Chapter I (1)

_Enquiring, whether there be any thing in the |nature| and
|condition| of man, to |oblige| him to think, that he is not
to admit of any doctrines or institutions, as revealed from
God, but such as his own reason can prove to be necessary from
the nature of things._

I BEGIN with enquiring what there is to _oblige_ a man to hold this opinion, because if there is not some strong and plain proof arising from the _nature_ and _condition_ of man, to _oblige_ him thus to abide by the sole light of his own reason; it may be so far from being a duty, which he owes to God, that it may be reckoned amongst his most criminal presumptions. And the pleading for this authority of his own reason; may have the guilt of pleading for his greatest vanity. And if, as this writer observes, _spiritual pride be the worst sort of pride_,¹ a confident reliance upon our own reason, as having a right to determine all matters between God and man, if it should prove to be a _groundless pretension_, bids fair to be reckoned the highest instance of the _worst_ kind of the worst of sins.

¹ Page 150.

Every other instance of vanity, every degree of personal pride, and self-esteem, may be a pardonable weakness in comparison of this. For how small is that pride which only makes us prefer our own personal beauty or merit to that of our fellow-creatures, when compared with a self-confiding reason, which is too haughty to adore any thing in the divine counsels, which it cannot fully comprehend; or to submit to any directions from God, but such as its own wisdom could prescribe? Thus much is certain, that there can be no _medium_ in this matter. The claiming this authority to our own reason, must either be a very great duty, or among the greatest of sins.

If it be a _sin_ to admit of any _secrets_ in divine providence, if it be a _crime_ to ascribe wisdom and goodness to God in things we cannot comprehend: if it be a _baseness_ and _meanness_ of spirit to believe that God can teach us _better_ or _more_ than we can teach ourselves: if it be a _shameful apostacy_ from the dignity of our nature, to submit to any _mysterious providence_ over us, to comply with any other methods of _homage_ and _adoration_, than such as we could of ourselves contrive and justify; then it is certainly a great duty to assert and maintain this authority of our own reason.

On the other hand; if the profoundest humility towards God, be the highest instance of piety: if every thing within us and without us, if every thing we know of God, every thing we know of ourselves preaches up humility to us, as the foundation of every virtue, as the life and soul of all holiness: if _sin_ had its beginning from _pride_, and _hell_ be the effect of it, if _devils_ are what they are through spiritual pride and self-conceit, then we have great reason to believe, that the claiming this authority to our reason, in opposition to the revealed wisdom of God, is not a frailty of _flesh_ and _blood_, but that same spiritual pride which turned _angels_ into _apostate_ spirits.

Since therefore this appealing to our own reason, as the absolutely _perfect rule_ of all that ought to pass between God and man, has an _appearance_ of a pride of the _worst_ kind, and such as unites us both in temper and conduct with the fallen spirits of darkness, it highly concerns every pleader on that side, to consider what grounds he proceeds upon, and to ask himself, what there is in the _state_ and _condition_ of human nature, to oblige him to think, that nothing can be _divine_ or _holy_, or _necessary_, in religion, but what _human_ reason dictates?

I hope the reader will think this a fair state of the case, and that all the light we can have in this matter, must arise from a thorough consideration of the _state_ and _condition_ of man in this world. If without revelation he is free from mysteries as a _moral_ and _religious_ agent, then he has some plea from his state and condition to reject _revealed_ mysteries.

But if in a state of natural religion, he can’t acknowledge a divine providence or worship God, without _as much_ implicit faith, and submission of his reason, as any revealed mysteries require; then his _state_ and _condition_ in the world, condemns his refusal of any revelation sufficiently attested to come from God. This enquiry therefore into the state and condition of man, being so plainly the true point of the controversy, I hope to obtain the reader’s impartial attention to it.

Had mankind continued in a state of _perfect innocence_, without ever failing in their duty either to God or man, yet even in such a state, they could never have known what God would or would not reveal to them, but by some express revelation from him. And as God might intend to raise them to some higher, and unknown state of perfection; so he might raise them to it by the revelation of such things as their own reason, though uncorrupt, yet could not have discovered.

But if man, in a state of _innocence_, could have no pretence to set himself against divine revelation, and make his own reason the _final judge_ of what God could, or could not reveal to him; much less has he any pretence for so doing in his present state of _sin_, _ignorance_, and _misery_. His _nature_ and _condition_ is so far from furnishing him with reasons against revelation, against any _supernatural_ help from God; that it seems to be inconsolable without it; and every circumstance of his life prepares him to hope for terms of _mercy_ and deliverance from his present guilt and misery, not according to _schemes_ of his _own_ contrivance, not from his _own knowledge_ of the _nature_, and _reason_, and _fitness_ of things, but from some _incomprehensible depth_ of divine goodness.

For if sin, and misery, and ignorance, cannot convince us of our own weakness, cannot prepare us to accept of any _methods_ of _atoning_ for our guilt, but such as our own disordered reason can suggest, we are not far from the hardened state of those miserable spirits, that make war against God.

