Chapter V

THE GERMAN NAVY LAW
1912

‘The young disease, that must subdue at length,
Grows with his growth, and strengthens with his strength.’
POPE, _Essay on Man_.

The Morrow of Agadir—Mission of Sir Ernest Cassel—The New German
Navy Law—The Haldane Visit to Berlin—An Imperial Mare’s
Nest—The Opening of the Reichstag—A Speech at Glasgow—The
_Luxus Flotte_—Mr. Haldane Returns—Attempt to reach a
Settlement—Correspondence with Lord Fisher—Fisher’s
Vision—The Navy Estimates—The Naval Holiday—Efforts at
Goodwill—Consequences of German Naval Power—Von Tirpitz’
Illusions—Anglo-French Naval Conversations—The Entente
strengthened—Von Tirpitz’ Unwisdom—Organisation of the
Navy—The New Structure—With the Fleet—The _Enchantress_ in
Portland Harbour—The Safeguard of Freedom.

I have shown how forward the Chancellor of the Exchequer was during the crisis of Agadir in every matter that could add to the strength of the British attitude. But as soon as the danger was passed he adopted a different demeanour. He felt that an effort should be made to heal any smart from which Germany might be suffering, and to arrive at a common understanding on naval strength. We knew that a formidable new Navy Law was in preparation and would shortly be declared. If Germany had definitely made up her mind to antagonise Great Britain, we must take up the challenge; but it might be possible by friendly, sincere and intimate conversation to avert this perilous development. We were no enemies to German Colonial expansion, and we would even have taken active steps to further her wishes in this respect. Surely something could be done to break the chain of blind causation. If aiding Germany in the Colonial sphere was a means of procuring a stable situation, it was a price we were well prepared to pay. I was in full accord with this view. Apart from wider reasons, I felt I should be all the stronger in asking the Cabinet and the House of Commons for the necessary monies, if I could go hand in hand with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and testify that we had tried our best to secure a mitigation of the naval rivalry and failed. We therefore jointly consulted Sir Edward Grey, and then with the Prime Minister’s concurrence we invited Sir Ernest Cassel to go to Berlin and get into direct touch with the Emperor. Sir Ernest was qualified for this task, as he knew the Emperor well and was at the same time devoted to British interests. We armed him with a brief but pregnant memorandum, which cannot be more tersely summarized than in von Bethmann-Hollweg’s own words[10]: ‘Acceptance of English superiority at sea—no augmentation of the German naval programme—a reduction as far as possible of that programme—and on the part of England, no impediment to our Colonial expansion—discussion and promotion of our Colonial ambitions—proposals for mutual declarations that the two Powers would not take part in aggressive plans or combinations against one another.’ Cassel accepted the charge and started at once. He remained only two days in Berlin and came at once to me on his return. He brought with him a cordial letter from the Emperor and a fairly full statement by von Bethmann-Hollweg of the new German Navy Law. We devoured this invaluable document all night long in the Admiralty, and in the morning I wrote as follows to Sir Edward Grey:—

_January 31, 1912._

Cassel returned last night, having travelled continuously from Berlin.
At 10 a.m. on Monday he saw Ballin, who went forthwith to the German
Chancellor, and in the afternoon he saw Ballin, Bethmann-Hollweg and
the Emperor together. They all appeared deeply pleased by the
overture. Bethmann-Hollweg, earnest and cordial, the Emperor
‘enchanted, almost childishly so.’ The Emperor talked a great deal on
naval matters to Cassel, the details of which he was unable to follow.
After much consultation the Emperor wrote out with Bethmann-Hollweg
paper, ‘A,’ which Ballin transcribed. The second paper, ‘B,’ is
Bethmann-Hollweg’s statement of the impending naval increases,
translated by Cassel. Cassel says they did not seem to know what they
wanted in regard to colonies. They did not seem to be greatly
concerned about expansion. ‘There were ten large companies in Berlin
importing labour _into_ Germany.’ Over-population was not their
problem. They were delighted with Cassel’s rough notes of our ideas.
They are most anxious to hear from us soon....

Such is my report.

OBSERVATIONS.

It seems certain that the new Navy Law will be presented to the
Reichstag, and that it will be agreed to, even the Socialists not
resisting. The naval increases are serious, and will require new and
vigorous measures on our part. The spirit may be good, but the facts
are grim. I had been thinking that if the old German programme had
been adhered to, we should have built 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, against their
six years’ programme of 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2. If their new programme
stands, as I fear it must, and they build 3, 2, 3, 2, 3, 2, we cannot
build less than 5, 4, 5, 4, 5, 4. This maintains 60 per cent.
superiority in Dreadnoughts and Dreadnought Cruisers over Germany
only. It will also be 2 keels to 1 on their additional 3 ships.

The creation of a third squadron in full commission is also a serious
and formidable provision. At present, owing to the fact that in the
six winter months the first and second squadrons of the High Sea Fleet
are congested with recruits, there is a great relief to us from the
strain to which we are put by German naval power. The addition of the
third squadron will make that strain continual throughout the year.
The maintenance in full commission of 25 battleships, which after the
next four or five years will all be Dreadnoughts, exposes us to
constant danger, only to be warded off by vigilance approximating to
war conditions. A further assurance against attack is at present found
in the fact that several of the German Dreadnoughts are very often the
wrong side of the Kiel Canal, which they cannot pass through and must
therefore make a long _détour_. The deepening of the Canal by 1913
will extinguish this safety signal.[11] The fact that the defenders
are always liable to be attacked while only at their ordinary average
strength by an enemy at his selected moment and consequent maximum
strength, means that our margins would have to be very large. Against
25 battleships we could not keep less than 40 available within
twenty-four hours. This will involve additional expense.

The German increase in personnel must also be met. I had intended to
ask Parliament for 2,000 more men this year and 2,000 next. I expect
to have to double these quotas. On the whole the addition to our
estimates consequent upon German increases will not be less than three
millions a year. This is certainly not dropping the naval challenge.

