Chapter XV: Part I: , Page 713 (7)

“1. I was a member of the SS from 1931 to 19 October 1944 and a
member of the SD from its creation in 1934 to January 1941. I
served as a member of the Waffen-SS from February 1941 until the
middle of 1942. Later I served in the Economics Department of
the Military Administration of Belgium from September 1942 to
September 1944. I surrendered to the Allies on 19 October 1944.

“2. On or about 10 August 1939 the Chief of the Sipo and SD,
Heydrich, personally ordered me to simulate an attack on the
radio station near Gleiwitz, near the Polish border, and to make
it appear that the attacking force consisted of Poles. Heydrich
said: ‘Actual proof of these attacks of the Poles is needed for
the foreign press, as well as for German propaganda purposes.’ I
was directed to go to Gleiwitz with five or six SD men and wait
there until I received a code word from Heydrich indicating that
the attack should take place. My instructions were to seize the
radio station and to hold it long enough to permit a
Polish-speaking German, who would be put at my disposal, to
broadcast a speech in Polish. Heydrich told me that this speech
should state that the time had come for the conflict between the
Germans and the Poles and that the Poles should get together and
strike down any Germans from whom they met resistance. Heydrich
also told me at this time that he expected an attack on Poland
by Germany in a few days.

“3. I went to Gleiwitz and waited there a fortnight. Then I
requested permission of Heydrich to return to Berlin but was
told to stay in Gleiwitz. Between the 25th and 31st of August I
went to see Heinrich Müller, head of the Gestapo, who was then
nearby at Oppeln. In my presence Müller discussed with a man
named Mehlhorn plans for another border incident, in which it
should be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking
German troops . . . . Germans in the approximate strength of a
company were to be used. Müller stated that he had 12 or 13
condemned criminals who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms
and left dead on the ground at the scene of the incident to show
that they had been killed while attacking. For this purpose they
were to be given fatal injections by a doctor employed by
Heydrich. Then they were also to be given gunshot wounds. After
the assault members of the press and other persons were to be
taken to the spot of the incident. A police report was
subsequently to be prepared.

“4. Müller told me that he had an order from Heydrich to make
one of those criminals available to me for the action at
Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred to these criminals
was ‘Canned Goods.’

“5. The incident at Gleiwitz in which I participated was carried
out on the evening preceding the German attack on Poland. As I
recall, war broke out on the 1st of September 1939. At noon on
the 31st of August I received by telephone from Heydrich the
code word for the attack which was to take place at 8 o’clock
that evening. Heydrich said, ‘In order to carry out this attack,
report to Müller for “Canned Goods.”’ I did this and gave Müller
instructions to deliver the man near the radio station. I
received this man and had him laid down at the entrance to the
station. He was alive, but he was completely unconscious. I
tried to open his eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that
he was alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot
wounds, but a lot of blood was smeared across his face. He was
in civilian clothes.

“6. We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a speech
of 3 to 4 minutes over an emergency transmitter, fired some
pistol shots, and left.”

And then “sworn to and subscribed to before Lieutenant Martin”.

The Gestapo and the SD carried out mass murders of hundreds of thousands of civilians of occupied countries, as a part of the Nazi program to exterminate political and racial undesirables, by the so-called Einsatz Groups. Your Honors will recall evidence concerning the activities of these Einsatz Groups or Einsatzkommandos. I now refer to Document R-102.

If Your Honors please, I understand Major Farr introduced this document this morning; but I want to refer to just one brief statement, which he did not include, concerning the SD and the Einsatz Groups and Security Police. It is on Page 4 of R-102. Quoting:

“During the period covered by this report the stations of the
Einsatz Groups of the Security Police and SD have changed only
in the northern sector.”

THE PRESIDENT: What was the document?

COL. STOREY: R-102, which was already introduced in evidence by Major Farr, and it is in Volume 2 toward the end of the book. There are two reports submitted by the chief of the Einsatz Group A available. The first report is Document L-180, which has already been received as Exhibit USA-276.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, would you not pass quite so quickly from one document to another?

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, pardon me, Sir. L-180, and I want to quote from Page 13. It is on Page 5 of the English translation. It is the beginning of the first paragraph, near the bottom of the page. Quoting:

“In view of the extension of the area of operations and of the
great number of duties which had to be performed by the Security
Police, it was intended from the very beginning to obtain the
co-operation of the reliable population in the fight against
felons, that is, mainly the Jews and Communists.”

And also in that same document, Page 30 of the original, Page 8 of the English translation, quoting:

“From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish
problem in Ostland could not be solved by pogroms alone.”

THE PRESIDENT: I am told that this has been read already.

COL. STOREY: I had it checked, and we did not catch that, Your Honor. I will pass on then.

Now, if Your Honor pleases, we will pass to Document 2273-PS next. I offer in evidence now just portions of Document 2273-PS, which is Exhibit USA-487. This document was captured by the U.S.S.R. and will be offered in detail by our Soviet colleagues later. But, with their consent, I want to introduce in evidence a chart which is identified by that document; and we have an enlargement which we would like to put on the board, passing to the Tribunal photostatic copies.

If Your Honor pleases, this chart is identified by the photostatic copy attached to the original report which will be dealt with in detail later. I want to quote just one statement from Page 2 of the English translation of that document. It is the third paragraph from the bottom on Page 2 of the English translation:

“The Estonian self-protection movement, formed as the Germans
advanced, did begin to arrest Jews; but there were no
spontaneous pogroms. Only by the Security Police and the SD were
the Jews gradually executed as they became no longer required
for work. Today there are no longer any Jews in Estonia.”

