Chapter XXVIII: Appendix: E (2)

_Princess Royal_, 328, 333, 428, 466–7, 481–5
Battle cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 26,350 tons. Speed 27
knots. Eight 13·5″, sixteen 4″ guns.

_Prince Eitel Friedrich_, 316
German armed merchant cruiser.

_Proserpine_, 543
Light cruiser. Launched 1896. Displacement 2,135 tons. Speed 20
knots. Eight 4″ guns.

Protectionist Movement, 20, 22

_Psyche_, 323–4
Light cruiser. Launched 1898. Displacement 2,200 tons. Speed 20
knots. Eight 4″ guns.

_Pyramus_, 323–4
Light cruiser. Launched 1897. Displacement 2,135 tons. Speed 20
knots. Eight 4″ guns.

_Queen Elizabeth_, 137, 140–1, 465, 545
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1913. Displacement 27,500 tons.
Speed 25 knots. Eight 15″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Queen Mary_, 141
Battle cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 27,000 tons. Speed 27
knots. Eight 13·5″, sixteen 4″ guns.

Rawlinson, Sir Henry, 303, 381–3, 386–8, 394

Reading, Lord, 291

Redmond, Mr., 191, 197

Reid, Sir Robert. See Loreburn, Earl

_Renown_, 495, 500
Battle cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement 26,500 tons. Speed 32
knots. Six 15″, seventeen 4″ guns.

_Repulse_, 495, 500
Battle cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement 26,500 tons. Speed 32
knots. Six 15″, seventeen 4″ guns.

_Requin_, 544
French battleship. Launched 1885. Displacement 7,200 tons. Speed 14
knots. Two 10·8″, six 3·9″ guns.

_Reshadieh_, 222
Turkish battleship building in Great Britain. Requisitioned for Royal
Navy. Renamed Erin. Launched 1913. Displacement 22,940 tons. Speed
21½ knots. Ten 13·5″, sixteen 6″ guns.

_Revenge_, 409, 492
(old.) (Renamed _Redoubtable_ later.) Battleship. Launched 1892.
Displacement 14,000 tons. Speed 17½ knots. Four 13·5″, ten 6″
guns.
(new.) Dreadnought Battleship. Launched 1915. Displacement 25,750
tons. Speed 23 knots. Eight 15″, fourteen 6″ guns.

_Rinaldo_, 407
Sloop. Launched 1901. Displacement 980 tons. Speed 13 knots. Six 4″
guns.

Ripon, Lord, 24

Roberts, Earl, 248–9, 360

Ronarc’h, Admiral, 371, 377, 379

_Roon_, 514
German cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement 9,350 tons. Speed 21
knots. Four 8·2″, ten 5·9″ guns.

Rosebery, Lord, and Anglo-French Agreement, 15

Rouvier, M., 26

Roy, General, 371, 377

Royal Fleet Reserve, 255

Royal Flying Corps, 336–7

Royal Naval Air Service, 336–7

Royal Naval Division, 306–7

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, 255

_Royalist_, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,500 tons. Speed 29
knots. Two 6 six 4″ guns.

Russian Army, 55, 298

Russo-Japanese War, 14, 23

— Influence of Russian defeat on German policy, 14

Saint-Seine, Comte de, 233

_Salamis_, 498
Greek battle cruiser building in Germany, 1914.

Salisbury, Marquess of, 10, 11, 21

Samoa, 321, 444–5

Samson, Commander, 340, 343–4, 398

Samuel, Sir Marcus, 108

_Sapphire_, 428
Light cruiser. Launched 1904. Displacement 3,000 tons. Speed 22
knots. Twelve 4″ guns.

Scapa Flow, 414, 425–6, 485–6, 505

Scarborough bombardment, 507–9, 520

_Scharnhorst_, 307–8, 313–4, 316–7, 320–4, 443, 445–69, 476–7, 483–4
German cruiser. Launched 1906. Displacement 11,420 tons. Speed 22½
knots. Eight 8·2″, six 5·9″ guns.

Scheer, Admiral, 261 (_note_), 332–4, 431, 504, 515

Scheldt, 361, 373

Schwab, Mr., 497–8

Seaplanes, 336–44

Serbia, 31, 204

_Severn_, 401
Monitor. Launched 1914. Displacement 1,250 tons. Speed 11½ knots. Two
6″, two 4·7″ guns.

_Shearwater_, 315
Canadian sloop. Launched 1901. Displacement 980 tons. Speed 13 knots.
Six 4″ guns.

