Chapter XIX

WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY
November and December, 1914

‘... that pale, that white-faced shore,
whose foot spurns back the ocean’s roaring tides
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
That water-walled bulwark, still secure
And confident from foreign purposes.’
KING JOHN. Act II, Sc. 1.

German Dreadnoughts off Yarmouth—What does it mean—Anticlimax—Inroads
upon the Grand Fleet—The Drain of Refits—Sir John Jellicoe’s
Protests—Admiralty and Commander-in-Chief—The Dreadnought
Margin—The Third Battle Squadron to Rosyth—The Admiralty Insist on
their view—The Destroyer Distribution—A Real Difficulty—A Wearing
Discussion—The actual Facts of Relative Strength—British Readiness
to Accept Battle—The Attempted Seaplane Raid on Cuxhaven—The Grand
Fleet sweeps South—The Invasion Alarm—Moon and Tides—Further
Intervention on the Belgian Coast—Immense Relief of the Falklands
Victory—Lord Fisher’s View—Correspondence between us—Lord Fisher
and Admiral Sturdee—Admiral Oliver’s foresight—Growing Power of
the Fleet—New Construction—Submarines—Fisher’s Great Impulse—The
Battle Cruisers _Repulse_ and _Renown_—Monitors—The Great
Programme—Full Speed Ahead.

Lord Fisher had barely taken up his duties in the Admiralty, when an incident occurred which seemed to indicate the ending of the period of German inactivity in the North Sea which had succeeded the action of August 28 in the Heligoland Bight. Early in the morning of November 3, the unusual signal was made to the Admiralty that several German battle-cruisers or battleships had been sighted off Gorleston on the Norfolk coast by the mine-sweeping gunboat _Halcyon_ and that she was engaged with them. Almost immediately afterwards heavy shells were reported to be bursting in the water and on the beach near Yarmouth. The First Sea Lord and I reached the War Room from our bedrooms in a few minutes. The question was, What did it mean? It seemed quite certain that German battle cruisers would not be sent to throw shells at an open town like Yarmouth. Obviously this was a demonstration to divert the British Fleet from something else which was going to happen—was already perhaps happening. Was it a German raid into the Channel, or a serious attempt by the German Navy to intervene upon the Belgian coast while the land battle was still raging? Was it a descent on the British coast at Sunderland or Blyth? We had no means of judging. The last thing it seemed possible to believe was that first-class units of the German Fleet would have been sent across the North Sea simply in order to disturb the fisher-folk of Yarmouth. By other signals our destroyers, _Leopard_ and _Lively_, who were patrolling in the neighbourhood of Yarmouth, also reported that they were engaged, and added that they were proceeding to attack the enemy. Where were our main forces? The Commander-in-Chief was for the first time in the war at the Admiralty, whither he had been summoned to confer with the new First Sea Lord. The Grand Fleet was at Lough Swilly in the North of Ireland. The 3rd Battle Squadron was steaming through the Irish Channel. No part of the Grand Fleet was nearer than Beatty and his battle cruisers: and these were as far off as Cromarty. Whatever happened, we could not fight a general action with our main Fleet till late on the following day. Meanwhile the Harwich striking force, the Dover flotillas, Admiral Hood’s forces off the Belgian coast and Admiral Burney’s Channel Fleet must do the best they could. If the German demonstration off Yarmouth was the prelude or concomitant to a serious attempt to break into the Channel, the very greatest naval events would follow. The contingency, as the reader is aware, had always been faced, and we were well aware that we should have to wait for our revenge till the next day. Meanwhile there was nothing to be done but to put all the fleets and flotillas on guard and in motion with the double object of resisting to the utmost a German attack to the southward and intercepting as speedily as possible from the North the return of the enemy. Several hours of tension passed; and then gradually it became clear that the German battle cruisers were returning home at full speed, and that nothing else was apparently happening; and the incredible conclusion forced itself upon us that the German Admiralty had had no other purpose in hand than this silly demonstration off Yarmouth beach.

This anticlimax was fatiguing. The experience of bracing ourselves to the most tremendous events, and then finding nothing happen, was one which we were compelled more than once to undergo at the Admiralty.

* * * * *

The new First Sea Lord was even more sure of the superiority of the British line of battle over the enemy than I was, and in this his views contrasted very sharply with those of the Commander-in-Chief. In full agreement with Sir Arthur Wilson, he proposed on his assumption of office to bring the Third Battle Squadron (the _King Edwards_) down to Portland to increase our security against a German incursion into the Channel; and he moved the Fifth Battle Squadron (the _Formidables_) with the two _Lord Nelsons_ to Sheerness to provide battleship support for the Harwich Striking Force, and to give an additional security against raid or invasion. These movements were no sooner determined than news of the Battle of Coronel was received (November 4), and we were forced to make far more serious inroads upon Sir John Jellicoe’s command. The battle cruisers _Inflexible_ and _Invincible_ were sent as described to the Falklands: and Lord Fisher, as we have seen, demanded the _Princess Royal_ for the Atlantic.

