Chapter IX: Turkey and the Slavs (11)

On February 6, 1919, he asked the Committee of the Ten on behalf of his father, Hussein ibn Ali, to recognise the independence of the Arabian peninsula, and declared he aimed at grouping the various regions of Arabian Asia under one sovereignty. He did not hesitate to remind the members of the Conference that he was speaking in the name of a people who had already reached a high degree of civilisation at a time when the Powers they represented did not even exist; and at the end of the sitting in the course of which the scheme of a League of Nations was adopted, he asked that all the secret treaties about the partition of the Asiatic dominion of the Ottoman Empire between the Great Powers should be definitely cancelled.

In March, 1919, the Emir went back to Syria, under the pretext of using his influence in favour of a French collaboration. He was given an enthusiastic greeting; but the supporters of the Arabian movement, which was partly his own work, declared their hostility to any policy that would bring about a mandate for Syria.

On March 7 it was announced that a National Syrian Congress, sitting at Damascus, had just proclaimed Syria an independent country, and the Emir Feisal, son of the Grand Sherif of Mecca, King of Syria.

It was reported that a declaration, issued by a second congress that was held in the same town and styled itself Congress of Mesopotamia, had been read at the same sitting, through which the latter congress solemnly proclaimed the independence of Irak—Mesopotamia—with the Emir Abdullah, the Emir Feisal’s brother, as King under the regency of another brother of his, the Emir Zeid.

All this, of course, caused a good deal of surprise in London, though something of the kind ought to have been expected.

In the above-mentioned document, after recalling the part played by the Arabs in the war and the declarations made by the Allies about the right of self-determination of peoples, the Congress declared the time had come to proclaim the complete independence and unity of Syria, and concluded as follows:

“We, therefore, the true representatives of the Arabian nation in
every part of Syria, speaking in her name and declaring her will,
have to-day unanimously proclaimed the independence of our country,
Syria, within her natural boundaries, including Palestine, which
independence shall be complete, without any restriction whatsoever,
on the basis of a civil representative government.

“We will take into account every patriotic wish of all the
inhabitants of Lebanon concerning the administration of their
country and maintain her pre-war limits, on condition Lebanon shall
stand aloof from any foreign influence.

“We reject the Zionists’ claim to turn Palestine into a national
home for the Jews or a place of immigration for them.

“We have chosen His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, who has always
fought for the liberation of the country, and whom the nation looks
upon as the greatest man in Syria, as constitutional King of Syria
under the name of H.M. Feisal I.

“We hereby proclaim the military governments of occupation hitherto
established in the three districts have now come to an end; they
shall be replaced by a civil representative government, responsible
to this Council for anything relating to the principle of the
complete independence of the country, till it is possible for
the government to convene a Parliament that shall administer the
provinces according to the principles of decentralisation.”

The Congress then asked the Allies to withdraw their troops from Syria, and stated that the national police and administration would be fully able to maintain order.

To some extent the Emir Feisal resisted the suggestions, or at least refused to comply with the extreme demands, of the Nationalists of Damascus and Palestine—whose club, the Nadi El Arabi, played in these regions the same part as the Committee of Union and Progress—for after forming a Government of concentration, he had merely summoned one class of soldiers, whereas the Nationalists in his absence had decreed the mobilisation of several classes, and in agreement with General Gouraud he had appointed administrator of the disputed region of Bukaa his cousin, the Emir Jemil, who was a moderate man. Yet, whether he wished to do so or not, whether he was an accomplice of the leaders or not, the fact is that, after being the agent of England, he became the agent of the Nationalists, who had succeeded in having the independence of the Arabian countries of Asia Minor proclaimed under the leadership of the Hejaz.

Thus it turned out that the foundation of an Arabian State assumed a capital importance at the very time when the future condition of the Ottoman Empire was under discussion.

In the course of the interview between M. Mohammed Ali and Mr. Lloyd George, as the Prime Minister asked him whether he was averse to the action of the Syrian Moslems, who had acknowledged the Emir Feisal as King of Arabia and proclaimed an independent Moslem State unconnected with the Caliphate, the leader of the Indian delegation, after hinting that “this matter can well be left for settlement amongst Muslims,” made the following statement:

“Just as we have certain religious obligations with regard to
the Khilafat that have brought us here, we have other religious
obligations, equally solemn and binding, that require us to
approach the Turks and Arabs. ‘All Muslims are brothers, wherefore
make peace between your brethren,’ is a Quranic injunction. We have
come here in the interests of peace and reconciliation, and propose
going to the Arabs and Turks for the same purpose.

“Quite apart from the main claim for preservation of the Khilafat
with adequate temporal power, the Muslims claim that the local
centre of their Faith—namely, the ‘Island of Arabia’—should remain
inviolate and entirely under Muslim control. This is based on the
dying injunction of the Prophet himself. The Jazirat-ul-Arab, as
its name indicates, is the ‘Island of Arabia,’ the fourth boundary
being the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. It therefore includes
Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, as well as the region commonly
known to European geographers as the Arabian peninsula. Muslims can
acquiesce in no form of non-Muslim control, whether in the shape of
mandates or otherwise, over any portion of this region. Religious
obligations, which are absolutely binding on us, require that there
at least there shall be exclusively Muslim control. It does not
specify that it should be the Khalifa’s own control. In order to
make it perfectly clear, I may say the religious requirements,
sir, will be satisfied even if the Emir Feisal exercises
independent control there.

