Chapter I (2)

And as in our account of the existence of things, we are obliged to have recourse to a being, whose existence must not be ascribed to _any cause_ because every thing cannot have a cause, no more than every thing can be created, so in our account of _wisdom_ and _goodness_, there is the same necessity of having recourse to an infinite wisdom and goodness, that never _began_ to be, and that is as different as to its _manner_ of existence, from all other wisdom and goodness, that have a beginning, as the _existence_ of God is _different_ from the existence of the creatures.

* But if it be necessary to hold, that there is an infinite wisdom and goodness that _never began_ to be, then it is as necessary to affirm, that such wisdom and goodness can no more be _founded_ upon the _relations_ of things, than the _unbeginning existence_ of God can be _founded_ upon the existence of things. And to seek for any _reasons_ of a wisdom and goodness that was always in the _same infinite_ state, is like seeking the cause of that which can have no cause, or asking _what_ it is that _contains_ infinity.

* When therefore this writer saith, _Infinite wisdom can have no commands, but what are founded on the unalterable reason of things_;¹ he might as justly have said, an _infinite Creator_ can have no power of creating, but what is founded on the _unalterable nature_ of creatures.

¹ Page 247.

* For the _reason_ of things, is just as unalterable, as the _nature_ of creatures. And if the reasons and relations of things are nothing else but their _manner_ of existence, or the _state_ of their nature, certainly the relations of things must have the same _beginning_, and the same _alterable_ or unalterable nature, as the things from whence they flow. Unless it can be said, that a thing may exist in _such a manner_, though it does not exist at all.

When therefore he says again, _That the will of God is always determined by the nature and reason of things_;¹ It is the same as if he had said, the _omnipotence_ of God is always determined by the _nature_ of _causes_ and _effects_. For as all causes and effects are what they are, and _owe_ their _nature_ to the omnipotence of God, so the relations of things are what they are, and owe their nature to the wisdom and will of God.

¹ Page 65.

Nor does this dependance of the relations of things on the will of God, destroy the nature of relations, or make them doubtful, any more than the existence of things depending on the _power_ of God, destroys the certainty of their existence, or renders it doubtful. For as God cannot make things to exist, and not to exist at the same time, though their existence depends upon his power, so neither can he make things to have such relations, and yet not to have such relations at the same time, though their relations depend upon his will.

So that the ascribing the relations of things to the will of God, brings no uncertainty to those duties of life, which flow from such relations, but leaves the state of nature with all its relations, and the duties which flow from them, in the greatest certainty, so long as nature itself is continued; and when that either _ceases entirely_, or is only _altered_, it is not to be wondered at, if all its relations cease, or are altered with it.

Our author says, _Dare any one say, that God’s laws are not founded on the eternal reason of things?_¹

¹ Page 425.

* I dare say it with the same assurance, as that his _existence_ is not founded on the _eternal existence_ of things. And that it is the same extravagance to say, that God’s laws are founded on the _eternal reasons_ of things, as to say, that his _power_ is founded on the _eternal capacities_ of things. For the _capacities_ of things have just the same _solidity_ and _eternity_, as the relations of things have, and are just such _independent realities_ as they are: and are just the same _proper materials_ to found the omnipotence of God upon, as the relations of things are, to found his infinite wisdom upon.

And as we can say, that the _omnipotence_ of God in preserving and supporting the creation, will certainly act _suitably_ to itself, and _consistent_ with that omnipotence which first made things be what they are, and put nature into such a state as it is in; so we can say, that the _infinite wisdom_ of God in giving laws to the world, will act _suitably_ to itself, and _consistent_ with that wisdom which at first made the nature and relations of the rational world be what they are.

But then as the _omnipotence_ of God, though it acts suitably to the state of the creation, and the nature of causes and effects, which it first ordained, yet cannot be said to be founded upon the nature of causes and effects, because neither causes nor effects have _any nature_, but what they _owe_ to omnipotence; so the infinite wisdom of God, though in giving laws to the world, it acts _suitably_ to the natures and relations of rational beings, yet cannot be said to be _founded_ upon such relations, because such relations are the _effects_ of the divine wisdom, and owe their existence to it.