This last order produced continuous protests from Sir John Jellicoe, and led to an interchange of telegrams and letters in which the Commander-in-Chief dwelt upon every aspect of his dangers and weakness and the Admiralty, while insisting on their decision, endeavoured to reassure and placate him.

Our Dreadnought margin in home waters at the outbreak of war had been just sufficient. Every ship was ready and in good order. We did not feel that we could spare one. But after the first two months we were compelled to send ships one at a time from each Battle Squadron down to their home ports on the South Coast for refit. A regular system of refits, as was foreseen, had to be instituted. This involved the permanent absence of two or three of the most important vessels from the Grand Fleet. The enemy, on the other hand, lying in his main base, could always in theory be credited with having all his ships available at his selected moment for battle. Before, however, the drain of refits came upon us we had succeeded in reinforcing the Fleet by five fine ships, so that we began the war at our maximum possible strength and always, except for the briefest intervals, held or improved on that number.

The requirements of the Commander-in-Chief were, however, hard to meet. The strategy on which we were all agreed, involved keeping the Grand Fleet in distant northern waters and required very large forces of destroyers and other light craft for its local security, and for its service in battle. On the other hand, while no properly defended war harbour had yet been created capable of holding the entire fleet, various other bases had to be effectively guarded and patrolled, for which separate flotillas must be supplied. If at any time from any cause, two or three ships were absent from the Grand Fleet for a week or two, the Commander-in-Chief drew severe comparisons between the German Fleet and his own. He was a master of this kind of argument. From his own side he deducted any ship which had any defect, however temporary, however small—even defects which would not have prevented her from taking her place in the line in an emergency. He sometimes also deducted two or three of the most powerful battleships in the world which had newly joined his command because they were not trained up to the full level of efficiency of the others; and these were absolutely blotted out as if they were of no value whatever.[90] He next proceeded to deal with the enemy. He always credited them with several ships more than we now know they had, or were then thought likely to have. In October, 1914, he gave credence to a suggestion that the four German Dreadnoughts of the _König_ class had been completely re-armed with 14–inch guns. In 1915 the size of these guns had advanced to 15–inch. I was on both occasions compelled to set up expert committees to demolish these baseless suppositions. Unable to deny that the British line of battle could fire a broadside double in weight to that of the Germans, he developed a skilful argument to prove that this advantage was more than counteracted by other disadvantages arising from the superior displacement of contemporary German ships. He dwelt on this even at a period when his fleet had been reinforced by seven or eight additional units of enormous power without any corresponding accession to the enemy’s strength.

One must admit, nevertheless, that the withdrawal of the _Princess Royal_ inflicted a very serious injury upon the Battle Cruiser Squadron, and that Sir David Beatty might have had to fight an action without any margin of superiority during her absence. In this matter, however, Lord Fisher entered the lists in person.

_First Sea Lord to Commander-in-Chief._

Personal.

_November 12, 1914._

I want to make it clear to you what the _Scharnhorst_ Squadron means
as regards our dispositions.

1. We have not heard of them since November 4.

2. They may adopt the following courses:—

(_a_) Go through Panama Canal, smash our West Indian Fleet and
release all the armed German liners from New York—hence the
_Princess Royal_.

(_b_) Go to south-east coast of America and stop our vital food
supplies—hence the two _Invincibles_.

(_c_) Go to the Cape and raid the Army base at Walfish Bay—hence the
_Minotaur_ to reinforce _Albion_.

(_d_) Go to Duala and relieve the Germans, destroying our ships and
military expedition—hence the _Warrior_, _Black Prince_ and
three _Edgar Quinets_.

I hope to send Bartolomé to you to-morrow with information which is
too secret to be written or telegraphed.

The secret information pointed to the possibility of the Germans endeavouring to slip one or two of their battle cruisers into the Atlantic to help the return to Germany of the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ and incidentally to release all their fast liners in New York. Lord Fisher became vehemently impressed with this idea, and certainly the period was one of extreme strategic tension when some enterprise by the enemy seemed especially to be expected.

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief._

_November 13, 1914._

Since war began you have gained two Dreadnoughts on balance, and will
have by 20th twenty-seven superior units to twenty. We intend
_Princess Royal_ to rejoin you as soon as _Scharnhorst_ is dealt with.