“But, since we have to provide sufficient territories and resources
and naval and military forces for the Khalifa, the necessity for
the utmost economy which has to rule and govern all our claims in
these matters suggests that both these requirements may easily be
satisfied if the Jazirat-ul-Arab remains, as before the war, under
the direct sovereignty of the Khalifa. We have great hopes that
if we have opportunities of meeting our co-religionists we shall
bring about a reconciliation between them and the Turks. After all,
it cannot be said that Turkish rule in Arabia has been of such a
character that other Powers are bound to interfere.”

Moreover, he added:

“With regard to the Arabs, about whom you asked me a little while
ago, the delegation are not apprehensive with regard to the
feasibility of an adjustment between the Khalifa and the Arabs. As
I have already pointed out, there is the Quranic injunction: ‘All
Muslims are brothers, wherefore make peace between your brethren.’
That is a duty laid upon us, and recently, at the Bombay Session,
the All-India Khilafat Conference passed a resolution authorising
a delegation to proceed to the Hejaz and other parts of Arabia to
reconcile the Arabs and the Turks. Our interest is in the Khilafat
as Mussulmans. No population and no territory could be so dear to
the Muslim as the Arabs and Arabia. The Turks could not win such
affection from us as the Arabs do. This is the land that we want
to keep purely under Muslim control. Even if the Arabs themselves
want a mandate in that country we will not consent. We are bound by
our religious obligations to that extent. Therefore, it cannot be
through antipathy against the Arabs or because of any particular
sympathy for the Turks that we desire the Khalifa’s sovereignty
over the Island of Arabia. The Turks are much farther removed from
us. Very few of us know anything of the Turkish language; very few
of us have travelled in the Turkish Empire. But we do go in large
numbers to Mecca and Medina. So many of us want to die there. So
many Mussulmans settle down and marry in Arabia; one of my own
aunts is an Arab lady. Wherever we have met Arabs on our journey—we
have had no opportunity, of course, of discussing the subject with
well-educated people, but—we have asked the class of people we have
met what they thought of the action of the King of the Hejaz—‘King’
in a land where God alone is recognised as a king: nobody can ever
claim kingship there. They said his was an act that they condemned,
it was an act they did not in the least like. They considered it
to be wrong; the Arabs spoke disparagingly of it. I do not know to
what extent it may be true, but there are a number of people who
now come forward as apologists for the Arabs. They say that what
Emir Feisal and the Sherif did was to save something for Islam;
it was not that they were against the Turks, but they were for
Islam. Whether this was or was not the fact, it is very significant
that such apologies should be made now. Honestly, we have no
apprehensions that we could not reconcile the Arabs and the Turks.
This is a question which I think the Allied Council, the Peace
Conference, could very well leave the Mussulmans to settle amongst
themselves. We do not want British bayonets to force the Arabs into
a position of subservience to the Turks.”

Resuming the idea he had already expressed, he concluded his speech thus:

“That can be very easily arranged, and if such a Federation as we
dream of becomes a reality—and I do not see why it should not—the
Arabs would have all the independence they require. They may
claim national independence, but they cannot forget that Islam is
something other than national, that it is supernational, and the
Khilafat must be as dear to them as it is to us. Even now the King
of the Hejaz does not claim to be the Khalifa. When people began
to address him as such, he rebuked them, and he published in his
official organ, _Al-Qibla_, that he wanted to be called King of
the Hejaz, and not Amir-ul-Mumineen, a title reserved only for the
Khalifa.”

M. Syud Hossain declared in his turn:

“We are not opposed to the independence of Arabia. We are opposed
to Emir Feisal’s declaration of independence only for this
reason—that Arabia, throughout the history of Islam, has up till
now remained under the direct control of the Khalifa. This is the
first time in the history of Islam that anyone who is not the
Khalifa has set up any claim over Arabia. That is why there is,
from the Muslim point of view, a conflict of religious obligations
with actual facts. We are not opposed to Arabian independence.
On the contrary, we wish very much for complete autonomy in that
region, but we want it to be in harmony and not in conflict with
the Khilafat and its claims. The idea is not unrealisable, as both
Arabs and Turks are Muslims.”

Naturally the concentration of the French troops, during the Cilician troubles, had made the action of the Syrian Nationalists popular among the Moslem masses. On the other hand, an anti-Zionist agitation had gained ground in Palestine and quickly developed into a propaganda in favour of the union of Palestine and Syria under one sovereign. All these facts, which point to the existence in Syria of a movement in favour of an independent State, explain how it turned out that the Emir Feisal, who favoured the scheme of a confederate Arabian Empire, was proclaimed King.

General Noury Pasha, sent by the Emir Feisal to London at the beginning of April, handed to the Foreign Office and to the representative of the French Foreign Office who happened to be in that city, three letters written in the Emir’s own hand in which he is said to have asked both Governments to recognise and support the independence of his country, and informed them that the measures taken by the Damascus Congress concerning Mesopotamia merely aimed at putting an end to Turkish anarchy and the riots of Mosul.

The proclamation of the Emir Feisal as King of Syria brought about much discontent in Lebanon.

A meeting was held on March 22 at Baabda, where the General Government of Lebanon resided, to protest against the decision of the Damascus Congress. About a thousand people were present, and the following motions were passed unanimously:

“1. The meeting enters a protest against the right the Syrian
Congress has assumed of disposing of Lebanon, of laying down its
frontiers, of restricting its independence, and of forbidding it to
collaborate with France.

