Chapter V (1)

_Shewing that all the |mutability| of our tempers, the |disorders|
of our passions, the |corruption| of our hearts, all the
|reveries| of the imagination, all the |contradictions| and
|absurdities| that are to be found in human life, and human
opinions, are in effect the mutability, disorders, corruption,
and absurdities of |human reason|._

IT is the intent of this chapter to shew, that altho’ common language ascribes a variety of faculties and principles to the soul, imputing this action to the blindness of our _passions_, that to the inconstancy of our _tempers_; one thing to the heat of our _imagination_, another to the coolness of our _reason_; yet, in strictness of truth, every thing that is done by us, is the action and operation of our reason, and is to be ascribed to it, as the sole principle from whence it proceeded, and by which it is governed and effected.

And the different degrees of reason are in men, as the different degrees of love and aversion; as the different degrees of wit, parts, good nature, or ill nature, are in man.

And as all men have naturally more or less of these qualities, so all men have naturally more or less reason: and the bulk of mankind are as different in reason, as they are in these qualities.

As love is the same passion in all men, yet is infinitely different; as hatred is the same passion in all men, yet with infinite differences; so reason is the same faculty in all men, yet with infinite differences.

And as our passions not only make us different from other men, but frequently and almost daily different from ourselves, loving and hating under great inconstancy; so our reason is not only different from the reason of other men, but is often different from itself; by a strange inconstancy, setting up first one opinion, and then another.

So that when we talk of _human reason_, or a reason _common_ to mankind, we talk of as _various_, _uncertain_, and _unmeasurable_ a thing, as when we talk of a _love_, an _aversion_, a _good nature_, or _ill nature_, common to mankind; for these qualities admit of no variation, uncertainty, or mutability, but such as they directly receive from the _reason_ of mankind.

For it is as much the reason of man that acts in all these tempers, and makes them to be just what they are, as it is the reason of man that demonstrates a mathematical proposition.

Was our reason steady, there would be just the same steadiness and regularity in our tempers; did not reason fall into follies and absurdities, we should have nothing foolish or absurd in our love or aversion. For every humour, every kind of love or aversion, is as strictly the _action_ or _operation_ of our reason, as judgment is the act of our reason.

And the tempers and passions of a child, differ only from the tempers and passions of a man, as the reason of a child differs from the reason of man.

So that our passions and tempers, are the natural real effects of our reason, and have no qualities, either good or bad, but such as are to be imputed to it.

A laudable good nature, or a laudable aversion, is only reason acting in a _certain manner_: a criminal good nature, or a criminal aversion, is nothing else but reason acting in another certain manner.

But still it is reason, or our understanding that is the _only agent_ in our bad passions, as well as good passions; and as much the _sole agent_ in all our passions and tempers, as in things of mere speculation.

So that the state of reason in human life, is nothing else but the state of human tempers and passions; and right reason in morality, is nothing else but right love, and right aversion.

All _that_ therefore which we commonly call the weakness, blindness, and disorder of our _passions_, is in reality the weakness, blindness, and disorder of our _reason_. For a right love, or wrong love, denotes only reason acting in a _certain, particular_ manner.

So that if any thing can be said of love, aversion, good nature, or ill nature, as common to mankind; the same may be said of reason, as common to mankind.

For the distinction of our reason from our passions, is only a distinction in language, made at pleasure; and is no more real than the _desire_ and _inclination_ are really different from the _will_. All therefore that is weak and foolish in our passions, is the weakness and folly of our reason; all the inconstancy and caprice of our humours and tempers, is the caprice and inconstancy of our reason.

It is not properly _avarice_ that makes men sordid; it is not _ambition_ that makes them restless; it is not _bribery_ that makes men sell their consciences; it is not _interest_ that makes them lye, and cheat, and perjure themselves. What is it therefore? Why it is that _absolutely perfect_ faculty, which our author sets up as the _unerring_ standard of all that is _wise_, _holy_, and _good_; it is _reason_, the _use of reason, human reason_, that does all this.

For whether any thing be fit to be done, it is as he says, “reason alone which must judge; as the eye is the sole judge of what is visible, the ear of what is audible, so reason of what is reasonable.”

Every thing therefore that is done, every thing that is chosen in human life before any thing else, is as strictly chosen by reason, as every thing that is seen, is seen by the eye; and every thing that is heard, is heard by the ear.

To suppose that reason permits itself to be governed by passions or tempers, but is not the _immediate agent_ of all that is done by them, is as absurd, as to suppose that reason permits itself to be governed by the _hand_ when it is writing falsly, or the _tongue_, when it is talking profanely, but it is not the immediate, direct agent of all that is written and spoken by them.

* _Brutes_ are incapable of immorality, because none of their actions are the actions of _reason_: every thing therefore that is immorality, baseness, or villainy in us, must be the act of our reason, otherwise it could no more be immoral, than the actions of brutes.

