Chapter XV: Antwerp

‘If Hopes were dupes, Fears may be liars,
It may be in yon smoke conceal’d,
Your comrades chase e’en now the fliers,
And but for you, possess the field.

For while the tired waves vainly breaking
Seem here no painful inch to gain,
Far back, through creeks and inlets making,
Comes silent flooding in the main.’
CLOUGH.

The Battle of the Marne—The Race for the Sea—Antwerp, the True
Flank—Admiralty Concern about Antwerp—The Neutrality of the
Scheldt—Opening of the Siege of Antwerp, September 28—Lord
Kitchener’s Plans—Belgian Decision to Evacuate Antwerp—Conference
at Lord Kitchener’s House, Midnight, October 2—British Ministers
urge further Resistance—My Mission to Antwerp—French Aid
Promised—The Situation in Antwerp, October 3—My Proposals to the
Belgian and British Governments—Progress of the German
Attack—Strange Contrasts—Acceptance of my Proposals by British and
Belgian Governments—Chances of Success—Relief Approaching—Fighting
of October 5—The Belgian Night Attack Fails—The Front broken in,
October 6—Arrival of the British Naval Brigades—Arrival of Sir
Henry Rawlinson—Decisions of British and Belgian Council of War,
Night of October 6—The Personal Aspect—Five Days Gained.

It is not possible to understand the British attempt to prolong the defence of Antwerp without seeing the episode in its true setting. The following is a simple way of reviewing the military operations in the West up to the point which this account has now reached.

The German armies swept through Belgium intending to turn and drive back the French left and left centre. At the same time after a diversion in Alsace the French centre struck forward on either side of Metz at the German left and left centre. The French hoped that this counter-stroke would rupture the German line and paralyse the turning movement through Belgium. However, after the whole fronts had been in collision for several days of intense battle, it appeared that the French counter-stroke had not ruptured the German line, and that the turning movement through Belgium had succeeded in driving back the French left. Thus by the twentieth day the French right was thrown on to the defensive and their three armies of the left and left centre and the British army were in full retreat southward towards Paris. The Germans therefore were completely successful in the first main shock.

But henceforward the French right stood like a rock in front of Nancy under General de Castelnau, and at the Trouée des Charmes under General Dubail, and the Germans sustained a series of bloody checks. Meanwhile the French left and centre by retreating for five marches extended the pursuing Germans to the utmost while falling back themselves on their own reserves and supplies. And by September 6 (the 37th day) the French armies turned and assumed the offensive on the whole front of 120 miles from Paris to Verdun. In addition a new French army under General Maunoury had come into existence to the north of Paris which attacked the German right, and all the time the resistance of the Nancy army (de Castelnau) and of the army of General Dubail on its right continued unbreakable. Thus from September 6 the whole of the French and German armies and the British Expeditionary Force were locked in general battle on a front of over 180 miles, with practically every division and all their reserves on both sides thrown in.

This battle, which lasted for four days, was the greatest of the war. The Germans aimed not at the capture of Paris or Verdun or Nancy, but at the final destruction of the French military power. Had they succeeded in breaking the French front between Paris and Verdun or in falling upon its rear from the direction of Nancy, nearly half the French Army, certainly more than a million men, would have been cut off in the Verdun angle. The rest, whatever happened in the neighbourhood of Paris, would have had to retreat to the southward and would never again have been numerous enough to form a complete front. Compared with stakes like these, the entry into Paris by the German right flank or the capture of the Channel Ports by a couple of German corps were insignificant and rightly discarded by the German Headquarters. Once the French Army was cut in half and finally beaten, everything would fall into their hands. They therefore directed all their available troops to the battlefield, ignored the Channel Ports, and compelled von Kluck, commanding their right army, to skirt Paris and close in to their main battle front. How near they were to success will long be debated and never decided. But certainly they were within an ace. No military reproach lies upon their disregard of other objectives: but only upon any failure to disregard them. It is not to their neglect to enter Paris or seize Calais that their fatal defeat was due, but rather to the withdrawal of two German army corps to repel the Russian invasion of East Prussia.

The soul of the French nation triumphed in this death struggle, and their armies, defeated on the frontier, turned after the long marches of retreat, and attacked and fought with glorious and desperate tenacity. British attention has naturally been concentrated upon the intense military situation developed before and around Paris, in which our own army played a decisive part; and the various pressures which operated upon von Kluck have now been minutely exposed. Attacked on his right flank and rear by Maunoury’s army while advancing to the main battlefield, he was compelled to counter-march first two of his corps and then his two remaining corps in order to make head against the new danger. Thus a gap of 30 miles was opened in the German line between von Kluck and von Bülow. Into this gap marched the battered but reanimated British army. The tide had turned. But the whole of this great situation about Paris was itself only complementary to the battle as a whole. The gaze of the military student must range along the whole line of the French armies, the defeat of any one of which would have been fatal. Most of all his eye will rest upon the very centre of the Paris-Verdun line, where Foch though driven back maintained his resistance. ‘My centre cedes. My right recoils. Situation excellent. I attack.’ But all the four French armies between Paris and Verdun fought with desperate valour, while Dubail and de Castelnau round the corner maintained their superb defence. And thus, weakened by its rapid advance, the whole German line came to a standstill. And as this condition was reached, the penetration by the British and by the Fifth French army on the British right, of the gap in the German line between von Bülow and von Kluck determined both these commanders in succession to retreat, and thus imposed a retrograde movement upon the whole of the invading hosts. ‘The most formidable avalanche of fire and steel ever let loose upon a nation’ had spent its force.

From the moment when the German hopes of destroying the French armies by a general battle and thus of ending the war at a single stroke had definitely failed, all the secondary and incidental objectives which hitherto they had rightly discarded became of immense consequence. As passion declined, material things resumed their values. The struggle of armies and nations having failed to reach a decision, places recovered their significance, and geography rather than psychology began to rule the lines of war. Paris now unattainable, the Channel Ports—Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne—still naked, and lastly Antwerp, all reappeared in the field of values like submerged rocks when the tidal wave recedes.

The second phase of the war now opened. The French, having heaved the Germans back from the Marne to the Aisne, and finding themselves unable to drive them further by frontal attacks, continually reached out their left hand in the hopes of outflanking their opponents. The race for the sea began. The French began to pass their troops from right to left. Castelnau’s army, marching behind the front from Nancy, crashed into battle in Picardy, striving to turn the German right, and was itself outreached on its left. Foch’s army, corps after corps, hurried by road and rail to prolong the fighting front in Artois; but round the left of this again lapped the numerous German cavalry divisions of von der Marwitz—swoop and counter-swoop. On both sides every man and every gun were hurled as they arrived into the conflict, and the unceasing cannonade drew ever northwards and westwards—ever towards the sea.