“2. The Congress asserts the independence of Lebanon. In the
demarcation of its frontiers, allowance should be made for its
vital necessities and the claims repeatedly expressed by the
populations.

“3. The Congress considers as null and void the decisions taken by
the Damascus Congress concerning Syria, as the latter Congress was
never regularly constituted.

“4. The Congress confirms the mandate given to the delegates sent
by Lebanon who are now in Paris.

“5. The Congress confirms the independence of Greater Lebanon with
the collaboration of France.

“6. The Congress expresses the wish that a Commission consisting
of inhabitants of Lebanon will lay the foundation of the future
constitution of Lebanon, which is to replace the protocol of 1860.

“7. The Congress asserts the Union of Lebanon and France; the
national emblem shall be the tricolour with a cedar on the white
part.”

This opposition was supported by the Maronite archbishops of the sanjak of Tripolis, Latakia, Hama, and Homs, who sent a telegram of protest from Tripolis to Syria on March 13. Thus the Arabian movement also met with Christian opposition.

Khyatin Saffita Tabez Abbas, chief of the Alawite tribe, sent the following protest from Tartus to the Peace Conference:

“Without the consent of the Alawite tribes, the Emir Feisal has
had himself proclaimed King of Syria. We protest energetically
against such illegal proceedings. We want an Alawite Confederation
established under the direct and exclusive protectorate of France.”

Of course, it was urged that the Assembly of the Syrian Congress at Damascus included only extremists who worked hand in hand with the Turkish Nationalists; it seems, nevertheless, that it represented the opinions of most Syrians, who wanted to restore the unity of Syria; and their wish was no doubt connected with the wish that was gaining ground to restore the unity of Arabia.

On the other hand, the Anglo-French treaty, which aimed at a partition of Ottoman Arabia so as to balance French and English interests, but disregarded the wishes of the peoples, could not but rouse a feeling of discontent. Moreover, some Anglo-Egyptian agents and some British officers had foolishly supported this movement in order to cripple French influence, feeling quite confident they could check this movement later on and put Syria under their own suzerainty. But they were soon thrust aside by the movement, which had been fostered by them in India and now logically was turning against them.

The Arabs of the interior of Arabia also addressed a proclamation to General Gouraud stating they welcomed the French as friends, but did not want them as masters and conquerors.

The Arabian opposition to France which made itself felt far beyond the boundaries of independent Syria, the difficulties raised by the Emir Feisal in the coast area, and the agitation stirred up by the Damascus Government in Syria since the French troops had relieved the English in those parts in October, 1919, induced General Gouraud to occupy the railway stations of Maalhakah and Rayak, the latter being at the junction of the railway line from Aleppo with the Beyrut-Damascus line leading to the Hejaz. At the same time, by way of reprisal for the capture of Mejel-Anjar in the plain of Bukaa lying between Libanus and Anti-Libanus by the Sherifian troops, he gathered his forces in the rear of that town at Zahleh and decided to occupy all this area, which was within the zone put under French control by the 1916 treaty.

On July 20 the Emir Feisal held a war council at Damascus and issued a decree of general mobilisation.

According to the Memoirs of Liman von Sanders, who commanded the Turkish troops in Syria-Palestine, doubts may be raised as to the Emir Feisal’s straightforwardness in his dealings first with the Turks during the war, and later with both the English and the French after the cessation of hostilities.

“The commander of the fourth army, Jemal Pasha, informed me in
the second half of August that the Sherif Feisal was willing to
hold the front occupied by the fourth army along the Jordan on
his own account and with his own troops, if guarantees were given
him by the Turkish Government as to the creation of an Arabian
State. According to the Sherif Feisal an important British attack
was being prepared in the coast zone, and in this way it would be
possible to reinforce the front between the sea and the Jordan with
the troops of the fourth army. Through my Turkish brigadier-general
I instructed General Jemal Pasha to enter into negotiations with
the Sherif Feisal on this point, and I urged Enver to give the
guarantees that were demanded.

“I never had any answer from either Enver or Jemal on this point.
So I cannot say to what extent Feisal’s offer could be relied upon.
According to what I heard from my brigadier-general, I fancy the
Turks mistrusted his offer, which they considered as a mere decoy
to put our positions along the Jordan in the hands of the Arabs,
while the main English attack was to take place in the coast zone
or between the sea and the Jordan.”[42]

As was pointed out by the _Journal des Débats_, which quoted the preceding lines on July 21, 1920, the opinion of Liman von Sanders was quite plausible; yet the recent events on the French front may also have had an influence on the Emir Feisal. Most likely, if we bear in mind the intrigues he carried on afterwards, his first proposal was a consequence of the German advance on the Western front in spring, 1918, but the Allies’ victorious offensive on the Somme on August 8, 1918, caused him to alter his plans. It is noteworthy that in his proposals he disclosed where the first English attack was to take place. At any rate, both suppositions, which corroborate each other, increase the suspicions that might already be entertained about his sincerity; and, since then he has obviously taken advantage of every opportunity to play a double game, or at least to turn all the differences between the Powers to the advantage of Arabian independence.

