Chapter XXIV: Part I: , Page 713 (16)
The next document, Your Honor, is 508-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-545. Now, the Hitler order of 18 October 1942 was actually carried out in a number of instances, of which we have the documentary proof for several. Document 508-PS shows that during the night of 19-20 November 1942, a British freight glider crashed near Egersund, in Norway. The glider carried a British commando unit of 17 men, of whom three were apparently killed in the crash. All were in British uniform. Fourteen survivors were executed in accordance with the Hitler Order the evening of 20 November. In proof of this I will read certain extracts from 508-PS, beginning on Page 1 of the translation, the paragraph numbered “1)”:
“1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a
British freight glider at Egersund in the night of . . .”
It reads November 11 in the translation, but I believe in the original it was November 20; that is a typographical error.
“a) No firing on the part of the German defense.
“b) The towing plane (Wellington) crashed after touching the
ground; 7-man crew dead. The attached freight glider also
crashed; of the 17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage
force. Führer Order has been carried out.”
I pass to Page 3 of the translation, on which page appear two teletype messages. I wish to read the first two paragraphs at the top of the page:
“On 20 November 1942 at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15
kilometers northeast of Egersund. It is a British aircraft
(towed glider) made of wood without engine. Of the 17-member
crew three are dead, six are severely, the others are slightly,
wounded.
“All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve insignia.
Furthermore, following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents,
skis, and radiosender, exact number still unknown. The glider
carried rifles, light machine guns and machine pistols, number
unknown. At present the prisoners are with the battalion in
Egersund.”
Passing to the second teletype message, the first paragraph:
“Beside the 17-member crew extensive sabotage material and work
equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was
absolutely proved. The 280th Infantry Division ordered the
execution of the action according to the Führer Order. The
execution was carried out toward the evening of 20 November.
Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki
uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short
interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their
names, ranks and serial numbers.”
I pass to the last paragraph of that teletype, at the foot of Page 3 of the translation:
“In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew,
the Armed Forces Commander of Norway has issued an order to the
district commanders, according to which the interrogations by
G-2”—that was I. C. in the German—“and by BDS”—police—“are
important before the execution of the Führer Order; in case of
Paragraph Number 4 of the Führer Order, the prisoners are to be
handed over to the BDS.”
Your Lordship, the next document is 512-PS, Exhibit USA-546. This document recites three specific instances where the Hitler Order was carried out in Norway and especially emphasizes the desirability of taking individual commandos prisoner for interrogation. I read from Document 512-PS, dated 13 December 1942:
“According to the last sentence of the Führer Order of 18th
October, individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being
in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this
measure was proved in the cases of the Glomfjord, 2-man torpedo
Drontheim, and glider plane Stavanger, where interrogations
resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy intentions. Since in the
case of Egersund the saboteur was liquidated immediately and no
clues were obtained; therefore, Armed Forces Commander refers to
the above-mentioned last sentence of the Führer Order calling
for liquidation only after a short interrogation.”
One final document from the Norwegian Theater of War is relative.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, what does “RK” in the last paragraph mean? The first words of the last paragraph?
COL. TAYLOR: Red Cross (Rotes Kreuz).
THE PRESIDENT: So they had a protest from the Red Cross?
COL. TAYLOR: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: And “BDS”?
COL. TAYLOR: That is “Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo).”
Document 526-PS which is Exhibit USA-502, dated 10 May 1943, Colonel Storey has already brought to the Tribunal’s attention in connection with the presentation against the Sicherheitsdienst. I will first read the opening sentences:
“On 30 March 1943, in Toftefjord (degree of latitude 70), an
enemy cutter was sighted. Cutter was blown up by enemy.
“Crew: 2 dead and 10 taken prisoners.
“Cutter sent from Scalloway (Shetland Isles) by the Norwegian
Navy.”
Passing to the word “Purpose”:
“Purpose: Building of an organization for the sabotaging of
strong-points, battery positions, staff and troop billets and
bridges.