That document is a top-secret document by Einsatz Group A, which was a special projects group. This chart, of which the photostatic copy is attached to the original in the German translation on the wall, shows the progress of the extermination of the Jews in the area in which this Einsatzkommando group operated.

If Your Honors will refer to the top, next to Petersburg—or Leningrad as we know it—and down below, you will see the picture of a coffin; and that is described in the report as 3,600 having been killed.

Next, over at the left, is another coffin in one of the small Baltic states showing 963 in that area have been put in the coffin.

Then next, down near the capital of Riga, you will note that 35,238 were put away in the coffins; and it refers to the ghetto there as still having 2,500.

You come down to the next square or the next state showing 136,421 were put in their coffins; and then in the next area, near Minsk and just above Minsk, there were 41,828 put in their coffins.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you sure they were put in their coffins, the 136,000?

COL. STOREY: I beg your pardon, Sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Are you sure that they were executed, the 136,000?—because there is no coffin there.

COL. STOREY: No, Sir—the bottom statement—here are the totals from the documents.

THE PRESIDENT: These photostatic copies are different from what you have got there. In the area which is marked 136,421 there is no coffin.

COL. STOREY: Well, I am sorry. The one that I have is a true and correct copy of theirs.

THE PRESIDENT: Mine has not got it and Mr. Biddle’s has not got it.

COL. STOREY [_Turning to an assistant._] Will you hand this to the President, please?

THE PRESIDENT: I suppose the document itself will show it.

COL. STOREY: I will turn to the original and verify it. Let me have the original, please. Apparently there is a typographical error. If Your Honor pleases, here it is: 136,421, with the coffin.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Parker points out it is in the document itself, too.

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, it is in the document itself. There is an error on that.

The 128,000 at the bottom shows at that time there were 128,000 on hand, and the literal translation of the statement, as I understand, means, “still on hand in the Minsk area.”

I next refer to Document 1104-PS, Volume 2, Exhibit USA-483, which I now offer in evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, did you tell us what the document was? There is nothing on the translation, is there, to show what the document is.

COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, it is a report of the special-purpose Group A, a top-secret report—or the Einsatz group in other words—making a record of their activities in these areas, and this chart was attached showing the areas covered.

THE PRESIDENT: Special group of the Gestapo?

COL. STOREY: The special group that was organized of the Gestapo and the SD in that area. In other words, a Commando group.

As I mentioned, Your Honor, they organized these special Commando groups to work in and behind the armies as they consolidated their gains in occupied territories, and Your Honor will hear from other reports of these Einsatz groups as we go along in this presentation. In other words, “Einsatz” means “special action” or “action groups,” and they were organized to cover certain geographical areas behind the immediate front lines.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but they were groups, were they, of the Gestapo?

COL. STOREY: The Gestapo and the SD.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is part of the Gestapo.

COL. STOREY: There were some of the Kripo in it too.

Now the next document is 1104-PS, dated October 30, 1941. This document shows on that date the Commissioner of the territory of Sluzk wrote a report to the Commissioner General of Minsk, in which he severely criticized the actions of the Einsatzkommandos of the Sipo and the SD operating in his area for the murder of the Jewish population of that area, and I quote from the English translation, on Page 4 of that document, beginning at the first paragraph after the colon:

“On 27 October, in the morning at about 8 o’clock, a first
lieutenant of the Police Battalion Number 11, from Kovno,
Lithuania, appeared and introduced himself as the adjutant of
the battalion commander of the Security Police. The first
lieutenant explained that the police battalion had received the
assignment to effect the liquidation of all Jews here in the
town of Sluzk within 2 days. The battalion commander with his
battalion in strength of four companies, two of which were made
up of Lithuanian partisans, was on the march here and the action
would have to begin instantly. I replied to the first lieutenant
that I had to discuss the action in any case first with the
commander. About half an hour later the police battalion arrived
in Sluzk. Immediately after the arrival a conference with the
battalion commander took place according to my request. I first
explained to the commander that it would not very well be
possible to effect the action without previous preparation,
because everybody had been sent to work and that it would lead
to terrible confusion. At least it would have been his duty to
inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested him to postpone
the action 1 day. However, he refused this with the remark that
he had to carry out this action everywhere in all towns and that
only 2 days were allotted for Sluzk. Within those 2 days the
town of Sluzk had by all means to be cleared of Jews.”

That report was made to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories through Gauleiter Hinrich Lohse, at Riga. Your Honors will recall that he was referred to in another presentation.

Now skipping over to Page 5, the first paragraph—I would like to quote it:

“For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must
point out, to my deepest regret, that the latter almost bordered
on sadism. The town itself during the action offered a picture
of horror. With indescribable brutality on the part both of the
German police officers and particularly of the Lithuanian
partisans, the Jewish people, and also with them White
Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded
together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard, and in
different streets the corpses of Jews who had been shot
accumulated. The White Ruthenians were in the greatest anguish
to free themselves from the encirclement. In addition to the
fact that the Jewish people, among whom were also artisans, were
barbarously maltreated in sight of the White Ruthenian people,
the White Ruthenians themselves were also beaten with clubs and
rifle butts. It was no longer a question of an action against
the Jews. It looked much more like a revolution.”