We criticise him the more severely, as we fully understand the Arabs’ aspirations. We disapprove of his policy and blame his attitude, because we believe Arabian aspirations cannot be lawfully fulfilled at the Turks’ expense, and the Arabs cannot expect they will safeguard their liberty by supporting the English policy in the East in every particular, especially with regard to the Turks, at a time when India and Egypt are seeking to shake off that policy.

Let us add that the Pan-Arabian movement owes the development it has now taken to Colonel Lawrence’s manœuvres, who diverted it from its original aim to make use of it, and became the Emir Feisal’s counsellor in order to influence him in favour of England. Miss Bell, too, played an influential part in that movement.

Though the Emir was the leader of a movement which, on the whole, was hostile to Turkey, and though he asked for English support, he had no objection to co-operating with the Nationalists, who, being threatened by the Allies, offered their support in order to conciliate him. Thus things had come to a more and more confused state. According to the information given by _Le Temps_ on July 20, 1920, it appeared that as early as January, 1919—

“The Sherifian agents, Noury Shalaan, Mohammed Bey, and the
Emir Mahmoud Faour, are working hand in hand with the Turkish
Nationalists. The Turkish Colonel Selfi Bey has several times
travelled from Anatolia to Damascus and _vice versa_ to carry
instructions.

“At the beginning of February, Mustafa Kemal sent an appeal to the
population of Anatolia in which he said: ‘The Arabian Government
relies or will rely on us.’

“The Sherifian authorities are constantly raising difficulties
to prevent the French from sending reinforcements or supplies to
Cilicia by rail.”

In view of the exactions of all sorts the Emir Feisal indulged in, such as the capture of revenue lawfully belonging to the administration of the Ottoman debt and the proscription of French currency, to say nothing of such acts of aggression as attacks on French outposts and the closing of the railways, General Gouraud on Wednesday, July 14, addressed to the Arabian chief the following ultimatum, which expired on the 18th:

“Recognition of the French mandate for Syria.

“Liberty to make use of the Rayak-Aleppo railway.

“The occupation of Aleppo and the stations lying between Aleppo and
Rayak.

“The immediate abolition of forced recruiting.

“Reduction of the Sherifian army to its effectives of December,
1919.

“Free circulation for the French-Syrian currency.

“Punishment of the authors of crimes against French soldiers.

“Acceptance of the above-mentioned conditions within four days. If
these conditions are not complied with, they shall be enforced by
arms.”

Syria, too, was in quite a perturbed state, owing to the discontent prevailing among the population and the differences between the various factions which were striving to get the upper hand in the country. Two towns, Hasbeiya and Rashaya, situated on the slopes of Mount Hermon, had rebelled against the Sherifian Government and wanted to become parts of Lebanon.

An important debate began on July 19 in the House of Commons about the condition of affairs in Asia Minor and the possible consequences the French ultimatum addressed to the Emir Feisal might have for British interests in that region.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore (Stafford, C.U.) asked the Prime Minister whether he could give any information regarding the new military action of France in Syria; whether the twenty-four hours’ ultimatum issued by the French to the Arab Government in Damascus was submitted to and approved by the Supreme Council; whether the terms of the mandate for Syria had yet been submitted to the Allied and Associated Powers; and whether His Majesty’s Government would use their influence with the French and Arab Governments to secure the suspension of further hostilities pending the decision of the Council of the League of Nations on the terms of the Syrian mandate. To this Mr. Bonar Law answered:

“The ultimatum had not been submitted to the Supreme Council. The
terms of the mandate for Syria have not yet been submitted to
the Allied Powers. As regards the last part of the question, His
Majesty’s Government, who had for some time, but unsuccessfully,
been urging the Emir Feisal to come to Europe to discuss the
outstanding questions with the Supreme Council, do not consider
that they can usefully act upon the information at present at their
disposal, but they are in communication with the French Government
on the matter.”

Then Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked again:

“Is it a fact that severe casualties have already resulted from
this, and that the French have advanced over the line agreed upon
between the British and French Governments last year, and that they
have advanced from Jerablus to Jisir-Shugr and from the junction at
Rayak; and has he any information with regard to the progress of
hostilities in another part of the Arab area on the Euphrates?”

Mr. Bonar Law having replied that he had not received the information, Lord Robert Cecil intervened in the discussion, and asked in his turn:

“Have the Government considered the very serious effect of these
proceedings on the whole situation in Asia Minor, particularly
with reference to Moslem feeling, and whether, in view of the fact
that these proceedings were apparently in absolute contravention
of Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, he would cause
representations to be made to our French Allies on the subject?”

Of course, Mr. Bonar Law could only reply:

“We are in communication with the French Government, but I do not
accept the statement of my noble friend that what has happened is
against the Treaty of Versailles. It is very difficult for us here
to judge action which is taken on the responsibility of the French
Government.”

Finally, to Lord Hugh Cecil’s inquiry whether the British Government was bound by promises made to the Emir Feisal, Mr. Bonar Law answered:

“The Government are certainly bound by their pledge. In my opinion
the fact that the mandate was given to France to cover that area
was not inconsistent with that pledge.”