I agree with you that caution is necessary. In order to meet the new
German squadron, we are contemplating bringing home the Mediterranean
battleships. This means relying on France in the Mediterranean,[12]
and certainly no exchange of system[13] would be possible, even if
desired by you.

The only chance I see is roughly this. They will announce their new
programme, and we will make an immediate and effective reply. Then if
they care to slow down the ‘tempo’ so that their Fleet Law is
accomplished in twelve and not in six years, friendly relations would
ensue, and we, though I should be reluctant to bargain about it, could
slow down too. All they would have to do, would be to make their
quotas biennial instead of annual. Nothing would be deranged in their
plan. Twelve years of tranquillity would be assured in naval policy.
The attempt ought to be made.

We laid these matters before the Cabinet, who decided that a British Cabinet Minister should go to Berlin and selected Mr. Haldane for that purpose. The ex-Emperor in his Memoirs makes a ridiculous story out of this:—

‘... a keen dispute had arisen among Ministers—especially between
Churchill and Grey—as to who should go to Berlin, in the event of the
achievement of the object of making Germany abandon the further
development of her fleet, and affix his name to this great historical
document. Churchill considered himself the right man for the job,
seeing that he was the head of the Navy, but Grey and Asquith would
not allow their colleague to reap the glory. Thus for a time, Grey
stood in the foreground—another proof that some political purpose
rather than the number of ships was the leading factor. After a while,
however, it was decided that it was more fitting to Grey’s personal
and official importance that he should appear only at the termination
of the negotiations, to affix his name to the agreement, and ... “to
get his dinner from the Emperor and to come in for his part of the
festivities and fireworks,” which, in good German, means to enjoy the
“Bengal light illumination.” As it had been decided that in any event
Churchill was not to get this, it was necessary to choose somebody for
the negotiations who was in close accord with Asquith and Grey and
who, possessing their complete confidence, was willing to conduct the
negotiations as far as the beginning of the “fireworks”; one,
moreover, who was already known at Berlin and not a stranger to
Germany. Churchill certainly qualified to this extent, for he had
attended the Imperial manœuvres in Silesia and Wurtemberg on several
occasions as a guest of the Emperor.’

On this it may be observed that there never was any question of my going to Berlin to negotiate about the Navy; nor did I at this time wish to go. All the British ministers concerned worked together in the utmost accord. After full discussions we authorized Sir Ernest Cassel to send the following telegram:—

_Sir E. Cassel to Herr Ballin (drafted by Sir E. Cassel, the First
Lord, Mr. Haldane, Sir Edward Grey)._

_February 3, 1912._

Spirit in which statements of German Government have been made is most
cordially appreciated here. New German programme would entail serious
and immediate increase of British naval expenditure which was based on
assumption that existing German naval programme would be adhered to.

If the British Government are compelled to make such increase, it
would make negotiations difficult if not impossible.

If, on the other hand, German naval expenditure can be adapted by an
alteration of the tempo or otherwise so as to render any serious
increase unnecessary to meet German programme, British Government will
be prepared at once to pursue negotiations on the understanding that
the point of naval expenditure is open to discussion and that there is
a fair prospect of settling it favourably.

If this understanding is acceptable, the British Government will
forthwith suggest the next step, as they think that the visit of a
British Minister to Berlin should in the first instance be private and
unofficial.

All being acceptable, the Secretary of State for War accompanied by Sir Ernest Cassel, started accordingly on February 6 for Berlin.

I had undertaken some weeks earlier to make a speech in support of the Home Rule Bill in Belfast. Violent hostility to this project developed in the inflammable capital of Ulster. Being publicly committed, I had no choice but to fulfil my engagement, though to avoid unnecessary provocation the meeting-place was changed from the Ulster Hall to a large tent which was erected in the outskirts of the city. Threats of violence and riot were loudly proclaimed on every side and nearly 10,000 troops were concentrated in the area to keep the peace. I had planned, if all went well at Belfast, to go on the next day to Glasgow to inspect some of the shipbuilding works along the Clyde, and to make a speech on the Naval position, which should state very plainly our root intentions and be the necessary counterpart of the Haldane mission. As I was waiting for the train for Ireland to leave the London railway station, I read in the late edition of the evening papers the German Emperor’s speech on the opening of the Reichstag announcing Bills for the increase both of the Army and the Navy. The new Navy Law was still a secret to the British and German nations alike, but knowing as I did its scope and character and viewing it in conjunction with the Army Bill, I sustained a strong impression at this moment of the approaching danger. One sentence, full of German self-revelation, stood out vividly. ‘It is my constant duty and care to maintain and to strengthen on land and water, the power of defence of the German people, _which has no lack of young men fit to bear arms_.’ It was indeed true. One thought of France with her declining birthrate peering out across her fortresses into the wide German lands and silently reflecting on these ‘young men fit to bear arms’ of whom there was indeed ‘no lack.’ My mind, skipping over the day of Irish turmoil and the worry of the speech that lay before me, fixed upon Glasgow as the place where some answer to this threat of continental domination might perhaps be provided. Once again Europe might find a safeguard against military overlordship in an island which had never been and never would be ‘lacking in trained and hardy mariners bred from their boyhood up to the service of the sea.’

Accordingly, after the Irish ordeal was over, I said at Glasgow:—

‘The purposes of British naval power are essentially defensive. We
have no thoughts, and we have never had any thoughts of aggression,
and we attribute no such thoughts to other great Powers. There is,
however, this difference between the British naval power and the naval
power of the great and friendly Empire—and I trust it may long remain
the great and friendly Empire—of Germany. The British Navy is to us a
necessity and, from some points of view, the German Navy is to them
more in the nature of a luxury. Our naval power involves British
existence. It is existence to us; it is expansion to them. We cannot
menace the peace of a single Continental hamlet, no matter how great
and supreme our Navy may become. But, on the other hand, the whole
fortunes of our race and Empire, the whole treasure accumulated during
so many centuries of sacrifice and achievement, would perish and be
swept utterly away if our naval supremacy were to be impaired. It is
the British Navy which makes Great Britain a great Power. But Germany
was a great Power, respected and honoured all over the world, before
she had a single ship....