* If therefore, as this author often saith, reason be the only faculty that distinguisheth us from brutes; it necessarily follows, that those irregularities, whether of humour, passions, or tempers, which cannot be imputed to brutes, must be solely attributed to that faculty by which we are distinguished from brutes; and consequently, every thing that is foolish, vain, shameful, false, treacherous, and base, must be the acts of our reason; since if they were the acts of any thing else, they could have no more vanity, falseness, or baseness, than hunger and thirst.

It is not my intent to condemn our common language, which talks of reason and the passions, as if they were as different as a _governor_ and his _subjects_.

These forms of speech are very intelligible and useful, and give great life and ornament to all discourses upon morality.

But when persons ascribe to reason, as a _distinct faculty_ of human nature, I know not what _absolute perfection_, making it as immutable, and incapable of any addition or improvement, as God himself: it is necessary to consider reason, not as it is represented in common language, but as it is in reality in itself.

Notwithstanding therefore in common language, our passions, and the effects of them, are usefully distinguished from our reason, I have here ventured to shew, that all the disorders of human nature, are in effect the disorders of human reason, and that all the perfection or imperfection of our passions is the perfection or imperfection of our reason.

Our follies and absurdities of every kind are as necessarily to be ascribed to our reason, as the _first immediate_ cause of them, as our wisdom and discretion are to be ascribed to it in that degree.

The difference between reason assenting to the properties of a _square_, and reason acting in motions of desire or aversion, is only this, that in the latter case, it is reason acting under a sense of its own good or evil, in the former case, it is reason acting under a sense of _magnitude_.

And as the relations of magnitude, as they are the objects of our reason, are only the objects of its assent or dissent; so good and evil, as they are objects of our reason, are only the objects of its _desire_ or _aversion_: and as the assent or dissent, in matters of speculation, whether right or wrong, is solely the act of our reason; so desire or aversion, in human life, whether right or wrong, is equally the act of our reason.

We often say, that our passions deceive us, or persuade us; but this is no more strictly so, than when we say, our _interest_ deceived, or a bribe blinded us. For bribes and interest are not active principles, nor have any power of deception; it is only our reason that gives them a false value, and prefers them to a greater good.

It is just so in what we call the deceit of our passions: they meddle with us no more than bribes meddle with us; but that pleasurable perception, which is to be found in certain enjoyments, is by our reason preferred to that better good, which we might expect from self-denial.

We say again, that our passions paint things in false colours, and present to our minds vain appearances of happiness.

But this is no more strictly true, than when we say, ♦our _imagination_ forms castles in the air. For the imagination signifies no distinct faculty from our reason, but only reason acting upon our _own ideas_.

♦ “out” replaced with “our”

So when our passions are said to give false colours to things, or present vain appearances of happiness, it is only our reason acting upon its own ideas of _good_ and _evil_, just as it acts upon its own ideas of _architecture_, in forming castles in the air.

So that all _that_ which we call different faculties, tempers, and passions, strictly speaking, means nothing else, but the various acts of one and the same rational principle, which has different names, according to the objects that it acts upon, and the manner of its acting.

In some things it is called speculative, in others it is called practical reason. And we may as justly think our speculative reason is a different faculty from our practical reason, as that our aversions, or likings, are not as fully to be ascribed to our reason, as syllogisms and demonstrations.

* It was truly reason that made _Medea_ kill her children, that made _Cato_ kill himself, that made Pagans offer human sacrifices to idols; that made _Epicurus_ deny a providence, _Mahomet_ pretend a revelation; that made some men sceptics, others bigots; some enthusiasts, others profane; that made _Hobbes_ assert all religion to be human invention, and _Spinosa_ to declare trees, and stones, and animals to be parts of God; that makes free-thinkers deny freedom of will, and fatalists exhort to a reformation of manners; that made _Vaux_ a conspirator, and _Ludlow_ a regicide; that made _Muggleton_ a fanatic; and _Rochester_ a libertine. It was as truly reason that did all these things, as it is reason that demonstrates mathematical propositions.

_Medea_ and _Cato_ acted as truly according to the judgment of their reason at that time, as the confessor that chuses rather to suffer, than deny his faith.

Had not _Medea_ and _Cato_ thought it best to do what they did, at the time they did it, they would no more have done it than the _confessor_ would chuse to suffer rather than deny his faith, unless he had judged best so to do.

And when we say reason governs the passions, it means no more, than that reason governs itself; that it acts with deliberation and attention, does not yield to its first judgments, but uses second, and third thoughts.

So that guarding against the passions, is only guarding against its own first judgments and opinions; that is guarding against itself.

To all this may, perhaps, be objected, that our passions arise from bodily motions, and depend upon the state of our blood and animal spirits, and therefore what we do under their commotions, cannot be attributed to our reason.

It is readily granted, that the body has this share in our passions and tempers: but then the same thing must be granted of the body, in all the acts and operations of the mind. So that if our desires and aversions cannot be imputed to our reason, because of the joint operation of the animal spirits in them; no more can syllogisms and demonstrations be attributed to our reason, because the operation of bodily spirits concurreth in the forming of them.

For the most abstract thought, and speculation of the mind, has as truly the _conjunct_ operation of bodily spirits, as our strongest desires or aversions. And it is as much owing to the state of the body, that such speculations are what they are, as it is owing to the state of the body, that such passions are what they are.