Shells, weight of, 121–2

Slade, Admiral, 139

Smith, F. E. _See_ Birkenhead, Lord

Smith, Sir James M., 205 (_note_)

Smuts, General, 464, 544

Souchon, Admiral, 265, 269, 275, 536

South African War, 12, 20

_Southampton_, 517
Light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 5,400 tons. Speed 25½
knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Southborough, Lord, 108, 138

Spee, Admiral von, 317–9, 442, 455–8, 460–6, 473–7, 542

Spenser-Grey, Commander, 389 (_note_)

Spies, 49, 224

_Stettin_, 333
German light cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 3,396 tons. Speed
23½ knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

Stoddart, Admiral, 448, 452–5, 460–4, 462, 473

_Strassburg_, 333
German light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 4,500 tons. Speed
27 knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

Sturdee, Admiral, 438, 455, 462, 466, 472–5, 493–4

Submarine menace, 409, 413–41, 495–7

Sueter, Commodore, 340, 344

_Swift_, 143–5, 422
Destroyer leader. Launched 1907. Displacement 1,800 tons. Speed 35
knots. Four 4″ guns.

_Swiftsure_, 312–3, 542–3
Battleship. Launched 1903. Displacement 11,800 tons. Speed 19½ knots.
Four 10″, fourteen 7·5″ guns.

Swinton, Major, 300

_Sydney_, 314, 316–7, 320–4, 327, 468, 471–2, 542
Australian light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 5,400 tons.
Speed 25½ knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Talaat Bey, 523

Tanks, 344–5

Tariff Reform, 22

Tennyson-D’Eyncourt, Sir Eustace, 129

Tholens, Lieutenant, 333

Thomson, Graeme, 396

_Tiger_, 428, 465–6
Battle cruiser. Launched 1913. Displacement 28,000 tons. Speed 28
knots. Eight 13·5″, twelve 6″ guns.

Tirpitz, Admiral von, 33, 46, 66, 103, 111, 114, 117–8, 140, 188–91,
260, 263, 333, 515

Togo, Admiral, 86, 131

Toul demanded by Germany, 156, 218

Transport Department, 397–8

_Tribal_ class, 142

Triple Alliance, 7, 12, 16

_Triumph_, 219, 313–7
Battleship. Launched 1903. Displacement 11,800 tons. Speed 19½ knots.
Four 10″, fourteen 7·5″ guns.

Troubridge, Admiral, 120, 267, 269, 272–3

_Tsukuba_, 466
Japanese cruiser. Launched 1905. Displacement 13,750 tons. Speed 21
knots. Four 12″, twelve 6″, twelve 4·7″ guns.

Turkey enters the War, 522–51

Turkish alliance with Germany, 266, 539–40

Tweedmouth, Lord, 74

Tyrrell, Sir William, 210, 367

Tyrwhitt, Admiral, 148, 330–2, 349, 352, 404, 506

_Undaunted_, 402
Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,500 tons. Speed 29
knots. Two 6″, six 4″ guns.

Unionist Party supports Government, August, 1914, 215–6, 232

_Valiant_, 140–1
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1914. Displacement 27,500 tons.
Speed 25 knots. Eight 15″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Venerable_, 406–7
Battleship. Launched 1899. Displacement 15,000 tons. Speed 18 knots.
Four 12″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Vengeance_, 467, 493
Battleship. Launched 1899. Displacement 12,950 tons. Speed 18 knots.
Four 12″ twelve 6″ guns.

Venizelos, M., 529–30, 534, 538, 544

Verdun demanded by Germany, 156, 218

Villiers, Sir F., 364, 367, 370

Von der Marwitz, 359

Warrender, Sir George, 508–10, 512, 514–8

_Warrior_, 269, 467, 484, 542
Cruiser. Launched 1905. Displacement 13,550 tons. Speed 23 knots. Six
9·2″, four 7·5″ guns.

_Warspite_, 140–1
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1913. Displacement 27,500 tons.
Speed 25 knots. Eight 15″, twelve 6″ guns.

Watts, Sir Philip, 106, 129, 133, 144, 147

Webb, Captain, 427

Weddigen, Lieutenant, 352

Wemyss, Admiral, 527

Westminster, Duke of, 302

_Weymouth_, 313, 465, 407–8
Light cruiser. Launched 1910. Displacement 5,250 tons. Speed 24¾
knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Whitby bombardment, 520

White, Sir W., 108

_Wildfire_, 406–7
Sloop. Launched 1888. Displacement 1,140 tons. Speed 14 knots.