“Assigner of mission in London: Norwegian Major Munthe.
“Führer Order executed by Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service).
“Wehrmacht communiqué of 6 April announces the following about
it: ‘In northern Norway an enemy sabotage unit was engaged and
destroyed on approaching the coast.’”
Now, shifting to the Italian Theater of War, I call the Court’s attention to 509-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-547. This document is dated 7 November 1943; and is a telegram from the Supreme Commander in Italy to OKW; and it shows that on 2 November 1943 three British commandos, taken prisoner near Pescara in Italy, were given “special treatment” (sonderbehandelt), which as the Court knows from previous evidence in the case, meant death. What happened to the nine remaining prisoners of war in the hospital, we do not know.
I have one more document from the Italian Theater, 2610-PS, Exhibit USA-548. This specifically shows the carrying out of Hitler’s orders. It consists of an affidavit, dated 7 November 1945, by Frederick W. Roche, a major in the Army of the United States. Major Roche was the Judge Advocate of an American Military Commission which tried General Anton Dostler, formerly Commander of the 75th German Army Corps, for the unlawful execution of 15 members of the United States Armed Forces. I will read from this affidavit:
“Frederick W. Roche, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
“I am a major in the Army of the United States. I was the Judge
Advocate of the Military Commission which tried Anton Dostler
for ordering the execution of the group of 15 United States Army
personnel who comprised the ‘Ginny Mission.’ This Military
Commission, consisting of five officers, was appointed by
command of General McNarney, by Special Order, Number 269, dated
26 September 1945, Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater of
Operations, United States Army, APO 512.
“The Military Commission met at Rome, Italy, on 8 October 1945,
and proceeded with the trial of the case of the United States
_versus_ Anton Dostler. The trial of this case consumed 4 days,
and the findings and sentence were announced on the morning of
12 October 1945. The charge and specification in this case are
as follows:
“Charge: Violation of the law of war.
“Specification: In that Anton Dostler, then general, commanding
military forces of the German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation,
to wit the 75th Army Corps, did, on or about 24 March 1944, in
the vicinity of La Spezia, Italy, contrary to the law of war,
order to be shot summarily, a group of United States Army
personnel consisting of two officers and 13 enlisted men who had
then recently been captured by forces under General Dostler,
which order was carried into execution on or about 26 March
1944, resulting in the death of the said 15 members of the Army
of the United States. . . .”—and a list of names follows.
“I was present throughout the entire proceeding. I heard all the
testimony and I am familiar with the records in this case. The
facts developed in this proceeding are as follows:
“On the night of 22 March 1944 two officers and 13 enlisted men
of the 2677th Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of
the United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats
and landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All 15
men were members of the Army of the United States and were in
the military service of the United States. When they landed on
the Italian coast, they were all properly dressed in the field
uniform of the United States Army and they carried no civilian
clothes. Their mission was to demolish a railroad tunnel on the
main line between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail line was being
used by the German forces to supply their fighting forces on the
Cassino and Anzio beachhead fronts. The entire group was
captured on the morning of 24 March 1944 by a patrol consisting
of Fascist soldiers and a group of members of the German Army.
All 15 men were placed under interrogation in La Spezia and they
were held in custody until the morning of 26 March 1944, when
they were all executed by a firing squad. These men were never
tried nor were they brought before any court or given any
hearing; they were shot by order of Anton Dostler, then general
commanding the 75th German Army Corps.
“Anton Dostler took the stand in this case and testified, by way
of defense, that he ordered the 15 American soldiers to be shot
pursuant to the Hitler Order of 18 October 1942 on commando
operations, which provided that commandos were to be shot and
not taken prisoners of war, even after they had been
interrogated. He also testified that he would have been subject
to court-martial proceedings if he did not obey the Hitler
Order.
“The following is a true copy of the findings and sentence in
the case of the United States against Anton Dostler, as these
findings and sentence appear in the original record of the trial
and as they were announced in open court at Rome, Italy, on 12
October 1945:
“Findings: General Dostler, as President of this Commission it
is my duty to inform you that the Commission, in closed session
and upon secret written ballot, at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Commission concurring in each finding of guilty,
finds you of the specification and of the charge: Guilty.