For the motions of the bodily spirits are inseparable from, and according to, the state and action of the mind: when reason is in speculation of a trifle, they concur but weakly; when reason speculates intensely, their operation is increased. And sometimes the attention of the mind is so great, and has so engaged and called in all the animal spirits to its assistance, that the operations of our senses are suspended, and we neither see, nor feel, till the attention of the mind has let the spirits return to all the parts of the body.

Now will any one say, that these intense thoughts are less the acts of the mind, because they have a greater concurrence of bodily spirits, than when it is acting with indifference, and so has a lesser quantity of bodily spirits?

Yet this might as well be said, as to say, that the assent or dissent, in speculation, is the act of our reason; but liking or disliking, loving or hating, are not the acts of our reason, because they have a greater concurrence of bodily spirits.

For, as the mind is in a different state when it desires good, or fears evil, from what it is when it only compares two triangles; so the motions of the bodily spirits, have only _such_ a difference, as is _correspondent_ to these two states of the mind. They act and join as much in comparing the triangles, as in the desire of good, or fear of evil. And the mind is just as much governed by the body, in its passions, as in its calmest contemplations.

For as the gentle operation of the animal spirits is then correspondent to the state and action of the mind; so in all our passions, the strong and increased motion of the animal spirits, is equally correspondent thereto.

So that reason is no more the agent, in our tempers and passions, than in our dry and sedate speculations.

It may happen, that a man may have as great an eagerness in solving a mathematical problem, as another hath to obtain any great good, or avoid any great evil.

But may it therefore be said, that it is not reason that solves the problem, because the bodily spirits are so active in it?

To draw now some plain consequences from the foregoing account.

_First_, If reason be the _universal agent_ in the natural man; if all the difference among _such_ men, is only such a difference as reason makes, then nothing can be more extravagant, than to affirm any thing concerning the degree of perfection, or imperfection of reason, as _common_ to man. It is as wild and romantic, as to pretend to state the measure of folly and wisdom, of fear and courage, of pride and humility, of good humour and ill-humour, _common_ to mankind: for as these states of the mind, are only so many different states of reason; so no uncertainty belongs to them, but what, in the _same degree_, belongs to _reason_.

_Secondly_, Granting that all matters of religion must be agreeable to _right, unprejudiced_ reason; yet this could be no ground for receiving nothing in religion, but what _human_ reason could prove to be necessary; for _human_ reason is no more _right, unprejudiced_ reason, than a sinner is _sinless_, or a man an _angel_.

Granting again, that a man may go a great way towards rectifying his reason, and laying aside its prejudices; yet no particular man can be a _better judge_ of the rectitude of his _own reason_, than he is of the rectitude of his own _self-love_, the brightness of his own _parts_, and the depth of his own _judgment_.

For there is nothing to deceive him in _self-love_, in the opinion of his _own merit_, _wit_, and _judgment_, but what has the same power to deceive him, in the opinion of his own reason. And if, as our author says, “It be the fate of most sects to be the fondest of their ugliest brats.”¹ None seem so inevitably exposed to this fatality, as those whose religion is to have no form, but such as it receives from their own hearts.

¹ Page 184.

_Thirdly_, A man that has his religion to chuse, and with this precious privilege, that he need not allow any thing to be matter of religion, but what his own reason can prove to be so, is in as fair a way to be governed by his _passions_, as he that has his _condition_ of life to chuse, with the liberty of taking that which his own reason directs him to.

Does any one suppose, that nothing but _reason_ would direct him in the choice of his condition? Or that he would make the better choice, because he proceeded upon this maxim, that nothing could be right, but that which was agreeable to his _own reason_? Or that his tempers, his prejudices, his self-love, his passions, his partiality, would have no influence upon his choice, because he had resigned himself up to his _own reason_?

Now it is just the same in the choice of a religion, as in the choice of a condition of life: as it is not a matter of speculation, but of _good_ and _evil_; so if it is left to be determined by our _own reason_, it rather appeals to our _tempers_, than employs our reason; and to resign ourselves up to our own reason, to tell us what ought, or ought not to be a matter of religion, is only resigning ourselves up to our tempers, ♦to take what we _like_, and refuse what we _dislike_ in religion.

♦ removed duplicate “to”

* In a word; when _self-love_ is a proper arbitrator betwixt a man and his adversary; when _revenge_ is a just judge of meekness; when _pride_ is a true lover of humility; when _falshood_ is a teacher of truth; when lust is a fast friend of chastity; when the _flesh_ leads to the spirit; when _sensuality_ delights in self-denial; when _partiality_ is a promoter of equity; when the _palate_ can taste the difference between sin and holiness; when the _hand_ can feel the truth of a proposition; then may _human reason_ be a proper arbitrator between God and man, the sole, final, just judge of all that ought, or ought not to be a matter of a _holy_, _divine_, and _heavenly_ religion.