William, Crown Prince, 65

William, German Emperor, 11, 26, 33, 96, 98, 101, 104, 110–2, 216, 334

Wilmot, Sir E., 107

Wilson, Sir Arthur K., 78, 84–6, 146, 159, 437–9, 462, 481, 486, 488,
505, 510–2

—— character sketch, 78–81;
letter to Mr. Asquith refusing to undertake office of First Sea Lord
unless under Mr. Churchill, 85;
opposes creation of Naval War Staff, 81;
view of the British plan in event of war, 55

Wilson, Sir Henry, 50, 53, 55, 286

—— states his view of the German plan for attacking France, 53–5

Wyndham, George, 508

_Yahagi_, 466
Japanese light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 4,950 tons. Speed
26 knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Yarmouth, bombardment of, 479–81

_Yarmouth_, 314, 316–7, 323–4, 468, 542
Light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 5,250 tons. Speed 24¾
knots. Eight 6″ guns.

_Yashima_, Japanese battleship, loss of, 430

Yeomanry Cavalry, 347

Ypres, 411

Zanzibar, 11

_Zélée_, 316, 445
French gunboat. Launched 1899. Displacement 554 tons. Speed 13 knots.
Two 3·9″, four 2·5″ guns.

_Zemchug_, 308, 314, 323
Russian light cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement 3,130 tons. Speed
23 knots. Eight 4·7″ guns.

Zeppelins, 337–40, 400

-----

Footnote 1:

Prince Henckel von Donnesmarck.

Footnote 2:

Von Tirpitz’s account is quite direct. “At his [von
Kiderlen-Wächter’s] suggestion the Chancellor dispatched the gunboat
_Panther_ to the Moroccan port Agadir on July 1, 1911, and left the
British Government, when it asked the reason, completely in the dark
and without a reply for many weeks. The result was that on July 21
Lloyd George delivered a speech which had been drawn up in the British
Cabinet, in which he warned Germany that she would find British power
on the side of France in the event of a challenge.”

Footnote 3:

The work had been begun by Lieutenant-Colonel Adrian Grant-Duff,
afterwards killed on the Aisne.

Footnote 4:

The italics are mine.

Footnote 5:

The close blockade of the German ports was prescribed in the war
orders of 1909, during Lord Fisher’s term of office. Sir Arthur Wilson
did not reveal any modification, which he had made in consequence of
new conditions to anyone.

Footnote 6:

Sir Charles Ottley: at that time Secretary to the Committee of
Imperial Defence.

Footnote 7:

The memorandum abridged can be read in Appendix A.

Footnote 8:

Admiral Mahan.

Footnote 9:

Sir Julian Corbett.

Footnote 10:

_Reflections on the World War_, v. Bethmann-Hollweg, p. 48.

Footnote 11:

It was not in fact completed till August, 1914.

Footnote 12:

By later decision a Squadron of British Battle-cruisers was stationed
in the Mediterranean.

Footnote 13:

i.e. The Entente.

Footnote 14:

The final published text of the law provided for 72.

Footnote 15:

Sir Francis Hopwood, now Lord Southborough, the Additional Civil Lord.

Footnote 16:

A doubtful gem! They could have coaled only in a few ports with
special appliances.

Footnote 17:

This is the biggest gun which can be completely worked by hand, the
shot being lifted by a single man.

Footnote 18:

_Lion, Tiger, Queen Mary, Princess Royal._

Footnote 19:

Contrary to common opinion and, as many will think, to the proved
lessons of the war, I do not believe in the wisdom of the
Battle-Cruiser type. If it is worth while to spend far more than the
price of your best battleship upon a fast heavily-gunned vessel, it is
better at the same time to give it the heaviest armour as well. You
then have a ship which may indeed cost half as much again as a
battleship but which at any rate can do everything. To put the value
of a first-class battleship into a vessel which cannot stand the
pounding of a heavy action is false policy. It is far better to spend
the extra money and have what you really want. The battle-cruiser in
other words should be superseded by the fast battleship, i.e. fast
strongest ship, in spite of her cost.—W.S.C.

Footnote 20:

The Third Sea Lord.

Footnote 21:

Director of Admiralty Contracts.

