Chapter IV

_Of the state and nature of reason, as it is in man; and how its
perfection in matters of religion is to be known._

THIS writer and others, who take to themselves the names of _free-thinkers_, make their court to the world, by pretending to vindicate the right that all men have, to judge and act according to their own reason. Though, I think, the world has no more to thank them for on this account, than if they had pretended to assert the right that every man has, to see _only_ with his _own eyes_, or to hear _only_ with his _own ears_.

For their own reason always did, does, and ever will, govern rational creatures, in every thing they determine, either in speculation or practice. It is not a matter of _duty_ for men to use their own reason, but of _necessity_: and it is as impossible to do otherwise, as for a being that cannot act but from choice, to act without choice.

Man is under the same necessity of acting from his own choice, that _matter_ is of not acting at all; and a being, whose principle of action is reason and choice, can no more act without it, or contrary to it, than an extended being can be without extension.

All men therefore are equally reasonable in this respect, that they are, and must be, by a _necessity_ of nature, equally directed and governed by their own reason and choice.

* The dispute therefore betwixt Christians and _unbelievers_, concerning reason, is not, whether men are to use their _own reason_, any more than whether they are to see with their _own eyes_; but whether every man’s reason must needs guide him, by its _own light_, or must cease to guide him, as soon as it guides him by a light borrowed from revelation? This is the true state of the question, not whether reason is to be followed, but when it is _best_ followed? Not whether it is to be our guide, but how it may be made our _safest guide_?

* The _free-thinkers_, therefore, rather appeal to the passions, than reason of the people, when they represent the clergy and Christianity as enemies to reason, and themselves as friends and advocates for the use of reason.

* For Christians oppose unbelievers, not because they _reason_, but because they reason _ill_. They receive revelation, not to suppress the natural power, but to give new and heavenly light to their reason; not to take away their right of judging for themselves, but to secure them from false judgments.

Christians therefore do not differ from unbelievers in the _constant use_ of their reason, but in the _manner_ of using it: as _virtuous_ men differ from _rakes_, not in their desire of happiness, but in their manner of seeking it.

It appears from what has been said, that every man’s own reason is his only principle of action, and that he must judge according to it, whether he receives, or rejects revelation.

Now although every man is to judge according to the light of his own reason, yet his reason has very little light that can be called its own. For, as we derive our nature from our parents, so that which we generally call _natural knowledge_, or the light of nature, is a knowledge and light that is made natural to us, by the same authority, which makes a certain language, certain customs, and modes of behaviour, natural to us.

Nothing seems to be our own, but a bare capacity to be instructed, a nature fitted for any impressions; as liable to be made a _Hottentot_, by being born among Hottentots, as to be a _Christian_, by being born among Christians.

It is not my intention by this to signify, that there is not a good and evil, right and wrong founded in the nature of things: but only to shew, that we find out this right and wrong, not by any inward strength, that our natural reason of itself affords, but by such external means, as people are taught articulate language, or the rules of civil life.

Men do not prefer virtue to vice, from a philosophical contemplation of the fitness of the one, and the unfitness of the other; but because it is a judgment as early in their minds, as their knowledge of the words, virtue and vice.

And it can no more be reasonably affirmed, that our knowledge of God and divine things, our opinions of the excellency of this, or that virtue, and of the immortality of our souls, are the effects of our natural light; than it can be reasonably affirmed, that our living in society, and our articulate language are owing to the light of nature.

For, as all mankind find themselves in this state before any reasoning about it; as education, and human authority have taught us language, and accustomed us to the rules and manners of a social life: so education, and the same authority, have planted in our minds, certain notions of God and divine things, and formed us to a belief of our soul’s immortality, and the expectation of another life.

And mankind are no more left to find out a God, or the fitness of virtue, by their own reason, than they are left by their own reason, to find out who are their parents, to find out the fitness of speaking an articulate language.

Now if this is the state of reason, as it is in man; if this is all the light that we have from our own nature, a bare capacity of receiving good or bad impressions, right or wrong opinions and sentiments, according to the state of the world we fall into; then we are but poorly furnished, to assert the _absolute perfection_ of our own reason.