“Sentence: And again in closed session and upon secret written
ballot, at least two-thirds of all the members of the Commission
concurring, sentences you: To be shot to death by musketry.”
Now the order of 18 October 1942 remained in force, so far as we know, until the end of the war. I wish to offer 506-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-549. This document is dated 22 June 1944. It is initialed by Warlimont, and in it the OKW made it where the commando operation was undertaken by only one person. I will read the single paragraph of the order:
“The Operations Staff agrees with the view taken in the letter
of the army group judge to the Supreme Commander Southwest of 20
May 1944. The Führer Order is to be applied even if the enemy
employs only one person for a task. Therefore, it does not make
any difference if several persons or a single person take part
in a commando operation. The reason for the special treatment of
participants in a commando operation is that such operations do
not correspond to the German concept of usage and customs of
warfare.”
The Allied landing in Normandy early in June 1944, in the course of which large-scale airborne operations took place, raised among the Germans the question as to how far the Hitler Order would be applied in Normandy, and in France behind the German lines. I direct the Court’s attention to Document 531-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-550. The memorandum is dated 23 June 1944 and is signed by Warlimont. Warlimont’s memorandum starts by quoting a teletype received from the Supreme Command in the West, inquiring what should be done about applying the Hitler Order to airborne troops and commandos.
I would like to read a small part of the teletype, beginning at the beginning:
“Supreme Command West; teletype message Number 1750/44; top
secret; 23 June 1944.
“The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been carried
out according to the order referred to.”
If I may interpolate here, the order referred to is shown in the cross-reference to the Führer Order of 18 October 1942.
“With the large-scale landing achieved, a new situation has
arisen. The order referred to directs, in Paragraph 5, that
enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner in open combat or
surrender within the limits of normal combat operations (such as
large-scale landing operations and undertakings) are not to be
treated according to Paragraphs 3 and 4. It must be established
in a form easily understood by the troops how far the concept
‘within the limits of normal combat operations, _et cetera_’ is
to be extended.”
Then I pass down to Subparagraph D and read the first sentence of that subparagraph.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you ought to read the latter part of “C.”
COL. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I think it is all summarized in the one sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: The last sentence is the one that I mean.
COL. TAYLOR: “Considerable reprisals against our own prisoners
must be expected if its contents become known.”
Then, continuing with “D”:
“The application of Number 5 for all enemy soldiers in uniform
penetrating from the outside into the occupied western
territories is held by the Supreme Command West to be the most
correct and clearest solution.”
Accordingly, as it is there shown, the Supreme Command in the West directed that Paragraph 5, which is the paragraph under which the orders for execution are not to be applied, should be utilized in the West.
At the foot of the page is the position taken by the Armed Forces Operational Staff, the recommendation they were making:
“1. The Commando Order remains basically in effect, even after
the enemy landing in the West.
“2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect that
the order is not valid for those enemy soldiers in uniform who
are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of the
beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender. Our
troops committed in the immediate combat area means the
divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to
and including corps headquarters.
“3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases, enemy personnel who have
fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD,
upon whom it is incumbent to determine whether the Commando
Order is to be applied or not.
“4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units
committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner
with the order concerning the treatment of members of commando
undertakings of 18 October 1942, along with the above
explanation.”
The final document on this episode, or inquiry, is 551-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-551, and this is the actual order of 25 June 1944, constituting OKW’s reply to the inquiry from the Supreme Command West, signed by Keitel, initialed by Warlimont and Jodl. I will read beginning with:
“Subject: Treatment of commando participants.
“1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the
order of the Führer on the annihilation of terror and sabotage
units of 18 October 1942 remains fully in force.
“Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the
bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in
the most forward lines, as well as of the reserves up to the
corps commands, according to Number 5 of the basic order of 18
October 1942, remain exempted.