Footnote 22:

An approximate estimate of the return obtained by His Majesty’s
Government on their original investment of £2,200,000, in the
Anglo-Persian Oil Co., Ltd.:

(1) The original Government investment of £2,200,000 in £1
Ordinary Shares has become one of 5 million shares, and
the appreciation in value of these at current prices
represent approximately some £16,000,000

(2) The Government has received in dividends, interest,
Income Tax, Excess Profits, Duty and Corporation Tax,
over 6,500,000

(3) The supply contract has enabled the Government
Departments to save on the purchase price of oil as
compared with current prices, about 7,500,000

(4) It may also be claimed that the prices of oil supplied
by other companies have been brought down by the
competition of the Anglo-Persian Company, though to what
extent must be a matter of opinion: and further, that the
saving on oil prices under the supply contract may be
expected to continue throughout the currency of the
contract. It would not be unfair to estimate the effect
of the last two factors at an additional 10,000,000
———————————
Total £40,000,000

Footnote 23:

Actually four.

Footnote 24:

_Kiel and Jutland_, by Commander George von Hase.

Footnote 25:

Rear-Admiral Briggs was at this time Controller or Third Sea Lord.

Footnote 26:

No one can form any idea of the difficulties the Admiralty encountered
in securing adequate defences for Eastern harbours. Coast Defence was
in the province of the War Office and paid for on their estimates.
They needed every penny for their Field Army and Expeditionary Force,
and naturally marshalled all their experts against expenditure on
fortifications in Great Britain. In consequence expert opinion was
always divided. The discussions evaporated in technicalities, and the
lay members of the Committee were rarely convinced of the unwelcome
need of spending money. To such a point was the dispute carried, that
Prince Louis and I undertook in desperation to fortify Cromarty
ourselves, arm it with naval guns and man it with marines. And this
was the only new work completed when the war broke out.

Footnote 27:

Mr. Marsh and Mr. (now Sir James) Masterton Smith.

Footnote 28:

I have inconsistently adopted the familiar spelling of this ship’s
name instead of _Göben_.

Footnote 29:

Later in the morning I learnt that Lord Fisher was in the office and I
invited him into my room. I told him what we had done and his delight
was wonderful to see.

Foolish statements have been made from time to time that this sending
of the Fleet to the North was done at Lord Fisher’s suggestion. The
interview with me which Lord Fisher records in his book is correctly
given by him as having taken place on the 30th. The Fleet had actually
passed the Straits of Dover the night before. I think it necessary to
place on record the fact that my sole naval adviser on every measure
taken prior to the declaration of war was the First Sea Lord.

Footnote 30:

Now Lord Birkenhead.

Footnote 31:

Dryden, _Threnodia Augustalis_.

Footnote 32:

The minute constituting the Division is printed in Appendix A.

Footnote 33:

Appendix B.

Footnote 34:

Admiral Scheer, p. 13.

Footnote 35:

Appendix C. I hope it may be read.—W. S. C.

Footnote 36:

See map to face p. 274.

Footnote 37:

_The Flight of the Goeben_, Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne.

Footnote 38:

See Official Naval History, pp. 60, 61.

Footnote 39:

At the Falklands the two British battle cruisers used up nearly
three-quarters of their ammunition to sink only two weaker
antagonists, using 12–inch guns against 8·8–inch. The _Goeben_
single-handed would have had to have sunk four, using 11–inch guns
against 9·2–inch.

Footnote 40:

The italics are mine.—W. S. C.

Footnote 41:

General Lanrezac—‘_Le plan de Campagne Français_,’ p. 110.

Footnote 42:

General von Kluck—‘_The March on Paris_,’ p. 38.

Footnote 43:

Committee of Imperial Defence.

Footnote 44:

The Fourth Division (the Fifth to go).

Footnote 45:

The Fourth Division (fifth in order of embarkation) arrived on the
field at the beginning of the battle of Le Cateau.

Footnote 46:

Actually called the 6th Army.

Footnote 47:

In fact, however, it was the 1st Middlesex (19th Infantry Brigade
attached to 4th Division), who captured the guns at Néry, the Guards
being miles away at Villers Cotterets.

Footnote 48:

The italics are new.

Footnote 49:

The Third German Army took Rheims and were bombarded in the town by
the Second Army.

Footnote 50:

Official History Appendix 22, p. 473.

Footnote 51:

The correspondence on this subject is printed in the Official History
of the War, Appendix 22, p. 471.

Footnote 52:

See map to face p. 328.

Footnote 53:

See Appendix.