For to insist upon the _prerogative_ of our own nature, as qualifying us to make our own peace with God, and to reject the _atonement_ which he has provided for us, because we esteem it more fit and reasonable, that our _own repentance_ should be sufficient without it, is the same height of _pride_ and _impiety_, as to affirm, that we have no need of any repentance at all.

For as mankind, if they had continued in a state of _innocence_, could not have known how their innocence was to be rewarded, or what changes of state God intended them for, but as revelation had discovered these things unto them: so after they were _fallen_ into a state of guilt and sin, they could never know what _misery_ it would expose them to, or _when_, or _how_, or whether they were ever to be delivered from it, and made as happy as if they had _never_ sinned; these are things that nothing but a revelation from God could teach them.

So that for a sinner to pretend to appoint the _atonement_ for his own sins, or to think himself able to tell what it _ought_ to be, is as foolish and vain a presumption, as if man in _innocence_ should have pretended to appoint his own method of being changed into a _cherub_.

The writers against revelation appeal to the _reason_ and _nature_ of things, as _infallibly_ discovering every thing that a revelation from God can teach us.

Thus our author; _If the relations between things, and the fitness resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions, must not God be an arbitrary being? But if God only commands what the nature of things shew to be fit, it is scarce possible that men should mistake their duty; since a mind that is attentive can as easily distinguish fit from unfit, as the eye can beauty from deformity_¹.

¹ Page 30.

It is granted, that there is a fitness and unfitness of actions founded in the nature of things, and resulting from the relations that persons and things bear to one another. It is also granted, that the reasonableness of most of the duties of children to their parents, of parents to their children, and of men to men, is very apparent, from the relations they bear to one another; and that several of the duties which we owe to God, plainly appear to us, as soon as we acknowledge the relation that is between God and us.

But then, this _whole argument_ proves directly the contrary to that which this author intended to prove by it.

I here therefore join with this author; I readily grant, that the nature, reason and relations of things and persons, and the fitness of actions resulting from thence, is the _sole rule_ of God’s actions. And I appeal to this one common principle, as a sufficient proof that a man cannot thus abide by the _sole light_ of his own reason, without contradicting the nature and reason of things, and denying this to be the _sole rule_ of God’s actions.

* For if the _fitness_ of actions is founded in the _nature_ of things and persons, and this fitness be the _sole rule_ of God’s actions, it is certain that the rule by which he acts, must in many instances be _entirely_ inconceivable by us, so as not to be known _at all_, and in no instances _fully_ known, or _perfectly_ comprehended.

* For if God is to act according to a _fitness founded_ in the _nature_ of things, and nothing can be fit for him to do, but what has its fitness founded in his own _incomprehensible_ nature, must he not necessarily act by a rule _above_ all human comprehension? If he must govern his actions by his own nature, he must act by a _rule_ that is just as _incomprehensible_ to us as his own nature.

* And we can be no farther _competent judges_ of the _fitness_ of the conduct of God, than we are competent judges of the divine nature; and can no more tell what is, or is not _infinitely wise_ in God, than we can raise ourselves to a _state_ of infinite wisdom.

So that if the _fitness_ of actions is founded in the _particular nature_ of things and persons, and the fitness of God’s actions must arise from that which is _particular_ to his nature, then we have from this argument, the _utmost certainty_ that the _rule_ or _reasons_ of God’s actions must in many cases be entirely inconceivable by us, and in no cases perfectly apprehended; and for this very reason, because he is not an _arbitrary being_, that acts by _mere will_, but is governed in every thing he does, by the reason and nature of things.

How mistaken therefore is this author, when he argues after this manner. _If God requires things of us, whose fitness our reason can’t prove from the nature of things, must he not be an arbitrary being?_ For how can that prove God to be an arbitrary agent, which is the necessary consequence of his not being arbitrary?

Supposing God not to be an _arbitrary being_, but to act constantly, as the perfections of his own nature make it _fit_ and _reasonable_ for him to act, then there is an utter impossibility of our comprehending the reasonableness and fitness of many of his actions.

* For instance; look at the _reason_ of things, and the _fitness_ of actions, and tell me how they moved God to create mankind in the state and condition they are in. Nothing is more above the reason of men, than to explain the reasonableness of God’s providence in creating man of such a _form_ and _condition_, to go through _such_ a state of things as human life is. No revealed mysteries can more exceed the comprehension of man, than the state of human life itself.

Shew me according to what _fitness_, founded in the _nature_ of things, God’s infinite wisdom was determined to form you in such a manner, bring you into such a world, and suffer and preserve _such a state_ of things, as human life is, and then you may have some pretence to believe no revealed doctrines, but such as your own reason can deduce from the nature of things.

But whilst your own _form_, whilst _creation_ and _providence_ are depths which you cannot thus look into, ’tis strangely absurd to pretend, that God cannot reveal any thing to you as a matter of religion, except your own reason can shew its foundation in the nature and reason of things.

_Revelation_, you say, is on your account, and therefore you ought to see the _reasonableness_ and _fitness_ of it. And don’t you also say, that God has made you for your _own sake_; ought you not therefore to know the reasonableness and fitness of God’s forming you as you are? Don’t you say, that providence is for the _sake_ of man? Is it not therefore fit and reasonable, in the nature of things, that there should be no _mysteries_, or _secrets_, in providence, but that man should so see its methods, as to be able to prove all its steps to be constantly fit and reasonable?