Where would the grappling armies strike blue water? At what point on the coast? Which would turn the other’s flank? Would it be north or south of Dunkirk? Or of Gravelines or Calais or Boulogne? Nay, southward still, was Abbeville even attainable? All was committed to the shock of an ever-moving battle. But as the highest goal, the one safe inexpugnable flank for the Allies, the most advanced, the most daring, the most precious—worth all the rest, guarding all the rest—gleamed Antwerp—could Antwerp but hold out.

Antwerp was not only the sole stronghold of the Belgian nation: it was also the true left flank of the Allied front in the west. It guarded the whole line of the Channel Ports. It threatened the flanks and rear of the German armies in France. It was the gateway from which a British army might emerge at any moment upon their sensitive and even vital communications. No German advance to the sea-coast, upon Ostend, upon Dunkirk, upon Calais and Boulogne, seemed possible while Antwerp was unconquered.

My own feeling at the outbreak of the war had been that if the right things were done, Antwerp ought to hold out for two or even three months, that is to say, until we knew the result of the main collision of the armies on all the fronts—French, Russian, Austrian. I rested my thought on Metz and Paris in 1870–71, Plevna in 1878, Port Arthur in 1904. The fall of Namur unsettled these foundations. Still Antwerp, even apart from its permanent fortifications, was a place of great strength, fortified by rivers and inundations, and defended by all that was best in the Belgian nation and by practically its whole Field Army.

I was from the beginning very anxious to do everything that could be done out of our slender resources to aid the Belgian King and nation to maintain their stronghold, and such small items as the Admiralty could spare in guns and ammunition were freely sent. The reports which we received from Antwerp and the telegrams of the Belgian Government already at the beginning of September began to cause me deep concern. So also did the question of the Scheldt, whose free navigation both for troops and munitions seemed vital to the Belgian people.

I thought that Antwerp should be made to play its part in the first phase of the war by keeping as many German troops as possible out of the great battle. If the Belgian Army defending the city could be strengthened by British troops, not only would the defence be invigorated, but the Germans would be continually apprehensive of a British inroad upon them from this direction, the deadliness of which Lord Roberts’s strategic instinct had so clearly appreciated. It was true that we had no troops in England fit to manœuvre in the field against the enemy. But the defence of the fortified lines of Antwerp was a task in which British Territorial troops might well have played their part. Accordingly on September 7 I sent a memorandum to the Prime Minister, Sir Edward Grey and Lord Kitchener emphasising the importance of Antwerp, particularly from the naval standpoint:—

‘The Admiralty view the sustained and effective defence of Antwerp as
a matter of high consequence. It preserves the life of the Belgian
nation: it safeguards a strategic point which, if captured, would be
of the utmost menace.’

In order to save Antwerp, two things were necessary: first, effective defence of the fortress line; and second, free uninterrupted communication with the sea. The first was tolerably well provided for by the Belgian Army which could easily be reinforced by British Territorial troops. But the second essential, the free communication with the sea, was a larger matter, and in it were involved our relations with the Dutch. I proposed that we should request the Dutch Government to give a free passage up the Scheldt to Antwerp for whatever troops and supplies were needed. I pointed out further that it was impossible to try to supply an army at Antwerp by Ostend and Ghent; that the appeals which the Belgians were then making to us to send 25,000 troops to co-operate with an equal number of Belgian troops for the purpose of keeping open the line Antwerp-St. Nicholas-Ghent-Bruges-Ostend was a counsel of despair.

‘It involves practically a flank position for a line of supply
protected by forces large enough to be hit hard and perfectly
powerless against any determined German attack which it is thought
worth while to deliver. At any moment a punch up from Brussels by a
German division or larger force would rupture the line, and drive the
troops trying to hold it to be disarmed on neutral Dutch territory or
into the sea.’

I dwelt on the disadvantages to the Allies of a neutrality which kept the Rhine open for Germany and closed the Scheldt to Antwerp.

As these questions are still of some delicacy I have thought it better to summarise rather than reprint my memorandum. But I draw the reader’s attention to the date—September 7.

I still think that strong representations to the Dutch Government might well have induced them to grant this relief to Antwerp and the Belgian nation in their agony. The original guarantee of Belgian neutrality was given to the Government of the Netherlands, and it would have been a natural and legitimate demand that they should put no needless obstacle in the way of its fulfilment. The sympathies of Holland for the sufferings of Belgium were naturally restrained by the fear of sharing her fate. But a neutral Holland was of far more use to Germany than a hostile, a conquered, or even an allied Holland. Once Holland was attacked by or allied to Germany we could close the Rhine, and if we were in alliance with Holland, the Texel and other Dutch islands of enormous strategic importance would become available for the forward action of the British Navy. We should in fact have that oversea base without which a British naval offensive was impossible. I do not therefore believe that if Holland had agreed to open the Scheldt for the succour of Antwerp, Germany would have declared war upon her. There would have been a long argument about interpretations of neutrality in which the Germans, after their behaviour, would have started at a great disadvantage. I still think that if Holland could have said to Germany ‘the English are threatening us with a blockade of the Rhine if we do not open the Scheldt,’ Germany would have accepted the lesser of two evils.

The Foreign Secretary did not, however, feel able to put this grave issue to the Dutch Government. Neither did Lord Kitchener wish to use the British Territorial Divisions in the manner proposed, and while adhering to my own opinion I certainly do not blame him. He would not send any Territorials into Antwerp, nor was anything effective done by the Allies for the city during the whole of September. From the moment when German Main Headquarters had extricated and reformed their armies after the failure at the Marne, the capture of Antwerp became most urgently necessary to them. Accordingly on the afternoon of September 9, as is now known, the German Emperor was moved to order the capture of that city. Nothing was apparent to the Allies until the 28th. The Belgian and German troops remained in contact along the fortress line without any serious siege or assaulting operations developing. But on the 28th the Germans suddenly opened fire upon the forts of the Antwerp exterior lines with 17–inch howitzers hurling projectiles of over a ton.

Almost immediately the Belgian Government gave signs of justified alarm. British intelligence reports indicated that the Germans were seriously undertaking the siege of Antwerp, that their operations were not intended as a demonstration to keep the Belgian troops occupied or to protect the lines of communication. Information had come from Brussels that the Emperor had ordered the capture of the town, that this might cost thousands of lives, but that the order must be obeyed. Large bodies of German reserve troops were also reported assembling near Liége. In view of all these reports it was evident that the rôle of our small British force of marines, omnibuses, armoured cars, aeroplanes, etc., operating from Dunkirk was exhausted. They had no longer to deal with Uhlan patrols or raiding parties of the enemy. Large hostile forces were approaching the coastal area, and the imposture whereby we had remained in occupation of Lille and Tournai could be sustained no longer.

Lord Kitchener was disquieted by the opening of the bombardment upon the Antwerp forts. He immediately sent (on September 29) a staff officer, Colonel Dallas, into the city to report direct to him on the situation. On the evening of October 1 this officer reported that:—

‘The Belgian War Minister considered the situation very grave. Did not
think that resistance to the German attack could be maintained by
defensive measures only within the fortress. That the only way to save
Antwerp from falling was by a diversion from outside on the German
left flank. That the French had offered a division and that he looked
forward to co-operation by an English force also if that could be
arranged.’