During the next month you should suspend sending ships away for refit,
doing the best you can at Scapa. If notwithstanding the above you feel
the need of reinforcements we should propose to meet you by stationing
the eight _King Edwards_ at Rosyth, where they would be well placed to
join you for general action or to attack an invading force.

This would avoid necessity of stationing cruisers there for the
present.

If you agree the eight _King Edwards_ will be ordered to sail
to-night.

The Commander-in-Chief in reply asserted that the twenty-seven units quoted included three ships, two of which had never fired a gun and the third was only partially trained. He deprecated the Third Battle Squadron being stationed at Rosyth, as without being covered by cruisers or sea-going destroyers, it would run a great risk from mines and submarines outside the limits of the port defence. He suggested that it was preferable to keep them at Cromarty closely adjacent to the main base where they would be covered by the cruisers of the Grand Fleet and by the Destroyer Flotilla stationed at Cromarty.

The Admiralty, however, insisted on the Third Battle Squadron being stationed at Rosyth.

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief._

_November 16, 1914._

... The importance of preventing the enemy from making a serious
attack on our coast and getting away without being engaged makes it
imperative to have a force nearer the probable points of attack than
either Scapa Flow or Cromarty, which are practically the same distance
off. The coast has been so denuded of destroyers for the sake of
strengthening the force with you (amounting now to seventy-one
destroyers) that there is only a skeleton force of patrol vessels
available on the East Coast, amounting to three Scouts, twenty-three
Destroyers, twelve Torpedo Boats, between the Naze and St. Abbs Head,
a distance of 300 miles. In these circumstances we are reluctantly
compelled to decide on the _King Edwards_ and the Third Cruiser
Squadron going to Rosyth, and you should detach half a flotilla of the
seventy-one destroyers at Scapa Flow to act with them. We are sending
you a carefully compiled table of comparative strength of your Fleet
and the German High Sea Fleet, which makes it clear that without the
Third Battle Squadron you have such a preponderance of gun power that
with equal gunnery efficiency a successful result is ensured....

The Admiralty have in mind the importance of getting back the
_Princess Royal_ as soon as the situation admits. Your proposals as to
mining have been carefully considered, but the work done by our
submarines in the Bight has been of such importance that it is
undesirable to add to their dangers by laying mines whose positions
must be very uncertain. The Germans have no difficulty in sweeping any
channel they wish when they want to bring any of their ships out, and
do so daily. It would be very difficult for us to lay fresh lines in
any channels they sweep on account of the dangers to the mine-layers
from our own mines.

This and preceding telegrams expressed the deliberate views of the First Sea Lord and Sir Arthur Wilson, and I was in the fullest agreement with them.[91]

The Commander-in-Chief, however, urged that the 71 destroyers mentioned by the Admiralty included 10 which were absent refitting, and pointed out with justice that the 40 destroyers of the Harwich flotillas had been omitted from those at the disposition of the Admiralty. He asked particularly for reconsideration of the order to detach half a flotilla with the Third Battle Squadron. Without these additional 12 destroyers he stated that the safety of the Dreadnought Battle Fleet was seriously endangered; a submarine attack on Scapa Flow was quite feasible and ‘as I am directed to use this base, I trust I shall not be held responsible for any disaster that may occur.’ He concluded by pointing out that the relative strength of the High Sea Fleet and the Grand Fleet could not be decided without reference to the cruiser and destroyer strength of the two fleets: his comparative weakness in these essentials counterbalanced, he declared, any battleship superiority he possessed and made him anxious to be concentrated.

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief._

_November 17, 1914._

We have carefully reviewed the position and given fullest
consideration to your wishes. We are confident that your fleet with
its cruisers and flotillas is strong enough for the definite task
entrusted to it. In view of the grave needs we have to meet elsewhere
we cannot reinforce you at present, nor alter our dispositions.

The 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers
should proceed to Rosyth as ordered. You have, of course, full
discretion to move your Fleet in any way necessary to provide for its
safety and enable you to meet the enemy, and are not tied to Scapa.
Every effort is being made to accelerate the completion of the
submarine defences.