_Lastly_, If this be the state of reason, then to pretend, that our reason, is too perfect to be governed by any thing but its own light, is the same extravagance, as to pretend, that our love is too pure to be governed by any thing but its own inclinations, our hatred too just to be governed by any thing but its own motions. For if all that is base and criminal in love, all that is unjust and wicked in hatred, is to be imputed to our reason; then no perfection can be ascribed to our reason, but such as is to be ascribed to our love and hatred.

An Extract from Mr. LAW’s
SERIOUS ANSWER
To Dr. TRAPP’s Four Sermons,
On the Sin, Folly, and Danger of being righteous over-much.

1. * MIGHT I follow the _bent_ of my own mind, I should be wholly employed in setting forth the infinite love of God to mankind in Christ Jesus, and endeavouring to draw all men to the belief and acknowledgment of it. This _one great mercy_ of God, which makes the _one_ happiness of all mankind, so justly deserves all our thoughts and meditations, so highly enlightens, and improves every mind that is attentive to it, so removes all the evils of this present world, so sweetens every state of life, so inflames the heart with the love of every divine and human virtue, that he is no small loser, whose mind is, either by writing or reading, detained from the view and contemplation of it.

2. When the mystery of divine love was first manifested to the world, it produced its proper effects. It put an end to all _selfishness and division; for all that believed were of one heart and one spirit, and had all things common_.¹ And indeed, under the real influence and full belief of this great mystery of divine love, there seems to be no room left for any thing else amongst Christians, but returns of love to God, and flowing out of love towards one another.

¹ Acts ii. 44.

3. * It is so difficult to enter into controversy without being, or at least seeming in some degree unkind to the person one opposes, that it is with great reluctance I have entered upon my present undertaking; having nothing more deeply riveted in my heart, than an universal love and kindness for all men, and more especially for those whom God has called to be my fellow-labourers, in promoting the salvation of mankind. But however unwilling, yet I find myself obliged to consider and lay open many grievous faults in the Doctor’s discourse; and to shew to all Christians, that the dearest interests of their souls are much endangered by it.

4. * And this I must do with great plainness and sincerity in the love of truth, and under the direction of charity, saying nothing in the spirit of an _adversary_, sparing nothing thro’ _respect of persons_, sacrificing nothing to the taste or temper of the world, but setting every thing in that naked light, in which the Spirit of God represents it to my own mind.

5. The Doctor undertakes to stir up, and alarm mankind with the _sin_, _folly_ and _danger_ of being _righteous over-much_. The text from which he has the title of his discourses is very unhappily chosen, and must be looked upon rather as a severe reproach, than any kind of justification of it. The text is indeed in the writings of _Solomon_, and as it stands there, has no hurt in it; because as the royal preacher sometimes introduces fools, and sometimes infidels making their speeches, so there is a necessity of supposing that to be the case in the Doctor’s text; not only from the context which plainly shews there are two persons introduced, the one _for_, the other _against_ righteousness; but because the words, otherwise, cannot be taken in a sense that is tolerable, or consistent with the common _notions_ of piety.

6. Is it not therefore strange, that the Doctor should think it right, to limit, explain, and model both the letter and spirit of the gospel by such a saying in the writings of _Solomon_ as must be ascribed to the spirit and mouth of an infidel? Is it not stranger, that such a text, so offensive to piety, should have not only been so long dwelt upon in the Doctor’s three churches, but sent abroad into the world, as a proper key to all the practical sayings, parables, and doctrines of Jesus Christ?

7. Supported by this text, the Doctor endeavours to deter and fright Christians from the sin, folly and danger of being righteous over-much, and from what he calls the baneful plague of enthusiasm. But then it is matter of just complaint, that he does all this, without ever shewing in any part of his discourse, wherein true righteousness, or the right and sober spirit of piety consists. And if he supposed all his readers to be already well acquainted with the nature, and extent of Christian holiness, there would then have been little occasion for his present undertaking.

8. But the Doctor overlooks this important matter. He neither supposes them to have this knowledge, nor endeavours to help them to it; but in a flow of zeal, reflects at large upon all attempts towards a piety, that is not _modern, common_, and according to the present fashion of religion in the world. Thus, you every where find severe reflections cast upon pretenders to piety, pretended spiritualists; great accusations of excesses, extraordinaries and by-paths; but no where a word or a hint, in favour of those, who would only be so extraordinary, and so much out of the _common_ paths, as the blessed saints and martyrs of the primitive church were. No where are _such people_ told, that he wishes them _God speed_, that _their zeal_ is much wanted both amongst _clergy_ and _laity_, and that the gospel suffers because we know not where to find living examples of its purity and perfection. No where are they told, that he writes not against them, that he loves their spirit, and should be glad to add new fervours to it: nor what Christian perfection is, what a holiness of body, soul and spirit it requires; how powerfully all are called to it, how earnestly all ought to aspire after it, and how sadly mistaken, what enemies to themselves they are, who for the sake of any, or all the things in the world, die less purified and perfect, than they might have been.

9. If we had to do with _one single_ person sincerely good, yet seeming to carry matters too high in some part of his duty, and intended privately to dissuade him from such heights; yet even this, thus privately done and to a person of piety, would be exceeding _dangerous_ and _unjustifiable_; unless we took the utmost care at the same time, to _keep up_ the pious zeal of his mind, to shew him wherein true perfection consisted, and to encourage his utmost endeavours after it.