‘If to-day our position is eminently satisfactory we owe much to the
foresight and resolution of Mr. McKenna.... Whatever is needed for the
safety of the country will be asked for by the Government, and granted
by the representatives of the nation with universal assent. There is
no need for anxiety in regard to our shipbuilding capacity. There is
no chance whatever of our being overtaken in naval strength unless we
want to be....

‘But what of the men ? We have to-day 135,000 men in the active
service ratings of the Navy. The great bulk of them are long-service
men who have begun as boys and have been trained as a lifelong
profession to the naval service. We have no difficulty in recruiting
for the Navy ... and there is no doubt whatever of our ability to make
any increases which may be necessary, and which I think will be
necessary, in the _personnel_ of the Navy. We have great reserves of
seamen in this country. There are measures which may be taken to make
a greater use of our reserves than has hitherto been found possible,
and I have given directions for that part of the subject to be
carefully studied by the naval experts upon whom I rely. Our reserves,
both from the Royal Navy and from the Mercantile Marine, are a great
resource, _and this island has never been, and never will be, lacking
in trained and hardy mariners bred from their boyhood up to the
service of the sea_.

‘Whatever may happen abroad there will be no whining here, no signals
of distress will be hoisted, no cries for help or succour will go up.
We will face the future as our ancestors would have faced it, without
disquiet, without arrogance, but in stolid and inflexible
determination. We should be the first Power to welcome any retardation
or slackening of naval rivalry. We should meet any such slackening not
by words but by deeds.... If there are to be increases upon the
Continent of Europe, we shall have no difficulty in meeting them to
the satisfaction of the country. _As naval competition becomes more
acute, we shall have not only to increase the number of the ships we
build, but the ratio which our naval strength will have to bear to
other great naval Powers_, so that our margin of superiority will
become larger and not smaller as the strain grows greater. Thus we
shall make it clear that other naval Powers, instead of overtaking us
by additional efforts, will only be more outdistanced in consequence
of the measures which we ourselves shall take.’

This speech created a considerable outcry in Germany, which was immediately re-echoed by a very large proportion of our own Liberal press. It appeared that the word “luxury” had a bad significance when translated into German. The ‘_Luxus Flotte_’ became an expression passed angrily from lip to lip in Germany. As I expected, on my return to London I found my colleagues offended. Their congratulations upon Belfast were silenced by their reproaches about Glasgow. Mr. Haldane returned two days later from Berlin, and the Cabinet was summoned to receive an account of his mission. Contrary to general expectation, however, the Secretary of State for War declared that so far from being a hindrance to him in his negotiations, the Glasgow speech had been the greatest possible help. He had in fact used almost identical arguments to von Bethmann-Hollweg the day before. He had told the Chancellor that if Germany added a third squadron we should have ‘to maintain five or even six squadrons in home waters, perhaps bringing ships from the Mediterranean to strengthen them’; that if ships were added to the existing programme we should ‘proceed at once to lay down two keels to each of the new German additions’; and that for the sake of the Navy ‘people would not complain of the addition of another shilling to the income tax.’ He described how he had read the operative passages in my speech himself to the Emperor and Von Tirpitz in proof and confirmation of what he had himself been saying during their previous discussions. This settled the matter so far as I was concerned. It was only another instance of the very manly and loyal part which Mr. Haldane took at all times and on every question connected with the preparedness of this country for war with Germany.

Mr. Haldane brought back with him the actual text of the new German Navy Law, or “Novelle” as it was called. This had been handed to him by the Emperor during the course of the discussion. It was an elaborate technical document. Mr. Haldane had had the prudence to refuse to express any opinion upon it till it had been examined by the Admiralty experts. We now subjected this document to a rigorous scrutiny. The result more than confirmed my first unfavourable impression.

‘The main feature in the new law,’ I reported to the Cabinet on
February 14, ‘is the extraordinary increase in the striking force of
ships of all classes immediately available throughout the year.
Whereas formerly we reckoned against 17 battleships, 4 battle
cruisers, and 12 small cruisers in the active battle fleet,
demobilised to a great extent during the winter months, we must in
future prepare against 25, 12 and 18, which are not to be subject to
anything like the same degree of temporary demobilisation.... Full
permanent crews are to be provided for all, or nearly all, torpedo
boat destroyers, now aggregating 115, and working up to an authorised
total of 144, instead of for half the number as at present. There is
to be an increase on the already large provision of £750,000 in this
year’s Estimates for submarines. The numbers are not stated, but from
the fact that 121 additional executive officers are required for this
service alone by 1920, we may infer that between 50 and 60 submarines
are to be added.[14] We know nothing of the rate at which this
construction is to be achieved. The increases in personnel are also
important. Under their existing law, the Germans are working to a
total of 86,500 in 1917 by annual increments of 3,500. The new law
adds 15,000 officers and men, and raises the total in 1920 to
101,500.’

On March 9 I pointed out that the fundamental proposition of the
negotiations from the Admiralty point of view had been that the
existing Germany Navy Law should not be increased, but, if possible,
reduced, whereas on the contrary a new law was certainly to be enacted
providing for large and progressive increases not only in 1912 but in
the five following years. Practically four-fifths of the German Navy
were to be placed permanently upon a war footing. The German
Government would be able to have available at all seasons of the year
twenty-five, or perhaps twenty-nine, fully commissioned battleships,
‘whereas at the present time the British Government have in full
commission in Home Waters only twenty-two, even counting the Atlantic
Fleet.’

Thus on the fundamental proposition we encountered an unyielding
attitude. Nevertheless we persevered and the discussion was
transferred to the question of a mutual declaration against aggressive
plans. Here Sir Edward Grey offered the following formula: ‘England
will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany, and pursue no aggressive
policy towards her. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and
forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which
England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that
has such an object.’ The German Government considered this formula
inadequate and suggested through their Ambassador the following
additional clause: ‘England will therefore observe at least a
benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon Germany’; or, ‘England
will therefore, as a matter of course, remain neutral if a war is
forced upon Germany.’