Later on, Mr. Ormsby-Gore obtained leave to move the adjournment of the House in order to call attention to the immediate danger to British interests in the Middle East arising from the threatened new hostilities in Syria. He said that first—

“He wished to criticise vigorously the sins of omission and
commission committed by the British Government, and more
particularly by the British Foreign Office. Only by a frank
and full statement by the British Government would bloodshed
be prevented. The responsibility of this country was deeply
involved in view of the pledges which had been given to the Arabs
before they came into the war, while they were our allies, and
above all since the armistice.... It was essential that both the
French Government and the Arab Government in Damascus should know
exactly what the demands of the British Government were, and how
far we were committed and how far we intended to stand by those
commitments. The British taxpayer, too, wanted to know how far
we were committed. Our pledges to the French were less specific
than those to the Arabs. We pledged ourselves to recognise the
independence of the Arabs. The British Government were bound by
their undertaking to Hussein to recognise the establishment of an
independent Arab State comprising within its borders Damascus,
Hama, Homs, and Aleppo. Did the British Government communicate
these pledges frankly to the French Government? We were responsible
for encouraging the Arabs to believe that we were going to stand
by them. Were we going to stand by that pledge or not? If not, we
ought to tell the Arabs so frankly. It was quite impossible for
us to secure the pacification of Arabia, including Mesopotamia,
unless Damascus was at peace. French, Arab, and British areas had
been agreed upon to last until the permanent settlement was come
to, and if there had been a breach of that agreement those who were
responsible for the breach ought to be held responsible. Until the
mandate for Syria had been approved by the Council of the League
of Nations and the new Arab Government in Syria was established
there should be no disturbance of the _status quo_ without the
willing agreement of all parties. For years the Arabs had been our
greatest friends in the East and France our dearest ally in Europe.
The outbreak of hostilities between them revealed the bankruptcy of
British diplomacy.”

Earl Winterton, like Mr. Ormsby-Gore, took up the defence of the Emir and suggested that Great Britain should act as mediator between France and the Arabs:

“As one who had fought with the Arabs during the war, he resented
the idea contained in the suggestion that while it was all very
well to use the Arabs during the war, it was not worth while now
that the war was over having a row with France for their sake....
Prince Feisal had put his case before the Peace Conference, but
the Government, following its usual practice of secrecy, had never
allowed the House to hear a word of it or of the considered answer
of the Supreme Council. He submitted that the claims that France
had to the mandate in Syria were based, and could only be based,
on the law of the League of Nations. He was amazed to see in a
Northcliffe newspaper that day a reference to ‘the great historical
traditions of France in Syria.’ If that suggested that France
had any rights in Syria over and above those given by the League
of Nations they were coming to a very dangerous argument. It was
absurd to treat a people like the Arabs as an upstart people, to
be treated in a condescending way by the Allies. The duty of the
Government was to make representations at once to both the French
and Arab Governments, asking that this matter should be submitted
to arbitration, and that the whole case should be made public.”

Finally, General Seely, a former Minister, rose, and owned that under the terms of the treaty with Turkey, France had got a force in Syria, but the whole difficulty lay in the French issuing an ultimatum without consulting Great Britain. According to the three speakers, England was interested in the question, owing to her engagements with the Emir Feisal, and the after-effects which French action might have in Syria and the neighbouring regions.

Mr. Bonar Law, feeling obliged to take into account both the section of public opinion on behalf of which the three speakers had spoken, and the feelings of an Allied country, reminded his opponents, who hardly concealed their unwillingness to approve the arrangements which had just been concluded, that France had the same mandate for Syria as Great Britain had for Mesopotamia, and endeavoured to prove that the situation of England in Mesopotamia was very much the same as the situation of France in Syria. He expressly said:

“The real question before the House was whether the British
Government had a right to interfere in a country over which France
had duly received a mandate. It was true that, in October, 1915,
the British Government had declared they were prepared to recognise
and support the independence of the Arabs within those portions
of the territories claimed by the Emir Feisal in which Great
Britain was free to act, but it was added, without detriment to the
interests of her ally France.’ ...

“It was said that the independence of the Arab people was
incompatible with the mandate. If so, this part of the Treaty of
the Covenant of the League of Nations ought not to have been in,
and France ought not to have been allowed to obtain a mandate
in Syria. It was also said that what the French were doing was
uncalled for; that all that was necessary was to have the _status
quo_. But British troops were in occupation of all the territories,
and the British Government came to the conclusion that it was
not fair that we should be called upon to bear the burdens of
occupation of territories in which later we should have no
interest. We gave notice that we intended to withdraw the British
troops. The country had therefore to be occupied, and at the San
Remo Conference the mandate for Syria was given definitely to the
French Government. That was not done behind the back of the Emir
Feisal. It was done with his knowledge, and when he was in Paris
he himself agreed that there should be a French mandate for that
territory.

“We had accepted a mandate in Mesopotamia. Supposing the French
Government said to us, ‘You are using force in Mesopotamia, and
you are doing it without consulting the French Government. You are
breaking the conditions of the proper homogeneity of the Allies,
and you should not take steps to repulse the troops attacking
you in Mesopotamia until you have come to an arrangement with
the French Government.’ The analogy was complete. We were in
Mesopotamia for the purpose of setting up not a colony, but an
independent Arab State, and, in spite of that, we were attacked by
Arabs all through Mesopotamia. Our answer to the French would be
that the mandate for Mesopotamia had been entrusted to us, and we
claimed to deal with the country in the way we thought right. It
was said that this action of the French Government was contrary
to the whole spirit of the mandate and an independent Arab State.
That was not so. In the ultimatum to which reference had been made
a passage occurred which he would quote. Acceptance of the French
mandate was one of the conditions. ‘The mandate,’ it is stated,
‘will respect the independence of Syria and will remain wholly
compatible with the principle of government by Syrian authorities
properly invested with powers by the popular will. It will only
entail on the part of the mandatory Power co-operation in the form
of collaboration and assistance, but it will in no case assume the
colonial form of annexation or direct administration.’ The French
Government told us they were acting on that principle, and was the
House of Commons really going to ask the British Government to say,
‘We do not accept your assurance, but we ask you to allow us to
interfere with you in the exercise of your authority’?