“2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the
immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all
parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they
are to be turned over to the SD.
“3. All troops committed outside the combat area of Normandy are
to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and
sabotage units briefly and succinctly, according to the
directives issued for it.
“4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily how
many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies
especially also to undertakings by the military commanders. The
number is to be published daily in the Armed Forces communiqué
to exercise a frightening effect, as had already been done
toward previous commando undertakings in the same manner.”
Your Lordship, there is just one further development in connection with this order, this basic order, and that was that in July 1944. The question was then raised within the German High Command as to whether the order should be applied to members of foreign military missions with special regard to the British, American, and Soviet military missions which were co-operating with Allied Forces in Southeastern Europe, notably in Yugoslavia. A long document signed by Warlimont, which is 1279-PS, and becomes Exhibit USA-552, embodies the discussions which were had at OKW. I think I need not read from this document, and merely wish to point out that the Armed Forces operational staff recommended that the order should be applied to these military missions and drew up a draft to this effect. I would, however, like to read 537-PS, which is Exhibit USA-553. This is the order which actually resulted from these discussions. It is dated 30 July 1944. I will read that in full:
“Subject: Treatment of members of foreign ‘Military Missions’
captured together with partisans.
“In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest,
members of foreign so-called ‘Military Missions’ (Anglo-American
as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the
struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as
specified in the special orders regarding the treatment of
captured partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as
prisoners of war but in conformity with the Führer’s order
concerning the annihilation of terror and sabotage troops of 18
October 1942.
“This order shall not be transmitted to units subordinate to the
corps commands and the equivalent staffs of the other branches
of the Armed Forces, and is to be destroyed after being made
known.
“The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Keitel.”
Pursuant to this order, approximately 15 members of an Allied military mission to Slovakia were executed in January 1945, as is shown by Document L-51, which is already in the record as Exhibit USA-521, and which has been read in full by Lieutenant Harris. I will not read it again.
This concludes the presentation of documents with respect to the order of the 18th of October 1942 and its subsequent enforcement and application. I can pass from here to another subject.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes now.
[_A recess was taken._]
COL. TAYLOR: Your Lordship, the order I have just been discussing operated chiefly in the Western Theater of War. This was natural, since Germany occupied almost the entire western coast of Europe from 1940 until the last year of the war, and during that period land fighting in Western Europe was largely limited to commando operations.
I want to pass now to the Eastern Front, where there was large-scale land fighting in Poland and the Soviet Union, from 1941 on. Here the German forces were fighting among a hostile population and had to face extensive partisan activities behind their lines. I propose to show here that the activities of the German Armed Forces against partisans and against other elements of the population became a vehicle for carrying out Nazi political and racial policies and a vehicle for the massacre of Jews and numerous segments of the Slav population which were regarded by the Nazis as undesirable. I will show that it was the policy of the German Armed Forces to behave with the utmost severity to the civilian population of the occupied territories; and that its military operations, particularly against partisans, were so conducted as to advance the Nazi policies to which I have referred.
I will show that the Armed Forces supported, assisted, and acted in co-operation with the SS groups to which reference has been made in the presentation by Major Farr and Colonel Storey.
I do not plan to make a full or even partial showing of war crimes on the Eastern Front. That will be done by the Soviet Delegation. Nor do I plan to retrace the ground covered by Colonel Storey and Major Farr during their presentation of the evidence against the SS, SD, and Gestapo, except to the extent necessary to clarify the relations between these organizations and the German Armed Forces and to demonstrate their close collaboration in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe.
The first document to which I will make reference is Document C-50, which will be Exhibit USA-554; and it will show that these policies of severity were determined upon and made official even before the invasion of the Soviet Union took place. This document consists of an order by Hitler dated 13 May 1941 and two covering transmittal sheets of subsequent date. I ask the Tribunal to note on Page 4 of the translation that the order is signed by Keitel, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, and also to note the distribution, which appears at the foot of the second sheet, showing the distribution to the principal staff sections. The order itself begins on the third page, and that is where I propose to read. The document is entitled, “Order concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and procedure in the area ‘Barbarossa’ and special military measures”:
“The application of martial law aims, in the first place, at
maintaining discipline.