And then I skip down to the next to the last paragraph on that same page, quoting:

“In conclusion, I find myself obliged to point out that the
police battalion looted in an unheard-of manner during the
action and that not only in Jewish houses but equally in those
of the White Ruthenians. Anything of use, such as boots,
leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, was taken away.
According to statements of the troops, watches were torn off the
arms of Jews openly on the street and rings pulled off their
fingers in the most brutal manner. A disbursing officer reported
that a Jewish girl was asked by the police to obtain immediately
5,000 rubles to have her father released. This girl is said
actually to have run about everywhere to obtain the money.”

There is another paragraph, with reference to the number of copies, on the third page of the translation, to which I would like to call Your Honors’ attention—the last paragraph on Page 3 of the translation, quoting:

“I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy may
be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order cannot be
maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of that sort. To have
buried alive seriously wounded people, who then worked their way
out of their graves again, is such extreme beastliness that this
incident as such must be reported to the Führer and the Reich
Marshal.

“The civil administration of White Ruthenia makes every effort
to win the population over to Germany, in accordance with the
instructions of the Führer. These efforts cannot be brought into
harmony with the methods described here.”—Signed by the
Commissioner General for White Ruthenia.

And then, on the 11th of November 1941, he forwards it on to the Reich Minister for occupied countries, in Berlin.

THE PRESIDENT: Who was that at that time?

COL. STOREY: The Reich Minister, I believe—at that time at least—for the eastern occupied countries was the Defendant Rosenberg. I think that is correct. On the same date, by separate letter, the Commissioner General of White Ruthenia reported to the Reich Commissioner for the eastern countries that he had received money, valuables, and other objects taken by the police in the action at Sluzk and other regions, all of which had been deposited with the Reich Credit Institute for the disposal of the Reich Commissioner.

On 21 November 1941 a report on the Sluzk incident was sent to the personal reviewer of the permanent deputy of the Minister of the Reich with a copy to Heydrich, who was the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. That is shown on the first page of Document Number 1104-PS.

The activities of the Einsatz groups continued throughout 1943 and 1944 under Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD. Under adverse war conditions, however, the program of extermination was, to a large extent, changed to one of rounding up slave labor for Germany.

I next refer to Document 3012-PS, which has heretofore been introduced as Exhibit USA-190. This is a letter from the headquarters of one of the Commando groups, a section known as Einsatz Group C, dated 19 March 1943. This letter summarizes the real activities and methods of the Gestapo and SD, and I should like to refer to additional portions to those previously quoted, on Page 2 of Document 3012-PS; and I believe I will read the first page, beginning with the first paragraph:

“It is the task of the Security Police and of the Security
Service”—SD—“to discover all enemies of the Reich, and fight
against them in the interest of security, especially the
security of the Army in the zone of operations. Besides the
annihilation of active, avowed opponents, all other elements who
by virtue of their convictions or their past might under
favorable conditions actively appear as enemies are to be
eliminated through preventive measures. The Security Police
carries out this task according to the general directives of the
Führer, with all required severity. Energetic measures are
especially necessary in territories endangered by the activity
of partisan bands. The competence of the Security Police within
the zone of operations is based on the ‘Barbarossa’
decrees.”—The Tribunal will recall the famous “Barbarossa”
code-name decrees that were issued in connection with the
invasion of Russia—“I deem the measures of the Security Police,
carried out on a considerable scale during recent times,
necessary for the two following reasons:

“1. The situation at the front in my sector had become so
serious that the population, partly influenced by Hungarians and
Italians who were streaming back in confusion, were openly
opposing us.

“2. The strong expeditions by partisan bands, coming chiefly
from the forest of Bryansk, were another reason. Besides that,
other partisan groups formed from the population were appearing
like mushrooms in all districts. The procurement of arms
evidently provided no difficulties at all. It would have been
inexcusable if we had observed this whole activity without
taking measures against it. It is obvious that all such measures
are accompanied by severity.

“I want to take up the significant points of these severe
measures:

“1) The shooting of Hungarian Jews; 2) the shooting of
agriculturalists; 3) the shooting of children; 4) the burning to
the ground of villages; 5)”—the shooting, quoting—“while
trying to escape, of Security Service (SD) prisoners.

“Chief of Einsatz Group C confirmed once more the suitability of
the measures executed and expressed his appreciation for the
drastic steps taken. In consideration of the current political
situation, especially in the armament industry in the
fatherland, the measures of the Security Police are to be
subordinated to the greatest extent to the recruiting of labor
for Germany. In the shortest possible time the Ukraine has to
place at the disposal of the armament industry 1 million
workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our territory daily.”

If Your Honor pleases, I believe the numbers have been quoted before by Mr. Dodd. I refer on the next page to the first order, in 1 and 2—Subparagraphs:

“1. Special treatment is to be kept to a minimum.

“2. The listing of communist functionaries, activists, and so
on, is to take place only by roster for the time being, without
arrests. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to arrest all
the close relatives of a member of the Communist Party. Likewise
members of the Komsomolz are to be arrested only if they were
active in leading positions.”

The next subparagraphs have been read into evidence, 3 and 4, in a previous presentation.

“5. The reporting of partisan bands as well as drives against
them is not affected hereby. I point out, however, that all
drives against those bands are to take place only with my
approval.