The destroyer question was one of real difficulty. Although we had more than double the sea-going strength of the German flotillas, we had so much to guard, that we could not provide a superior force kept always intact in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief for a great Fleet action. ‘I know perfectly well,’ wrote Sir John Jellicoe on December 4 to Lord Fisher, ‘that the First and Third Flotillas [from Harwich] will not join me in time.’... The Germans, he declared, would have eight flotillas comprising 88 torpedo boat destroyers, all of which would certainly be ready at the selected moment. ‘They have five torpedoes each: total 440 torpedoes—_unless I can strike at them first_.’ He himself might, he claimed, fall as low as 32 or even 28. ‘You know,’ he added, ‘the difficulty and objections to turning away from the enemy in a Fleet action: but with such a menace I am bound to do it, unless my own torpedo boat destroyers can stop or neutralise the movement.’ There was no doubt that all the Commander-in-Chief’s thought fitted together into one consistent whole and was the result of profound study and reflection. Lord Fisher, however, remained obdurate. ‘I think we have to stand fast,’ he wrote to me, enclosing Sir John Jellicoe’s letter. ‘The Tyrwhitt mob and our oversea submarines are our sole aggressive force in the South.’ He proposed however to put one of the Harwich flotillas in the Humber. ‘We wait your return before action[92]—Humber and Harwich each 290 miles from Heligoland—but the complete flotilla at the Humber is very much nearer Jellicoe, and so a salve to him in reply to enclosed. As A. K. Wilson observed a moment ago, both he and I would probably have written exactly the same letter as Jellicoe _trying to get all we could_! Yours till death, F.’

This was a wearing discussion, and no one can blame the Commander-in-Chief for expressing his anxieties and endeavouring to keep his command up to the highest strength. I always tried to sustain him in every possible way. His powerful orderly brain, his exact and comprehensive knowledge, enabled him to develop and perfect in this first year of the war the mighty organisation of the Grand Fleet. He bore with constancy the many troubles and perplexities of the early months. His fine sailorlike qualities made him always ready night or day to take his whole gigantic Fleet to sea, and he was never so happy as when he was at sea. Even when I did not share his outlook, I sympathised with his trials. The opinions of Lord Fisher at this period upon the margin of strength required for the Grand Fleet were, as will be seen, in sharp contrast with those he expressed at a later period during the operations at the Dardanelles. Personally I always considered our line of battle amply superior; nor did I believe the Germans would be able to bring out at a given moment all the 88 torpedo boats with which Sir John Jellicoe always credited them. We now know the actual forces which the enemy assembled on December 16 of this same year, on the occasion when the whole High Sea Fleet made almost the most ambitious sortie into the North Sea which its history records. There were 13 Dreadnought battleships and 4 battle cruisers, total 17 Dreadnoughts instead of the 20 which were completed and which the Admiralty counted as available; and 53 torpedo boats in place of the Commander-in-Chief’s 88. Against this Sir John Jellicoe had (until refits were reopened at the end of November) 27 superior units (subject to what he says about them); and as many of the 71 destroyers as were fit for sea on any given day. The Germans also took to sea on December 16 a squadron of 8 pre-Dreadnoughts, and against this our Third Battle Squadron, which had been rightly restored to the Grand Fleet, was a proper and superior provision. This balance of strength represents the period of our greatest strain in Home waters and all over the world.

At this, as at all other times, the Admiralty would have welcomed a general battle. An attack by seaplanes launched from carrying ships upon the Zeppelin sheds near Cuxhaven, was planned by us for November 22. On the 20th we telegraphed to Sir John Jellicoe:—

‘Our reliable German information and also our telegram No. 338 to you
shows, firstly, concentration of German cruisers, battle cruisers and
battleships in Weser and Elbe; and secondly, disposal of their
submarines to hunt in the Shetlands and English Channel. In these
favourable circumstances the aerial attack on Cuxhaven Zeppelin sheds,
which we had previously planned and considered desirable in itself,
might easily bring on a considerable action in which your battle
cruisers and the Grand Fleet might take part without undue risk from
German submarines.

‘We suggest for your consideration Tyrwhitt and aeroplanes attacking
on Monday at daybreak, with you supporting him from the northward with
whatever force is necessary, if the enemy respond to the challenge.
Further, if it should prove, as some reliable information indicates,
that the enemy is preparing an offensive raid or sortie himself, our
movement would bring on a collision at the outset unexpected and
disconcerting to him.’

The Commander-in-Chief, after some discussion, preferred Tuesday daybreak for the attack, as the longer notice would enable him to finish certain repairing work. The Admiralty plans were altered accordingly. We telegraphed on the 21st:—

‘We consider the present a good occasion for a sweep southward by the
Grand Fleet. The seaplane attack is incidental and subsidiary, though
very desirable in itself. It may bring on an action now that the
German Fleet is concentrated near Wilhelmshaven, and their cruisers
and battle cruisers are active. It will frustrate any offensive
movement they may intend, as reported.... Tuesday, 24th, at 5.30 a.m.,
will be the time.’