If our light is little more than the opinions and customs of those amongst whom we live, and it be so hard for a man to arrive at a greater wisdom, than the common wisdom of the _country_ which gave him birth and education; how unreasonably do we appeal to the perfection of our reason, against the _necessity_ and _advantage_ of divine revelation?

* If we are nothing without the assistance of men; if we are a kind of foolish, helpless animals, ’till education and experience have revealed to us the wisdom and knowledge of our fellow-creatures; shall we think ourselves too wise and full of our own light, to be farther enlightened with a wisdom revealed to us by God himself?

This gentleman, speaking of education, saith, “Education is justly esteemed a second nature; and its force is so strong, that few can wholly shake off its prejudices, even in things unreasonable and unnatural.”

All that I shall add to this account, is, that we are by the condition of human life, necessarily subjected to this _second nature_, and cannot avoid coming under its power.

And here let me ask this pleader for the sufficiency of the light of nature, how those that resign themselves up to the light of their _own nature_, shall know, whether it is their _first_, or their _second_ nature that directs them?

Here are, it seems, _two natures_; they may be as different as good and evil; yet as they are both _natures_, both _internal light_, how shall a man know which he follows? He does not know which was first, or why he should call one first, and the other second; they are both internal, and without any thing to distinguish them. And as he is not to resist the motions of nature, or stifle its directions; so he must be as obedient to the directions of the second, as of the first nature, because he does not perceive their difference, nor has any means to distinguish their operations.

He therefore that asserts the light of nature to be a sufficient unerring guide in divine matters, ought either to shew, that our _second_ nature is as _safe_ a guide as the first; or that though it is nature, yet it has no _natural powers_ over us.

For since every man is _necessitated_ to take upon him a second nature, which he does not _know_ to be a second, or _when_ it began, or _how far_ it has proceeded, or how _contrary_ it is to his first nature; he that would prove the light of nature to be so perfect, that nothing can be added to it, is obliged to prove, that our second nature, which we receive by education, has the same degree of perfection. For so far as our second nature is different from the first, so far it has changed the first; and if we are to follow nature exclusive of revelation, we may take _revenge_, _self-murder_, _incontinence_, _sensuality_, _pride_, _self-conceit_, and a _contempt_ of all things sacred, to be the true dictates of nature.

For it often happens to people, to be thus educated; so if education is a second nature, and nature is to be esteemed a _true_ and _perfect_ guide; a man thus educated, has all his vices made so many glorious laws of nature; and thro’ the strength of his natural light, he condemns humility, self-denial, and devotion, as foolish bigotry.

This writer says, “Natural religion, _that is, the religion of nature_, is a perpetual standing rule for men of the meanest, as well as the highest capacities, and carries its own evidence with it, those internal, inseparable marks of truth.¹ _But if education is a |second nature|, and, as this writer affirms, |has the force of a second nature even in things unreasonable and unnatural|; then this second nature has not only its natural religion, which is also |a perpetual standing rule for men of the meanest, as well as the highest capacities; which carries its own evidence with it, those internal, inseparable marks of truth|; but it may also have a natural religion, both |unreasonable and unnatural|; since education has the force of nature even in things of this kind._”

¹ Page 243.

Again: If education has this force of nature even in things unreasonable and unnatural; if it is also absolutely necessary for all men to come under the power of some second nature; what can be more vain, than to pretend to state the light, or rectitude of human nature, since it must be for the most part in every man, as the uncertainty, variety, happiness or unhappiness of education has rendered it?

And our author can no more tell, what man would be without education, or what nature would do for those who had no foreign instruction, than he can tell what sort of beings dwell in the moon. And yet he that does not know this, how can he know what the light of nature is in itself?

* Again to declare the light of nature so perfect, as to be incapable of all improvement even by divine revelation, is no less an extravagance, than to declare the education of mankind to be perfect in the same degree.

* For if nature not only wants, but cannot possibly avoid education; if this necessary unavoidable education becomes another nature, undiscernible from the first; then nothing can possibly be affirmed of the perfection of the light of nature, but what must be affirmed in the same degree of the perfection of education. And he that affirms that mankind have had, at all times, and in all places of the world, the same sufficient, perfect light of nature, must affirm, that mankind have had, at all times, and in all places of the world, the same perfect, unerring education.