But if this caution, instruction and encouragement, cannot be omitted without great hurt to religion, when we speak only to a person of piety, and in private, about any religious _extremes_, what must be said of the Doctor’s conduct? Who to the world dead in trespasses and sin, preaches up the _sin_, _folly_ and _danger_ of _being_ righteous over-much? To the world _eating and drinking and rising up to play_, he harangues temperance, abstinence, mortification and severity of life! To the world asleep, insensible, and careless, not only of the purity and perfection, but of the first principles of the gospel, he boldly and rashly approaches all appearances of holiness, that are uncommon and extraordinary! To _no_ part of the world does he represent or propose the _perfection_ of the gospel, or recommend it as that, which deserves all that they can do, or suffer for the sake of it.

This, therefore, I am obliged to point out, as a _fundamental defect_ in the Doctor’s discourse, and such as renders it an evil _temptation_, a dangerous _snare_, and fatal _delusion_ to all those who do not read it with a full, and thorough dislike.

10. * Coldness, indifference, and a lifeless, outward compliance with the duties of religion: a slavery to ease, softness, and sensual pleasures: a criminal conformity to the spirit, fashions, and corruptions of the world; unmortified passions; conniving at favourite sin; deep roots of pride, partiality, and self-love: an unawakened conscience; an insensibility of their corrupt, unreformed, unregenerate state: a proneness to be content and satisfied with poor beginnings, names and appearances of virtue; is perhaps the state of more than two _thirds_ of those that are looked upon to be the religious amongst us.

Now the Doctor’s discourse has a direct and natural fitness to lull all these people asleep, to ♦suppress all stirring and intentions of amendment, to keep up and nourish every disorder of their hearts, to increase their blindness, and awaken nothing in them, but a _hurtful zeal_ to censure and condemn all those that are endeavouring to practise the _uncommon_ piety of the gospel.

♦ The first line on page 144 “upon the madness, danger, and
folly of too much” appears to be extraneous and inconsistent
with the text flow, so has been removed. The catchword from
the previous page appears at the start of line two.

There is scarce a reader amongst this number of people, whether he be _layman_ or _clergyman_, but will find this effect from the Doctor’s instructions; he will begin to take _fresh comfort_ in his state, to think himself _happy_ for having had no aspirings after high improvements in piety; he will not only be content with his corruptions, but be fixed and hardened against all _inward_ and _outward_ calls to a solid piety; he will approve of the deadness and insensibility of his own heart, and acquiesce in it, as his just security, from the _sin_ and _folly_ and _danger_ of being _righteous over-much_.

11. Again, others there are, I make no doubt in all parts of the kingdom, both amongst clergy and laity, men and women, rich and poor, whose consciences are greatly awakened, who see the general apostacy from the religion of the gospel, whose souls are wanting and wishing nothing so much, as to know how all that they _are_, all that they _have_, and all that they _do_, may be one continual sacrifice, and service of love unto God; to know how, and in what manner, and to what extent, and by what means, they may and ought to _be perfect, even as their Father which is in heaven is perfect_.

Now, who can help looking with _love_ and _compassion_ upon those poor souls, longing for that which has been so long lost; asking after that, which scarce any one will tell them any thing of, and wanting to enter upon paths where there are few or no footsteps to be seen, nor any travellers in motion?

Had these awakened souls lived in the first ages of the church, nay, I may say in almost any till these very last ages of it, their zeal had not been in vain: they could have been at no loss to know _how_ they were to proceed in their heavenly purpose; because they would have been immediately directed to some living examples of the perfect spirit of the gospel, who were publicly known and acknowledged by all to be such, who had the same undisputed right, to point out the Christian profession, as _John_ the Baptist had to preach up _mortification_ and _self-denial_. Every age, and every sex, priests and people of all conditions, had their known standards to resort to, where every one was sure to be guided, assisted, and encouraged to live up to that height of holiness.

12. But now how does the Doctor deal with this sort of people? What _love_, _assistance_, and _encouragement_ does he reach out to them? Why, truly, he considers them as a _deluded_, _weak_, or _hypocritical_, or _half-thinking_ people, that disturb the Christian church with their projects; who are to be set right by returning to the instructions of common sense. He ridicules every step they must take in their intended progress, by adding absurdities of his own invention to it. There is nothing for such people throughout his whole discourse, but reproaches, and discouragement.

Are they desirous of all that _self-denial_, all such _mortification_ of bodily appetites and sensual passions, as may best fit them to be temples of the Holy Spirit? He ridicules them, as holding the sinfulness of _smelling a rose_.

Do they begin to discover the _deep corruption_ of their nature, the superficialness and weakness of their virtues, and to fear they have as yet scarce come up to the righteousness of the _Scribes_ and _Pharisees_? He tells them “The great enemy of souls adapts his temptations to all sorts of tempers and dispositions.” Those who are disposed to be good and virtuous, if he cannot prevail with them to be vicious, commonly so called, he labours to make them over virtuous, that is vicious, tho’ not commonly so called; and so involves them in dangers and mischiefs.