The minister had also said

‘That a Belgian cavalry division and some volunteers, and possibly two
divisions of the Belgian Field Army would be able to assist in the
operation which would be most effective in the neighbourhood of
Ghent.’

The Commander of the Antwerp fortress also considered the situation grave, and while Colonel Dallas was with him a message arrived to say that Fort Ste. Catherine had fallen, that the German troops had pressed forward between it and the adjoining work, and had occupied the Belgian infantry trenches at this point.

Colonel Dallas further reported that according to the Belgian headquarters the German Army in Belgium comprised—‘Siege army, consisting of the 3rd Reserve Army Corps, 1 division of marines, 1 Ersatz reserve division, 1 brigade of _Landsturm_, 2 regiments of pioneers, 1 regiment of siege artillery.’ And that ‘The troops of the Military Government of Brussels consist of a weak _Landwehr_ brigade and some Bavarian _Landsturm_, number unknown.’

The Belgian Field Army was about 80,000 strong, in addition to which there were some 70,000 fortress troops. Four divisions of the Belgian Army were defending the southern portion of the outer perimeter of the Antwerp defences, with the 5th Division in reserve, and one weak division was at Termonde. A cavalry division of about 3,600 sabres was south-west of Termonde guarding communications between Antwerp and the coast. Ghent was held by some volunteers.

On the night of October 1, Sir F. Villiers reported that

‘On southern section of the outer line of forts German attacks
continued to-day, and in the afternoon the enemy’s troops disabled
fort Wavre, Ste. Catherine and adjoining works, and occupied Belgian
trenches at this point.’

The Belgian troops were, however, still holding out on the Belgian side of the River Nethe.

Lord Kitchener now showed himself strongly disposed to sustain the defence or effect the relief of Antwerp, and to use the regular forces he still had in England for this purpose, provided the French would co-operate effectively. Early in the afternoon of October 2 he moved Sir Edward Grey to send the following telegram to the British Ambassador at Bordeaux:—

‘The French Government should be informed that military advisers here
consider that in view of the superior forces Germany has in the field
there, the dispatch of a French Territorial division with the
additions proposed in ten days’ time, together with the force we are
prepared to send, would not be able effectively to force the Germans
to raise the siege of Antwerp.

‘Unless something more can be done they do not advise the dispatch of
the force. We are sending some heavy artillery with personnel to
assist Belgians.

‘Situation at Antwerp is very grave, and French Government will fully
realise the serious effect on the campaign that would be entailed by
its loss.

‘Unless the main situation in France can be decided favourably in a
short time, which would enable us to relieve Antwerp by detaching a
proper force, it is most desirable that General Joffre should make an
effort and send regular troops to region of Dunkirk, from which post
they could operate in conjunction with our reinforcements to relieve
Antwerp.

‘We can send some first-line troops, but not sufficient by themselves
to raise the siege of Antwerp, and we cannot send them to co-operate
with any but French regulars.

‘If General Joffre can bring about a decisively favourable action in
France in two or three days the relief of Antwerp may be made the
outcome of that, but if not, unless he now sends some regular troops
the loss of Antwerp must be contemplated.’

All he was able to send to Antwerp was the following:—

‘Be very careful not to raise hopes of British and French forces
arriving quickly to relieve Antwerp. The matter has not been decided,
as the Territorial division offered by France in ten days’ time would,
in my opinion, be quite incapable of doing anything towards changing
the situation at Antwerp. I have represented this. Unless a change is
made, I consider it would be useless to put in our little force
against the very superior German forces in the field round Antwerp.’

He then entered in some detail upon the few guns he was sending, giving particular directions about the use of the two 9·2’s.

Up to this point I had not been brought into the affair in any way. I read, of course, all the telegrams almost as soon as they were received or dispatched by Lord Kitchener, and followed the situation constantly. I warmly approved the efforts which Lord Kitchener was making to provide or obtain succour for Antwerp, and I shared to the full his anxieties. I saw him every day. But I had no personal responsibility, nor was I directly concerned. My impression at this time was that the situation at Antwerp was serious but not immediately critical; that the place would certainly hold out for a fortnight more; and that meanwhile Lord Kitchener’s exertions or the influence of the main battle in France would bring relief. So much was this the case that I proposed to be absent from the Admiralty for about eighteen hours on the 2nd–3rd October.

I had planned to visit Dunkirk on October 3 on business connected with the Marine Brigade and other details sent there at General Joffre’s request. At 11 o’clock on the night of the 2nd I was some twenty miles out of London on my way to Dover when the special train in which I was travelling suddenly stopped, and without explanation returned to Victoria Station. I was told on arrival I was to go immediately to Lord Kitchener’s house in Carlton Gardens. Here I found shortly before midnight besides Lord Kitchener, Sir Edward Grey, the First Sea Lord, and Sir William Tyrrell of the Foreign Office. They showed me the following telegram from our Minister, Sir Frederick Villiers, sent from Antwerp at 8.20 p.m. and received in London at 10 p.m. on October 2:—

The Government have decided to leave to-morrow for Ostend, acting on
advice unanimously given by Superior Council of War in presence of the
King. The King with field army will withdraw, commencing with advanced
guard to-morrow in the direction of Ghent to protect coast-line, and
eventually it is hoped to co-operate with the Allied armies. The Queen
will also leave.

It is said that town will hold out for five or six days, but it seems
most unlikely that when the Court and Government are gone resistance
will be so much prolonged.

Decision taken very suddenly this afternoon is result of increasingly
critical situation. I have seen both Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs, who maintain that no other course was possible, in
view of danger that the King’s Government and field army will be
caught here.

I saw that my colleagues had received this news, which they had already been discussing for half an hour, with consternation. The rapidity with which the situation had degenerated was utterly unexpected. That the great fortress and city of Antwerp with its triple line of forts and inundations, defended by the whole Belgian Field Army (a force certainly equal in numbers to all the German troops in that neighbourhood), should collapse in perhaps forty-eight hours seemed to all of us not only terrible but incomprehensible. That this should happen while preparations were in progress both in France and England for the relief or succour of the city, while considerable forces of fresh and good troops undoubtedly stood available on both sides of the Channel, and before General Joffre had even been able to reply to Lord Kitchener’s telegram, was too hard to bear. We looked at each other in bewilderment and distress. What could have happened in the last few hours to make the Belgians despair? Our last telegram from Colonel Dallas, received that afternoon, had said: ‘Situation unchanged during night and Germans have not made further progress. Great slaughter of Germans reported and corresponding encouragement to Belgians, who are about to undertake counter-attack in neighbourhood of Fort Ste. Catherine.’ And now a message at 10 p.m. announced immediate evacuation and impending fall!