No result was, however, achieved. Sir John Jellicoe brought the Battle Fleet down into the centre of the North Sea about 180 miles from Heligoland, with the battle-cruisers about 40 miles nearer. But in the weather prevailing the seaplanes could hardly get off the water; and the Germans remained unaware of our movements and without any plans of their own. The episode shows however the underlying confidence of the Admiralty and of the Commander-in-Chief in the strength of the Grand Fleet even during this time of strain.

To add to the distractions of this hard month of November, 1914, an invasion scare took a firm hold of the military and naval authorities. It was argued by the War Office that the lull on the fighting fronts would enable the Germans to spare large numbers of good troops—250,000 if necessary—for the invasion of Great Britain. Lord Kitchener directed all defensive preparations to be made, and Lord Fisher threw himself into the task with gusto. Although, as the reader is aware, I was sceptical on this subject, I felt that the precautions were justifiable, and would at any rate add interest to the life of our coast and Home defence forces. I therefore allowed myself to succumb to the suppressed excitement which grew throughout the highest circles, and did my utmost to aid and speed our preparations. We stationed as described the 3rd Battle Squadron at the Forth, brought the 2nd Fleet to the Thames, disposed the old _Majestic_ battleships in the various harbours along the East Coast, arranged block ships to be sunk, and laid mines to be exploded, at the proper time in the mouths of our undefended harbours; while the whole coastal watch, military, aerial and marine, throbbed with activity. The Army arrangements were complicated by the fact that some of the divisions which were sufficiently trained to be used to repel the invaders, had lent their rifles to those that were undergoing training, and these rifles had to be collected and redistributed as a part of the procedure prescribed for the supreme emergency. To such expedients were we reduced! However, the Germans remained absolutely quiescent; the tides and moon, which for some days before November 20 were exceptionally favourable to nocturnal landings, ceased to present these conditions, and the sense of some great impending event gradually faded from our minds.

_Lord Fisher to Mr. Churchill._

_7 a.m., November 21, 1914._

An angel’s sleep! In Heaven from 9 till now!

It WAS kind of you not to wake me with Grey’s credible witness!

Let us entreat and urge Kitchener to send a hundred thousand men AT
ONCE to Flanders, and warn Joffre not to be ‘two divisions too few and
two days too late!’ Kitchener’s balance of 160,000 men will amply
suffice and the ‘Ides of March’ have passed! The waning moon and
dawning tide [dawn high-tide] will not recur till days following
December 10. _Do write to him accordingly, or shall I?_

It has been a splendid ‘dress rehearsal,’ tell him, and very
reassuring—his mass of men and his mobile guns! We MUST press him to
send 100,000 men to Flanders....

On November 20 General Joffre asked for further naval co-operation on the Belgian coast.

‘General Foch,’ he stated, ‘reports that for some little time the
French or English ships have no longer been participating in the
action of our forces in the neighbourhood of Nieuport. On account of
very violent bombardment by the enemy in this region, it would be
advantageous if the ships could attack the numerous German batteries
established to the east of the mouth of the Yser. I should be glad if
you would notify the Ministry of Marine, and the Admiralty, of this
situation, in order to obtain a more active co-operation on the part
of the squadron between Nieuport and Ostend.’

We were able to send the old battleship _Revenge_, whose guns had been specially re-mounted for long range fire, and several smaller vessels under Admiral Hood, and the naval bombardment of the German right was effectively resumed. ‘The conditions on the coast,’ Hood, however, reported on the 22nd, ‘are quite different from what they were during the first few days. To-day there was a heavy fire from guns I could not locate or damage. No troops are ever visible. The inundation has stopped their movement.’

To the situation of strain and effort which gripped us during November came the welcome relief of the victory at the Falklands. Lord Fisher received it with a moderated satisfaction.

‘We cannot,’ he wrote to me on December 10, ‘but be overjoyed at the
_Monmouth_ and _Good Hope_ being avenged! But let us be
self-restrained—_not too exultant!—till we know details! Perhaps their
guns never reached us!_ (We had so few casualties!) We know THEIR
gunnery was excellent! Their THIRD salvo murdered Cradock! So it may
have been like shooting pheasants: the pheasants not shooting back!
Not too much glory for us, only great satisfaction. Not a battle for a
Poet Laureate! _Let us wait and hear before we crow!_ Then again, it
may be a wonder why the cruisers escaped—if they have escaped—I hope
not, for we had such a preponderating force—such numbers! (_How the
Glasgow must have enjoyed it!_) Anyhow, don’t let us encourage
ourselves in too many joy messages till we know more.’

But I made haste to ascribe to him all the credit that was his due.

_December 10._

This was your show and your luck.

I should only have sent one Greyhound[93] and _Defence_. This would
have done the trick.