This last condition would have carried us far beyond our original
intention, and might well have been held to deprive us of the power to
come to the aid of France in a war ‘forced,’ or alleged to be
‘forced,’ upon Germany as the result of a quarrel between Austria and
Russia. It would certainly have been regarded as terminating the
Entente. Moreover, even if we had taken this step the new German Navy
Law was not to be withdrawn. At the most it was to be modified. Thus a
complete deadlock was reached at an early stage. Still, so important
did we think it to create at least a friendly spirit, and so desirous
were we of placating Germany and gratifying her aspirations, that we
still persisted in an endeavour to come to an arrangement beneficial
to Germany in the colonial sphere. These negotiations were still
progressing and had almost reached a conclusion definitely
advantageous to Germany, when the war broke out.

* * * * *

Lord Fisher did not like the idea of a naval programme. On February 13, 1912, he wrote:—

‘I can’t support you at all in any way whatever for any two years’ or
more programme. Some d——d fool has got hold of you to have made you
say that! THE GREAT SECRET IS TO PUT OFF TO THE VERY LAST HOUR THE
SHIP (big or little) _that you mean to build_ (or PERHAPS NOT BUILD
HER AT ALL!). You see all your rival’s plans fully developed, their
vessels started beyond recall, and then in each individual answer to
each such rival vessel you plunge with a design 50 per cent. better!
knowing that your rapid shipbuilding and command of money will enable
you to have your vessel fit to fight as soon if not sooner than the
rival vessel. Sometimes, as in one famous year, you can drop an
armoured ship and put the money into acceleration of those building
because you have a new design coming along, so don’t be a d——d ass and
deliberately lay down a ship which you know is obsolete by some sudden
vast step in old Watts’ brain! “_Sufficient for the year is the
programme thereof._” For God’s sake get that written up somewhere for
you to look at when you get out of bed in the morning! and do please
tell me the name of the born fool who hoaxed you. Is it...? He has
just got a gold medal in America for advocating smaller battleships I
believe.... You know Archbishop Whately proved that Napoleon Bonaparte
never existed!...

‘We are asses now for not building a 16–inch gun as Sir E. Wilmot told
you in the letter I sent you—but you can’t help yourself any more than
you can help deliberately laying down ships for the Line of Battle
that go less than 30 knots—there are certain things my beloved Winston
that even God Almighty can’t help! (let alone you!). He for instance
can’t help two added to two being four!...

‘_The most damnable thing in the world is a servile copyist!_ One of
the four Nelsonic attributes is “_Power of Initiative_”! and
“_Plunge_” is the watchword of “_Progress_”! but I sicken you with my
reiteration, so good-bye.’

I replied on February 19:—

‘I am delighted to see your handwriting again. I had begun to fear the
well of truth and inspiration was running dry. Do not, however, shut
your mind against a programme. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and I
have been agreed on this policy ever since 1909, and I am quite
certain that it can be developed so as to secure the greatest
advantages without any sacrifice of elasticity. Such a programme as I
have in mind will cover the whole period of the existing German Navy
Law. It will deal only with the numbers of capital ships. It will be
framed on certain clearly defined assumptions. It will be capable both
of expansion and of diminution, of retardation and acceleration. It
will not necessarily be embodied in an Act of Parliament. It will
probably have to be revised after four years. It will recite certain
definite facts of the existing shipbuilding situation, particularly in
relation to Germany and Austria. It will be measured in relation to
these facts so as to secure ample margins of superiority both in new
construction and in establishment over those Powers. Unforeseen
contingencies will be met by additions, but it would always be open
within certain limits for England and Germany to agree upon
proportionate reductions. The programme of minor construction will be
entirely flexible and expressed only in terms of money.

‘At present we suffer every disadvantage: a panic and a row every
year, spasmodic building, hopeless finance, total lack of foresight in
regard to the labour market, and no means of bargaining with our
competitors. At present we have nothing to put against their threats.
Nothing, in my opinion, would more surely dishearten Germany, than the
certain proof that as the result of all her present and prospective
efforts she will only be more hopelessly behindhand in 1920. She would
know it was not bluff because if a Liberal Government could propose
it, a Tory Government would _a fortiori_ carry it farther. The vast
financial reserves of which John Bull can dispose would come into
view, and would weigh in the balance with a direct and real weight. It
is the uncertainty as to whether we shall throw up the sponge or not,
on which the German Navy has lived and fattened. The standard will be
60 per cent. preponderance in new construction against the present
law, and two keels to one for all increases above it. Sixty per cent.
preponderance in men, 20 to 12 in destroyers, at least 2 to 1 in
armoured cruisers, protected cruisers and their equivalents,
submarines and small fry generally. This is no new idea of mine. I
have been working it out ever since I came to the Admiralty, and am
absolutely convinced that it is the only way of securing economy,
efficiency and moral effect. Whether the plan when made should be
published is a political question. How Navy Estimates should be
financed is for the Treasury and the House of Commons to decide. What
the Admiralty are concerned with is the maintenance of proper margins
of superiority, the power to look ahead, and the power within certain
prescribed limits to manœuvre.

‘Hopwood[15] and Sir Marcus Samuel are hard at it over oil.’

This letter mollified the admiral. On the 25th February, 1912, he wrote:—

‘I hasten to reply to your letter of February 19th just arrived,
because if your Programme (which has my enthusiastic admiration) _is
not embodied in an Act of Parliament_ then all my objections vanish!
An Act of Parliament (The Naval Defence Act) _made_ us build 20
cruisers that had only 48 hours coal supply. _Can I ever forget that!_
but Providence came along and made them useful as “_Minelayers_.”
However ocean “tramps” at £10 a ton would have been cheaper and more
effective. Sir W. White built the “_County Class_” and forgot the
guns, but Providence came along and has made them useful for commerce
protectors with their 6–inch guns and big coal supply and good
speed—however a few “Mauretanias” would be far more effective than a
hundred “Countys”![16]

‘I can only pray that your Programme will be officially published—for
_it is sure to leak out_! It will add immensely to your reputation and
influence and the moral effect will be prodigious!