“6. The prisons are to be kept empty as a rule. We must be aware
of the fact that the Slavs interpret all soft treatment on our
part as weakness and that they will act accordingly, right away.
If we restrict our harsh Security Police measures through the
above orders for the time being, it is done only for the
following reason: the most important thing is the recruiting of
workers. No check of persons to be sent into the Reich will be
made. There are therefore no written certificates of political
reliability or the like to be furnished.”—Signed—“Christensen,
SS Sturmbannführer and Commanding Officer.”

I understood that Your Honor wanted to adjourn at 4 o’clock, and I believe that I can introduce one more statement. It was the Einsatz Groups of the Security Police and SD that operated the infamous death vans. Previously, Document 501-PS, which was received as Exhibit USA-288, referred to this operation. The letter from Becker, which is a part of this exhibit, was addressed to Obersturmbannführer Rauff at Berlin. We now refer to Document L-185. I simply refer to Document 501-PS as a reference to the death vans. Document L-185, Exhibit USA-484, is the one I now offer in evidence, Page 7 of the English translation—L-185. It will be observed that the chief of Amt II D of the RSHA in charge of technical matters was Obersturmbannführer Rauff. Mr. Harris advises me that the only point to be proved by that is that the chief of Amt II D of the RSHA, who made this report on technical matters, was the Obersturmbannführer Rauff; and then he refers in the same connection to Document 2348-PS, which is Exhibit USA-485. The previous one was to identify Rauff, and then to offer his affidavit which is 2348-PS, second volume. Reading from the beginning of the affidavit—it was made on 19 October 1945 in Ancona, Italy—quoting:

“I hereby acknowledge the attached letter, written by Dr. Becker
. . . on the 16 May 1942 and received by me on the 29 May 1942,
as a genuine letter. I did on 18 October 1945 write on the side
of this letter a statement to the effect that it was genuine. I
do not know the number of death vans being operated and cannot
give an approximate figure. The vans were built by the Saurer
Works, Germany, located, I believe, in Berlin. Some other firms
built these vans also. Insofar as I am aware, these vans
operated only in Russia. Insofar as I can state, these vans were
probably operating in 1941; and it is my personal opinion that
they were operating up to the termination of the war.”

If Your Honor pleases, I do not believe that we will have time to go into the next exhibit.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the Tribunal will now adjourn, until Wednesday, the 2d of January.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 2 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

TWENTY-FIFTH DAY
Wednesday, 2 January 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: I call on the counsel for the United States.

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, when Your Honors adjourned on 20 December we were presenting the Gestapo and had referred to the use of the death vans by the Einsatz groups in the eastern occupied countries and had almost concluded that phase of the presentation. Your Honors will recall we had referred to the use of some death vans made by the Saurer works, and the final reference that I want to make in that connection is to a telegram attached to Document 501-PS, which it is not necessary to read, which establishes the fact that the same make of truck or vans were the death vans used by the Einsatz groups.

The final document in connection with the Einsatz groups in the Eastern Occupied Territories which we desire to offer is Document 2992-PS, and I believe it is in the second volume of the document book. This is an affidavit made by Hermann Gräbe. Hermann Gräbe is at present employed by the United States Government at Frankfurt. The affidavit was made at Wiesbaden; and I offer excerpts from the affidavit, 2992-PS, Exhibit Number USA-494.

This witness was at the head of a construction firm that was doing some building in the Ukraine and he was an eyewitness to the anti-Jewish actions at the town of Rovno, Ukraine, on 13 July 1942, and I refer to the part of the affidavit which is on Page 5 of the English translation. Beginning at the first:

“From September 1941 until January 1944 I was manager and
engineer-in-charge of a branch office in Sdolbunov, Ukraine, of
the Solingen building firm of Josef Jung. In this capacity it
was my job to visit the building sites of the firm. The firm
had, among others, a site in Rovno, Ukraine.

“During the night of 13 July 1942, all inhabitants of the Rovno
ghetto, where there were still about 5,000 Jews, were
liquidated.

“I should describe the circumstances of my being a witness of
the dissolution of the ghetto and the carrying out of the pogrom
during the night and morning, as follows:

“I employed for the firm in Rovno, in addition to Poles,
Germans, and Ukrainians, about 100 Jews from Sdolbunov, Ostrog,
and Mysotch. The men were quartered in a building, 5
Bahnhofstrasse, inside the ghetto, and the women in a house at
the corner of Deutschestrasse, 98.

“On Saturday, 11 July 1942, my foreman, Fritz Einsporn, told me
of a rumor that on Monday all Jews in Rovno were to be
liquidated. Although the vast majority of the Jews employed by
my firm in Rovno were not natives of this town, I still feared
that they might be included in this announced pogrom. I
therefore ordered Einsporn at noon of the same day to march all
the Jews employed by us—men as well as women—in the direction
of Sdolbunov, about 12 kilometers from Rovno. This was done.

“The Eldest of the Jews had learned of the departure of the
Jewish workers of my firm. He went to see the commanding officer
of the Rovno Sipo and SD, SS Major (SS Sturmbannführer) Dr.
Pütz, as early as Saturday afternoon to find out whether the
rumor of a forthcoming Jewish pogrom, which had gained further
credence by reason of the departure of Jews of my firm, was
true. Dr. Pütz dismissed the rumor as a clumsy lie and for the
rest had the Polish personnel of my firm in Rovno arrested.
Einsporn avoided arrest by escaping from Sdolbunov. When I
learned of this incident I gave orders that all Jews who had
left Rovno were to report back to work in Rovno on Monday, 13
July 1942. On Monday morning I myself went to see the commanding
officer, Dr. Pütz, in order to learn, for one thing, the truth
about the rumored Jewish pogrom and secondly to obtain
information on the arrest of the Polish office personnel. SS
Major Pütz stated to me that no pogrom whatever was planned.
Moreover, such a pogrom would be stupid because the firms and
the Reichsbahn would lose valuable workers.

