element. But a
history extending over ten centuries at least plainly shows, by
innumerable facts and truths, the absurdity of such assertions.

“If the Ottoman Empire, in spite of its wonderful efforts for the
last 130 years, has not been able to reform and renovate itself
as the other States have done, that is because, in addition to a
thousand other difficulties, it has never had, for the last two
centuries, either the power or the peacefulness that would have
been necessary to bring such a protracted task to a successful end;
for every ten, fifteen, or twenty years, it has been attacked by
its neighbours, and the events of the last twelve years testify
still more forcibly than any others to the fact that any step taken
by the Turks on the way to progress—in the European sense of the
word—was not only resented, but even violently opposed by their
merciless enemies.