‘The _Key Note_ is 2 keels to 1 for all increases above the present
German Law! _2 to 1 in Armoured Cruisers is also vital!_

‘You don’t say a word of your visit to Jellicoe—_but he does_! He is
“_much impressed with your grasp of the whole business_,” and as
Jellicoe very seldom indeed gives praise I think you must have talked
well! as well as that night we stumbled over the dockyard stores at
Devonport returning from the _Lion_ and the _Monarch_! (It’s a pity we
didn’t have a shorthand writer!)

‘_Don’t make any mistake about big submarines being obligatory_!...

‘Big risks bring big success! (It was Napoleon, wasn’t it? “_Risk
nothing, get nothing!_”) Increased surface speed is _above all_ a
necessity, and broadside torpedo discharges and the bigger gun will
come automatically with the above two essentials, and they (_the Big
Submarines_) will be Destroyers with all the advantages of the present
Destroyers and—as well—the power of submergence during daylight
attacks. Battle tactics will be revolutionised and England’s power
will be multiplied not sevenfold but manifold! and with a radius of
action of 6,000 miles ... but it wants an Isaiah to proclaim this
vision!

‘For God’s sake trample on and stamp out protected Cruisers and hurry
up Aviation....’

For a specimen of Fisher’s genius I commend these last few lines. Ten years of submarine development, spurred on by war on the greatest scale, were required to overtake in exact sequence the processes of that amazing vision in technical affairs. The consequences to Great Britain were, however, not so satisfactory as he forecasted.

* * * * *

Early in March, while the new German Navy Law was still unannounced, it was necessary to present our Estimates to the House of Commons. It would of course have been a breach of faith with the German Emperor to let any suggestion pass my lips that we already knew what the text of the Navy Law was. I was therefore obliged to make my first speech on naval matters on a purely hypothetical basis: ‘This is what we are going to do if no further increases are made in the German Fleet. Should unhappily the rumours which we hear prove true, I shall have to present a Supplementary Estimate to the House, etc.’

In this speech I laid down clearly, with the assent of the Cabinet, the principles which should govern our naval construction in the next five years, and the standards of strength we should follow in capital ships. This standard was as follows: Sixty per cent. in Dreadnoughts over Germany as long as she adhered to her present declared programme, and two keels to one for every additional ship laid down by her. Two complications of these clear principles were unavoidable. First, the two ‘Lord Nelsons’ although not Dreadnoughts were stronger in many ways, particularly in armour and subdivision, than the original _Dreadnought_ herself. Although projected earlier, they had actually been completed later. Acting on the advice of the Naval Staff, I counted these throughout as ‘Dreadnoughts.’ On the other hand, any ships provided by the Dominions were to be additional to anything we might build ourselves. Otherwise the efforts of the Dominions would not have resulted in any accession to our naval strength, and consequently these efforts might have been discouraged. Proceeding on these lines I set out the six years of British construction at 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, against a uniform German construction of 2. These numbers were well received by the House of Commons. We were not sure whether the Germans would adhere to an offer made to Mr. Haldane to drop one of the three extra ships embodied in their new Navy Law. This, however, proved ultimately to be the case and was at any rate a tangible result of the Haldane mission. In Tirpitz’ words: ‘He (Haldane) next came out with a proposal of a certain delay in the building of the three ships; could we not distribute them over twelve years?... He only wanted a token of our readiness to meet England, more for the sake of form.... Haldane himself proposed that we should retard the rate of our increase “in order to lubricate the negotiations,” or that we should at least cancel the first of the three ships. He outlined in writing of his own accord the same principle which I had previously fixed upon in my own mind as a possible concession. I _therefore sacrificed the ship_.’

We therefore ‘sacrificed’ two hypothetical ships, and our programmes, which would have been increased to 5, 4, 5, 4, 5, 4, were ultimately declared at 4, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4. The splendid gift of the _Malaya_ by the Federated Malay States raised the figure of the first year from 4 to 5.

In announcing these decisions to Parliament later in the same month I made publicly and definitely those proposals for a Naval Holiday which were fruitless so far as Britain and Germany were concerned, but the principle of which has since been adopted by the English-speaking peoples of the world:—

‘Take, as an instance of this proposition I am putting forward for
general consideration, the year 1913. In that year, as I apprehend,
Germany will build three capital ships, and it will be necessary for
us to build five in consequence.

‘Supposing we were both to take a holiday for that year and introduce
a blank page into the book of misunderstanding; supposing that Germany
were to build no ships that year, she would save herself between six
and seven millions sterling. But that is not all. In ordinary
circumstances we should not begin our ships until Germany had started
hers. The three ships that she did not build would therefore
automatically wipe out no fewer than five British potential
super-Dreadnoughts. That is more than I expect they could hope to do
in a brilliant naval action. As to the indirect results within a
single year, they simply cannot be measured, not only between our two
great brother nations, but to all the world. They are results
immeasurable in their hope and brightness. This then is the position
which we take up—that the Germans will be no gainers over us so far as
naval power is concerned by any increases they may make, and no
losers, on the basis I have laid down, by any diminution.’

By the beginning of April it became certain that no general arrangement for a naval holiday could be effected with Germany. The Emperor sent me a courteous message through Sir Ernest Cassel expressing his great regret, but adding that such arrangements would only be possible between allies. Herr Ballin wrote at this same time to Sir Ernest:—

‘I entirely share your opinion of C.’s (Churchill’s) speech, and
believe that it is simply the unusual feature of frankness and honesty
which flustered the whole world, and especially the leading parties
here, and has caused a torrent of indignation in the Press. It is not
easy to become all at once accustomed to such a complete change from
the mystery mongering hitherto prevalent; up to now, it was thought
that language was given to British and German Navy Ministers to
conceal their thoughts. Suddenly, some one makes a new departure, and
everybody asks disconcertedly, “What does this man want?”