“An hour later I received a summons to appear before the area
commissioner of Rovno. His deputy, Stabsleiter and Cadet Officer
Beck, subjected me to the same questions as I had undergone at
the SD. My explanation that I had sent the Jews home for urgent
delousing appeared plausible to him. He then told me—making me
promise to keep it a secret—that a pogrom would, in fact, take
place in the evening of Monday, 13 July 1942. After lengthy
negotiation I managed to persuade him to give me permission to
take my Jewish workers to Sdolbunov—but only after the pogrom
had been carried out. During the night it would be up to me to
protect the house in the ghetto against the entry of Ukrainian
militia and SS. As confirmation of the discussion he gave me a
document, which stated that the Jewish employees of Messrs. Jung
were not affected by the pogrom.”

And this original which I hold in my hand, I will now pass to the translator for reading. I call the attention of Your Honors to the fact that it has the letterhead of “Der Gebietskommissar in Rovno,” and it is dated the 13th of July 1942, and it is signed by this area commissioner. I now read this document:

“The area commissioner”—which means Gebietskommissar—“Rovno.
Secret.”—Addressed—“Messrs. Jung, Rovno.

“The Jewish workers employed by your firm are not affected by
the pogrom”—in parenthesis “Aktion.” As I understand, that
means “action.”

“You must transfer them to their new place of work by Wednesday,
15 July 1942, at the latest.”

Signed by the Area Commissioner Beck. And then the stamp—the official stamp of the area commissioner at Rovno.

Now, just the following paragraph on the original, Page 5 or 6, I believe it is; one more paragraph I would like to read after the reference “Original attached”:

“On the evening of this day I drove to Rovno and posted myself
with Fritz Einsporn in front of the house in the Bahnhofstrasse
in which the Jewish workers of my firm slept. Shortly after 2200
the ghetto was encircled by a large SS detachment and about
three times as many members of the Ukrainian militia. Then the
electric arclights which had been erected in and around the
ghetto were switched on. SS and militia squads of four to six
men entered or at least tried to enter the house. Where the
doors and windows were closed and the inhabitants did not open
at the knocking, the SS men and militia broke the windows,
forced the doors with beams and crowbars and entered the houses.
The people living there were driven on to the street just as
they were, regardless of whether they were dressed or in bed.
Since the Jews in most cases refused to leave their houses and
resisted, the SS and militia applied force. They finally
succeeded, with strokes of the whip, kicks, and blows with rifle
butts, in clearing the houses. The people were driven out of
their houses in such haste that small children in bed had been
left behind in several instances. In the streets women cried out
for their children and children for their parents. That did not
prevent the SS from driving the people along the road at running
pace, and hitting them, until they reached a waiting freight
train. Car after car was filled, and the screaming of women and
children and the cracking of whips and rifle shots resounded
unceasingly. Since several families or groups had barricaded
themselves in especially strong buildings and the doors could
not be forced with crowbars or beams, the doors were now blown
open with hand grenades. Since the ghetto was near the railroad
tracks in Rovno, the younger people tried to get across the
tracks and over a small river to get away from the ghetto area.
As this stretch of country was beyond the range of the electric
lights, it was illuminated by small rockets. All through the
night these beaten, hounded, and wounded people moved along the
lighted streets. Women carried their dead children in their
arms, children pulled and dragged their dead parents by their
arms and legs down the road toward the train. Again and again
the cries, ‘Open the door! Open the door!’ echoed through the
ghetto.”

I will not read any more of this affidavit. It is a very long one. There is also a second affidavit, but the part I wanted to emphasize is the fact that the original exemption was signed by the area commissioner and that the SD and the SS participated in this action.

THE PRESIDENT: Oughtn’t you to read the rest of that page, Colonel Storey?

COL. STOREY: All right, Sir. I really had eliminated that because I thought there might be some repetition.

“About 6 o’clock in the morning I went away for a moment,
leaving behind Einsporn and several other German workers who had
returned in the meantime. I thought the greatest danger was past
and that I could risk it. Shortly after I left, Ukrainian
militia men forced their way into 5 Bahnhofstrasse and brought
seven Jews out and took them to a collecting point inside the
ghetto. On my return I was able to prevent further Jews from
being taken out. I went to the collecting point to save these
seven men. I saw dozens of corpses of all ages and both sexes in
the streets I had to walk along. The doors of the houses stood
open, windows were smashed. Pieces of clothing, shoes,
stockings, jackets, caps, hats, coats, _et cetera_, were lying
in the street. At the corner of a house lay a baby, less than a
year old with his skull crushed. Blood and brains were spattered
over the house wall and covered the area immediately around the
child. The child was dressed only in a little shirt. The
commander, SS Major Pütz, was walking up and down a row of about
80 to 100 male Jews who were crouching on the ground. He had a
heavy dog whip in his hand. I walked up to him, showed him the
written permit of Stabsleiter Beck and demanded the seven men
whom I recognized among those who were crouching on the ground.
Dr. Pütz was very furious about Beck’s concession and nothing
could persuade him to release the seven men. He made a motion
with his hand encircling the square and said that anyone who was
once here would not get away. Although he was very angry with
Beck, he ordered me to take the people from 5 Bahnhofstrasse out
of Rovno by 8 o’clock at the latest. When I left Dr. Pütz, I
noticed a Ukrainian farm cart with two horses. Dead people with
stiff limbs were lying on the cart. Legs and arms projected over
the side boards. The cart was making for the freight train. I
took the remaining 74 Jews who had been locked in the house to
Sdolbunov.