Don’t you say, that the _world_ is for the _sake_ of man; is it not therefore fit and reasonable that man should see, that the _past_ and _present_ state of the world has been such as the reason and fitness of things required it should be?

* Now if the _imperfect_ state of human nature, the _calamities_ of this life, the _diseases_ and mortality of human bodies, the _methods_ of God’s continual providence in governing human affairs, are things that as much concern us, as any methods of revealed religion; and if these are things that we cannot explain, according to any _fitness_ or _unfitness_ founded in the _nature_ of things, but must believe a great deal more of the infinite wisdom of God, than we can so explain; have we any reason to think, that God cannot, or ought not to raise us out of this unhappy state of things, help us to an higher order of life, and exalt us to a nearer enjoyment of himself, by any means, but such as our own poor reason can grope out of the nature and fitness of things?

Now what is the reason, that all is thus mysterious and unmeasurable by human reason, in these matters so nearly concerning human nature? ’Tis because God is not an _arbitrary being_, but does that which the _incomprehensible perfections_ of his own nature, make it _fit_ and _reasonable_ for him to do. Do but grant that nothing can be _fit_ for God to do, but what is _according_ to his own _infinite perfections_: let but this be the _rule_ of his actions, and then you have the _fullest_ proof, that the fitness of his actions must be above our comprehension, who can only judge of a _fitness_ according to our _own perfections_; and then we must be surrounded with mystery for this very reason, because God acts according to a _certain rule_, his own nature.

_Again_: What is the nature of a human soul, upon what _terms_, and in what manner it is _united_ to the body, how far it is _different_ from it, how far it is _subject_ to it, what powers and faculties it _derives_ from it; are things wherein the _wisdom_ and _goodness_ of God, and the _happiness_ of man are deeply concerned. Is it not necessary that these things should have their foundation in the _reason_ and _fitness_ of things? And yet what natural reason, uninspired from above, can shew that this _state_ of soul and body is founded therein?

* _Again_: The origin of _sin_ and _evil_, or how it entered into the world consistently with the infinite wisdom of God, is a mystery of _natural religion_, which reason cannot unfold. For can we shew from the _reason_ and _nature_ of things, that it was _fit_ and _reasonable_, for the providence of God to suffer sin to enter, and continue in the world? Here therefore the man of natural religion must drop his method of reasoning from the fitness of things, and that in an article of the highest concern to the moral world, and be as mere a believer, as he that believes the most incomprehensible mystery of revealed religion.

Now as there have been in the several ages of the world, some _impatient_, _restless_ and _presuming_ spirits, who, because they could not in these points explain the justice of God’s providence, have taken refuge in horrid _atheism_, so they made just the same _sober use_ of their reason, as our _modern unbelievers_, who because they can’t comprehend the _fitness_ and _necessity_ of certain Christian doctrines, resign themselves up to an hardened _infidelity_. For it is just as reasonable to allow of no mysteries in _revelation_, as to allow of no mysteries in _creation_ and _providence_.

And whenever this writer shall think it proper to attack _natural_ religion with as much freedom as he has _revealed_, he need not enter upon any _new_ hypothesis, or _different_ way of reasoning. For the same turn of thought, may soon find materials in the natural state of man, for as large a bill of complaints against natural religion, and the mysteries of providence, as is here brought against revealed doctrines.

To proceed: If the _fitness of actions is founded in the nature and relation of beings_, then nothing can be fit for God to do, but so far as it is fit for the _Governor of all created beings_, whether on earth, or in any other part of the universe; and he cannot act fitly towards mankind, but by acting as is fit for the Governor of all beings.

* Now what is fit for the _Governor of all created_ nature to do in this or that particular part of his creation, is as much above our reason to _tell_, as it is above our power to _govern_ all beings. And how mankind ought to be governed, with relation to the whole creation, of which they are so small a part, is a matter equally above our knowledge; because we know not how they are a part of the whole, or what relation they bear to any other part, or how their state affects the whole, or any other part, than we know what beings the whole consists of.

Now there is nothing that we know with more certainty than that God is governor of the _whole_, and that mankind are a _part_ of the whole; and that the uniformity and harmony of divine providence, must arise from his infinite wise government of the _whole_; and therefore we have the utmost certainty, that we are _vastly incompetent_ judges of the fitness or unfitness of any methods that God uses in the government of so small a part of the universe, as mankind are.

_Again_: If the _fitness of actions is founded in the relations of beings to one another_, then the fitness of the actions of God’s providence over mankind, must be in many instances altogether incomprehensible to us.

For the relation which God bears to mankind, as their _all-perfect Creator_ and continual _Preserver_, is a relation that our reason conceives as imperfectly, and knows as little of, as it does of any of the divine attributes. When it compares it to that of a _father_ and his children, a _prince_ and his subjects, a _proprietor_ and his property, it has explained it in the best manner it can, but still has left it as much a _secret_, as we do the divine nature when we only say, it is _infinitely_ superior to every thing that is _finite_.