‘A few friendly lines addressed to you about the report I sent would
have a happy effect. [A complaint which we were reputed to have made
about an alleged clandestine visit of certain German ships to the
Shetland Islands.]... If he wishes it, C. can make use of this
opportunity in a few quite unofficial lines addressed to you, to brush
away the shadows which were created in high quarters here by the
“luxury fleet” (luxus flotte) and the absence of warmth in his last
speech. This will be a great help in the political negotiations. It
would be too pitiful if, owing to misunderstanding and sentiment, the
great work of arrangement were to be hindered ... etc., etc.’

In compliance I therefore wrote the following letter for the Emperor’s eye:—

_Mr. Churchill to Sir Ernest Cassel, April 14, 1912._

I am deeply impressed by the Emperor’s great consideration. I only
mentioned the incident to Ballin as an example to show the kind of
anxieties and the strain to which the naval situation gives rise. I am
very glad to know that it was free from all sinister significance: and
I take this opportunity of saying again that we have been throughout
equally innocent of any offensive design. I suppose it is difficult
for either country to realise how formidable it appears to the eyes of
the other. Certainly it must be almost impossible for Germany, with
her splendid armies and warlike population capable of holding their
native soil against all comers, and situated inland with road and
railway communications on every side, to appreciate the sentiments
with which an island State like Britain views the steady and
remorseless development of a rival naval power of the very highest
efficiency. The more we admire the wonderful work that has been done
in the swift creation of German naval strength, the stronger, the
deeper and the more preoccupying those sentiments become. Patience,
however, and good temper accomplish much; and as the years pass many
difficulties and dangers seem to settle themselves peacefully.
Meanwhile there is an anxious defile to be traversed, and what will
help more perhaps than anything else to make the journey safe for us
all, is the sincere desire for goodwill and confidence of which
Ballin’s letter and its enclosure are a powerful testimony.

* * * * *

The growth of the German Navy produced its inevitable consequences. The British Fleet for safety’s sake had to be concentrated in Home Waters. The first concentration had been made by Lord Fisher in 1904. This had effected the reduction of very large numbers of small old vessels which were scattered about the world ‘showing the flag’ and the formation in their place of stronger, better, more homogeneous squadrons at home. This measure was also a great and wise economy of money. A few months later the British battleships were recalled from China. The more distant oceans had thus been abandoned. But now a further measure of concentration was required. We saw ourselves compelled to withdraw the battleships from the Mediterranean. Only by this measure could the trained men be obtained to form the Third Battle Squadron in full commission in Home Waters. It was decided by the Cabinet that we must still maintain a powerful force in the Mediterranean, and ultimately, four battle cruisers and an armoured cruiser squadron were accordingly based on Malta. It was further decided that a Dreadnought battle squadron should also be developed in the Mediterranean by the year 1916 equal in strength to that of the growing Austrian battle fleet. These decisions were taken with the deliberate object of regaining our complete independence. But the withdrawal—even if only for a few years—of the battleships from the Mediterranean was a noteworthy event. It made us appear to be dependent upon the French Fleet in those waters. The French also at the same time redisposed their forces. Under the growing pressure of German armaments Britain transferred her whole Battle Fleet to the North Sea, and France moved all her heavy ships into the Mediterranean. And the sense of mutual reliance grew swiftly between both navies.

It is astonishing that Admiral Von Tirpitz should never have comprehended what the consequences of his policy must be. Even after the war he could write:—

‘In order to estimate the strength of the trump card which our fleet
put in the hands of an energetic diplomacy at this time, one must
remember that in consequence of the concentration of the English
forces which we had caused in the North Sea, the English control of
the Mediterranean and Far-Eastern waters had practically ceased.’

The only ‘trump card’ which Germany secured by this policy was the driving of Britain and France closer and closer together. From the moment that the Fleets of France and Britain were disposed in this new way our common naval interests became very important. And the moral claims which France could make upon Great Britain if attacked by Germany, whatever we had stipulated to the contrary, were enormously extended. Indeed my anxiety was aroused to try to prevent this necessary recall of our ships from tying us up too tightly with France and depriving us of that liberty of choice on which our power to stop a war might well depend.

When in August, 1912, the Cabinet decided that naval conversations should take place between the French and British Admiralties, similar to those which had been held since 1906 between the General Staffs, I set forth this point as clearly as possible in a minute which I addressed to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and we did our utmost to safeguard ourselves.

_August 23, 1912._

_Sir Edward Grey,
Prime Minister._

The point I am anxious to safeguard is our freedom of choice if the
occasion arises, and consequent power to influence French policy
beforehand. That freedom will be sensibly impaired if the French can
say that they have denuded their Atlantic seaboard, and concentrated
in the Mediterranean on the faith of naval arrangements made with us.
This will not be true. If we did not exist, the French could not make
better dispositions than at present. They are not strong enough to
face Germany alone, still less to maintain themselves in two theatres.
They therefore rightly concentrate their Navy in the Mediterranean
where it can be safe and superior and can assure their African
communications. Neither is it true that we are relying on France to
maintain our position in the Mediterranean.... If France did not
exist, we should make no other disposition of our forces.

Circumstances might arise which in my judgment would make it desirable
and right for us to come to the aid of France with all our force by
land and sea. But we ask nothing in return. If we were attacked by
Germany, we should not make it a charge of bad faith against the
French that they left us to fight it out alone; and nothing in naval
and military arrangements ought to have the effect of exposing us to
such a charge if, when the time comes, we decide to stand out.

This is my view, and I am sure I am in line with you on the principle.
I am not at all particular how it is to be given effect to, and I make
no point about what document it is set forth in. But [consider] how
tremendous would be the weapon which France would possess to compel
our intervention, if she could say, ‘On the advice of and by
arrangement with your naval authorities we have left our Northern
coasts defenceless. We cannot possibly come back in time.’ Indeed [I
added somewhat inconsequently], it would probably be decisive whatever
is written down now. Every one must feel who knows the facts that we
have the obligations of an alliance without its advantages, and above
all without its precise definitions.