Footnote 54:

The old battleships in question were actually “Canopuses”—the class
above “Majestics.”

Footnote 55:

The underlining denotes approximately the comparative values of the
units.

Footnote 56:

Only those ships of the Japanese Navy who took part in the operations
are included.

Footnote 57:

_Encounter_ went instead of _Melbourne_.

Footnote 58:

They went without escort and without mishap.

Footnote 59:

Admiral Scheer, p. 52.

Footnote 60:

_See also_ Appendix.

Footnote 61:

Dupont, ‘Haut Commandment Allemand en 1914,’ p. 92.

Footnote 62:

The Naval torpedo school centre.

Footnote 63:

The first design of the Tank made at my request by Admiral Bacon in
September, 1914, carried a bridge in front which it dropped on
arriving at a trench, passed over, and automatically raised behind it.

Footnote 64:

An officer of the General Staff who had been attached, at my request
in 1913, to the Admiralty War Staff in order to promote an effective
_liaison_ between the two staffs. This very gifted officer rendered us
invaluable service. He died prematurely after the hardships of the
war, throughout the whole of which he served with distinction in
situations of responsibility and danger.

Footnote 65:

Mr. Thomas Gibson Bowles.

Footnote 66:

‘The loss on September 22,’ wrote Mr. Gibson Bowles, ‘of the
_Aboukir_, the _Cressy_ and the _Hogue_, with 1,459 officers and men
killed, occurred because, despite the warnings of admirals, commodores
and captains, Mr. Churchill refused, until it was too late, to recall
them from a patrol so carried on as to make them certain to fall
victims to the torpedoes of an active enemy.’

Footnote 67:

But see Lord Esher: ‘One night he (Kitchener) was in bed asleep, when
Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, bursting into the
room, pleaded for the War Minister’s permission to leave at once for
Antwerp. In spite of the late hour, Sir Edward Grey arrived in the
middle of the discussion, and while he was engaging Lord Kitchener’s
attention, Mr. Churchill slipped away. He was next heard of when a
telegram from Antwerp was put into Lord K.’s hands, in which his
impetuous colleague asked bravely to be allowed to resign his great
office, to be given command of a Naval Brigade, and pleading that
reinforcements should be hurried out to those “forlorn and lonely
men,” as he called them, who were vainly trying to hold on to the
Antwerp lines. Lord K. was not upset, but he was not unmoved,
etc....’—_The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener_, p. 67.

It is remarkable that Lord Esher should be so much astray; for during
the war I showed him the text of the telegrams printed in this chapter
and now made public for the first time. We must conclude that an
uncontrollable fondness forbade him to forsake fiction for fact. Such
constancy is a defect in an historian.

W. S. C.

Footnote 68:

Commanders Marix and Spenser-Grey.

Footnote 69:

It was perhaps an unconscious recognition of the naval significance of
Antwerp that all three great Powers—Germany, France and Britain—used
in its attack and defence Naval Brigades formed since the outbreak of
war.

Footnote 70:

Rawlinson’s Force was so styled.

Footnote 71:

The heavy losses of the 7th Division have often been attributed to
their attempt to relieve Antwerp. In fact, however, these losses did
not begin until after they had joined the main army.

Footnote 72:

i.e. The absence of a greater French effort.

Footnote 73:

A battleship.

Footnote 74:

A curious coincidence or foreboding. Almost at that moment the
_Audacious_ was moving to her doom.

Footnote 75:

War Office.

Footnote 76:

This will be discussed in the second volume. The alternatives are here
only mentioned to explain the context.

Footnote 77:

This energetic and practical officer, whom I had employed during the
previous eighteen months to supervise the fortification of Cromarty,
had already designed a type of anti-submarine boom which he was
actually installing at Cromarty.

Footnote 78:

I have slightly abridged this minute.

Footnote 79:

_October 28, 1914._

DEAR MR. CHURCHILL,—

I have lately been driven to the painful conclusion that at this
juncture my birth and parentage have the effect of impairing in some
respects my usefulness on the Board of Admiralty. In these
circumstances I feel it to be my duty, as a loyal subject of His
Majesty, to resign the office of First Sea Lord, hoping thereby to
facilitate the task of the administration of the great Service, to
which I have devoted my life, and to ease the burden laid on H.M.
Ministers.

I am,
Yours very truly,
LOUIS BATTENBERG,
_Admiral_.