* When therefore it is just, for all people to abide by the absolute perfection of their education, the infallible light of their second nature, as the unerring standard, of all that is moral, religious, and divine; then it may be just to appeal to the natural light of all men, of all ages, and all places, as a sufficient teacher of all that ought, or ought not to be a matter of religion.

* For till it can be shewn, that men are not liable to a second nature from education; the state of nature must differ all over the world, and in every age of the world, just as the light, and advantages of education, have differed in the several parts, and ages of the world.

* In a word, the religious and moral light of our first nature, is just as great as the first strength of infants; and the religious and moral light of our second nature, is just as perfect as our education, and as much of our own growth, as the first language that we are taught to speak.

May not therefore one justly wonder, what it is that could lead any people into an imagination of the absolute perfection of human reason? There seems no more in the state of mankind, to betray a man into this fancy, than to persuade him, that the reason of infants is absolutely perfect. For sense and experience, are as full and strong a proof against one, as against the other.

But it must be said for these writers, that they decline all arguments from facts and experience, to give a better account of human nature; but with the same justice, as if a man was to lay aside the authority of history, to give you a truer account of the life of _Alexander_.

Their objection against revelation is founded upon the pretended sufficiency and perfection of human reason, to teach all men all that is wise, and holy, and divine, in religion. But how do they prove this perfection of human reason? Do they appeal to mankind as proofs of it? Do they produce any body of men in this or any other age, that without any assistance from revelation, have attained to this perfection of religious knowledge? This is not so much as pretended to; the history of such men is entirely wanting. And yet the want of such a fact as this, has even the force of demonstration against this pretended sufficiency of natural reason.

Because it is a matter not capable of any other kind of proof, but must be admitted as certainly true, or rejected as certainly false, according as fact and experience bear witness for or against it.

* For an enquiry about the light, and strength, and sufficiency of reason, to guide and preserve men in the knowledge and practice of true religion, is a question, as _solely_ to be resolved by _fact and experience_, as if the enquiry was about the _shape_ of man’s body, or the _number_ of his senses. And to talk of a light and strength of reason, natural to man, which fact and experience have never yet proved, is as egregious nonsense, as to talk of natural senses, or faculties of his body, which fact and experience have never yet discovered.

From the bare consideration of a rational soul in union with a body, and bodily passions, we can neither prove man to be _strong_ nor _weak_, _good_ nor _bad_, _sickly_ nor _sound_, _mortal_ nor _immortal_: all these qualities must discover themselves, as the _eye_ discovers its degree of _sight_, the _hand_ its degree of _strength_.

To enquire therefore, whether men have by nature light sufficient to guide, and keep them in the true religion; is the same appeal to fact and experience, as to enquire, whether men are _mortal_, _sickly_, or _sound_: or how far they can _see_ and _hear_.

* As therefore these gentlemen are, in this debate, without any proof, or even pretence of proof, from experience, so their cause ought to be looked upon to be as vain and romantic, as if they had asserted, that men have senses naturally fitted to hear sounds, and see objects at all distances, tho’ experience has, from the creation to this time, proved the quite contrary.

For he that asserts the sufficiency of reason, to guide men in matters of religion, is not only without any positive proof from experience on his side, but has the history of all ages, for near six thousand years, fully demonstrating the quite contrary.

If some other enquirers into human nature, should affirm, that there is in mankind a _natural instinct_, sufficient to make every man, at all times, love every other man, with the _same degree_ of affection, as he loves himself; I suppose such an opinion would be thought too absurd to need any confutation. And yet all the absurdity of it would lie in this, that it affirmed something of the _sufficiency_ of a natural quality in man, which could not be supported by a single instance of any one man, and was contrary to the experience and history of every age of the world.

Now this is exactly the case of these gentlemen: their opinion has neither more or less absurdity in it: they only affirm such a sufficiency of reason to be natural to all men, as cannot be supported by a single instance of any one man, that ever lived, and is fully contradicted by the experience and history of every age since the creation of the world.