“The mandate having been given, it was clearly no business of ours
to interfere unless some action had been taken so outrageous that
we had a right to say that it was not in accordance with the Peace
Treaty and would not be accepted by the League of Nations or any
other independent body....

“Had we that justification? He thought we had a right at least
to assume that the French Government had something of a case for
the action they were taking. He had the actual words in which
the French described the necessity of their taking this action.
They pointed out that a large number of French soldiers had been
massacred by Arabs. They did not say that the Emir Feisal was
responsible for that—he did not think the Emir was—but that whether
it was due to his responsibility or want of power to prevent it the
situation was one which the French Government could not allow
to continue. With regard to the railway, on which they said they
depended absolutely under present conditions for the support of
their forces in dealing with the rebellion of Mustafa Kemal in
Cilicia, they complained that they had tried over and over again to
get from the Emir the use of that railway for the purpose of the
supply of their troops, but had failed. They said that that was a
condition of things which they could not allow to continue if they
were to be responsible for the mandate. He thought that was a very
good case.”

On Lord Winterton exclaiming: “Then the French have a mandate for Damascus! But neither the Arabs nor the Supreme Council have ever admitted such a mandate,” Mr. Bonar Law, on behalf of the Government, answered:

“They had been in communication with the French Government on that
point, and their reply was to this effect: ‘There is no intention
of permanent military occupation. As soon as the mandate has been
accepted and order has been restored the troops will be withdrawn.’

“A great deal had been said about the claims of Emir Feisal. No one
would recognise them more readily than His Majesty’s Government.
They knew that he and his tribesmen did gallant service in the war,
but he asked the House to remember that but for the sacrifices both
of the French and ourselves, there would have been no possibility
of King Hussein having any authority in his country....

“They met him over and over again in London and Paris, and when the
question came of giving the mandate, on two occasions the British
and French Governments sent a joint invitation to the Emir Feisal
to come to Europe and discuss the question with them. The Emir
Feisal was not able to come for one reason or another on either
occasion; but he did say that no case of any ally or anyone in
connection with the Peace Treaty was considered more thoroughly
than his, or with more inclination to meet his wishes. The House
must be under no misapprehension. There was great trouble in the
Middle East. Arab fighting would add to that trouble, and what
happened in Syria must have reflex action in Mesopotamia. If it
was assumed, as some hon. members were ready to assume, that we in
Mesopotamia were pursuing solely selfish aims with no other object,
and if they assumed that the French were pursuing imperialistic
aims in Syria with no other object, then, of course, the case was
hopeless. There was no Frenchman who had shown a broader mind
and a greater readiness to grasp the position of other people
than General Gouraud. In any degree to reflect upon the French
Government in this matter was a very serious thing.”

The time seemed very badly chosen indeed for such a debate in the English Parliament, as Mr. Winston Churchill, War Secretary, had just informed the Commons that important reinforcements coming from India had recently been dispatched to Mesopotamia, and the Commander-in-Chief had been given full powers to take any measures the situation might require.

It was the policy of England in the East which stood responsible for such a state of things. Though the bulk of public opinion in France was averse to any military action in the East, either in Syria or in Turkey, yet France was driven to fight, as it were, by England—though both Governments were supposed to act jointly in the East—in order to prevent her ally from undermining her influence. Such was the outcome of England’s ill-omened policy, who first had supported the Arabian movement and now seemed to forsake it, and thus had roused all the East against Europe through the resentment caused by her attitude towards Turkey and Persia. Perhaps England was not very sorry, after all, that France should divert against herself part of the Arabian forces from the Mesopotamian front, where the British effectives were insufficient in number.

M. Millerand corroborated Mr. Bonar Law’s statements before the French Chamber, disclosed some of the agreements made with England, and apologised for being unable to say more; he also declared England had officially recognised she had no right to meddle with Syrian affairs; and finally declared that whoever should feel tempted—he meant the Emir who had just submitted to General Gouraud’s ultimatum—to oppose France to Great Britain in Asia Minor would now know it would have France alone in front of him. And yet if one day Great Britain rules over Mesopotamia, she is not likely to give France a free hand in Syria.

Just at the same time—on July 20—the Cairo correspondent of _The Times_ wrote that he understood the King of the Hejaz had telegraphed to Mr. Lloyd George how surprised and disappointed he was at the French policy in Syria, and asked him to interfere. King Hussein also declared he could not exert his influence on the Emir Feisal’s brothers or prevent them from coming to his help.

The English Government circles, on the other hand, seemed at last inclined to favour a scheme that would put Syria and Mesopotamia, respectively under the sovereignty of the Emir Feisal and the Emir Abdullah, under a French mandate in Syria and a British one in Mesopotamia. But the _Daily Express_ of July 17 seemed apprehensive lest the French expedition aimed at overthrowing the Emir Feisal and replacing him by the Emir Said, who had been expelled from Syria during the British occupation. Let it be said, incidentally, that the Arabs of the Emir Feisal possessed 100,000 rifles, the very arms taken from the Turks by the English and left by the latter in the hands of the Arabian leader.