_October 29, 1914._

MY DEAR PRINCE LOUIS,—

This is no ordinary war, but a struggle between nations for life or
death. It raises passions between races of the most terrible kind.
It effaces the old landmarks and frontiers of our civilisation. I
cannot further oppose the wish, you have during the last few weeks
expressed to me, to be released from the burden of responsibility
which you have borne thus far with so much honour and success.

The anxieties and toils which rest upon the naval administration of
our country are in themselves enough to try a man’s spirit; and when
to them are added the ineradicable difficulties of which you speak,
I could not at this juncture in fairness ask you to support them.

The Navy of to-day, and still more the Navy of to-morrow, bears the
imprint of your work. The enormous impending influx of capital
ships, the score of thirty-knot cruisers, the destroyers and
submarines unequalled in modern construction which are coming now to
hand, are the results of labours which we have had in common, and in
which the Board of Admiralty owes so much to your aid.

The first step which secured the timely concentration of the Fleet
was taken by you.

I must express publicly my deep indebtedness to you, and the pain I
feel at the severance of our three years’ official association. In
all the circumstances you are right in your decision. The spirit in
which you have acted is the same in which Prince Maurice of
Battenberg has given his life to our cause and in which your gallant
son is now serving in the Fleet.

I beg you to accept my profound respect and that of our colleagues
on the Board.

I remain,
Yours very sincerely,
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

Footnote 80:

Throughout this chapter the map facing page 476 and the table of ships
on page 478 will be found useful.

Footnote 81:

The rocks of Abrolhos off the Brazilian Coast were our secret coaling
base in these waters.

Footnote 82:

Details relating to colliers, supply ships and mails have been
omitted, unless of significance to the account.

Footnote 83:

The table of ships on page 478 will be found useful.

Footnote 84:

_Official History of the War: Naval Operations_, Vol. I, p. 344.

Footnote 85:

All the ships in small capitals fought eventually in the battle of the
Falkland Islands.

Footnote 86:

Here the reader should certainly look at the map facing page 476,
which deals directly with this situation.

Footnote 87:

All the above telegrams had to be sent by various routes and most were
repeated by several routes, as of course we could not communicate
direct across these great distances. But I omit the procedure to
simplify the account.

Footnote 88:

See opposite page 474.

Footnote 89:

Only _Dreadnoughts_ had tripods.

Footnote 90:

_The Grand Fleet_, by Sir John Jellicoe, p. 31.

Footnote 91:

_See_ Appendix D., p. 566.

Footnote 92:

I was in France for thirty-six hours.—W. S. C.

Footnote 93:

Battle cruiser.

Footnote 94:

Appendix E.

Footnote 95:

Two had had to be removed from each of the five ‘Queen Elizabeths,’
owing to spray interference.

Footnote 96:

See map to face page 518.

Footnote 97:

i.e. about 80 miles West of Heligoland.

Footnote 98:

It must be explained that in these days the wireless communication
with destroyers and still more submarines was not as perfect as it
became later on. The _Firedrake_ had therefore been stationed in the
morning midway between the submarines and Harwich to pass on messages.
She had late in the afternoon, after the orders to take the submarines
into the Bight had reached her, rejoined Commodore Keyes and the link
was, for the time being, broken.

Footnote 99:

The whole of this operation is described in minute detail in the
official British Naval History, and should be studied with the
excellent charts by those who are interested in its technical aspect.
So complicated is the full story that the lay reader cannot see the
wood for the trees. I have endeavoured to render intelligible the
broad effects.—W.S.C.

Footnote 100:

See map to face page 518, ‘The Dawn Situation.’

Footnote 101:

See map facing this page, ‘The Noon Situation.’

Footnote 102:

The _Dresden_ and two armed merchant cruisers were alive for a few
weeks more, but in complete inactivity.

Footnote 103:

In peace.

Footnote 104:

In war.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

1. P. 50, changed “Tirah Expedition in 1988” to “Tirah Expedition in 1898”. 2. P. 517, changed “out Light Cruiser Squadron” to “our Light Cruiser Squadron”. 3. Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in spelling. 4. Retained anachronistic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed. 5. Footnotes have been re-indexed using numbers and collected together at the end of the last chapter. 6. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_. 7. Enclosed bold font in =equals=. 8. Superscripts are denoted by a caret before a single superscript character, e.g. M^r. 10. P. 24, changed “The result of the polls in January, 1906, was a Conservative landslide” to “The result of the polls in January, 1906, was a Liberal landslide”.