Those who in years to come look back upon the first convulsions of this frightful epoch will find it easy with after knowledge and garnered experience to pass sagacious judgments on all that was done or left undone. There is always a strong case for doing nothing, especially for doing nothing yourself. But to the small group of Ministers who met that midnight in Lord Kitchener’s house, the duty of making sure that Antwerp was not cast away without good cause while the means of saving it might well be at hand was clear. I urged strongly that we should not give in without a struggle: and we decided unitedly upon the following telegram to Sir F. Villiers:—

_October 3, 1914_, 12.45 a.m.

The importance of Antwerp being held justifies a further effort till
the course of the main battle in France is determined. We are trying
to send you help from the main army, and, if this were possible, would
add reinforcements from here. Meanwhile a brigade of Marines will
reach you to-morrow to sustain the defence. We urge you to make one
further struggle to hold out. Even a few days may make the difference.
We hope Government will find it possible to remain and field army to
continue operations.

On the other hand, the danger of urging the Belgian Government to hold out against their considered judgment without a full knowledge of the local situation was present in every mind, and even if the forces for the relieving army were to come into view, there was much to be arranged and decided before precise dates and definite assurances could be given. We were confronted with the hard choice of having either to take decisions of far-reaching importance in the utmost haste and with imperfect information, or on the other hand tamely to let Antwerp fall.

In these circumstances, it was a natural decision that some one in authority who knew the general situation should travel swiftly into the city and there ascertain what could be done on either side. As I was already due at Dunkirk the next morning, the task was confided to me: Lord Kitchener expressed a decided wish that I should go; the First Sea Lord consented to accept sole responsibility in my absence. It was then about half-past one in the morning. I went at once to Victoria Station, got into my train which was waiting, and started again for Dover. A few minutes before I left, Lord Kitchener received the answer to his telegram of the 2nd from the British Ambassador in Bordeaux. Sir Francis Bertie said that before he could carry out the instructions sent him about Antwerp, he had received a letter from the French Foreign Minister stating that with the shortest delay possible two Territorial Divisions, complete with artillery and cavalry, would be sent to Ostend for the relief of the fortress. This was to be without prejudice to what the French Government expected to do very soon in respect of ‘a contemplated combined movement, French, British and Belgian, on the extreme left of General Joffre’s armies which indirectly would have the effect of causing German troops in the neighbourhood of Antwerp to retreat, and so effect its relief.’ The French Government, he said, could not go back on their decision to employ Territorials. The French Foreign Minister declared that the Territorials were good troops, better in some respects than some of the Regulars, and that they were sending two divisions complete, with artillery and cavalry, instead of one. Sir Francis Bertie added that the French Government had received reports from its Attaché in Antwerp stating that ‘though the military situation there was not good, it could not be regarded as really bad. The Germans had suffered severe losses in the attacks which they had made on some of the outer works. Those attacks had not been simultaneous, which fact indicated that the Germans were not in great force, had only a limited siege train and not more than two army corps before Antwerp.’

Meanwhile a telegram was also sent (1.15 a.m. October 3) by Sir Edward Grey to the Belgian Government saying that I would arrive on the morning of the 3rd.

‘It is hoped that the First Lord of the Admiralty, who is fully
acquainted with our views, may have the honour of an audience with the
King before a final decision as to the departure of the Government is
taken.’

On this the Belgian Council of War, sitting at dawn on the 3rd, suspended the order for the evacuation of the city.

‘I communicated at once with Minister of War,’ telegraphed Sir F.
Villiers, October 3, 6.37 a.m. ‘He summoned a meeting of Ministers,
who, after deliberation, informed me that, awaiting arrival of First
Lord they had decided to postpone departure. Audience with King for
Mr. Churchill will be arranged for at as early an hour as possible.’

* * * * *

Lord Kitchener now threw himself into the task of concentrating and organising a relieving Army. He telegraphed at 9.40 a.m. on October 3 asking the French War Minister to make all preparations to send the proposed two divisions with cavalry and artillery complete as soon as possible and to let him know how soon they could be dispatched. He was asked in reply whether he would prefer one Territorial Division with a complete brigade of _Fusiliers Marins_. He replied that he preferred the two divisions, and that the question of time was of the greatest importance and urgency. He was told, however, that it had been decided to send the _Fusiliers Marins_ after all. He replied that whichever was most convenient to the French should be sent, so long as it was sent with the least delay possible. He telegraphed to his Staff Officer in Antwerp, Colonel Dallas, at 2.15 p.m. October 3:—

‘What force in your opinion would suffice? Give full details of what
troops are most required to deal with the situation in co-operation
with the Belgian Field Army.

‘The French Government say they will send two divisions with full
complement of cavalry and artillery, but I do not yet know when they
will be available. If a corps of our troops, under Sir John French,
together with the 7th Division, and cavalry division from here, [were]
concentrated at Lille in order to attack the right flank of the main
German Army and drive it back, would this action, if accomplished in
about four or five days, in your opinion, relieve the situation at
Antwerp quickly enough to prevent the fall of the place, or must any
troops employed to relieve Antwerp be sent there via Zeebrugge, and,
if so, can you give me approximately the longest time we can have to
get troops there, so that I can inform the French Government?’

At 7.35 on the same afternoon the composition of the French contingent was received from the British Ambassador:—

‘87th Territorial Division from Havre, under General Roy, consisting
of 12 battalions of infantry, 2 groups of artillery (90–millimetre
guns), 2 squadrons of reserve cavalry (Dragoons), now being formed at
Dunkirk, 1 engineer company, headquarters and staff and usual services
attached to a division.

‘The Fusiliers Marins brigade, under command of Rear-Admiral Ronarc’h,
will be composed of two regiments of Fusiliers Marins (6,000), 86
mitrailleuses manned by seamen (260), 1 regiment of Zouaves (2,000).
Total of contingent about 23,000 men.

‘The Havre division will embark there on 5th October, and should be
landed at Dunkirk 7th October.

‘The Fusiliers Marins brigade will be sent to Dunkirk by land instead
of by sea. It will arrive at Dunkirk at about same time as the
Territorial division, namely, 7th October.’

* * * * *

I did not reach the city till after 3 p.m., and after consulting with Colonel Dallas I was visited by the Belgian Prime Minister. Monsieur de Broqueville was a man of exceptional vigour and clarity both of mind and speech. He had been called to the helm of the Belgian State at the moment of the decision not to submit to wrongful aggression. He explained to me the situation with precision. General de Guise, the commander of the fortress, added his comments. The outer forts were falling one by one. Five or six shells from the enormous German howitzers were sufficient to smash them to their foundations, to destroy their defenders even in the deepest casemates, and to wreck the platforms of the guns. Now the forts of the inner line were being similarly attacked, and there was no conceivable means of preventing their destruction one after another at the rate of about a fort a day. The army was tired and dispirited through having been left so long entirely upon its own resources without ever a sign of the Allies for whom they had risked so much. Material of every kind—guns, ammunition, searchlights, telephones, entrenching materials—was scanty. The water supply of the city had been cut off. There were many rumours of German sympathisers in its large population. At any moment the front might be broken in under the heavy artillery attack which was then in progress. But this was only half the danger. The life and honour of the Belgian nation did not depend on Antwerp, but on its army. To lose Antwerp was disastrous; to lose the army as well was fatal. The Scheldt was barred by a severe interpretation of neutrality. The only line of retreat was by a dangerous flank march parallel to the Dutch frontier and the sea-coast. Two Belgian divisions and the cavalry division were staving off the Germans from this only remaining line of retreat. But the pressure was increasing and the line of the Dendre was no longer intact. If Ghent fell before the Belgian Army made good its retreat, nothing would be saved from the ruin.