By what has been said, I hope the reader will observe, that this enquiry about the perfection or imperfection, the strength or weakness, of reason in man, as to matters of religion, rests _wholly_ upon fact and experience; and that therefore all speculative reasonings upon it, are as idle and visionary, as a sick man’s dreams about health; and are as wholly to be rejected, as any speculative arguments that should pretend to prove, in spite of all facts and experience, the _immortality_, and _unalterable_ state of human bodies.

Our author himself seems sensible, that the argument drawn from facts and experience, pressed hard upon his cause; and therefore has given the best answer to it, he can yet think of.

“It cannot, _says he_, be imputed to any defect in the light of nature, that the _Pagan_ world ran into idolatry; but to their being entirely governed by priests, who pretended communication with their gods, and to have thence their revelations, which they imposed upon the credulous, as divine oracles.”

The justness of this assertion will fully appear by the following illustration.

“It cannot be imputed to any defect in the health and soundness of man’s natural constitution, that the world has, in all ages, been over-run with distempers; but to their being entirely governed by physicians, who pretended to I know not what secret knowledge of medicines, which they imposed upon the sickly, as infallible remedies.”

For, as a perfect state of health, conscious to itself of a sufficiency of natural strength to keep clear of all diseases, seems to be out of all danger from physicians; so had mankind been ever conscious to themselves, of a sufficient natural knowledge of what is true or false in religion; such _as enabled men of the meanest capacity to distinguish between religion and superstition_,¹ what _room_ had there been for frauds and impostures herein?

¹ Page 3.

“Can the superstition of the _Pagans_ be imputed to any defect or insufficiency in the light of reason, when it was wholly owing to their abandoning that divine light; and in defiance of it, running into senseless traditions?”¹

¹ Page 37.

But how came it, that they ran into senseless traditions? What was it that admitted these traditions as just and good? Why, it was that faculty which judges of every thing, and which this writer recommends as an unerring guide. And to say, a man’s superstition is not owing to any defect or weakness of his reason, but to his admitting senseless traditions, is as vain, as to say, a man’s false reasoning is not owing to any weakness of his reason, but to his proceeding upon foolish and absurd arguments.

He proceeds thus: “It is certainly no good argument against the sufficiency of the divine light of nature, that men could not err, except they left it, and followed vain traditions.”¹

¹ Second Address, page 39.

This observation has just the same sense and acuteness in it, as if it had been said, _It is certainly no good argument against_ the sufficiency of the divine healthfulness _of human nature, that men could not be sickly, except they left it_, and _fell into various distempers: or, against the_ sufficiency of the divine strength of natural courage, that men could not be timorous, till they left it, and followed vain fears. For, to prove that reason is sufficient, because every thing that is absurd, is contrary to reason, is like proving our healthfulness to be sufficient, because all distempers are contrary to it: or our courage to be sufficient, because fears and cowardice are contrary to it.

Besides, how is it that men leave their reason? Why, just as ignorant men leave their knowledge; as dull people leave their wit, or cowards leave their courage. The first part of this paragraph tells you of a sufficiency of the divine light of nature: well; What has this divine light of nature done? What sufficient effects has it had? Why, it has covered all the world with darkness.

Again: Supposing that all mankind, even the wisest nations, have for this six thousand years been thus imposed upon, not knowing how to distinguish idle tales and senseless traditions from true religion; is not this a noble foundation for this writer to build the _sufficiency of the divine light of nature upon_? For supposing it had been in the greatest degree insufficient, what other effect could have followed from it, but only this, that _all mankind_, even the _wisest nations_, should have been over-run with error? And is it not strange, that effects should bear no proportion to their causes; that the same things should follow from the _sufficiency_ of the divine light of nature, which must have followed from its _greatest insufficiency_?

* And must not the enemies of _reason_ and _free-thinking_ be forced to confess, that this writer hath chosen an excellent guide for himself; since he so fully acknowledges, that no one yet has been rightly guided by it? Must not his present undertaking be granted to be the effect of cool and sober deliberation, since it only calls people of _all_, even the _meanest capacities_, to such an use of their reason, as the wisest of men and nations have always been strangers to?