But it was a niggling coup. Your _flair_ was quite true. Let us have
some more victories together, and confound all our foes abroad—and
(don’t forget) at home.

This delighted the Admiral, and in his reply (December 11) he threw a friendly light upon other fields of activity than those with which this chapter has been concerned.

Your letter _pleasant_! There is another _quite lovely scheme_! _I_ am
to be praised so as to get ‘swelled head’ and think myself ignored by
you, and to be in your shoes! It is all too sweet for words! It is
palpably transparent! I was told of this yesterday! It really _is
curious_ why they so hate you! I think I told you what G—— said, that
though he abhorred me, yet ... I have splendid friends in the Tory
camp!

A cause of difference, however, soon arose between us. The First Sea Lord was displeased with Sir Doveton Sturdee for not having succeeded in destroying the German light cruiser _Dresden_ with the rest, and he searchingly criticised that Admiral’s dispositions after the action. He wished to leave Admiral Sturdee in South American waters till the _Dresden_ was hunted down. As it was imperative that the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ should come home at once, such a decision would have entailed transferring Admiral Sturdee’s flag to the _Carnarvon_, and leaving him with a command scarcely suited to his rank and standing, and woefully out of harmony with his recent achievement. I was obliged to veto this proposal, and Lord Fisher was for some time much vexed at my decision.

The First Sea Lord also made the disquieting suggestion that the Germans might slip a battle cruiser like the _Derfflinger_ through our blockade in the long winter nights and fall upon the returning _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_, who had fired away three-quarters of their ammunition. I was greatly disturbed at this, and hastened to the Chief of the Staff. But Admiral Oliver was not often found improvident. He had already several weeks before sent the battleship _Vengeance_ with a quarter outfit for both vessels to St. Vincent, where it awaited them.

* * * * *

In spite of their anxieties, November and December were months of rapidly growing power to the Navy. The variety and scope of Admiralty business extended continually, and the number of important directions to be given increased every week. The reader who is further interested should study in the Appendix the selection of First Lord’s Minutes which I have thought it worth while to print.[94] From these original documents, conceived under the pressure of events, a truer idea can be formed of what was passing than from much description.

In no part of our work did Lord Fisher and I act together in greater harmony than in the realm of new construction.

The first task of the Admiralty in naval construction on the outbreak of war was to accelerate the completion of all the warships which were building in Great Britain, and according to the schemes we had had prepared before the war, extreme priority was to be assigned to vessels which could be finished within six months. On this basis we proceeded during the first three months. When it became clear that the war would not be ended one way or the other by the first main decisions on land, and that the sea battle was indefinitely deferred, I extended this original period, and we adopted the principle ‘Everything that can be finished in 1915, and nothing that can’t.’

This brought very large numbers of vessels into the accelerated class and, of course, opened the way for a considerable new construction of submarines, destroyers and even light cruisers. There had already been ordered when Lord Fisher arrived at the Admiralty a score of new destroyers and submarines, in addition to all the pre-war vessels under accelerated construction.

The yards were therefore full of work, and care was needed not to impede current construction by new orders. Lord Fisher, however, brought a very great surge of impulse to this sphere of our activities. It was a moment when megalomania was a virtue. Some progress had already been made on two of the British battleships of the programme of 1914–15. The First Sea Lord at once demanded to make them into battle-cruisers, sacrificing two more guns in each in order to get the immense speed for which he thirsted. I agreed to this, although it involved some delay; and the _Repulse_ and the _Renown_ were redesigned accordingly.

The construction of submarines was more urgent. I was not alarmed about the immediate position, although all sorts of rumours were afoot.

Naval Intelligence Division.

_November 7, 1914._

With reference to your report of yesterday, apparently attaching
credence to a statement that from 100 to 200 small submarines have
been manufactured secretly in Germany, have you considered how many
trained officers and personnel this important flotilla would require?
What evidence is there at your disposal to show that the Germans have
trained this number of submarine captains and officers? I have always
understood that their flotilla of submarines before the war did not
exceed 27. There is no personnel that requires more careful training
than the submarine personnel. All the experience of our officers shows
that a submarine depends for its effectiveness mainly upon its
captain. The function of the Intelligence Division is not merely to
collect and pass on the Munchausen tales of spies and untrustworthy
agents, but carefully to sift and scrutinise the intelligence they
receive, and in putting it forward to indicate the degree of
probability which attaches to it. It appears to me impossible that any
large addition to the German submarine force can be made for many
months to come. Even if the difficulties of material were overcome
those of personnel would impose an absolute limit. It is very likely
that a few small portable submarines have been prepared for coast
work.

W. S. C.

But the future already contained its menaces. I greeted Fisher on his arrival with the following minutes, the first two of which were addressed to his predecessor:—

Secretary.
Third Sea Lord.