W.S.C.

The difficulty proved a real one. The technical naval discussions could only be conducted on the basis that the French Fleet should be concentrated in the Mediterranean, and that in case of a war in which both countries took part, it would fall to the British fleet to defend the Northern and Western coasts of France. The French, as I had foreseen, naturally raised the point that if Great Britain did not take part in the war, their Northern and Western coasts would be completely exposed. We however, while recognising the difficulty, steadfastly declined to allow the naval arrangements to bind us in any political sense. It was eventually agreed that if there was a menace of war, the two Governments should consult together and concert beforehand what common action, if any, they should take. The French were obliged to accept this position and to affirm definitely that the naval conversations did not involve any obligation of common action. This was the best we could do for ourselves and for them.

I commend these discussions and the document I have printed above to German eyes. The German Naval Minister exults in a policy which has had the effect of uniting in common defence against Germany, in spite of themselves, two powerful Fleets till then rivals. The British Ministers so far from welcoming this consolidation of forces in the opposite balance to Germany, are anxious to preserve their freedom of action and reluctant to become entangled with continental Powers. Germany was, in fact, forging a coalition against herself, and Britain was seeking to save her from the consequences of her unwisdom. It is not often that one can show so plainly the workings of events. But all was lost on Admiral von Tirpitz.

This sincere, wrongheaded, purblind old Prussian firmly believed that the growth of his beloved navy was inducing in British minds an increasing fear of war, whereas it simply produced naval rejoinders and diplomatic reactions which strengthened the forces and closed the ranks of the Entente. It is almost pathetic to read the foolish sentences in which on page after page of his Memoirs he describes how much Anglo-German relations were improved in 1912, 1913 and 1914 through the realisation by the British people of Germany’s great and growing naval power. He notices that the violent agitations against German naval expansion which swept England in 1904 and again in 1908 were succeeded by a comparatively calm period in which both Powers were building peacefully and politely against each other. This he thinks was a proof that his treatment was succeeding, and that all friction was passing away—another dose or two and it would be gone altogether. The violent agitations in England were, however, the symptom of doubt and differences of opinion in our national life about whether the German menace was real or not, and whether the right measures were being taken to meet it. As doubts and differences on these points were gradually replaced by general agreement among the leading men in all parties to meet a grave danger, the agitations subsided. The excitement in the Press and in Parliament, the warning speeches and counter-speeches were not intended for foreign consumption. England was not trying to make an impression upon Germany. She was trying to make up her own mind: and in proportion as this mind arrived at solid and final conclusions, silence was again restored. But it was not the silence of sleep. With every rivet that von Tirpitz drove into his ships of war, he united British opinion throughout wide circles of the most powerful people in every walk of life and in every part of the Empire. The hammers that clanged at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven were forging the coalition of nations by which Germany was to be resisted and finally overthrown. Every threatening gesture that she made, every attempt to shock or shake the loosely knit structure of the Entente made it close and fit together more tightly. Thus Tirpitz:—

‘British statesmen naturally did not stress the fact in their
conversations with Germans that it was mainly the presence of our
nearly completed fleet in the North Sea that had produced their
respectful tone, and had lessened the probability of a British attack.
Of course they only spoke of their peaceful inclinations and not so
much of the facts which strengthened these inclinations.’ And again
(p. 192): ‘Seventeen years of fleet-building had, it is true, improved
the prospects of an acceptable peace with England.’

Is it possible to be further from the truth than this? There never had been any probability or possibility of a British attack on Germany. Why should we attack Germany for building ships when we could ourselves build more ships quicker and cheaper? Why incur the guilt, cost and hazard of war, when a complete remedy was obvious and easy? But the ‘respectful tone’ was that of men who felt how serious the position had become, and were anxious to avoid any responsibility for causing a crisis. It was not restraint imposed by fear of the ‘nearly completed fleet in the North Sea,’ but the calm resulting from resolve to be prepared.

* * * * *

The organisation of a Fleet differs throughout from that of an Army. Armies only keep a small proportion of their soldiers in regular service. These form the framework of the battalions, train the recruits and keep guard in times of peace. When the order is given to mobilise, all the men who have been already trained but are living at home in civil life are called up as they are wanted: and then and not till then the Army is ready to fight.

Navies on the other hand were in the main always ready. The British Navy had all its best ships fully and permanently manned with whole-time men (called active service ratings). Measured by quality nearly the whole of its power was therefore constantly available. Measured even by numbers nearly three-quarters of the ships could go into action without calling out the Reserves. Only the oldest and most obsolete ships were manned in time of war by the Naval Reserve, i.e. men who had left the Navy and had returned to civil life. These obsolete vessels were the only part of the Fleet which had to be ‘mobilised’ like the armies of Europe.

Thus mobilisation, which is the foundation of all great armies, plays only a very small part in fleets. Every ship that really counted was always ready to steam and fight as soon as an order reached her.

The organisation of the British Home Fleets when I came to the Admiralty seemed to a mind accustomed to military symmetry to leave much to be desired. The terminology was misleading and confused. The word ‘Division’ was used in three different senses, sometimes tactical and sometimes administrative. The battle units were uneven in numbers. The degree of readiness and efficiency of the different squadrons was not apparent from the classes in which they were grouped. In consultation with Sir Francis Bridgeman, Prince Louis and Admiral Troubridge, the first Chief of the new War Staff, I designed a new and symmetrical organisation for the Fleets.