“The fact that the operational areas in the East are so
far-flung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the
peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial
with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve
while hostilities are in progress and until some degree of
pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless
jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main
task.
“This is possible only if the troops themselves take ruthless
action against any threat from the enemy population.
“For these reasons I herewith issue the following order
effective for the area ‘Barbarossa’ (area of operations, Army
rear area, and area of political administration):
“I. Treatment of offenses committed by enemy civilians.
“1. Until further notice the military courts and the
courts-martial will not be competent for crimes committed by
enemy civilians.
“2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military,
whether they are fighting or in flight.
“3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed
Forces, its members, and employees, are to be suppressed at once
by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the
assailants are destroyed.
“4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first
possible, persons suspected of criminal action will be brought
at once before an officer. This officer will decide whether they
are to be shot.
“On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a
battalion commander, collective drastic measures will be taken
without delay against localities from which cunning or malicious
attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances do not
permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.
“5. It is expressly forbidden to keep suspects in custody in
order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement of
civil courts.
“6. The commanders of the army groups may, by agreement with the
competent naval and air force commanders, reintroduce military
jurisdiction for civilians in areas which are sufficiently
pacified.
“For the area of the political administration this order will be
given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
“II. Treatment of offenses committed against inhabitants by
members of the Armed Forces and its employees.
“1. With regard to offenses committed against enemy civilians by
members of the Wehrmacht and its employees prosecution is not
obligatory, even where the deed is at the same time a military
crime or offense.
“2. When judging such offenses, it must be borne in mind,
whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in
1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people, and the
fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of
innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by
Bolshevistic influence and that no German has forgotten this
fact.
“3. Therefore, the judicial authority will decide in such cases
whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether legal
proceedings are necessary. In the case of offenses against
inhabitants it will order a court-martial only if maintenance of
discipline or security of the forces call for such a measure.
This applies, for instance, to serious offenses originating in
lack of self-control in sexual matters or in a criminal
disposition and to those which indicate that the troops are
threatening to get out of hand. Offenses which have resulted in
senseless destruction of billets or stores or other captured
material, to the disadvantage of our forces, should as a rule be
judged no less severely.
“The order to institute proceedings requires in every single
case the signature of the judicial authority.
“4. Extreme caution is indicated in assessing the credibility of
statements made by enemy civilians.
“III. Responsibility of military commanders of the troops.
Within their sphere of competence military commanders are
personally responsible for seeing that:
“1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command
is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on
principles set out under I, above.
“2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these
instructions and of verbal information in which the political
intentions of the High Command were explained to the
commanders-in-chief.
“3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in
accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.
“IV. Security. Once the camouflage is lifted, this decree will
be treated as ‘most secret.’”
Your Lordship, the next document will be C-148, Exhibit USA-555. Less than 3 months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the instructions which I have just read were amplified and made even more drastic. Document C-148 is an order dated 16 September 1941, signed by Keitel, widely distributed, as is shown on the second sheet where the distribution is listed. This order is of general application in all theaters of war, but from its contents it is clearly of primary importance for the Eastern Front. I read, beginning at the start of the order:
“Subject: Communist insurrection in occupied territories.
“1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia,
Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in
the area occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is
growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual
members of the Armed Forces into open rebellion and widespread
guerilla warfare.
“It can be seen that this is a mass movement centrally directed
by Moscow, which is also responsible for the apparently trivial
isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise
quiet.
“In view of the many political and economic crises in the
occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated that
nationalist and other circles will make full use of this
opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying
forces by associating themselves with the Communist
insurrection.
“This creates an increasing danger to the German war effort,
which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the
occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of
forces to the main centers of disturbance.