_October 13, 1914._

Please state exactly what is the total submarine programme now
sanctioned by the Cabinet or under construction in the various yards.
What measures can be adopted for increasing the number of submarines?
Is it possible to let further contracts for submarines on a fifteen
months’ basis? It is indispensable that the whole possible plant for
submarine construction should be kept at the fullest pressure night
and day.

W. S. C.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Naval Secretary.

_October 28, 1914._

Please propose without delay the largest possible programme of
submarine boats to be delivered in from 12 to 24 months from the
present time. You should assume for this purpose that you have control
of all sources of manufacture required for submarines, that there is
no objection to using Vickers’ drawings, and that steam engines may be
used to supplement oil engines. You should exert every effort of
ingenuity and organisation to secure the utmost possible delivery. As
soon as your proposals are ready, which should be in the next few
days, they can be considered at a conference of the Sea Lords. The
Cabinet must be satisfied that the absolute maximum output is being
worked to in submarines. We may be sure that Germany is doing this.
Third Sea Lord’s department must therefore act with the utmost vigour,
and not be deterred by the kind of difficulties which hamper action in
time of peace.

W. S. C.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord.

_October 30, 1914._

More important than the deliveries of battleships is the acceleration
of light cruisers and submarines. With regard to light cruisers, it
ought not to take more than one year to construct _Castor_,
_Inconstant_, _Cambria_ and _Canterbury_. What is the present position
of these ships? Have they been begun yet? Proposals should be made
which secure their delivery before the end of 1915.

2. Proposals should also be made to accelerate _Royalist_,
_Cleopatra_, _Champion_, and _Carysfort_, _Conquest_, and _Calliope_,
so as to obtain deliveries in February. This will only be possible by
working night and day in three 8–hour shifts on all these vessels,
arranging with other firms not concerned in their construction to lend
the necessary men.

3. All the “M” Class destroyers to be delivered in August, 1915,
should be pushed forward into April and May. There is surely no reason
why this cannot be done. Firms who will undertake to complete their
vessels by this date could be immediately given another order for a
repeat ship, so that there would be no fear of dislocation of their
business. Let me have proposals on this.

4. Submarines F2, F3, G6, G8, G15, G9, G7, G10, to G13, and G1, to G5,
all ought to be delivered before the end of 1915. There is an
extraordinary gap after G4, when for 6 months we do not receive a
single new submarine, and in 12 months we only receive 2. This is
shocking, and must be bridged at all costs.

Pray let me have further proposals after such conferences as may be
necessary with the firms concerned.

W. S. C.

Lord Fisher hurled himself into this business with explosive energy. He summoned around him all the naval constructors and shipbuilding firms in Britain, and in four or five glorious days, every minute of which was pure delight to him, he presented me with schemes for a far greater construction of submarines, destroyers and small craft than I or any of my advisers had ever deemed possible. Mr. Schwab was at that time passing through England on his return to the United States. We invited him to the Admiralty; and he undertook to build twenty-four submarines—twelve in Canada and twelve in the United States—the bulk of which were to be completed in the hitherto incredibly short period of six months. I arranged a system of heavy bonuses for early delivery. These large negotiations were completed and the subsequent work was carried out with wonderful thoroughness and punctuality by the immense organisation of the Bethlehem Steel Company. One evening, as Lord Fisher, Mr. Schwab and I sat round the octagonal table in the Admiralty, after a long discussion on the submarine contracts, we asked Mr. Schwab, ‘Have you got anything else that will be of use to us?’ He thereupon told us that he had four turrets carrying two 14–inch guns each which had almost been completed for the Greek battleship _Salamis_ then building in Germany for Greece. We set our hearts on these; and I had an idea. The reader will remember the three small monitors building for Brazil, which although no one could see any use for them at the time, I had decided to take over at the outbreak of war. The operations on the Belgian Coast had shown their value. I suggested to Lord Fisher that we should buy these 14–inch turrets and build monitors to carry them. The Admiral was delighted with the plan, and in a few hours he was closeted with his constructors designing the vessels. In all our correspondence we referred to them as the _Styx_ class.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.

_December 11, 1914._

We ought without delay to order more ‘Styx’ class for heavy inshore
work. There are, for instance, the four reserve 13.5–inch guns of the
_Audacious_, which should certainly be mounted in new monitors. It
should also be possible to draw from the reserve of 15–inch guns, and
to make in a short time 15–inch or 18–inch howitzers. We require now
to make ships which can be built in 6 or 7 months at the outside, and
which can certainly go close in shore and attack the German Fleet in
its harbours. These are special vessels built for a definite war
operation, and we must look to them in default of a general action for
giving us the power of forcing a naval decision at the latest in the
autumn of 1915.