And the _reason_ or _relations_ of things shew God’s _antecedent_ wisdom, and are effects of it, just as the nature of _causes_ and _effects_ shew his _antecedent_ power, and are the effects of it. And as he is infinitely powerful, but not from the nature of causes and effects; so he is infinitely wise, but not from the _reason_ and _nature_ of things.

Again; if God is _infinite_ wisdom, then his wisdom cannot be founded on the relations of things, unless things _finite_, and relations that began to be, can be the foundation of that wisdom which is infinite, and could not begin to be.

Therefore to ask, _what_ it is founded upon, when it can have no foundation upon _any thing_, is asking, what an _independent_ being is dependent upon, or _how_ that began, which could have no beginning?

And to ask the reason or foundation of _any one_ of the divine attributes, is the same as asking the reason or foundation of them all. And to seek for the reason or foundation of all the divine attributes, is seeking for the cause of God’s existence.

And as we do not come to God’s existence, till we come to the _end_ of _causes_, so nothing that is divine, can be attributed to any cause.

Nor is it any more a contradiction to say, there is something whose nature is without any cause or foundation of its existence, than to say, something exists without ever _beginning_ to exist. For as nothing can have a beginning, but as it proceeds from some cause; so that which can have no beginning, can have no cause. If therefore the divine wisdom ever _began_ to be _infinite_, and we could know when that beginning was, we should have some pretence to search for that, upon which its infinity was _founded_; but if it never could begin to be, then to seek for its reason, or foundation, is seeking for its beginning.

This writer affirms, that God’s wisdom and goodness must be founded on the nature and reason of things, otherwise it could not be proved, that God was not an _arbitrary being_.

* Now to seek for reasons to prove that God is not an arbitrary being, that is, a being of the _highest freedom_ and _independency_, that does every thing according to his _own will_ and _pleasure_, is as vain, as to seek for reasons to prove, that _all things_ are not the effect of his _will_. For if every thing besides God, received its existence from him; if every thing that exists, is the effect of his will, and he can do nothing, but because he wills the doing it, must he not be free and arbitrary in as _high a manner_, as he is powerful?

This _writer_ says, _It is not in our power to love the deity, whilst we consider him to be an arbitrary being, acting out of humour and caprice._¹

¹ Page 31.

But if God’s _will_ is as _essentially_ opposite to _humour_ and _caprice_, as his _omnipotence_ is to _weakness and inability_; then it is as absurd to suppose, that God must act according to humour and caprice, because he acts according to his own will, as to suppose that he must act with inability, because he acts by his omnipotence.

And if the will of God, _as such_, is in the highest state of perfection, then we have the _highest reason_ to love and adore God, because he is arbitrary, and acts according to his _own all-perfect will_. And if it be asked, what it is that makes the will of God _all-perfect_, it may as well be asked, what it is that makes him omnipotent, or makes him to exist. For, as we have not found out a God, till we have found a being that has no _cause_; so we have not found the _will_ of God, till we have found a _will_, that has no _mover_, or _director_, or _cause_ of its perfection. For that _will_ which never began to be, can no more be any thing, but what it is in itself, than it can begin to be.

That which makes people imagine, that _will alone_ is not so adorable, is because they consider it as a blind imperfect faculty that wants to be directed. But what has such a will as this to do with the _will_ of God?

For if the will of God is as _perfect_ a _will_, as his omniscience is a _perfect knowledge_, then we are as sure, that the will of God cannot want any direction, or _will_ any thing amiss, as we are, that his omniscience cannot need any information, or fall into any mistake. And if the _will_ of God wanted any direction or government, it is impossible it should have it; for having no superior, it could only be so governed, because it _willed_ it, and therefore must be always under its own government.

All the perfection therefore that can be ascribed to God, must be ascribed to his _will_, not as if it was the production of his will, (for nothing in God is produced) but as eternally inherent in it.

And as God’s will has thus all the perfection of the divine nature, and has no rule, or reason, or motive to any goodness, that comes from it, but its own _nature_ and _state_ in God: so this great will is the only law of all creatures, and they are all to obey and conform to it, for this reason, because it is the will of God.

* Nothing has a _moral_ reason, or fitness to be done, but because it is the will of God that it should be done.