“Several days after the 13th of July 1942 the area commissioner
of Sdolbunov, Georg Marschall, called a meeting of all firm
managers, railroad superintendents, and leaders of the
Organization Todt and informed them that the firms, _et cetera_,
should prepare themselves for the resettlement of the Jews which
was to take place almost immediately. He referred to the pogrom
in Rovno where all the Jews had been liquidated, i.e. had been
shot near Kostopol.”

Finally, his signature is sworn to on the 10th of November 1945.

THE PRESIDENT: What nationality is Gräbe?

COL. STOREY: He is German. Gräbe was a German and is now in the employ of the Military Government at Frankfurt—the United States Military Government.

Your Honor, in that connection there is another separate affidavit attached to this which is a part of the same document, which I will not attempt to read. But it has to do with the execution of some people in another area and is along the same line. I am not reading it because it would be cumulative, but it is a part of this same document.

I now pass from that subject to the next subject.

The Gestapo and SD stationed special units in prisoner-of-war camps for the purpose of screening out racial and political undesirables and executing those who were screened out. The program of mass murder of political and racial undesirables carried on against civilians was also applied to prisoners of war who were captured on the Eastern Front. In this connection I call attention of the Tribunal to the testimony of General Lahousen, which Your Honors will recall, of the 30th of November 1945. Lahousen testified to a conference which took place in the summer of 1941 shortly after the beginning of the campaign against the Soviet Union, which was attended by himself—and I want to emphasize this, because we will later have a document that emanated from this conference—attended by himself, General Reinecke, Colonel Breuer, and Müller, the head of the Gestapo. At this conference the command to kill Soviet functionaries and Communists among the Soviet prisoners of war was discussed. The executions were to be carried out by Einsatzkommandos of the Sipo and the SD. Lahousen further recalled that Müller, who was the head of the Gestapo, insisted on carrying out the program and that the only concession he made was that, in deference to the sensibilities of the German troops, the executions would not take place in the presence of the troops. Müller also made some concessions as to the selection of the persons to be murdered; but, according to Lahousen, the selection was left entirely to the commanders of these screening units. I refer to Page 633 of the official transcript (Volume II, Page 458).

Now I offer Document 502-PS as the next exhibit, Exhibit Number USA-486. This document is a Gestapo directive of the 17 of July 1941—If you will recall, Lahousen said this conference was in the summer of 1941—It is addressed to commanders of the Sipo and SD stationed in camps and provides in part as follows, and I read from the first page of the English translation. Now, if the Tribunal please, our colleagues, the Soviet prosecutors, will present most of that document; and I am only going to read enough to show that the Gestapo were the ones that took part in it. From the beginning:

“The activation of Commandos will take place in accordance with
the agreement of the Chief of the Security Police and Security
Service and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as of 16
July 1941. Enclosure 1.

“The Commandos will work independently within the limits of the
camp regulations according to special authorization and
according to the general directives given to them. Naturally the
Commandos will keep close contact with the camp commander and
the intelligence officer assigned to him.

“The mission of the Commandos is the political investigating of
all camp inmates, the separation and further treatment of:

“a. All political, criminal, or in some other way, intolerable
elements among them;

“b. Those persons who could be used for the reconstruction of
the occupied countries.”

Now I skip to the beginning of the fourth paragraph:

“The Commandos must use for their work, as far as possible at
present and even later, the experiences of the camp commanders
which the latter have collected meanwhile from the observation
of the prisoners and examination of the camp inmates. Further,
the Commandos must make efforts from the beginning to seek out
among the prisoners elements which would appear reliable,
regardless whether they are Communists or not, in order to use
them for intelligence purposes inside the camp and, if
advisable, later in the occupied territories also.

“By use of such informers and by use of all other existing
possibilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated
among the prisoners must proceed, step by step, at once. The
Commandos must find out definitely in every case, by a short
questioning of those reported and possibly by questioning other
prisoners, what measures should be taken. The information of one
informer is not sufficient to designate a camp inmate to be a
suspect without further proof. It must be confirmed in some way,
if possible.”

Now I skip to Page 2, the third paragraph of the English translation, quoting:

“Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the immediate
vicinity of the camp. If the camps in the Government General are
in the immediate vicinity of the border, then the prisoners are
to be taken for special treatment, if possible, into the former
Soviet Russian territory.”

And then the fifth paragraph:

“In regard to executions to be carried out and to the possible
removal of reliable civilians and the removal of informers for
the Einsatzgruppe into the occupied territories, the leader of
the Einsatzkommandos must make an agreement with the nearest
State Police office, as well as with the commandant of the
Security Police unit and Security Service, and beyond these,
with the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe concerned in the occupied
territories.”