By the natural light of our reason we may know with certainty, several _effects_ of this relation, as that it puts us under the care and protection of a wise, and just, and merciful providence, and demands from us the highest instances of humility, adoration and thanksgiving. But what it is in its own nature, what kind of state, it is to exist in and by God, what it is to see by a _light_ that is his, to act by a power from him, to live by a _life_ in him; are things as incomprehensible to reason, _left to itself_, as what it is to be in the _third heavens_, or to hear words that cannot be uttered.

But if this relation consists in these _inconceivable_ things, in a communication of _life_, _light_ and _power_, if these are enjoyed in God, and in ourselves, in a manner not to be explained by any thing that we ever heard, or saw; then we must necessarily be poor judges of what is fit for God to require of us, because of this _relation_. It teaches us nothing but the superficialness of our own knowledge, and the unfathomable depths of the divine perfections.

How little this writer has considered the nature of this _relation_ between God and man, may be seen by the following paragraphs. _The Holy Ghost_, says he, _cannot deal with men as rational creatures, but by proposing arguments to convince their understandings; and influence their wills, in the same manner as if proposed by other agents_. As absurd, as to say, God cannot _create_ us as rational beings, unless he creates us in the same _manner_, as if we were created by other agents. For to suppose that other agents can possibly act upon our understanding, and will, in the _same manner_ that God does; is as gross an absurdity, as to suppose that other agents can create us in the same manner that God creates us.

And to _confine_ the manner of the Holy Ghost’s acting upon us, to the manner of our acting upon one another by _arguments_ and _syllogisms_, is as great a weakness, as to _confine_ the manner of God’s creating us, to the manner of our making a _statue_ with _tools_ and _instruments_.

But he proceeds and says, _For to go beyond this, would be making impressions on men, as a seal does on wax; to the confounding of their reason, and their liberty in chusing; and the man would then be mearly passive, and the action would be the action of another being acting upon him, for which he could be no way accountable_¹.

¹ Page 199.

Here you see the Holy Spirit has but these two possible ways of acting upon men, it must either only propose an argument, just as a man may propose one, or it must act like a _seal upon wax_.

I only ask this writer, whether God communicates _life_, and _strength_, and _understanding_, and _liberty of will_ to us, only as men may communicate any thing to one another? or as a seal acts upon wax? If so, it may be granted, that the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us any other way.

But it must be affirmed, that we do, by a continual influx from God, enjoy all these powers, and receive the continuance of all these faculties from him, not as men receive things from one another, nor as _wax_ receives the _impression_ of the _seal_, but in a way as much above our conception, as creation is above our power; if we have all our _power_ of acting, by a _continual communication_ from him, and yet as free agents, have all our _light_ from him, and yet are _accountable intelligent_ beings; then it must be great weakness to affirm, that the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us in the same manner: for it would be saying, God cannot act upon us as he does act upon us.

The short of the matter is this. Either this _writer_ must affirm, that our _rational nature_, our _understanding faculties_, our _power_ of action, our _liberty_ of will, must _necessarily_ subsist without the _continual action_ of God upon them, or else he must grant, that God can _act_ upon our _understandings_ and _wills_ without making us as _merely passive_ as the wax under the seal.

This writer says, _Though the relation we stand in to God, is not artificial, as most are amongst men――yet this does not hinder, but that we may know the end he had in being related to us as Creator and Governor, and what he requires of his creatures and subjects_. But how are we to know this? _This_, says he, _the divine nature_, which _contains in it all perfection and happiness, plainly points out to us_¹.

¹ Page 29.

If he had said, since God must act over us as Creator and Governor, according to his own infinite _perfection and happiness_, therefore his conduct over us may be _very mysterious_, he had drawn a _plain_ conclusion. But he proves all to be plain, because God is to govern us according to something that is not plain, according to his own _incomprehensible nature_.

His argument therefore proceeds thus. God must govern us according to his own _infinite perfection and happiness_; but we _do not know_ what his infinite perfections and happiness are:

Therefore we _plainly know_ how he is to govern us.

Now if this writer is capable of taking such an argument as this to be demonstrative, it is no wonder that all his principles of religion are founded upon demonstration.

But if he knows no more of what arises from the _relation_ between God and his creatures, than he has here demonstrated, he might be very well content with some farther knowledge from divine revelation.

It is because of this incomprehensible relation between God and his creatures, that we are unavoidably ignorant of what God may justly require of us either in a state of _innocence_ or _sin_. For as the fitness of actions between beings _related_, must result from their respective natures, so the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, on which the relation between God and man is founded, makes it utterly impossible for mere natural reason to say, what _kind_ of _homage_, or _worship_, he may _fitly_ require of man in a state of _innocence_; or what _different_ worship and homage he may, or must require of men, as _sinners_.

And to appeal to the infinite perfections of God, as _plainly pointing this out_, is the same extravagance, as to appeal to the _incomprehensibility_ of God as a plain proof of our comprehending what God is.

As to the obligations of moral or social duties, which have their foundation in the several relations we bear to one another, these are the same in the state of _innocence_ or _sin_, and we know that we truly act according to the divine will, when we act according to what these relations require of us.