“2. The measures taken up to now to deal with this general
Communist insurrection movement have proved inadequate. The
Führer has now given orders that we take action everywhere with
the most drastic means, in order to crush the movement in the
shortest possible time. Only this course, which has always been
followed successfully throughout the history of the extension of
influence of great peoples, can restore order.
“3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the
following general directions:
“a. It should be inferred in every case of resistance to the
German occupying forces, no matter what the individual
circumstances, that it is of Communist origin.
“b. In order to nip these machinations in the bud the most
drastic measures should be taken immediately and on the first
indication, so that the authority of the occupying forces may be
maintained and further spreading prevented. In this connection
it should be remembered that a human life in the countries
concerned frequently counts for nothing, and a deterrent effect
can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for
50-100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as
suitable atonement for one German soldier’s death. The way in
which sentence is carried out should still further increase the
deterrent effect.
“The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively
lenient penalties and of being content, for purposes of
deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures does not
accord with these principles and shall not be followed.”
Unless the Court desires the next paragraph read, I will pass to Page 2, at the very end of the document, Paragraph Number 4:
“The commanding officers in the occupied territories shall see
to it that these principles are made known without delay to all
military establishments concerned in dealing with Communist
measures of insurrection”—Signed—“Keitel.”
Your Lordship, the next document will have the Exhibit Number USA-556, and it has been given the number D-411. It also has the designation UK-81. It is the last document in Document Book 2. This is a set of documents which includes a directive, dated 10 October 1941, by Field Marshal Von Reichenau, who was the Commander-in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber) of the German 6th Army then operating on the Eastern Front. Reichenau, who died in 1942, was therefore a member of the group as defined in the Indictment; and here is what he had to say. I begin reading at Page 5 of the translation:
“Subject: Conduct of troops in Eastern Territories.
“Regarding the conduct of troops towards the Bolshevistic
system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most
essential aim of war against the Jewish-Bolshevistic system is a
complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination
of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this
connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the
one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the Eastern
Territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of
the art of war, but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology
and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon
German and racially related nations.
“Therefore, the soldier must have full understanding for the
necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The
Army has to aim at another purpose, that is the annihilation of
revolts in the hinterland, which as experience proves, have
always been caused by Jews.
“The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not
being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and
unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war; and
guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes
and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers and
sent to prisoner-of-war camps. In fact, captured Russian
officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly
about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens.
Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete
thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to
clarify the meaning of the present struggle.
“The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not
working for the Armed Forces from army kitchens is an equally
misunderstood humanitarian act, as is the giving of cigarettes
and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great
sacrifices and things which are being brought by the command to
the front under great difficulties should not be given to the
enemy by the soldier, not even if they originate from booty. It
is an important part of our supply.
“When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire.
The troops should be interested in extinguishing fires only as
far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets.
Otherwise, the disappearance of symbols of the former
Bolshevistic rule, even in the form of buildings, is part of the
struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic
considerations are of any importance in the Eastern Territories.
“The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of
raw materials and plants essential for war economy. The complete
disarming of the civil population in the rear of the fighting
troops is imperative, considering the long and vulnerable lines
of communication. Where possible, captured weapons and
ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this be
impossible because of the situation, the weapons and ammunition
will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are found using
firearms in the rear of the Army, drastic measures are to be
taken. These measures will be extended to that part of the male
population who were in a position to hinder or report the
attacks. The indifference of numerous allegedly anti-Soviet
elements, which originates from a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude, must
give way to a clear decision for active collaboration. If not,
no one can complain about being judged and treated as a member
of the Soviet system.
“The fear of the German counter measures must be stronger than
the threats of the wandering Bolshevistic remnants. Being far
from all political considerations of the future, the soldier has
to fulfill two tasks:
“1. Complete annihilation of the false Bolshevistic doctrine of
the Soviet State and its armed forces.
“2. The pitiless extermination of alien treachery and cruelty
and thus the protection of the lives of German military
personnel in Russia.
“This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate
the German people once and forever from the Asiatic-Jewish
danger. Signed: Von Reichenau, Oberbefehlshaber.”