Proof that persons so screened out of the prisoner-of-war camps by the Gestapo were executed is to be found in Document 1165-PS, from which I did not intend to quote and which has been introduced previously as Exhibit Number USA-244. Document 1165-PS which shows that they executed those that had been screened out.

The first page of that document, without reading it, is a letter from the camp commandant of the Concentration Camp Gross-Rosen to Müller, who was the Chief of the Gestapo, dated the 23rd of October 1941, referring to a previous oral conference with Müller and setting forth the names of 20 Soviet prisoners of war executed the previous day.

The second page—I am still referring to 1165 but not reading from it, because it has been quoted from—is a directive issued by Müller on the 9th of November 1941 to all Gestapo offices, in which he ordered that all diseased prisoners of war should be excluded from transports to concentration camps for execution, because 5 to 10 percent of those destined for execution were arriving in the camps dead or half dead.

I now offer Document 2542-PS, Exhibit Number USA-489, which is in the second volume. This is an affidavit of Kurt Lindow, a former Gestapo official, which was taken on the 30th of September 1945, at Oberursel, Germany, in the course of an official military investigation by the United States Army; and I quote from that document from the beginning:

“I was criminal director in Section IV of the RSHA”—I call Your
Honors’ attention to the chart on the board that he was criminal
director in Section IV and head of the Subsection IV A 1—“from
the middle of 1942 until the middle of 1944. I had the rank of
SS Sturmbannführer.

“From 1941 until the middle of 1943, there was attached to
Subsection IV A 1”—which is not shown on this chart, but has
previously been described in the beginning—“a special
department that was headed by the Regierungsoberinspektor, later
Regierungsamtmann, and SS Hauptsturmführer Franz Königshaus. In
this department, were handled matters concerning prisoners of
war. I learned from this department that instructions and orders
by Reichsführer Himmler dating from 1941 to 1942 existed,
according to which captured Soviet political commissars and
Jewish soldiers were to be executed. As far as I know, proposals
for execution of such prisoners of war were received from the
various prisoner-of-war camps. Königshaus had to prepare the
orders for execution and submitted them to the chief of Section
IV, Müller, for signature”—Müller being the head of the
Gestapo.—“These orders were made out so that one was to be sent
to the agency making the request, and a second one to the
concentration camp designated to carry out the execution. The
prisoners of war in question were at first formally released
from prisoner-of-war status, then transferred to a concentration
camp for execution.

“The Chief of the section Königshaus, was under me in
disciplinary questions from the middle of 1942 until about the
beginning of 1943 and worked, in matters of his department,
directly with the chief of Subsection IV A, Regierungsdirector
Panzinger. Early in 1943 the department was dissolved and
absorbed into the departments in Subsection IV B. The work
concerning Russian prisoners of war must then have been done by
IV B 2a. Head of Department IV B 2a was Regierungsrat and
Sturmbannführer Hans Helmuth Wolf.

“There existed in the prisoner-of-war camps on the Eastern Front
small screening teams (Einsatzkommandos), headed by a lower
ranking member of the Secret Police or Gestapo. These teams were
assigned to the camp commanders and had the job to segregate the
prisoners of war who were candidates for execution, according to
the orders that had been given, and to report them to the office
of the Secret Police.”

I will not read the remainder of that affidavit.

Passing from that phase of the case: The Gestapo and SD sent recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps where they were executed—that is, prisoners of war who had escaped and were recaptured. The Tribunal will recall that in a document heretofore introduced, 1650-PS, was an order in which the Chief of the Security Police and SD instructed regional Gestapo offices to take certain classes of recaptured officers from camps and to transport them to Mauthausen concentration camp, under the operation known as “Kugel.” That, if Your Honor recalls, means “bullet.” That is the famous “Bullet Decree” that has been previously introduced. On the journey the prisoners of war were to be placed in irons. The Gestapo officers were to make semi-annual reports, giving numbers only, of the sending of these prisoners of war to Mauthausen. On the 27th of July 1944 an order was issued from the VI Corps Area Command on the treatment of prisoners of war. That is Document 1514-PS in the second volume, which I offer as Exhibit Number USA-491. This document provided that prisoners of war were to be discharged from prisoner-of-war status and transferred to the Gestapo under certain circumstances, and I quote from the first page, beginning with the word “subject,” quoting:

“Subject: Delivery of prisoners of war to the Secret State
Police.

“Enclosed in the annex Reference Decree 1. The following
summarized ruling is issued with respect to the delivery to the
Secret Police:

“1) a) According to Reference Decrees 2 and 3, the commander of
the camp has to deliver Soviet prisoners of war to the Secret
State Police in case of punishable offenses and to dismiss them
from imprisonment of war, if he does not believe that his
disciplinary functions suffice to prescribe punishment for
violations committed. Report of the facts of the case is not
necessary.

“b) Recaptured Soviet prisoners of war have to be delivered
first to the nearest police office in order to ascertain whether
punishable offenses have been committed during the escape. The
dismissal from imprisonment of war takes place upon suggestion
of the police office, (Section A6 of Reference Decree Number 4
regarding the compilation of all regulations on the
Arbeitseinsatz of prisoners of war who have been recaptured and
refuse to work.)

“c) Recaptured Soviet officers who are prisoners of war have to
be delivered to the Gestapo and to be dismissed from
imprisonment of war. (Section A1 of Reference Decree Number 4.)