But the question is, What distinct kind of _homage_, or _service_, or _worship_, God may require us to render to him, either in a state of _innocence_ or _sin_, on account of that relation he bears to us as an all-perfect Creator and Governor?

But this is a question that God alone can resolve.

Human reason cannot enter into it, it has no principle to proceed upon in it. For as the _necessity_ of divine worship, so the _particular manner_ of it, must have its reason in the divine nature.

_Sacrifice_, if considered only as an _human invention_, could not be proved to be a reasonable service. Yet considered as a _divine institution_, it would be the greatest folly not to receive it as a reasonable service. For as we could see no reason for it, if it was of human invention, so we should have the greatest reason to comply with it because it was of divine appointment. Not as if the divine appointment altered the _nature_ and _fitness_ of things; but because nothing has the _nature_ and _fitness_ of divine worship, but as it is of divine appointment.

Man therefore, had he continued in a state of innocence, and without revelation, might have lived in an awful fear, and pious regard of God, and observed every duty both of moral and civil life, as an act of obedience to him. But he could have no foundation either to invent any particular _manner_ of divine worship himself, or to reject any that was appointed by God, as _unnecessary_. It would have been ridiculous to have pleaded his innocence, as having no need of a divine worship. For who can have greater reason, or be fitter to worship God, than innocent beings? It would have been more absurd, to have objected the sufficiency of their reason; for why should men reject a _revealed manner_ of divine worship, because God had given them reason of their own, sufficient for the duties of social and civil life?

And as reason in a state of innocence and perfection, could not have any pretence to appoint the manner of divine worship, so when the state of innocence was changed for that of sin, it became more difficult for bare reason to know what kind of worship could be acceptable to God from sinners.

For what the _relation_ betwixt God and sinners makes it fit for God to require or accept of them, cannot be determined by human reason.

This is a _new state_, and the foundation of a _new relation_, and nothing can be fit for God to do in it, but what has its _fitness resulting_ from it. We have nothing to help our conceptions of the fore-mentioned _relative characters_ of God, as our _Governor_ and _Preserver_, but what we derive from our idea of human _fathers_ and _governors_: which idea only helps us to comprehend these _relations_, just as our idea of human power helps us to comprehend the _omnipotence_ of God. For a father or governor, no more represents the _state_ of God as our _Governor_ and _Preserver_, than our living in our father’s _family_, represents the _manner_ of our living in God.

These relations are both very plain, and very mysterious; they are very plain, as to the _reality_ of their existence; and highly mysterious and inconceivable, as to the _manner_ of their existence.

That which is _plain_, in these relative characters of God, plainly shews our obligations to every instance of _duty_, _homage_, _love_, and _gratitude_.

And that which is _inconceivable_ in them, is a solid foundation of that _profound humility_, _awful reverence_, _internal piety_ and _tremendous sense_ of the divine Majesty, with which devout persons think of God, and assist at the _offices_ of religion. Which excites in them a higher zeal for doctrines and institutions of divine revelation, than for all things human; that fills them with reverence for all _things_, places, and offices, that are either by divine or human authority, appointed to assist their desired intercourse with God.

And if some people, by a _long_ and _strict_ attention to _reason_, and the _fitness_ and _unfitness_ of things, have at last arrived at a demonstrative certainty, that all these sentiments of piety and devotion, are mere _bigotry_, _superstition_, and _enthusiasm_; I shall only now observe, that _youthful extravagance_, _passion_, and _debauchery_, by their own _natural tendency_, without the assistance of any other guide, seldom fail of making the same discovery. And though it is not reckoned any reflection upon _great wits_, when they hit upon the same thought, yet it may seem some disparagement of that _reason_ and _philosophy_, which teaches _old men_ to think the same of religion, that _passion_ and _extravagance_ teach the young.

To return: As there is no state in human life, that can give us a true idea of any of the fore-mentioned relative characters of God, so this relative state of God towards sinners is still less capable of being comprehended by any thing observable in the relations, betwixt a judge and criminals, a _creditor_ and his debtors, a _physician_ and his patients, a father or prince, and their disobedient children and subjects.

For none of these states separately, nor all of them jointly considered, give us any full idea, either of the _nature_ and _guilt_ of sin or how God is to deal with sinners, on the account of the relation he bears to them.

To ask, whether _sin_ hath solely the _nature_ of an offence, against a prince or a father, and so is pardonable by mere goodness; whether it is like an _error_ in a _road_ or _path_, and so is entirely at an end, when the right path is taken; whether its guilt hath the nature of a debt, and so is capable of being discharged, just as a debt is; whether it affects the soul, as a _wound_ or _disease_ affects the body, and so ought only to move God to act as a good physician? All these questions are as vain, as to ask, whether knowledge in God is really _thinking_, or his nature a real _substance_. For as his knowledge and nature cannot be strictly defined, but are capable of being signified by the terms _thinking_ and _substance_, so the nature of sin is not _strictly represented_ under any of these characters, but is capable of receiving _some representation_ from every one of them.

When sin is said to be an offence against God, it is to teach us, that we have infinitely more reason to dread it on _God’s account_, than to dread any offence against our parents, or governors.