Are they such as are desirous of reforming their own lives, by bringing all their actions to the standard of the gospel, and wholly intent upon their own advancement in merely _practical piety_?

To these he shews, that they are in the very paths that lead, and always did lead to _fanatic madness_.

Thus says he, “To what a height of _fanatic madness_ in _doctrines_, as well as practice are some advanced, who set out at first with the appearance of more than ordinary sanctity in _practice only_?” And again, “I do say that in all ages enthusiasts have been _righteous over-much_; they began with the last mentioned, and ended with the other; _and is it not so now_?”

13. Further, are there others, who begin to feel the _mystery_ of their redemption discovered in their own souls, so that they hunger and thirst after the manifestation of the divine life in them, desiring that Christ may be wholly formed and revealed in them, that they may _put on_ Christ, _be_ in him _new creatures_, led by his spirit, _growing_ in him as branches in the vine, hearing the word of God written and spoken in their hearts, in his light _seeing_ light, and _tasting_ in the inward man _the powers of the world to come_?

* For such as these, the Doctor has this instruction: “That there is, says he, such a thing as the operation of the Holy Spirit upon our souls, tho’ we cannot distinguish it from the operations of our own minds, is not only granted, but insisted upon by all sincere and sober Christians. But what _reason_, what _scripture_, is there for this inward _seeing_, _hearing_, _feeling_?”

* According therefore to the Doctor’s divinity both reason and scripture require, that the true Christian be _inwardly blind_, inwardly _deaf_, and void of all inward _feeling_. For if neither scripture nor reason will allow of any inward senses, then they must both of them require an _inward insensibility_. But as scripture from _Genesis_ to the _Revelation_, is full of proofs of these inward senses, I shall not now produce them: I shall here only observe that _hardness of heart_ is a well known phrase of scripture, and every where _signifies_ some degree of _blindness_, _deafness_, and loss of _feeling_. I suppose it will not be said that it signifies blindness, or loss of _outward eyes_ and _ears_, or feeling: neither does it signify a want of _human reason_, or natural _sagacity_; for _learned_, _polite_, and _ingenious_ men, are full as subject as others to this hardness of heart. Therefore the scripture is as open, as plain and express in declaring _for inward senses_, as it is in declaring against such a thing, as _hardness_ of _heart_. Hardness of heart is that to the _inward_ senses, which a deep, or as we call it, _dead sleep_, is to the _outward_. It keeps our inward eyes, and ears, and feeling all locked up.

14. A broken and a contrite heart unlocks our inward senses, and makes us see, and hear, and feel the things, which could no more be seen, heard or felt before, than a man in a deep sleep can hear, and see, and feel the things, that are said and done about him.

Water frozen into a rock of ice, is very different from the same water melted, warmed, and moving under the influence of the sun and the air.

Now this difference between water _flowing_, full of _light_ and _air_, and the same water frozen into a dark, hard rock of ice, is but a small resemblance of the difference between a _hardened_ heart, and the _same heart_ become broken.

15. But I return to the Doctor. His further instruction to this sort of people stands thus. They are told by him, “that their high notions of spiritual improvements have this effect: on the one hand, they lead to _presumption_, on the other to _desperation_.” “He has been told, _he says_, that some have been actually thrown into despair. They have been made stark mad, and received into _Bedlam_ as such. _And then he cries out_, Was the religion of Jesus Christ intended to make people mad? Is this for the honour of Christianity?”

* I shall not here question the Doctor’s information. I shall only observe, that when our Saviour was upon earth, there were two sorts of _mad_ people about him; the _one sort_ ran about in disorder, tore their cloaths and cut their own flesh; the other sort raved in malice, threw dust into the air, stopped their ears, and cried out _crucify him, crucify him_.

* It may be asked, which of these two sorts of state? Whose madness was the most shocking, that of the lunatics, or that of the _High Priests_, _Scribes_, and _Pharisees_? Those who only mangled their own bodies, or those that thirsted after the blood of Christ, and would have no rest till they saw his body nailed to the cross? To me the _lunatics_, seem to be in a _less degree_ of disorder; and the reason is this, because I see that our Saviour could heal them, but not the Priests, Scribes, and Pharisees.

Now is it reasonable, on account of the _madness_ of these Priests, Scribes and Doctors of the law, to say, “Is this for the honour of the _Jewish law_? Were the _law and the prophets intended to make people mad_?” If the Doctor knows how to excuse the law and the prophets, tho’ these great students of them were in such a desperate state of _madness_, then Christianity may be blameless; tho’ here and there a Christian (so called) may be fit for _Bedlam_.

16. Again, are there others, who desire to bring the whole form of their lives under rules of religion, to let the spirit of the gospel give laws to the most ordinary, indifferent, innocent and lawful things and enjoyments; so that, as the apostle speaks, _whether they eat or drink, or whatever they do_, they may _do all to the glory of God_?

These people are told by the Doctor, that “Wholly abstaining from things indifferent and innocent in themselves, as forbidden and unlawful, people were in the most disordered and distempered is a signal instance of being righteous over-much; and so on the other hand, is making things indifferent to be necessary, and matters of duty.”

