Chapter II

_Shewing from the |relation| between God and man, that human
reason cannot be a competent judge of the |fitness| and
|reasonableness| of God’s proceedings with mankind, either
as to the |time|, or |matter|, or |manner| of an external
revelation._

AS our author has laid it down for an undeniable rule of God’s actions, that he must, if he be a wise and good being, act according to the relation he stands in towards his creatures; I proceed upon this principle to prove the incapacity of _human reason_, to judge _truly_ of God’s proceedings in regard to divine revelation.

For if the fitness of actions _results from the nature and relations_ of beings, then the _fitness_ of God’s actions, as he is an _omniscient Creator_ and _Governor_, to whom every thing is _eternally foreknown_, over beings endued with _our freedom of will_, must be to us incomprehensible.

* We are not so much as capable of comprehending by our reason, the _possibility_ of this relation, or how the fore-knowledge of God can consist with the free agency of creatures. We know that God fore-knows all things, with the same certainty as we know there is a God. And if _self-consciousness_ is an infallible proof of our own existence, it proves with the same certainty the freedom of our will. And hence it is, that we have a full assurance of the consistency of God’s fore-knowledge with freedom of will.

* Now this _incomprehensible_ relation between an _eternally fore-knowing Creator and Governor_, and his free creatures, is the _relation_ from whence arises the fitness of God’s providence over us. But if the _relation_ itself is incomprehensible, then those actions that have their fitness from it, must surely be incomprehensible. Nothing can be fit for God to do, either in _creation_ or _providence_, but what has its fitness founded in his _fore-knowledge_ of every thing that would follow, from _every kind_ of creation, and _every manner_ of providence: but if nothing can be fit, but because it is according to _this fore-knowledge_ of _every thing_ that would follow from _every kind_ of creation, and _every manner_ of providence; then we have the utmost certainty, that the fitness of God’s actions as a _fore-knowing Creator_, and _Governor_ of free agents, must be founded upon _reasons_ that we cannot possibly know any thing of.

* And a child that has but just learned to speak, is as well qualified to state the fitness of the laws of matter and motion by which the whole vegetable world is preserved, as the wisest of men is qualified to comprehend, or state the fitness of the methods, which a _fore-knowing Providence_ observes over free agents. For every reason on which the fitness of such a providence is founded, is not only _unknown_ to us, but by a necessity of nature _impossible_ to be known by us.

For if the _fitness_ of God’s acting in this, or that manner, is founded in his fore-knowledge of every thing that would _happen_, from every _possible way_ of acting, then it is impossible for us to know the reasons, on which the fitness of his actions is founded, as it is impossible for us to be omniscient.

Who can tell what _different kinds_ of rational creatures, distinguished by variety of natures, and faculties, it is fit and reasonable for God to create, because he eternally foresaw what would be the _effect_ of such different creations? Who can explain the _fitness_ of that vast _variety_ there is amongst rational creatures of the _same species_, or shew that all their different faculties ought to be as they are? And yet the _fitness_ of this providence has its _certain reason_ in the divine fore-knowledge, and it could not be fit, but because of it.

Who can tell what _degree_ of reason rational creatures ought to enjoy, or what degrees of _new_ and _revealed_ knowledge it is fit and reasonable for God to give, or not give them, because they seem, or seem not to themselves to want it, are disposed, or not disposed to receive it? For as mankind cannot tell why it was fit and reasonable for God to create them of such a _kind_, and _degree_, as they are of; so neither can they tell how God ought, or ought not to add to their natural knowledge, and make them as _differently accountable_ for the use of revealed rules of life, as for the use of their natural faculties.

And as the reason why God created them of _such_ a _kind_, and with _such faculties_, was because of his own fore-knowledge of the _effects_ of such a creation; so if ever he does reveal to them any _supernatural_ knowledge, both the doing it, the _time_, the _matter_, and _manner_ of it, must have their fitness in his own _eternal fore-knowledge_ of the effects of such a revelation.

The reasons therefore on which the fitness of this or that revelation depends, _why_ or _when_, of _what matter_, in _what manner_, and to whom it is to be made, must, from the nature and reason of things, be as unsearchable by us, as the reasons of _this_ or _that_ creation of rational beings, at such a _time_, of such a _kind_, in such a _manner_, in such a _state_.