General Gouraud’s ultimatum had naturally been accepted by the Emir Feisal, but a few days after its expiration, and so military action had been started. General Gouraud, according to his communiqué, had, on July 22, at the Emir’s request, stopped the column that was on its way from Zaleh to Damascus. Feisal had alleged that his answer had been sent in due time, but untoward circumstances had prevented it from coming to hand the appointed day.

The French General had consented to give him the benefit of the doubt and halt his troops on certain conditions, one of which was that his soldiers should not be attacked. Now the French column that guarded the country between Homs and Tripolis, some distance to the east of the post of Tel-Kelah, was attacked by Sherifian regulars. Under these circumstances, and to prevent another attack which seemed to be preparing between Damascus and Beyrut, the southern French column that guarded the railway in case of an attack coming from Damascus, dislodged the Sherifian troops whose headquarters were at Khan-Meiseloun, in the mountain range which divides the plain of the Bukaa from the plain of Damascus, and thus the way was open to the latter town.

France, who otherwise would not have been obliged to fight in order to maintain her influence in Syria, was compelled to do so by the policy in which she was involved. But this policy, which drove her to inaugurate a Syrian campaign at the very time when by the side of England she enforced on Turkey a treaty that no Turk could accept, might have brought about, as Pierre Loti said in an article of the _Œuvre_, July 22, “the death of France in the East.”

Even the Christians[43]—the Armenians excepted—wished the French to leave Antioch in order to be able to come to an understanding with the Moslems who maintained order in the four great towns of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus, occupied by the Sherifian troops. A delegation of eight members representing the Christian element wanted to go to France, but the Patriarch of Lebanon handed General Gouraud a protest to be forwarded to the French Government; he inveighed against what he called “the shameful conduct of some members of the administrative Council of Lebanon,” and charged them, just as they were about to leave for Europe, with receiving important sums of money from the Emir Feisal to carry on an anti-French propaganda. After this protest, they were imprisoned by the French authorities: all of which shows the state of deep unrest then prevailing in Lebanon and our utter lack of reliable information from the East.

On July 23 a French column entered Aleppo, after a skirmish north of Muslemieh, and a reconnoitring body of cavalry which had pushed on as far as Homs bridge was greeted by some Sherifian officers, who informed them that the Sherifian troops had left the town. On the 25th, in the afternoon, the French troops entered Damascus without encountering any resistance. A new Government was formed after the downfall of the Sherifian Government, and General Gobet formally notified them on behalf of General Gouraud that the Emir Feisal was no longer King of the country. He demanded a war contribution of 10 million francs on account of the damage done by the war bands in the western zone; general disarmament should be proceeded with at once; the army should be reduced and converted into a body of police; all war material should be handed over to the French authorities, and the chief war criminals tried by military courts. All these conditions were, of course, assented to by the new Government, who expressed their sincere wish to collaborate with the French.

The Emir Feisal, who had come back to Damascus, was requested to leave the country with his family. He set off to England soon after and sought to meet Mr. Lloyd George at Lucerne.

Without considering the future relations between Lebanon and Syria or turning its attention to the future mode of government of Syria and its four great towns Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, the French Government decided to restore Greater Lebanon. M. Millerand informed Mgr. Abdallah Kouri, Maronite Archbishop of Arca, president of the delegation of Lebanon, of this by a letter dated August 24, 1920. The new State was to extend from the Nahr-el-Litani, which flows along the frontier of Palestine, to another State, called “Territoire des Alaonites,” or, in Arabic, Alawiya, coming between the Lebanon and Antioch, and to the crests of Anti-Libanus, including the Bukaa area, with the towns of Rayak and Baalbek. The ports of Beyrut and Tripolis in Syria were to enjoy local autonomy, but to keep in close connection with the new State. Beyrut was to be the seat of the new Government; Tripolis and its suburbs were to be grouped into a municipality. In this way Greater Lebanon would have recovered all its former territories, as it was before 1860, in conformity with the promises made by M. Clémenceau and confirmed by M. Millerand, and with the claims set forth in 1919 at the Peace Conference by the delegates of Lebanon.

Was it not a mistake in Syria, a country over which France had a mandate and where the proportion of Moslems is three to one, to start with a policy that favoured Lebanon and consequently the Christians? The question was all the more important as the discontent brought about by the Powers’ decisions was far from subsiding in these and the neighbouring regions.

Indeed, the Ansarieh tribes, living in the mountainous regions to the east of Antioch and Alexandretta, and in the Jebel Ansarieh between Latakia and Tartus, which had persistently kept aloof from us in the past, made their submission after the downfall of the Emir Feisal, and several Ansarieh chiefs—Ismail Pasha, Inad, and Ismail Bey Yaouah—accepted the conditions imposed on them. Yet dissatisfaction was still rampant in the Hauran area, and the train in which ed Rubi Pasha, the Syrian Premier, and other Ministers were going to Deraa was attacked on Friday, August 20, at Kerbet-Ghazeleh by Arabian bands. Ed Rubi Pasha and Abdurrahman Youssef Pasha were murdered. The railway line was recaptured later on, but the contingents sent to Deraa had to fight with Arabian bands at Mosmieh.