In these circumstances they had decided first to withdraw to what was called the entrenched camp on the left bank of the Scheldt, that is to say, towards their right; and, secondly, in the same direction through Ghent towards the left flank of the Allied armies. These orders had been suspended in consequence of the telegram from the British Government.

I then exposed Lord Kitchener’s plan and stated the numbers of the French and British troops already available for the assistance of the Belgian Army. I emphasised the importance of holding the city and delaying the Germans as long as possible without compromising the retreat of the army. I pointed out that the issue of the battle for the seaward flank still hung in the balance, and that the main armies were drawing nearer to Belgium every day. I asked whether the relieving forces mentioned, if actually sent, would influence their decision. They replied that this was a new situation; that had this help been forthcoming earlier, events might have taken a different course. Even now, if their line of retreat were safeguarded by the arrival of Allied troops in the neighbourhood of Ghent, they were prepared to continue the resistance. I thereupon drew up, with their approval and agreement, the following telegram to Lord Kitchener:—

_Antwerp, October 3, 1914_, 6.53 p.m. (_received_ 9.45 p.m.)

‘Subject to confirmation on both sides, I have made following
arrangement with M. de Broqueville, Prime Minister:—

‘Every preparation to be made by Belgian Government now for a
resistance of at least ten days, and every step taken with utmost
energy. Within three days we are to state definitely whether we can
launch big field operation for their relief or not, and when it will
probably take effect. If we cannot give them a satisfactory assurance
of substantial assistance within three days, they are to be quite free
to abandon defence if they think fit. In this case, should they wish
to clear out with field army, we (although not able to launch the big
operation) are to help their field army to get away by sending
covering troops to Ghent or other points on line of retreat. Thus,
anything they will have lost in time by going on defending Antwerp
with all their strength will be made up to them as far as possible by
help on their way out.

‘Further, we will meanwhile help their local defence in all minor
ways, such as guns, marines, naval brigades, etc.

‘I have put the terms high to avoid at all costs our undertaking
anything we could not perform, and also to avoid hurry in our saying
what troops we can spare for big operations. You will be able, as your
telegram No. 7 (to Colonel Dallas) indicates, to do much better than
this, and to give decided promise within three days, but the vital
thing is that Belgian Government and army should forthwith hurl
themselves with revived energy into the defence.

‘Attack is being harshly pressed at this moment, and half measures
would be useless, but Prime Minister informs me that they are
confident they can hold out for three days, pretty sure they can hold
out for six, and will try ten.

‘This arrangement, if adopted, will give time necessary for problem to
be solved calmly.

‘Two thousand marines are arriving this evening.

‘I am remaining here till to-morrow.

‘I have read this telegram to Belgian Prime Minister, who says that we
are in full agreement, subject to ratification by Council of Ministers
which is now being held.

‘If you clinch these propositions, pray give the following order to
the Admiralty: Send at once both naval brigades, minus recruits, via
Dunkirk, into Antwerp, with five days’ rations and 2,000,000 rounds of
ammunition, but without tents or much impedimenta.

‘When can they arrive?’

I had been met on arrival by Admiral Oliver, the Director of the Naval Intelligence Division. This officer had been sent by the Admiralty on September 29 to see what could be done to disable the large quantity of merchant shipping which lay in the Scheldt, so that if the city fell it could not be used by the Germans for embarking troops to invade England. He was a great stand-by in this time of stress. Night and day he laboured on the ships. With the assistance only of a Belgian sapper officer, four privates and a Belgian boy scout, he inserted explosive charges between the cylinders of thirty-eight large vessels, and by this means ruptured the propelling machinery so that not one of them was fit to go down the Scheldt during the whole of the German occupation.

While waiting for the reply from London that afternoon and also the next morning, I went out and examined the front: a leafy enclosed country, absolutely flat; a crescent of peering German kite balloons; a continuous bombardment; scarcely anything in the nature of an infantry attack; wearied and disheartened defenders. It was extremely difficult to get a clear view and so understand what kind of fighting was actually going on. We were, however, at length able to reach the actual inundations beyond which the enemy was posted. Entrenching here was impossible for either side, owing to the water met with at a foot’s depth. The Belgian pickets crouched behind bushes. There was at that moment no rifle fire, but many shells traversed the air overhead on their way to the Belgian lines.

Although the artillery fire of the Germans at Antwerp was at no time comparable to the great bombardments afterwards witnessed on the Western Front, it was certainly severe. The Belgian trenches were broad and shallow, and gave hardly any protection to their worn-out and in many cases inexperienced troops. As we walked back from the edge of these inundations along a stone-paved high road, it was a formidable sight to see on either hand the heavy shells bursting in salvoes of threes and fours with dense black smoke near or actually inside these scanty shelters in which the supporting troops were kneeling in fairly close order. Every prominent building—château, tower or windmill—was constantly under fire; shrapnel burst along the roadway, and half a mile to the left a wooded enclosure was speckled with white puffs. Two or three days at least would be required to make sound breastworks or properly constructed and drained trenches or rifle pits. Till then it must be mainly an affair of hedges and of houses; and the ineffective trenches were merely shell traps.

Antwerp presented a case, till the Great War unknown, of an attacking force marching methodically without regular siege operations through a permanent fortress line behind advancing curtains of artillery fire. Fort after fort was wrecked by the two or three monster howitzers; and line after line of shallow trenches was cleared by the fire of field guns. And following gingerly upon these iron footprints, German infantry, weak in numbers, raw in training, inferior in quality, wormed and waddled their way forward into ‘the second strongest fortress in Europe.’

As the fire of the German guns drew ever nearer to the city, and the shells began to fall each day upon new areas, the streams of country folk escaping from their ruined homes trickled pitifully along the roads, interspersed with stragglers and wounded. Antwerp itself preserved a singular calm. The sunlit streets were filled with people listening moodily to the distant firing. The famous spires and galleries of this ancient seat of wealth and culture, the spacious warehouses along the Scheldt, the splendid hotels ‘with every modern convenience,’ the general air of life, prosperity and civilisation created an impression of serene security wholly contradicted by the underlying facts. It was a city in a trance.

The Marines did not arrive until the morning of the 4th, and went immediately into the line. When I visited them the same evening they were already engaged with the Germans in the outskirts of Lierre. Here, for the first time, I saw German soldiers creeping forward from house to house or darting across the street. The Marines fired with machine-guns from a balcony. The flashes of the rifles and the streams of flame pulsating from the mouth of the machine-guns lit up a warlike scene amid crashing reverberations and the whistle of bullets.