When it is compared to a _debt_, it is to signify, that our sins make us accountable to God, not in the _same manner_, but with the same certainty, as a debtor is answerable to his creditor; and because it has some likeness to a debt, that of ourselves we are not able to pay.

When it is compared to a _wound_, or disease, it is not to teach us, that it may as justly and easily be healed as bodily wounds, but to help us to conceive the greatness of its evil; that, as diseases bring death to the body, so sin brings a worse kind of death upon the soul.

Since therefore the _nature_ and _guilt_ of sin can only so far be known, as to make it highly to be _dreaded_, but not so known as to be _fully_ understood, by any thing we can compare to it:

Since the _relation_ which God bears to _sinners_, can only be so known, as to make it highly reasonable to prostrate ourselves before him, in every instance of humility and penitence; but not so fully known as to teach us, in what manner, God must deal with us: it plainly follows, that if God is not an _arbitrary_ being, but acts according to a _fitness resulting_ from this relation, he must, in this respect, act by a _rule_ known only to himself, and such as we cannot _possibly_ state from the _reason_ and _nature_ of things.

For if the nature of things, and the fitness of actions resulting from their relations, is to be the rule of our reason, then _reason_ must be here at a full stop, and can have no more knowledge to proceed upon, in stating the _nature_, the _guilt_, or proper _atonement_ of sin in men, than of sin in _angels_.

For _reason_ can no more tell us what the _guilt_ of sin is, what _hurt_ it does us, how far it _enters_ into, and _alters_ our very nature, what _contrariety to_, and _separation_ from God, it necessarily brings upon us, or what _supernatural_ means are, or are not, necessary to abolish it; our _reason_ can no more tell this, than our _senses_ can tell us, what is the _inward_, and what is the _outward_ light of angels.

Ask reason what _effect_ sin has upon the soul, and it can tell you no more, than if you had asked, what effect the _omnipresence_ of God has upon the soul.

Ask reason, and the nature of things, what is, or ought to be, the _true nature_ of an atonement for sin, how far it is like _paying_ a _debt_, or _healing_ a _wound_, or how far it is different from them? And it can tell you no more, than if you had asked, what is the _true degree_ of power that _preserves_ us in existence, how far it is _like_ that which at first created us, and how far it is _different_ from it.

All these enquiries are, by the nature of things, made impossible to us, so long as we have no light but from our own natural capacities, and we cannot take upon us to be _philosophers_ in these matters, but by deserting our reason, and giving ourselves up to _vision_ and _imagination_.

And we have as much authority from the nature of things, to appeal to _hunger_ and _thirst_, and _sensual pleasure_, to tell us _how_ our souls shall live in the beatific presence of God, as to appeal to our _reason_ and _logic_, to demonstrate how sin is to be _atoned_, or the soul _prepared_, and _purified_, for future happiness.

For God has no more given us our reason to _settle_ the nature of an atonement for sin; or to find out what can, or cannot, take away its guilt, than he has given us _senses_ and _appetites_ to state the nature, or discover the ingredients of future happiness.

And he who rejects the _atonement_ for sins made by the Son of God, as _needless_, because he cannot prove it to be _necessary_, is as extravagant, as he that should deny that God created him by his _only Son_, because he did not remember it. For our memory is as proper a faculty to tell us, whether God at first created us, by his only Son, as our _reason_ is to tell us, whether we ought to be restored to God, with, or without the mediation of Jesus Christ.

When therefore this writer says, _Can any thing be more evident, than that if doing evil be the only cause of God’s displeasure, the ceasing to do evil, must take away that displeasure?_¹

¹ Page 4.

* Just as if he had said, if conversing with a _leper_ has been the only cause of a man’s getting a _leprosy_, must not departing from him, be the removal of the _leprosy_? For if any one, guessing at the _guilt_ of sin, and its _effects_ on the soul, should compare it to a _leprosy_ in the body, he can no more say, that he has reached its _real, internal_ evil, than he, that comparing the happiness of heaven to a crown of glory, can be said to have described its real happiness.

This _writer_ has no occasion to appeal to the nature of things, if he can be thus certain about things, whose nature is not only obscure, but _impossible_ to be known. For it is as impossible for him to know the _guilt_ and _effects_ of sin, as to know the shape of an angel. It is as impossible to know by the mere light of reason, what God’s _displeasure_ at sin is, what _separation_ from sinners it implies, or how it _obliges_ God to deal with them; as to know what the internal essence of God is. Our author therefore has here found the utmost degree of evidence, where it was _impossible_ for him to have the _smallest degree_ of knowledge.

If a man, having _murdered_ twenty of his fellow-creatures, should afterward be sorry for it, and wish that he had a power to bring them to life again, or to create others in their stead, would his ceasing to kill, and wishing he had a power to create others in their stead, put him just in the _same state_ with God, as if he had never murdered a man in his life? But unless this can be said, it cannot be said that repentance is sufficient to put a man in the _same state_, as if he never had sinned.

The writer has two more objections against the atonement for sin, made by Jesus Christ. _First_, as it is an _human sacrifice, which nature itself abhors_: and which was looked upon as the great abomination of idolatrous _Pagan_ worship.