* It may be asked, Is there then no _reason_ or _nature_ of things? Yes; as certainly as there are things. But the nature and reason of things, considered _independently_ of the divine will, have no more _obligation_ in them, than a _divine worship_ considered independently of, and without any regard to the _existence_ of God. For the _will_ of God is as absolutely necessary to found all _moral obligation_ upon, as the existence of God is necessary to be the foundation of religious worship. And the fitness of moral obligations, without the _will_ of God, is only like the fitness of _religious_ worship without the _existence_ of God.

And it is as just to say, that he destroys the _reason_ of religion, who founds it upon the nature and existence of God, as to say, he saps the foundation of moral obligations, who founds them upon the will of God. And as religion cannot be solidly defended, but by shewing its connexion with, and dependence upon God’s existence; so neither can moral obligations be asserted with reason, but by shewing them to be the will of God.

It may again be asked, Can God make that fit in itself, which is in _itself absolutely_ unfit to be done?

This question consists of improper terms. For God’s will no more makes actions to be fit _in themselves_, than it makes _things_ to exist _in, or of themselves_. No things, nor any actions have any _absolute_ fitness, of and in _themselves_.

A _gift_, a _blow_, the making a _wound_, or _shedding_ of _blood_, considered in themselves, have no _absolute_ fitness, but are fit or unfit according to a variety of accidental circumstances.

When therefore God by his will makes any thing fit to be done, he does not make the thing fit in _itself_, which is just in the _same state_ considered in _itself_, that it was before, but it becomes fit for the person to do it, because he can only be happy, or do that which is fit for him to do, by doing the will of God.

For instance, the _bare eating_ a fruit, considered in _itself_, is neither fit nor unfit. If a fruit is appointed by God for our food, then it is as fit to eat it, as to preserve our lives. If a fruit is poisonous, then it is as unfit to eat it, as to commit self-murder. If eating of a fruit is prohibited by God, then it is as unfit as to eat our own damnation.

But in none of these instances is the eating or not eating, considered in _itself fit_ or _unfit_: but has all its fitness, or unfitness, from such circumstances, as are entirely owing to the will of God.

Supposing therefore God to require a person to do something, which according to his present circumstances, _without_ that command, he ought not to do, God does not make that which is _absolutely_ unfit in _itself_, fit to be done: but only adds _new circumstances_ to an action, that is neither fit, nor unfit, moral, nor immoral in _itself_, but because of its circumstances.

Again, it is objected, _If there is nothing right or wrong, good or bad, antecedently and independently of the will of God, there can then be no reason, why God should will, or command one thing, rather than another._

It is answered, _first_, That all goodness, and all possible perfection, is as _eternal_ as God, and as essential to him as his existence. And to say, that they are either _antecedent_ or _consequent_, _dependent_ or _independent_ of his will, would be equally absurd. To ask therefore, whether there is not something right and wrong, antecedent to the will of God, is as absurd, as to ask for some antecedent cause of his existence. And to ask, how God can be good if there is not something good independently of him, is asking how he can be infinite, if there be not something infinite independently of him. And to seek for any other _source_ or _reason_ of the divine goodness, besides the divine nature, is like seeking for some external cause and help of the divine omnipotence.

The goodness and wisdom, therefore, by which God is wise and good, and to which all his works of wisdom and goodness are owing, are neither _antecedent_, nor _consequent_ to his will.

_Secondly_, Nothing is more certain, than that all _moral obligations_ and _duties_ of creatures towards one another, _began_ with the existence of moral creatures. This is as certain, as that all corporeal qualities and effects, _began_ with the existence of bodies.

As therefore nothing has the nature of a cause or effect, nothing has any quality of any kind in bodies, but what is entirely owing to matter so created and constituted by the _will_ of God; so no actions have any _moral qualities_, but what are wholly owing to that state and nature in which they are created by the will of God.

* Moral obligations therefore of creatures have the same _origin_, and the _same reason_, that natural qualities and effects have in the corporeal world, _viz._ the sole will of God. And as in a different state of matter, bodies would have had different qualities and effects; so in a different state of rational beings, there would be different moral obligations, and nothing could be right or good in their behaviour, but what began then to be right and good, because they then began to exist in such a state and condition of life. And as their state and condition could have no other cause or reason of its existence, but the sole will of God, so the cause and reason of right and wrong in such a state, must be equally owing to the will of God.