Twenty minutes in a motor-car, and we were back in the warmth and light of one of the best hotels in Europe, with its perfectly appointed tables and attentive servants all proceeding as usual!

* * * * *

The reply of the British Government reached me on the morning of the 4th, and I sent it at once to Monsieur de Broqueville.

_Lord Kitchener to First Lord._

‘Am arranging Expeditionary Force for relief of Antwerp as follows:—

‘_British Force._

‘7th Division, 18,000 men, 63 guns, under General Capper. Cavalry
Division, 4,000 men, 12 guns, under General Byng, to arrive at
Zeebrugge 6th and 7th October. Naval detachment, 8,000 men already
there, under General Aston, also Naval and Military heavy guns and
detachments already sent. Head-quarter Staff will be subsequently
notified.

‘_French Force._

‘Territorial Division, 15,000 men, proper complement of guns and 2
squadrons, General Roy, to arrive Ostend 6th to 9th October. Fusilier
Marins Brigade, 8,000 men, under Rear-Admiral Ronarc’h. Grand total,
53,000 men. Numbers are approximately correct.’

Also one from Prince Louis, 10.30 a.m.:—

‘The Naval Brigades will embark at Dover at 4 p.m. for Dunkirk, where
they should arrive between 7 or 8 o’clock. Provisions and ammunition
as indicated in your telegram.’

Monsieur de Broqueville replied:—

_Anvers, le 4 octobre_, 1914n.

J’ai l’honneur de vous confirmer notre accord sur les points envisagés
tantôt.

Comme je vous l’ai dit dès notre première conversation, nous
entendons, coûte que coûte, conserver Anvers. C’est pour nous un
devoir national de premier ordre.

Je tiens à vous répéter aussi que, si nous avons été sérieusement
affectés de ne pas voir nos puissants garants répondre plus tôt à nos
demandes de secours, notre volonté de lutter jusqu’à la mort n’a pas
été affaiblie un seul instant. L’appui des 9,000 fusiliers de marine
envoyés par votre Gouvernement hier et demain est pour la conservation
de la place d’Anvers un appui précieux.

Plus précieux encore est l’envoi de la 7^e division, appuyée par la
3^e division de cavalerie.

Il serait d’extrême importance que ces troupes soient dirigées sur
Gand avec le maximum de célérité: les heures ont en ce moment une
exceptionnelle valeur.

Les hautes autorités militaires et le Gouvernement tout entier,
consultés par moi, acceptent avec une véritable satisfaction l’entente
qui s’est établie entre nous.

Le Gouvernement a appris avec un sentiment de véritable gratitude que,
s’il venait à être fait prisonnier, le Gouvernement de la
Grande-Bretagne ne traiterait pas sans son assentiment des questions
intéressant le sort de la Belgique au moment où se négociera la paix.

Je me félicite tout particulièrement des relations si sympathiques que
je viens d’avoir avec l’éminent homme d’Etat envoyé ici par la grande
nation si hautement appréciée et aimée par la Belgique.

The matter had now passed into the region of pure action. Could Antwerp resist the enemy’s attack long enough to enable the French and British relieving force to come to her aid? Secondly, if this succeeded, could nine or ten Allied divisions at Antwerp and Ghent hold the Germans in check until the left wing of the main armies, advancing daily from the south, could join hands with them? In that case the Allied lines in the west might be drawn through Antwerp, Ghent and Lille. All this turned on a few days, and even on a few hours.

Judged by the number of troops available on both sides, the chances of the Allies appeared good. On paper they were nearly twice as strong as the enemy. But the Belgian Army had been left without aid or comfort too long. The daily destruction of their trusted forts, the harsh and unceasing bombardment of a vastly superior artillery, their apprehensions for their line of retreat, the cruel losses and buffetings they had suffered since the beginning of the war, had destroyed their confidence and exhausted their strength.

The prime and vital need was to maintain the defence of Antwerp against the unceasing artillery attack to which its whole southern front was exposed. The position behind the river was capable of being made a strong one. It was, potentially, stronger in many respects than the line of the Yser, along which a fortnight later this same Belgian Army, in spite of further losses and discouragements, was to make a most stubborn and glorious defence. But despondency in the face of an apparently irresistible artillery, and the sense of isolation, struck a deadly chill.

Meanwhile, however, help was hurrying forward. The Marines were already in the line. Armoured trains with naval guns and British bluejackets came into action on the morning of the 4th. The two Naval Brigades reached Dunkirk that night, and were due to enter Antwerp on the evening of the 5th. At the special request of the Belgian Staff they were to be interspersed with Belgian divisions to impart the encouragement and assurance that succour was at hand.

The British 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division, carried daringly across the water upon personal orders from Prince Louis in the teeth of submarines, began to disembark at Ostend and Zeebrugge from the morning of the 6th onward. The French division was embarking at Havre. Admiral Ronarc’h and his 8,000 Fusiliers Marins were already entrained for Dunkirk. If only Antwerp could hold out....

Meanwhile, also, it must be remembered, Sir John French was secretly withdrawing the British Army from the Aisne and moving round behind the French front to the neighbourhood of St. Omer with the intention of striking at Lille and beating in the German right. Every day that large German forces were detained in front of Antwerp helped and covered the detrainment and deployment of his army and increased its chances of success. But every day became graver also the peril to the Belgian Army of being cut off if, after all, the Germans should be the victors in the main battle.

The anxieties and uncertainties of this tremendous situation had to be supported by the Belgian chiefs in addition to those of the actual German attack battering on the crumbling Antwerp front and its exhausted defenders. That they were borne with constancy and coolness, that the defence was prolonged for five momentous days, and that although the Antwerp front was broken in before effective help could arrive, the Belgian Field Army was safely extricated, was a memorable achievement.

The attitude of the King and Queen through these tense and tragic days was magnificent. The impression of the grave, calm soldier King presiding at Council, sustaining his troops and commanders, preserving an unconquerable majesty amid the ruin of his kingdom, will never pass from my mind.

Meanwhile Lord Kitchener and Prince Louis continued to give the necessary orders from London.

I now found myself suddenly, unexpectedly and deeply involved in a tremendous and hideously critical local situation which might well continue for some time. I had also assumed a very direct responsibility for exposing the city to bombardment and for bringing into it the inexperienced, partially equipped and partially trained battalions of the Royal Naval Division. I felt it my duty to see the matter through. On the other hand, it was not right to leave the Admiralty without an occupant. I therefore telegraphed on the 4th to the Prime Minister offering to take formal military charge of the British forces in Antwerp and tendering my resignation of the office of First Lord of the Admiralty. This offer was not accepted. I have since learned that Lord Kitchener wrote proposing that it should be. But other views prevailed: and I certainly have no reason for regret that they did so. I was informed that Sir Henry Rawlinson was being sent to the city and was requested to do my best until he arrived.