The _cruelty_, _injustice_, and _impiety_, of shedding human blood in the sacrifices of the _Pagans_ is fully granted; but _reason_ cannot thence bring the smallest objections against the sacrifice of Christ.

For how can reason be more disregarded, than in such an argument as this? The _Pagans_ were unjust, cruel, and impious, in offering human blood to their false gods; therefore the true God cannot receive any _human_ sacrifice, or allow any persons to die, as a punishment for sin.

For, if no human sacrifice can be fit for God to receive, because human sacrifices, as parts of _Pagan_ worship, were unjust and impious; then it would follow, that the _mortality_, to which all mankind are appointed by God, must have the _same cruelty_ and _injustice_ in it. Now that _death_ is a punishment for sin, and that all mankind are by death offered as a _sacrifice_ for sin, is not only a doctrine of revealed religion, but the plain dictate of reason. But if reason must acknowledge the death of all mankind, as a sacrifice for sin, then it can have no just objection against the sacrifice of Christ, _because_ it was _human_.

I need not take upon me to prove the _reasonableness_ of God’s procedure in the _mortality_ of mankind; revelation is not under any necessity of proving this; because it is no difficulty that arises from revelation, but equally belongs to natural religion; and both of them must acknowledge it to be reasonable; not because it can be proved to be so from the nature of things, but is to be believed to be so, by faith and piety.

But if natural religion, will not suffer us to think it _inconsistent_ with the justice and goodness of God, to appoint all mankind victims to death on the account of sin, then _natural_ religion, can have no objection against the sacrifice of Christ, as it is an _human sacrifice_.

And all that _revelation_ adds to _natural_ religion, on the point of _human_ sacrifice, is only this; the knowledge of _one_, that gives _merit and effect_, to all the rest.

_Secondly_, It is objected, that the atonement made by Jesus Christ, represents God as punishing the _innocent_ and acquitting the _guilty_; or, as punishing the innocent _instead_ of the guilty.

But this proceeds all upon mistake: for the atonement made by Jesus Christ, though it procures pardon for the guilty, yet it does not acquit them, or excuse them from any punishment, or suffering for sin, which _reason could impose upon them_. Natural religion calls men to repentance for their sins: the atonement made by Jesus Christ does not acquit them from it, or pardon them without it; but calls them to a _severer_ repentance, than natural religion alone prescribes.

God therefore does not by this proceeding, shew his _dislike_ of the _innocent_ and his _approbation_ of the _wicked_.

For how can God be thought to punish our blessed Saviour out of _dislike_, if his sufferings are represented of such infinite merit with him? Or how can he shew thereby his _approbation_ of the guilty, whose repentance is not _acceptable_ to him, till recommended by the infinite merits of Jesus Christ?

As to the fitness of our Lord’s sufferings, as God and man; and the _nature_ and _degree_ of their worth; reason can no more enter into this matter, or _prove_ or _disprove_ any thing about it, than it can enter into the state of the whole creation, and shew, how it could, or could not, be in the whole, better than it is.

For you may as well ask any of your _senses_, as ask your _reason_ this principal question, _Whether any supernatural means be necessary for the atonement of the sins of mankind?_ Or, supposing it necessary, whether the _mediation_, _death_, and _intercession_ of Jesus Christ, as God and man, be that true supernatural means?

For as the fitness or unfitness of any _supernatural_ means, for the atonement of sin, must result from the _incomprehensible relation_ God bears to sinners, as it must have such _necessity_, and _dignity_, as this relation _requires_, it necessarily follows, that if God acts according to _this relation_, the _fitness_ of his actions cannot be according to our comprehension.

Again: Supposing some _supernatural means_ to be necessary, for destroying the guilt and power of sin; or that the _sufferings_, and _intercession_, of the Son of God incarnate, is that true supernatural means, it necessarily follows, that a revelation of such, or any other _supernatural_ means, cannot possibly be made obvious to our reason and senses, as the things of human life, or the transactions amongst men are; but can only be so revealed, as to become just occasions of our _faith_, _humility_, and _pious resignation_, to the divine wisdom and goodness.

For, to say that such a thing is _supernatural_, is only saying, that it is something, which, by the _necessary state_ of our own nature, we are as incapable of knowing, as we are incapable of seeing _spirits_.

If therefore supernatural things are by the letter of scripture ever revealed to us, they cannot be revealed to us as they are in their _own nature_: for if they could, such things would not be _supernatural_.

If an _angel_ could appear to us, as it is in its own nature, then we should be _naturally_ capable of seeing angels; but, because our nature is not _capable_ of such a sight; therefore, when _angels_ appear to men, they must appear, not as they are in themselves, but in some _human_ or _corporeal_ form.

It is just thus, when any _divine_ matter is revealed by God; it can no more possibly be revealed to us, as it is in its _own nature_, than an _angel_ can appear to us, as it is in its own nature; but such supernatural matter can only be revealed to us, by being represented to us, by its likeness to something, that we already _naturally_ know.

Thus revelation teaches us this _supernatural_ matter; that Jesus Christ is making _perpetual intercession for us in heaven_: for Christ’s _real state_, or _manner_ of existence with God in heaven, in regard to his church, cannot, as it is in its _own nature_, be described to us; it is in this respect ineffable, and incomprehensible. And therefore, this high and inconceivable manner of Christ’s existence with God in heaven, in regard to his church, is revealed to us under an idea, that gives us the truest representation of it, we are capable of.