“d) Soviet officer prisoners of war who refuse to work and those
who distinguish themselves as agitators and exert an unfavorable
influence upon the willingness to work of the other prisoners of
war have to be delivered by the responsible Stalag to the
nearest State Police office and dismissed from imprisonment of
war. (Section C1 of Reference Decree Number 4 and Reference
Decree Number 5.)

“e) Soviet enlisted prisoners of war refusing to work who are
ringleaders and those who distinguish themselves as agitators
and therefore exert an unfavorable influence upon the
willingness to work of the other prisoners of war have to be
delivered to the nearest State Police office and to be dismissed
from imprisonment of war. (Section C2 of Reference Decree Number
4.)

“f) Soviet prisoners of war (enlisted men and officers) who,
with respect to their political attitude, have been sifted out
by the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and the Security
Service have to be delivered upon request by the camp commander
to the Einsatzkommando and to be dismissed from imprisonment of
war. (Reference Decree Number 6.)

“g) 1. Polish prisoners of war have to be delivered, if acts of
sabotage are proven, to the nearest State Police office and to
be dismissed from imprisonment of war. The decision rests with
the camp commander. Report on this is not necessary. (Reference
Decree Number 7.)

“2. A report on the delivery and dismissal from imprisonment of
war in the cases mentioned under Paragraph 1 of this decree to
the Wehrkreis Command VI, Department for Prisoners of War, is
not necessary.

“3. Prisoners of war from all nations have to be delivered to
the Secret State Police and to be dismissed from imprisonment of
war, if a special order to that effect is issued by the OKW or
by Wehrkreis Command VI, Department for Prisoners of War.

“4. Prisoners of war under suspicion of participation in illegal
organizations and resistance movements have to be left to the
Gestapo upon request for the purpose of interrogation. They
remain prisoners of war and have to be treated as such. The
delivery to the Gestapo and their dismissal from imprisonment of
war has to take place only by order of the OKW or of Wehrkreis
Command VI, Department for Prisoners of War.

“In case of French and Belgian prisoners of war and interned
Italian military personnel, approval of Wehrkreis Command VI,
Department for Prisoners of War, has to be obtained—if
necessary by phone—before delivery to the Gestapo for the
purpose of interrogation.”

This decree was known as the “Bullet Decree.” Prisoners of war sent to Mauthausen concentration camp under the decree were executed.

I now offer in support of that statement Document 2285-PS, Exhibit Number USA-490. It is in the second volume. Document 2285-PS is an affidavit of Lieutenant Colonel Guivante de Saint Gast and Lieutenant Jean Veith, both of the French Army, which was taken on the 13th of May 1945 in the course of an official military investigation by the United States Army. The affidavit discloses that Lieutenant Colonel Gast was confined at Mauthausen from 18 March 1944 to 22 April 1945 and that Lieutenant Veith was confined from 22 April 1943 until 22 April 1945. I quote from the affidavit, beginning with the third paragraph of Page 1, quoting:

“In Mauthausen existed several treatments of prisoners, amongst
them the ‘action K or Kugel’ (Bullet action). Upon the arrival
of transports, prisoners with the mention ‘K’ were not
registered, got no numbers, and their names remained unknown
except for the officials of the Politische Abteilung. Lieutenant
Veith had the opportunity of hearing upon the arrival of a
transport the following conversation between the
Untersturmführer Streitwieser and chief of the convoy:

“‘How many prisoners?’

“‘15 but two K.’

“‘Well, that makes 13.’

“The K prisoners were taken directly to the prison where they
were unclothed and taken to the ‘bathroom.’ This bathroom in the
cellars of the prison building near the crematory was specially
designed for execution (shooting and gassing).

“The shooting took place by means of a measuring apparatus—the
prisoner being backed towards a metrical measure with an
automatic contraption releasing a bullet in his neck as soon as
the moving plank determining his height touched the top of his
head.

“If a transport consisted of too many ‘K’ prisoners, instead of
losing time for the ‘measurement’ they were exterminated by gas
sent into the shower room instead of water.”

I now pass to another subject, namely: “The Gestapo was responsible for establishing and classifying concentration camps and for committing racial and political undesirables to concentration and annihilation camps for slave labor and mass murder.”

The Tribunal has already received evidence concerning the responsibility of the Gestapo for the administration of concentration camps and the authority of the Gestapo for taking persons into protective custody to be carried out in the State concentration camps. The Gestapo also issued orders establishing concentration camps, transforming prisoner-of-war camps into concentration camps as internment camps, changing labor camps into concentration camps, setting up special sections for female prisoners, and so forth.

The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the classification of concentration camps according to the seriousness of the accusation and the chances for reforming the prisoners, from the Nazi viewpoint. I now refer to Documents 1063(a)-PS and 1063(b)-PS in the second volume, Exhibit Number USA-492. The concentration camps were classified as Class I, II, or III. Class I was for the least serious prisoners, and Class III was for the most serious. Now this Document 1063(a)-PS is signed by Heydrich and it is dated the 2d of January 1941. I quote from the beginning with the word “subject,” quoting:

“Subject: Classification of the concentration camps.

“The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police has given
his approval to classify the concentration camps into various
categories, which take into account the personality of the
prisoner as well as the degree of his harmfulness to the State.
Accordingly, the concentration camps will be classified into the
following categories:

“Category I—for all prisoners charged with minor offenses only
and definitely qualified for correction; also for special cases
and solitary confinement—Camps Dachau, Sachsenhausen, and
Auschwitz I. The latter also applies in part to Category II.