Our thought is proceeding independently on the same lines. I propose,
as a basis of discussion, that in addition to the 4 Schwab monitors,
we prepare 8 more at a cost of not more than £700,000 apiece. These
vessels should be armed either with 13·5–inch or 15–inch guns, two or
four in each as convenient. Or, alternatively, they should be armed
with four 18–inch howitzers in separate cupolas sunk low on their
heavily-armoured turtle backs. They should draw 8 feet at most, and be
propelled entirely by internal combustion at a speed not exceeding 10
knots; no funnels; three or four alternative telescopic masts for fire
observation; strong crinolines 20 feet away all round to make them
immune from mine or torpedo, etc....

W. S. C.

We soon embarked on an extensive scheme of monitor building.

Besides making four monitors to carry the American 14–inch gun turrets, we took two spare 15–inch gun turrets which had been prepared for two of the furthest-off new battleships (now converted into battle-cruisers), and eight 12–inch gun turrets out of four ‘Majestics,’ which we laid up; and with these and the American guns we armed no less than fourteen monitors, namely, two with two 15–inch guns, four with two 14–inch guns, and eight with two 12–inch guns apiece. Lord Fisher then went on and pulled the 9·2–inch guns out of the old ‘Edgars’ and mounted them in fourteen small monitors, drawing 6 feet 6 inches of water; and ten 6–inch guns[95] were mounted in still smaller monitors drawing 5 feet 11 inches. We also built later on twelve large river gunboats capable of being transported by rail for service on the Danube, if we ever got there, and twelve small river gunboats, or baby monitors, for service on the Tigris and the Euphrates. The bulk of the large monitors were constructed in Belfast with extraordinary celerity by Harland & Wolff and their sturdy ardent men. We also prepared 240 lighters with steel shields and internal combustion engines for landing troops under fire.

Thus in the autumn of 1914, under various programmes culminating in the great Fisher impetus, we set on foot the following enormous Fleet, all due to complete by the end of 1915:—

Battleships and Battle cruisers of the greatest power 7
Light cruisers 12
Destroyers of the largest class and leaders 65
Oversea submarines 40
Coastal submarines 22
Monitors—
Heavy 18
Medium 14
Light 5
Sloops and smaller anti-submarine vessels 107
Motor launches 60
Ex-lighters with internal combustion engines 240

This tremendous new Navy, for it was nothing less, was a providential aid to the Admiralty when more than two years later the real German submarine attack began. Its creation on such a scale is one of the greatest services which the nation has owed to the genius and energy of Lord Fisher. Probably Fisher in all his long life never had a more joyous experience than this great effort of new construction. No man knew better than he how to put war thought into a ship. Shipbuilding had been the greatest passion of his life. Here were all the yards of Britain at his disposal and every Treasury barrier broken down.

Of the battle-cruisers _Repulse_ and _Renown_, and still more of the light battle-cruisers _Courageous_, _Furious_ and _Glorious_, to which I consented four months later in circumstances which will be narrated in their place, it must be said that they were an old man’s children. Although possessing many marvellous qualities never hitherto combined in a ship of war, they were light in the bone; and the Navy always considered them wanting in the structural strength and armour which the new conditions of war more than ever required. None the less, their parent loved them dearly and always rallied with the utmost vehemence when any slur was cast upon their qualities.

I presided over all this process in November and December with the greatest admiration for the First Sea Lord, but with some misgivings on the score of expense. I was not yet satisfied that the war would be prolonged beyond 1915, and I did not wish to draw away from the armies men or material which might be needed in their service. Not until April, 1915, when the failure of Russia as a decisive factor became final, did I authorise a further extension of view to December 31, 1916, and agree to plans for additional new construction being made within that limit. Meanwhile I endeavoured to satisfy Lord Fisher as best I could. I pointed out to him repeatedly that from some points of view a ship finished twelve months before the end of the war was worth twelve times as much as a ship finished one month before its end, and urged continuously that vessels nearest completion must in no way suffer. He was, however, very difficult to feed. In a day he would sketch the design of a capital ship. In a week he would devour a programme and come back asking for more. A tit-bit like an 18–inch experimental gun which I suggested he should make, was snapped up the moment it was mentioned. ‘I will put it in a light cruiser and drive her 40 knots,’ he cried. ‘Hit how you like, when you like, where you like.’ This was his theme; but what about his doctrine ‘Armour is vision’? However, I backed him up all I could. He was far more often right than wrong, and his drive and life-force made the Admiralty quiver like one of his great ships at its highest speed.