October 5 was a day of continuous fighting. The situation fluctuated from hour to hour. I print the telegrams of this day in their sequence:—

10.18 a.m., _October 5_.

I telegraphed to Lord Kitchener:—

‘Line of the Nethe is intact. Marine Brigade holding important sector
north-west of Lierre, has been briskly engaged during the night, with
about seventy casualties so far. It seems not unlikely that the German
attack will be directed on this point, as passage of river is easier
there. I am making sure that they are properly supported by detachment
of artillery. General Paris is doing very well.

‘Later. Infantry attack indicated now appears to be developing.’

12.22 p.m.

‘It is my duty to remain here and continue my direction of affairs
unless relieved by some person of consequence, in view of the
situation and developing German attack. Prospects will not be
unfavourable if we can hold out for next three days. We have a good
deal of ground to sell, if it is well disputed, even if Nethe River is
forced.’

4.45 p.m.

Lord Kitchener to First Lord:—

‘I expect Rawlinson will reach Antwerp to-day. It is most necessary
that Belgians should not give way before the forces now on the sea
arrive for their support. You know date of arrival of troops at Ostend
and Zeebrugge. I cannot accelerate anything owing to difficulties of
navigation. Prince Louis is doing all he can. Are any of the guns we
sent in action? Our 9·2 on line to Lierre ought to be useful. I hope
Belgians realise the importance of holding Termonde so that relieving
force may act promptly on the German left flank. The arrival of our
troops should be kept very secret; by moving at night a surprise might
be possible in the early morning.’

4.45 p.m.

First Lord to Lord Kitchener:—

‘Attack has been pressed. Marines have stood well, with some loss,
but, on their right, a regiment has fallen back under shell fire, and
some German infantry to west of Lierre are across Nethe. General Paris
has ordered four Belgian battalions and his reserve battalion to join
another Belgian brigade to drive them back and reoccupy positions.
This is now in progress. Every effort is being made to gain time. At 9
p.m. to-night I am to attend Council of Ministers. I can get no news
of time of arrival of naval brigades. They will be wanted to-morrow
for certain.’

7 p.m.

Lord Kitchener to First Lord:—

‘I hear the Marine Fusilier Brigade had not arrived as expected at
Dunkirk to-day by train. I have in consequence telegraphed to French
Government as follows:—

‘“As the Marine Fusilier Brigade is moving by train, and their arrival
at Antwerp is urgently required, please ask Minister of War to
continue their journey by train to Antwerp.”

‘You might, I think, inform Belgian authorities, so as to have
facilities for this force of 8,000 to proceed to wherever you think
they would be most usefully employed without stopping at Ostend, and
if they have not passed Dunkirk they might be warned of their
destination.’

6.46 p.m.

First Lord to Lord Kitchener:—

‘We now hold all our positions along the Nethe, our counter-attack
having been successful. Germans will probably throw bridges in night
at Lierre. On outskirts of Lierre we are in contact with Germans. I
have just returned from advanced trenches and find marines cheerful
and well dug in.

‘General Paris does not think that he has lost more than 150 men
killed and wounded.

‘I presume you keep Sir John French informed.’

7.15 p.m.

Admiralty to First Lord:—

‘Sir H. Rawlinson just leaving Dunkirk for Antwerp via Bruges, where
he stays to-night. Dunkirk reports naval brigades arrive Antwerp 1
a.m. Tuesday. First six transports, containing 10,000 troops, 2,000
horses, should arrive Zeebrugge from 4 a.m. onwards; 9,000 troops,
2,500 horses, arrive partly at Ostend, mainly at Zeebrugge, Wednesday
morning; 2,500 cavalry, 2,500 horses, arrive partly Ostend, partly
Zeebrugge, Thursday morning.’

8.45 p.m.

Lord Kitchener to Colonel Dallas:—

‘You have been appointed as General Staff Officer on Expeditionary
Force. Warn everybody to keep movement of troops absolutely secret.
Try and bring off a complete or partial surprise on enemy’s left; for
this purpose movements of troops from sea-coast should be as much as
possible at night. Am sending flying squadron, which will, I hope,
protect troops from too inquisitive enemy’s aircraft. Sir Henry
Rawlinson has been appointed to chief command and will shortly arrive
Antwerp.

‘All movements going as arranged.’

In the evening I went to General Paris’ Headquarters on the Lierre road for the purpose of putting him in command of the other two Naval Brigades about to arrive. The fire along this road was now heavier. Shrapnel burst overhead as I got out of the car and struck down a man at my feet. As we discussed around the cottage table, the whole house thudded and shook from minute to minute with the near explosions of shells whose flashes lit the window panes. In such circumstances was it that General Paris received from the representative of the Admiralty the command of the Royal Naval Division which he was destined to hold with so much honour until he fell grievously wounded in his trenches after three years’ war. This was the most important military command exercised in the great war by an officer of the Royal Marines.

The general result of the fighting on the 5th raised our hopes. The counter-attack by one British and nine Belgian battalions drove the enemy back. All the positions that had been lost were regained, and the line of the Nethe was almost re-established. At midnight at the Belgian headquarters General de Guise received in my presence by telephone a favourable report from every single sector. The enemy had, however, succeeded in maintaining a foothold across the river, and it seemed certain they would throw bridges in the night. General de Guise therefore resolved to make a further counter-attack under the cover of darkness in the hope of driving the enemy altogether across the river. At 1 a.m. I telegraphed as follows:—

_Antwerp, October 6_, 1 a.m.

First Lord to Lord Kitchener and Sir E. Grey:—

‘All well. All positions are held along the Nethe. I hope you will not
decide finally on plan of operations till I can give you my views. I
have met Ministers in Council, who resolved to fight it out here,
whatever happens.

‘No 9·2’s have arrived yet, even at Ostend.’

It was 2 o’clock before I went to bed. I had been moving, thinking and acting with very brief intervals for nearly four days in Council and at the front in circumstances of undefined but very direct responsibility. Certainly the situation seemed improved. The line of the Nethe was practically intact and the front unbroken. The Naval Brigades, already a day behind my hopes, were arriving in the morning. By land and sea troops were hastening forward. All the various personalities and powers were now looking the same way and working for the same object. France and Britain, the Admiralty and the War Office, the Belgian Government and the Belgian Command were all facing in the same direction. Rawlinson would arrive to-morrow, and my task would be concluded. But what would the morrow bring forth? I was now very tired, and slept soundly for some hours.