But if any one should thence infer, that the Son of God must therefore either be always upon his knees, or _prostrate_ in some humble form of a supplicant, he would make a very weak inference.

Because this revealed idea of Christ, as a perpetual Intercessor in heaven, is only a comparative representation of something, that cannot be _directly_ and _plainly_ known as it is in its own nature; and only teaches us, how to believe something, though imperfectly, yet _truly_ of an incomprehensible nature.

Again: When it is by the letter of scripture revealed to us, that the blessed Jesus is the one _Mediator_ between God and man; that he is the _Atonement_, the _Propitiation_, and _Satisfaction_ for our sins: these expressions only teach us _as much_ outward knowledge of so great a mystery, as human language can represent. But they do not teach us the perfect nature of Christ’s state between God and sinners. For that being a _supernatural_ matter, cannot by any outward words be revealed to us as it is in its _own nature_, any more than the _essence_ of God can be made _visible_ to our eyes of flesh.

But these expressions teach us thus much with certainty, that there is in the _state_ of Christ between God and sinners, something infinitely and inconceivably beneficial to us; and _truly answerable_ to all that we mean by _mediation_, _atonement_, _propitiation_, and _satisfaction_.

And though the _real, internal manner_, of this mediation and atonement, as it is in its own nature, is _incomprehensible_, yet this does not lessen our knowledge of the truth and certainty of it, any more than the _incomprehensibility_ of the divine nature, lessens our certainty of its real existence.

And as our idea of God, though consisting of incomprehensible perfections, helps us to a real and certain knowledge of the divine nature; and though all mysterious, is yet the solid foundation of all piety; so our idea of Jesus Christ, as our _Mediator_ and _Atonement_, though it be incomprehensible as to its real nature, yet helps us to a _certain_ knowledge of Christ, as our _Mediator_ and _Atonement_; and, though full of mystery, is yet full of motives to the highest piety, love, and gratitude unto God.

All objections therefore, raised from any difficulties about the nature of _atonements_, _propitiations_, and _satisfactions_, as these words are used in common language, are vain, and entirely groundless.

For all these objections proceed upon this supposition, that _atonement_, or _satisfaction_, when attributed to Jesus Christ, signify neither more nor less, than when they are used as terms in _human laws_ or in _civil_ life; take away this supposition, and all objections are entirely removed with it.

To return: I have granted this writer his great principle, _That the relations of things and persons, and the fitness resulting from thence, is the sole rule of God’s actions_: and I have granted it upon this supposition, that it thence follows, that God must act according to his _own nature_; and therefore nothing could be fit for God to do, but what had the reason of its fitness in his own nature: and if so, then the _rule_ of his actions could not fall within our comprehension. And consequently, _reason alone_, could not be a competent judge of God’s proceedings; or say, what God might, or might not, require of us: and therefore I have, plainly turned his main argument against himself, and made it fully confute that doctrine, which he intended to found upon it.

But though I have thus far, granted the _nature_ and _relations_ of things and beings, to be the rule of God’s actions, because that plainly supposes, that his _own nature_ must be the rule of his actions; yet since our _author_, and other modern opposers of revealed doctrines of religion, hold it in another sense, and mean by it, I know not what _eternal, immutable_ reasons and relations of things, _independent_ of any being, and which are a _common rule and law of God and man_, I entirely declare against it, as an erroneous and groundless opinion.

Thus, when this writer says, _If the relations between things, and the fitness resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions, must he not be an arbitrary being?_ As he here means some _eternal, immutable relations, independent_ of God; so, to suppose, that God cannot be a _wise_ and _good_ being, unless such eternal, independent relations, be the _sole rule_ of his actions, is as erroneous, as to affirm, that God cannot be _omniscient_, unless _mathematical demonstrations_ be his _sole manner_ of knowing all things. And it is just as reasonable to fix God’s knowledge _solely_ in mathematical demonstrations, that we may thence be assured of his _infallible knowledge_, as to make I know not what independent relations of things, the _sole rule_ of his actions, that we may thence be assured, he is not _arbitrary_, but a wise and good being.

And we have as strong reasons to believe God to be, in the highest degree, _wise_ and _good_, without knowing on what, his wisdom and goodness is _founded_; as we have to believe him to be _omniscient_, and _eternal_, without knowing on _what_ his _omniscience_ is founded; or to _what_, his eternity is owing. And we have the same reason to hold it a vain enquiry, to ask what obliges God to be _wise_ and _good_, as to ask what obliges him to be _omniscient_, or _eternal_.

And as it would be absurd to ascribe the _existence_ of God to _any cause_, or found it upon any _independent relations_ of things, so it is the same absurdity, to ascribe the infinite wisdom and goodness of God to _any cause_, or found them upon any independent relations of things.

Nor do we any more _lose_ the notion, or _lessen_ the certainty of the divine wisdom and goodness, because we cannot say on _what_ they are founded, than we _lose_ the notion of God, or render his existence _uncertain_, because it cannot be founded on any thing.