Farther north, in the part of Cilicia entirely occupied by Kemalist troops, Colonel Brémond, commanding a group of 3,000 to 4,000 men consisting of French troops and native recruits, after being blockaded at Adana for six weeks, had to sign a truce in August because he was short of water, and the provisioning of Adana could only be ensured by establishing a base in the former Roman port of Karatash. Mersina, where the French had enlisted all the Armenian and Greek manhood, was also besieged and blockaded, except along the coast where a French warship overawed the rebels. Lastly, Tarsus, the third place occupied by French troops, was in the same predicament, and was cut off from the other two towns. Under these circumstances whoever could flee sailed to Cyprus, and the few boats which called at Mersina took away crowds of fugitives.

In Mesopotamia the situation was quite as bad, and everywhere the Arabs evinced much discontent. In the zone of the lower Euphrates and Lake Hamar, as well as in the Muntefik area, many disturbances occurred.

The _Sunday Times_ of August 21, 1920, in an article in which the attitude of the British Government was severely criticised, wondered whether it was not too late to atone for the mistakes of England, even by expending large sums of money, and concluded thus:

“Would it not be wiser to confess our failure and give up meddling
with the affairs of three million Arabs who want but one thing, to
be allowed to decide their own fate? After all, Rome was not ruined
when Hadrian gave up the conquests made by Trajan.”

The _Observer_ too asked whether a heavy expenditure of men and money could restore the situation, and added:

“The situation is serious; yet it is somewhat ludicrous too, when
we realise that so much blood and money has been wasted for a
lot of deserts and marshes which we wanted ‘to pacify,’ and when
we remember that our ultimate aim is to impose our sovereignty on
people who plainly show they do not want it.”

* * * * *

The diversity of creeds among the various Moslem sects had also, from the beginning, imperilled the unity of the Arabian world within the Ottoman Empire by endangering its religious unity. By the side of the Sunnis, or Orthodox Moslems, the Shia—viz., the rebels or heretics, belonging to a schism which is almost as old as Islam itself—recognise nobody but Ali as the lawful successor of Mohammed. According to them, the title of Caliph should not go outside the Prophet’s family, and his spiritual powers can only be conferred upon his descendants; so, from a religious point of view, they do not recognise the power of the other dynasties of Caliphs—for instance, that of the Ottoman Sultans. As Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, was killed at Kufa in Mesopotamia, and as Ali’s sons, Hassan and Hossein, were also massacred at Kerbela, near the ruins of Babylon, together with some of their descendants who had a lawful right to the title of Imam, Mesopotamia is looked upon by the Shia as their Holy Places.

Many wealthy Persians, to whom the worship of the members of Ali’s family has become a symbol and who consider their death as a religious sacrifice, have their own coffins carried to Mesopotamia that their bodies may lie in the holy necropolis of Kerbela or of Nejef, to the north-east of Mecca and Medina; and as a great many Arabs of Mesopotamia are still Shia, this schism practically divides the Persian world from the Turkish world.

But though the Persians, who have never recognised any Caliph, and for the last thirteen hundred years have been waiting till the Khilafat should revert to the lineal descent of Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, to acknowledge a Caliph’s authority, do not recognise the Ottoman Caliphate, yet their monarchs do not seek to deprive the Sultan of his title of Caliph to assume it themselves.

So their case is entirely different from that of the people of Morocco, who do not recognise the Ottoman Caliphate because their own sovereigns, as descendants of the Prophet, profess they have an hereditary right to hold the office of Caliph within the frontiers of their State.

The Shia faith has even spread as far as India and the Sunda Isles; and so the opposition between Shia and Sunnis may play an important part in freeing Mesopotamia from the Turkish influence of Constantinople.

Yet the English occupation has been so bitterly resented in Mesopotamia that the Shia Mujtahids, or imams of Nejef and Kerbela, have lately asked for the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over these towns, where are the two famous holy shrines of Islam. Moreover, the controversy on the question whether the Sultans of Turkey have a right to the Caliphate, because they do not belong to the tribe of Koreish, in which the Prophet was born, seems to have come to an end among the Moslems, or at least to have been laid aside in view of the present events.

Moreover, the Prophet, when he advised the Faithful to choose his successor in the tribe of Koreish, does not seem at all, according to the best Moslem authorities, to have wished to confer the supreme spiritual power for ever upon a particular section of the community related to him by ties of blood, and to have reserved the Caliphate to this tribe. It seems more likely that, as Islam at that time had not yet given birth to powerful States, he chose this tribe because it was the best organised and the strongest, and thus considered it as the fittest to maintain the independence of the Caliphate and defend the interests of Islam. Besides, within half a century after the Prophet’s death the Caliphate passed from Mohammed’s four immediate successors to the Omayyids for the reason indicated above, and in contradiction to the theory of lineal descent. It is obvious that, had Mohammed been guided by family considerations, he would not have merely given the Faithful some directions about the election of his successor, but he would have chosen one of his relations himself to inherit his office, and would have made it hereditary in the latter’s family.

The Wahhabis, who are connected with the Shia, are likewise a political and religious sect which was founded in the eighteenth century in Nejed, a region of Central Arabia conterminous with the north of Syria. The Wahhabi doctrine aims at turning Islam into a kind of deism, a rational creed, looking upon all the traditions of Islam as superstitions, and discarding all religious observances. Since the assassination of Ibn el Rashid in May, 1920, the present leaders of the Wahhabis are Abdullah ibn Mitah and Ibn Saud, over whom the Ottomans have a merely nominal power.