This may help us to an easy solution of the unreasonable questions, which this writer puts in this manner.

“If the design of God in communicating any thing of himself to men was their happiness, would not that design have obliged him, who at all times alike desires their happiness, to have at all times alike communicated it to them? If God always acts for the good of his creatures, what reason can be assigned, why he should not from the beginning have discovered such things as make for their good, but defer the doing it till the time of _Tiberius_; since the sooner this was done, the greater would his goodness appear?”¹

¹ Page 393.

And again “How is it consistent with the notion of God’s being universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children, when all had equal need of it? Was it not as easy for him to have communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, as in one?”¹

¹ Page 196.

Now all this is fully answered, by our author’s own great and fundamental principle.

“For if the relations between things and persons, and the things resulting from thence, be the sole rule of God’s actions,”¹ as he expressly affirms; then the _sole rule_ or reason of God’s revealing any thing to any men, at any time, must have its _fitness resulting_ from the divine fore-knowledge of the effects of _such_ a revelation, at _such_ a time, and to _such_ persons. If God does not act thus, he does not act according to the relation betwixt a _fore-knowing Creator_, and his free creatures. But if he does act according to a _fitness resulting_ from this _relation_, and makes, or does not make revelations, according to his own fore-knowledge of the fitness of times and persons for them; then to ask how a God, always equally good, can make a revelation at any time, and not make the _same_ at _all_ times, is as absurd as to ask, how a God, always equally good, can reveal that at one time, because it is a _proper_ time for it, and not reveal it at every other time, tho’ improper for it.

¹ Page 28.

* God’s goodness, directed by his own fore-knowledge of the _fitness_ of times, and of the _state_ and _actions_ of free agents, deferred a certain revelation to the time of _Tiberius_, because he _fore-saw_ it would then be an act of the _greatest_ goodness, and have its _best effects_ upon the world: to ask therefore, _what reason can be assigned_, why so good a revelation was not _sooner_, or even from the _beginning_ made to the world, is asking, why God should act, according to his _own fore-knowledge_ of the _state_ and _actions_ of _free agents_, and order all things, according to a fitness resulting from such a fore-knowledge?

These questions suppose, that if God shewed his _goodness_ to mankind by a revelation at such time, he must be _wanting_ in goodness before that time, because he did not make it _sooner_; whereas if his deferring it till _such_ a time, was owing to his _fore-knowledge_ of the actions and state of free agents, and because it would then have its _best effects_, then God is proved to be equally good before he made it, for this very reason, because he did not make it before its _proper_ time: and he had been wanting in goodness, if he had not _deferred_ it till that time.

Now this appealing to God’s fore-knowledge of the state and actions of _free agents_, as the cause of all that is particular in the _time_ and _manner_ of any revelation, and deducing its fitness from thence, cannot be said to be _begging the question_, but is resolving it directly according to the _rule_, which this writer lays down for God to act by: that “the relations between things and persons, _and_ the fitness resulting from thence, must be the sole rule of God’s actions.”

But if this is the _sole rule_, then God in giving any revelation, must act as the _relation_ betwixt a _fore-knowing_ Creator and his _free_ creatures requires; and his actions must have their _fitness resulting_ from his fore-knowledge of the _state_ and _actions_ of free agents. And if this is God’s sole rule, then to ask why _this_ or _that_ revelation _only_ at _such_ a time, is to ask why God _only_ does that which is _fit_ for him to do? And to ask, why not the same revelation at any other time, is asking why God does not do that, which it is _not fit_ for him to do?

This writer asks, “How it is consistent with the notion of God’s being universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children, who had equal need of it?” But if they had _equal need_ of it, yet if they were not _equally fit_ for it, but prepared only to have their _guilt_ increased by it, and so be exposed to a greater damnation; then God’s goodness to them is manifest, by withholding such information from them, and reserving it for those that would be made happier by it.