What is here said has some truth in it, and might be useful in its proper place, and under right limitations. But as it here stands, it is a grievous _snare_ and _deceit_ to the reader. For it is to signify to him, that _wholly abstaining from_ things in themselves indifferent, cannot be made a _matter_ of true religious advancement; but is a blameable instance of excess. If the Doctor had meant only to teach, that we should not abstain from things indifferent, as if they were in _themselves unlawful_, he should have told his readers that he meant no more. He should have told them, that such things might be abstained from justly, upon a better principle, and so become very expedient and edifying; and that he did not condemn the abstaining from such things, when it was done upon a motive of piety, or for the better fulfilling any duty; but only when it was done from superstitious notion, of the things being in themselves sin.

Had he done this, he had prevented the _snare_ and _deceit_ that is now in his assertion: but then he would at the same time have made it useless, and insignificant to the design of his discourse, and would have left a door open for such advances in piety, as he is now opposing.

17. It might easily be shewn, if this was the place for it, that no one can truly fulfil the two first and greatest of all laws, that of loving God with all our heart, and that of loving our neighbour as ourselves, unless he be willing and glad, in many instances, _wholly_ to _abstain_ from things in themselves indifferent and innocent.

St. _Paul_’s doctrine is this: _All things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient._ This sets the matter right on both sides. It leaves things in their own state of indifference, and yet carries us to a higher rule of acting. It directs us wholly to abstain from, some things innocent in themselves, and to do things because they are _expedient_; because by so doing, we shew a higher love of God, and a greater desire of doing every thing to his glory; because we thereby attain a greater conquest over all our inward and outward enemies, and in a greater degree help forward the edification of our neighbour.

18. Let us look at St. _Paul_’s doctrine and examples in the two following remarkable instances.

First where he declares it to be _lawful_ for those that preach the gospel to live by the gospel, and yet makes it matter of the greatest _comfort_ and joy to himself, that he wholly abstained from this _lawful_ thing: and declares, it were better for him to die, than that this _rejoicing_ should be taken from him. He appeals to his daily and nightly labouring with his own hands, that so he might preach the gospel freely, and not be chargeable to those that heard him. And this he said he did, not for want of authority to do otherwise, but that he might make himself an example unto them who followed him.

* What awakening instructions are here given to us of the clergy, in a matter of the greatest moment! How ought every one to be frighted at the thought of desiring or seeking a second living, or of rejoicing at great pay where there is but little duty, when the apostle’s rejoicing consisted in this, that he had passed thro’ all the fatigues and perils of preaching the gospel without any pay at all! How _cautious_, nay, how _fearful_ ought we to be, of going so far as the _secular_ laws permit us, when the apostle thought it more desirable to lose his life, than to go so far as the general laws of the gospel would have suffered him!

* It is _looked upon_ as _lawful_, to get several preferments, and to make a gain of the gospel, by hiring others to do duty for us at a lower rate.――It is looked upon as lawful, to quit a cure of souls of a small income, for no other reason but because we can get another of a greater.――It is looked upon as lawful, for a clergyman to apply the revenue of a church, which he serves, to his own use, tho’ he has more than a sufficient competency of his _own_, and much more than the apostle could get by his labour.――It is looked upon as lawful, for the clergy to live in state and equipage, to buy purple and fine linen out of the revenue of the church.――It is looked upon as lawful, for clergymen to enrich their families, and bring up their children in the fashionable vanities of a worldly and expensive life, by money got by preaching the gospel of Jesus Christ.

* But now _supposing_ all these to be _lawful_, what _comfort_ and _joy_ might we treasure up for ourselves, what benefit and edification should we give to our neighbour, if we wholly abstained from all these things, not by working day and night with our hands, as the great apostle did, but by limiting our wants and desires according to the plain demands of nature, and a religious self-denial?

The other instance of the apostle’s I appeal to is that, where he says, it is good neither to eat “flesh, nor drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbleth and is offended. And again, if meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, that I may not offend my brother.” Hence it appears, that to abstain from things indifferent, as if they were in themselves sinful, is wrong; but to _abstain_ from them upon other motives, may be matter of necessary duty and edification. But since the Doctor has not looked at this matter in the twofold view in which only it can be justly apprehended, he cannot well be excused from that _half thinking_, which he so much reproaches in others.

19. But I must further observe, that there is yet more of _snare_ and _deception_, in what the Doctor has here said of this matter. For the reader may thereby be easily brought into a belief, that things in themselves indifferent, are not _proper subjects_ of religion, or means of advancing in piety; and that he need not bring himself under _any laws_ of religion, concerning such things.

Whereas nothing can be more contrary to truth, or more hurtful to piety than such a belief. “Eating, drinking, sleeping, dressing, resting, labour, conversation, trade, diversion, and money, are in themselves indifferent.”

But it is in the religious, or irreligious use of these that some people _live_ up to the spirit of the gospel, and others _wholly die_ to it. And it is from strict laws of religion, made concerning these indifferent things, that the spiritual life of every one is to be built up.