All the ships available for Home Defence were divided into the First, Second and Third Fleets, comprising eight battle squadrons of eight battleships each, together with their attendant cruiser squadrons, flotillas and auxiliaries. The First Fleet comprised a Fleet Flagship and four battle squadrons of ships ‘in full commission’ manned entirely with active service ratings, and therefore _always ready_. To form this Fleet it was necessary to base the former ‘Atlantic Fleet’ on Home Ports instead of on Gibraltar, and to base the battleships hitherto in the Mediterranean on Gibraltar instead of Malta. By this concentration an additional battle squadron of strong ships (_King Edwards_) was _always ready_ in Home waters. The Second Fleet consisted of two battle squadrons, also fully manned with active service ratings but having about 40 per cent. of these learning and requalifying in the gunnery, torpedo and other schools. This Fleet was termed, ‘in active commission’ because it could fight at any moment; but to realise its highest efficiency, it required to touch at its Home Ports, and march on board its balance crews from the schools. In all these six battle squadrons, containing with their cruiser squadrons every modern and middle-aged ship in the Navy, there was not to be found a single reservist. No mobilisation was therefore necessary to bring the whole of this force into action. The Third Fleet also consisted of two battle squadrons and five cruiser squadrons of our oldest ships. These were only manned by care and maintenance parties and required the Reserves to be called out before they could put to sea. In order to accelerate the mobilisation of the leading battle squadrons and certain cruisers of the Third Fleet a special class of the Reserve was now formed called the ‘Immediate Reserve,’ who received higher pay and periodical training, and were liable to be called up in advance of general mobilisation.

Germany was adding a third squadron to the High Sea Fleet, thus increasing her _always ready_ strength from 17 to 25. We in reply, by the measures set out above and various others too technical for description here, raised our _always ready_ Fleet from 33 battleships to 49, and other forces in like proportion. On mobilisation the German figures would rise to 38; and the British at first to 57, and ultimately, as the new organisation was completed, to 65.

The reader will not be able to understand the issues involved in the completion and mobilisation of the Fleets on the eve of the war unless this organisation is mastered.

* * * * *

We made a great assembly of the Navy this spring of 1912 at Portland. The flags of a dozen admirals, the broad pennants of as many commodores and the pennants of a hundred and fifty ships were flying together. The King came in the Royal Yacht, the Admiralty flag at the fore, the Standard at the main, and the Jack at the mizzen, and bided among his sailors for four days. One day there is a long cruise out into mist, dense, utterly baffling—the whole Fleet steaming together all invisible, keeping station by weird siren screamings and hootings. It seemed incredible that no harm would befall. And then suddenly the fog lifted and the distant targets could be distinguished and the whole long line of battleships, coming one after another into view, burst into tremendous flares of flame and hurled their shells with deafening detonations while the water rose in tall fountains. The Fleet returns—three battle squadrons abreast, cruisers and flotillas disposed ahead and astern. The speed is raised to twenty knots. Streaks of white foam appear at the bows of every vessel. The land draws near. The broad bay already embraces this swiftly moving gigantic armada. The ships in their formation already fill the bay. The foreign officers I have with me on the _Enchantress_ bridge stare anxiously. We still steam fast. Five minutes more and the van of the Fleet will be aground. Four minutes, three minutes. There! At last. The signal! A string of bright flags falls from the _Neptune’s_ halyards. Every anchor falls together; their cables roar through the hawser holes; every propeller whirls astern. In a hundred and fifty yards every ship is stationary. Look along the lines, miles this way and miles that, they might have been drawn with a ruler. The foreign observers gasped.

These were great days. From dawn to midnight, day after day, one’s whole mind was absorbed by the fascination and novelty of the problems which came crowding forward. And all the time there was a sense of power to act, to form, to organise: all the ablest officers in the Navy standing ready, loyal and eager, with argument, guidance, information; every one feeling a sense that a great danger had passed very near us; that there was a breathing space before it would return; that we must be even better prepared next time. Saturdays, Sundays and any other spare day I spent always with the Fleets at Portsmouth or at Portland or Devonport, or with the Flotillas at Harwich. Officers of every rank came on board to lunch or dine and discussion proceeded without ceasing on every aspect of naval war and administration.

The Admiralty yacht _Enchantress_ was now to become largely my office, almost my home; and my work my sole occupation and amusement. In all I spent eight months afloat in the three years before the war. I visited every dockyard, shipyard and naval establishment in the British Isles and in the Mediterranean and every important ship. I examined for myself every point of strategic importance and every piece of Admiralty property. I got to know what everything looked like and where everything was, and how one thing fitted into another. In the end I could put my hand on anything that was wanted and knew thoroughly the current state of our naval affairs.

I recall vividly my first voyage from Portsmouth to Portland, where the Fleet lay. A grey afternoon was drawing to a close. As I saw the Fleet for the first time drawing out of the haze a friend reminded me of ‘that far-off line of storm-beaten ships on which the eyes of the grand Army had never looked,’ but which had in their day ‘stood between Napoleon and the dominion of the world.’ In Portland harbour the yacht lay surrounded by the great ships; the whole harbour was alive with the goings and comings of launches and small craft of every kind, and as night fell ten thousand lights from sea and shore sprang into being and every masthead twinkled as the ships and squadrons conversed with one another. Who could fail to work for such a service? Who could fail when the very darkness seemed loaded with the menace of approaching war?

For consider these ships, so vast in themselves, yet so small, so easily lost to sight on the surface of the waters. Sufficient at the moment, we trusted, for their task, but yet only a score or so. They were all we had. On them, as we conceived, floated the might, majesty, dominion and power of the British Empire. All our long history built up century after century, all our great affairs in every part of the globe, all the means of livelihood and safety of our faithful, industrious, active population depended upon them. Open the sea-cocks and let them sink beneath the surface, as another Fleet was one day to do in another British harbour far to the North, and in a few minutes—half an hour at the most—the whole outlook of the world would be changed. The British Empire would dissolve like a dream; each isolated community struggling forward by itself; the central power of union broken; mighty provinces, whole Empires in themselves, drifting hopelessly out of control and falling a prey to others; and Europe after one sudden convulsion passing into the iron grip and rule of the Teuton and of all that the Teutonic system meant. There would only be left far off across the Atlantic unarmed, unready, and as yet uninstructed America to maintain, single-handed, law and freedom among men.

Guard them well, admirals and captains, hardy tars and tall marines; guard them well and guide them true.