_Judas_, _Pontius Pilate_, and the _Jews_ that called for our Saviour’s crucifixion, had _equal need_ of a Saviour with those that believed in him. _Chorazin_ and _Bethsaida_ wanted the light of the gospel as much as those that received it. And if the rest of the world had been, at that time, as much indisposed for the light of the gospel, as they were, God’s goodness had been, greater to that age, if he had reserved the light of the gospel till a better age had succeeded.

So that this argument, founded on the _equal need_ of all, or former ages, has no force, unless it could be shewn, that the same revelation made to any of these former ages, would have produced all those good effects, which God foresaw would follow, from its being reserved for such a _particular time_ and _state_ of things and persons.

He asks again, “Was it not as easy for God to have communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, as in any one?” This argument is built upon this supposition, that God does things because they are _easy_, or forbears things because they are _difficult_ to be performed. For it can be no argument, that God ought to have revealed such things to _all_ nations or persons, because it was as _easy_ to him, as to do it to _any one_ nation or person; unless it be supposed, that the _easiness_ of a thing is a reason why God does it, and the difficulty of a thing a reason why he does not do it. But if this supposition be very absurd, then the argument founded upon it must be liable to the same charge.

But if God does things, not because they are easy, but because they are infinitely good and fit to be done, then the reason why God has afforded different revelations, to different ages and persons, is this, that his _manner_ of revealing every thing, might be worthy of his own _fore-knowledge_ of the effects of it, and that every thing that is particular in the _time_ or _manner_ of any revelation, might have its _fitness resulting_ from the _relation_ betwixt a good God and his creatures, whose _changing_ state, _different_ conduct, tempers and actions, are all eternally fore-known by him.

Again, it is objected, that a divine revelation must either be the effect of _justice_, or else of _mercy_ and _free goodness_; but in either of these cases it ought to be _universal_; for justice must be done to all. But if it is the effect of _mercy_ and _free goodness_, this writer asks, “How a being can be denominated merciful and good, who is so only to a few, but cruel and unmerciful to the rest?”¹

¹ Page 401.

It is answered, That there is neither _justice_ in God without mercy, nor _mercy_ without justice; and to ascribe a _revelation_ to either of them separately, in _contradistinction_ to the other, has no more reason in it, than to ascribe the _creation_ separately either to the _wisdom_ or _power_ of God, in contradistinction to the other.

_Secondly_, A divine revelation is not owing barely to the _justice_ or _free goodness_ of God, but to the goodness, mercy, and justice of God, _governed_ and _directed_ by his eternal fore-knowledge of all the effects of every revelation, at any, or all times.

* God ordains a revelation in this, or that manner, time, and place; not because it is a _justice_ that he cannot refuse, not because it is a matter of _favour_ or _free goodness_, and therefore may be given in any manner at pleasure; but because he has the whole _duration_ of human things, the whole _race_ of mankind, the whole _order_ of human changes and events, the whole _combination_ of all causes and effects of human tempers, all the actions of free agents, and all the consequences of every revelation, plainly in his sight; and according to this eternal fore-knowledge, every revelation receives every thing that is _particular_ in it, either as to _time_, _matter_, _manner_, or _place_.

* All complaints therefore about that which is _particular_, or _seemingly_ partial in the time and manner of any revelation, are very unjustifiable; and shew, that we are discontent at God’s proceedings, because he acts like himself, does what is best and fittest to be done, and governs the world, not according to our weak imaginations, but according to his own infinite perfections.

* We will not allow a providence to be _right_, unless we can comprehend the reasonableness of all its steps; and yet it could not possibly be right, unless its proceedings were as much _above_ our comprehension, as our wisdom is _below_ that which is infinite.

For if the _relations_ of _things_, and _persons_, and the fitness resulting from thence, be the _rule_ of God’s actions; then all the revelations that come from God, must have their fitness resulting from the relation his fore-knowledge bears to the _various states_, _conditions_, _tempers_, and _actions_ of free agents, and the various effects of every manner of revelation.

But if God cannot act worthy of himself in any revelation, unless he acts according to a fitness resulting from this relation; then he must act by a _rule_ that lies out of our sight, and his providence in this particular must be incomprehensible to us; for this very reason, because it has that very fitness, wisdom and goodness in it, that it ought to have.