And it is for want of religious laws in the use of these things, that the spirit of the gospel cannot get possession of our hearts. For our souls may receive an infinite hurt, and be rendered incapable of all true virtue, merely by the use of innocent and lawful things.

* What is more innocent than rest and retirement? And yet what more dangerous than sloth and idleness? How lawful is the care of a family? And yet how are many people rendered incapable of all virtue, by a ♦worldly, sollicitous temper? How lawful is it for us, to eat and drink in such quantity and quality, as may render the body healthful, and useful to the soul? And yet what danger is there in eating and drinking if we are not under this strict law of religion, to seek _only_ health; and not the pleasure of various tastes in our food? What _sensuality_ of discourse shall we not every day fall into, unless it be a fixed law to us, to speak of no other joy in our food, but that which is expressed by our grace before, and after our meals?

♦ “wordly” replaced with “worldly”

How indifferent a thing, and innocent in itself, is _dress_? And yet what more hurtful and abounding with sin? It reaches and affects the heart and soul both of the wearer and beholder. Its evils are innumerable; it has destroyed, and does destroy like a pestilence.

Now how can all these evils, which arise from the use of these things indifferent and lawful in themselves be avoided, but by making every thing in our _common_ and _ordinary_ life to be matter of conscience, which is to have its _rule_ and _measure_ and _end_ from the spirit of religion? And indeed what other end is there in religion, but to govern every motion, and desire of our hearts? To make all the actions of our common life pure and holy, by being done in strict conformity to the will of God, and under the light and guidance of his Holy Spirit? So that the very outward _form_ of our lives, and the _whole manner_ of our living in the world, whether in estate, shops, or farms, whether in eating, drinking, or dressing, may make it known to all the world, that we do every thing in the name of Jesus Christ, suitably to that high vocation wherewith we are called.

20. No folly of life whatever can be rightly removed but by being thus wholly cut up by the roots, by making every thing subject to the spirit of religion.

That which is to direct our _prayers_, and govern us at church, must with the same strictness direct our conversation, and govern our dealings in common life. We must dress with the same spirit that we give _alms_, or go to _prayers_; that is, we must no more dress to be seen and admired by others, than we must give alms, or make prayers for the same reasons.

And when religion has its seat in our hearts, and is the work of God’s spirit in us, this acting according to its direction in _all things_, will be so far from seeming to be a hard lesson, that it would be a pain to act otherwise. It is no hardship to a _miser_ to do _every_ thing suitably to the greedy desires of his heart. The ambitious man is not troubled with acting always agreeable to his ambition. If these persons are in trouble or distress, or under any dejection, you can only comfort the one with honour and power, and the other with filthy lucre and gain.

21. Yet the Doctor complains of the _Treatise upon Christian Perfection_, because Christians in _sickness, distress, and dejection_ of _spirit_, are there directed to seek for comfort and refreshment in God alone! Our blessed Lord is very short and yet very full upon this article. He only says, _Be of good comfort, I have overcome the world._ And the Doctor might as well be angry at the gospel for having made no mention of worldly amusements proper for sick and distressed Christians, as at the treatise of Christian Perfection, for not having done the same.

If I should see a sick man smelling a rose, I should not reprove him. But if he wanted comfort in his state, I would no more direct him to _any thing_, but the great and solid comforts that are to be found in the love, and goodness of God, than I would direct him to another Saviour, than Jesus Christ.

* For to tell Christians that in _some kinds_ of trouble, they might justly seek for relief in reading a _play_, or wanton _Bucolic_, instead of the _gospel_; would be the same absurdity, as to have told people in our Saviour’s time, that in some sorts of distress, they might justly have recourse to _Simon Magus_, instead of Jesus Christ.

22. But now to look back a little. I have considered the bulk of those Christians that are the most likely to be the Doctor’s readers, under two characters. The one as living some way or other in a partial, false, superficial, or half state of piety; the other as an awakened people, called by the Spirit of God to come out of the common corruption of the times. I have shewn that the Doctor’s discourse (where it is not disliked) must do great hurt, and have dreadful effects upon those two sorts of people; the one sort it seals up in a false security, sleeping in the chambers of death, without any oil in their vessels; the other it frightens, and discourages from their pious intentions of trimming their lamps with all diligence, and living upon the watch for the midnight call of the bridegroom’s voice.

That I may therefore do all the good I can to both these sorts of people, that I may awaken the one from their false security in their form of godliness, and encourage the other to proceed with all earnestness, after every degree of Christian holiness; I shall before I proceed any further, lay down a short account of the whole _ground_ of the Christian religion, that every one may clearly see, why we want the Christian religion to save us, what it is to do for us; and how it is done.

23. [1] Man was created a living image of the Holy Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

“2. This whole visible world, as far as the stars, or any corporeal being reaches, takes up that extent of space, where _Lucifer_ and his angels before their fall, had their glorious kingdom. So far as this visible frame of nature extends, so far was the extent of that kingdom.¹

¹ N. B. This, with several of the particulars that follow are
probable, but not supported by scripture. This is the theory
of _Jacob Behme_, ingenious, but quite incapable of proof.