The pretended _absolute independent fitnesses_, or _unfitnesses_ of actions therefore _in themselves_, are vain _abstractions_, and philosophical _jargon_, serving no ends of morality, but only helping people to wrangle and dispute away that sincere obedience to God, which is their only happiness. But to make these imaginary _absolute fitnesses_ the _common law_ both of God and man, is still more extravagant. For if the _circumstances_ of actions give them their _moral nature_, surely God must first be in our circumstances, before that which is a law to us, can be the same law to him.

And if a father may require that of a son, which his son, because of his _different state_, cannot require of his brother; surely that which God may require of us, may be as different from that which a father may require of a son, as God is different from a father.

Again, if God is as much under a law as we are, then he is as much under authority; for law can no more be without authority, than without a law-giver. And if God and we are under the _same law_, we must be under the _same authority_.

* But as God cannot be under any law in common with us his creatures, any more than he can be of the same rank or order with any ♦of us; so neither can he be under any law at all, any more than he can be under any authority at all.

♦ word omitted in text “of”

And though God is not to be looked upon as an _arbitrary being_, in the sense of this author, who will not distinguish arbitrary from _humour_ and _caprice_; yet in a true sense of the word, when applied to God, he must be affirmed to be an arbitrary being, that acts only from himself, from his _own will_, and according to his _own pleasure_.

And we have no more reason to be afraid to be left to a God without a law, or to be left to his will and pleasure, than to be left under the protection and care of a being, that is all love, and mercy, and goodness. For as the existence of God, as such, necessarily implies the existence of all perfection; so the will of God, as such, necessarily implies the _willing_ every thing, that _all perfection_ can will.

And as the existence of God, because it contains all perfection, cannot for that reason have any external cause; so the will of God, because it is _all perfection_, cannot, for that reason, have any external _rule_ or _direction_. But his own will is wisdom, and his wisdom is his will. His goodness is arbitrary, and his arbitrariness is goodness.

But this writer does not only thus bring God into this state of law and obligation with us, but makes farther advances in the same kind of errors.

_Hence_, says he, _we may contemplate the great dignity of our rational nature, since our reason for |kind|, tho’ not for degree, is of the |same nature| with |that of| God’s._¹

¹ Page 24.

Here you see _our reason_, that is, our _faculty_ of reasoning, (for reason cannot be called _ours_ in any other respect,) has no other difference from reason as it is in God, but that of degree. But what greater absurdity can a man fall into, than to suppose, that a being whose existence had a beginning but a few years ago, differs only in a degree from that which could not possibly have a beginning; or that a _dependent_ and _independent_ being, should not be different in _kind_, but _only_ in degree?

For to say, that the faculties of a dependent and independent being, may be of the same kind, is as flat a contradiction, as to say, the same kind of thing may be dependent, and independent.

Reason belongs to God and man, just as _power_, _existence_, _life_, and _happiness_, belong to God and man; and he that can, from happiness being common to God and man, prove our happiness to be of the _same kind_ and nature with God’s, may also prove reason in God and man to be of the same kind.

This writer indeed says, _Our happiness is limited, |because| our reason is so; |and that God has| unlimited happiness, |because| he alone has unlimited reason._¹

¹ Page 24.

But if that which is _necessarily limited_, is different from that which is _necessarily unlimited_, then we have proof enough from this very argument, that a reason _necessarily_ limited cannot be of the _same kind_ with that reason, which is _necessarily_ unlimited. Unless it can be said, that limited and unlimited, finite and infinite, beginning and unbeginning, have no contrariety in _kind_, but only differ, as a _short_ line differs from a _long_ one.

* The truth of the matter is this; reason is in God and man, as power is in God and man. And as the divine power has some degree of likeness to human power, yet with an _infinite_ difference from it: so that perfection which we call _reason_ in God, has some degree of likeness to reason as it is in man, yet is _infinitely_ and beyond all conception different from it.

* And as our enjoyment of power is so limited, so imperfect, so superficial, as to be scarce sufficient to tell us, what power is, much less what omnipotence is; so our share of reason is so small, and we enjoy it in so imperfect a manner, that we can scarce think or talk intelligibly of it, or so much as define our own faculties of reasoning.