All through the night the fighting was continual, but no definite reports were available up till about 9 o’clock. At the Belgian Headquarters I was told that the Belgian night attack had miscarried, that the Germans were counter-attacking strongly, that the Belgian troops were very tired and the situation along the Nethe obscure. General Paris and the Marine Brigade were also heavily engaged. The Naval Brigades had arrived and detrained and were now marching to their assigned positions in the line. But where was the line? It was one thing to put these partially trained and ill-equipped troops into a trench line, and quite another to involve them in the manœuvres of a moving action. Solidly dug in with their rifles and plenty of ammunition, these ardent, determined men would not be easily dislodged. But they were not capable of manœuvre. It seemed to me that they should take up an intermediate position until we knew what was happening on the front. General Paris was involved in close fighting with his brigade, and had not been able to take over command of the whole force. It was necessary, therefore, for me to give personal directions. I motored to the Belgian Headquarters, told General de Guise that these new troops must have fixed positions to fight in, and would be wasted if flung in piecemeal. I proposed to stop them about four miles short of their original destination as a support and rallying line for the Belgian troops who were falling back. He agreed that this was wise and right, and I went myself to see that the orders were carried out.

The moment one left the city gates the streams of wounded and of fugitives betokened heavy and adverse fighting. Shells from the enemy’s field artillery were falling frequently on roads and villages which yesterday were beyond his range. We were by no means sure at what point the flow of refugees would end and the wave of pursuers begin. However, by about midday the three Naval and Marine Brigades were drawn up with the Belgian reserves astride of the Antwerp-Lierre road on the line Contich-Vremde.

In this position we awaited the next development and expected to be almost immediately attacked. The Germans to our relief did not molest the retirement of the three Belgian divisions. They waited to gather strength and to bring up and use again the remorseless artillery upon which they were mainly relying. As no German infantry appeared and no heavy bombardment began, the Naval Brigades moved forward in their turn and took up positions nearer to where the enemy had halted. I remained in the line on the Lierre road. Here at about 5 o’clock Sir Henry Rawlinson joined me.

The General took, as might be expected, a robust view of the situation, and was by no means disposed to give up the quarrel either on the Antwerp front or on the line of communications, which were already being more severely pressed. In fact I found in this officer, whom I had known for many years, that innate, instinctive revolt against acquiescing in the will of the enemy which is an invaluable quality in military men. These sentiments were also shared by Colonel Bridges, former British military attaché in Belgium, who had arrived from Sir John French. At 7 o’clock a Council of War was held in the Palace under the presidency of the King. We affirmed the readiness and ability of the British Government to execute punctually and fully the engagements into which we had entered two days earlier. But the Belgian chiefs were convinced that even if the Antwerp front along the line of the Nethe could be restored, the danger to their communications had become so great that they must without delay resume the movement of their army to the left bank of the Scheldt, which had been interrupted three days previously. Here they conceived themselves able to join hands with any Anglo-French relieving force while at the same time securing their own retreat on Ghent, which they had already on September 4 reinforced by a brigade. It was not for us to contest their view, and events have shown that they were right. The arrangements set out in the following telegram were made:—

_Antwerp, October 6_, 10.37 p.m.

First Lord to Lord Kitchener:—

‘Germans attacked our position along the Nethe early this morning.
Belgian troops on the right of Marine brigade were overpowered.
General retirement with some loss was effected to a lightly entrenched
position on the line Contich-Vremde, where enemy are not for the
moment pressing. Germans will be enabled to bombard city to-morrow
owing to lost ground. In view of this and of complete exhaustion and
imminent demoralisation of Belgian Army, Rawlinson, who has arrived,
has, with my full agreement and that of Belgian General Staff, ordered
a general retirement to inner line of forts. The three naval brigades
will hold intervals between forts and be supported by about a dozen
Belgian battalions. On this line, which is very strong against
infantry attack, our troops can certainly hold out as long as the city
will endure bombardment. Had naval brigades arrived 24 hours earlier,
we could probably have held line of the Nethe. They have not been
engaged, and marines have not lost more than 200 men.

‘This evening Rawlinson and I attended a council of war presided over
by the King. We suggested an attempt to re-establish Anglo-Belgian
forces on line of the Nethe by employing 7th Division in a
counter-attack in 48 hours’ time, but they had all clearly made up
their minds that their army was not in a fit condition to co-operate
in any offensive movement. Accordingly we have arranged with them:—

‘(1.) That while the town endures bombardment General Paris with naval
division and Belgian support will defend inner line forts to the
utmost.

‘(2.) That the rest of the Belgian Field Army shall be immediately
withdrawn across the Scheldt to what they call the entrenched camp of
the left bank. This area is protected by the Scheldt, various forts
and entrenchments, and large inundations, and here they hope to find
time to recover and reform. From this position they will aid to the
best of their ability any relieving movement which may be possible
from the west.

‘(3.) Rawlinson will organise relieving force at Ghent and Bruges and
prepare to move forward as soon as possible.

‘But I shall hope to-morrow to convince you that it should be
strengthened for the operation.

‘We are all agreed that in the circumstances there is no other course
open.

‘I return with Rawlinson to-night to Bruges, and early to-morrow
morning shall be in London.

‘Aviation park and heavy guns will be moved from Antwerp.’

General Rawlinson and I left the city together that night, and after an anxious drive over roads luckily infested by nothing worse than rumour, I boarded the _Attentive_ at Ostend and returned to England.

So far as the personal aspect of this story is concerned, I cannot feel that I deserve the reproaches and foolish fictions which have been so long freely and ignorantly heaped upon me. I could not foresee that the mission I undertook would keep me away from the Admiralty for more than forty-eight hours, or that I should find myself involved in another set of special responsibilities outside the duties of the office which I held. No doubt had I been ten years older, I should have hesitated long before accepting so unpromising a task. But the events occurred in the order I have described; and at each stage the action which I took seemed right, natural and even inevitable. Throughout I was held in the grip of emergencies and of realities which transcended considerations of praise or blame.[67]

But, after all, it is by the results and as a whole that the episode will be judged; and these as will be shown were certainly advantageous to the Allied cause.

After the departure of the Belgian Field Army the further defence of the remaining lines of Antwerp was left to the fortress troops, the 2nd Belgian Division, and the three British Naval Brigades, who held on their front the equivalent of more than five complete German divisions, to wit: the 5th Reserve, 6th Reserve, 4th Ersatz and Marine Division, and the 26th, 37th, and 1st Bavarian Landwehr Brigades.

At midnight on the 7th the Germans, having advanced their artillery, began to bombard the city and the forts of the inner line. The forts melted under the fire, and a great proportion of the civil population fled through the night, lighted by conflagrations, over the bridges of the Scheldt to the open country, along the roads towards Ghent or into Holland. The enemy’s attack was pressed continuously, and the enceinte of the city was considered to be untenable by the evening of the 8th. The Belgian Division and the British Naval Brigades evacuated Antwerp that night, crossed the Scheldt safely, and began their retreat by road and rail on Ghent and Ostend. Two naval airmen,[68] as a Parthian shot, blew up after long flights a Zeppelin in its shed at Düsseldorf and bombed the railway station at Cologne. German patrols, after many precautions, entered Antwerp towards evening on the 9th, and on the 10th the stouthearted Governor, who had retired to one of the surviving forts, capitulated.

The resistance of the city had been prolonged by five days.

* * * * *