The Tribunal will note the sheet immediately preceding Reichenau’s order. That is Sheet Number 4 of the translation, which is a memorandum dated 28 October 1941. It shows that Reichenau’s order met with Hitler’s approval and was thereafter circulated by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army.
The Tribunal will also note from the first sheet, the very top sheet in the several ensuing, that Reichenau’s order was thereafter circulated down to divisional level, and was received by the 12th German Infantry Division on 27 November 1941.
These being the directives and policies prescribed by the German military leaders, it is no wonder that the Wehrmacht joined in the monstrous behavior and activities of the SS and SD on the Eastern Front.
Colonel Storey described to the Tribunal the formation of units known as Einsatzgruppen by the Sipo and SD, which were sent out to operate in and behind the operational areas on the Eastern Front, in order to combat partisans and to cleanse and pacify the civilian population. Major Farr and Colonel Storey both presented to the Tribunal a large amount of evidence showing the manner in which these units operated.
I want to refer back briefly to a few of these documents in order to trace the participation of the Armed Forces in those circumstances.
Colonel Storey read at length from 3012-PS, which is Exhibit USA-190, dated 19 March 1943. It is a directive from the commanding officer of one of these groups. This directive praised and justified such activities as the shooting of Hungarian Jews, shooting of children, and the total burning of villages and directed that in order not to obstruct the procuring of slave labor for the German armament industry, “as a rule no more children will be shot.”
Major Farr read from R-102, which is Exhibit USA-470, a report covering the work of the Einsatzgruppen in the German occupied territories of the Soviet Union during the month of October 1941. This report states cynically on Page 7:
“Spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on
the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not
been recorded on account of the lack of adequate instructions.”
It shows as clearly as the human eye can see that pacification and anti-partisan activities became mere code words for the extermination of Jews just as much as Weserübung was the code word for the invasion of Norway and Denmark.
We have seen from the documents quoted a few moments ago that the German Army received some similar policies and directives. It only remains to show that in the field the Army and the SS worked hand in glove.
The Tribunal will recall the document quoted by Major Walsh, 1061-PS, already in evidence as Exhibit USA-275. It describes the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto; and at this time I merely want to call attention to one paragraph appearing at Page 6 of the translation, the third paragraph from the bottom of the page, where the author of the document stresses the close co-operation between the SS and the Army. I read that one paragraph and quote:
“The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the
Waffen-SS, Police, and Wehrmacht became; they fulfilled their
duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as
models and examples of soldiers. Their combat duty often lasted
from early morning until late at night. At night search patrols
with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the
Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and
killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their
stores from abandoned dug-outs and for contacting neighboring
groups or exchanging news with them.”
To the same general effect is R-135, Exhibit USA-289, which is a report dated 5 June 1943 by the German General Commissioner for Minsk. Major Farr read from this report, describing an anti-partisan operation in which 4,500 enemies were killed: 5,000 suspected partisans and 59 Germans. The co-operation by the German Army is shown in the following excerpt, and I will begin reading at the bottom of Page 3 of the translation:
“The figures mentioned above indicate that again a heavy
destruction of the population must be expected. If only 492
rifles are taken from 4,500 enemy dead, this discrepancy shows
that among these enemy dead were numerous peasants from the
country. The battalion Dirlewanger especially has a reputation
for destroying many human lives. Among the 5,000 people
suspected of belonging to bands, there were numerous women and
children.
“By order of the chief of anti-partisan units, SS
Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach, units of the Wehrmannschaften
have also participated in the operation. SA Standartenführer
Kunze was in command of the Wehrmannschaften, among whom there
were also 90 members from my office and from the District
Commissariat of Minsk. Our men returned from the operation
yesterday without losses.”
I need not read the rest of that. The next paragraph shows again the participation of the Armed Forces personnel.
The SS Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach, referred to in this quotation, will be a witness later in the day, and in this connection I want to call the Court’s attention to 1919-PS, Exhibit USA-170, which is Himmler’s speech on October 4, 1943 to a gathering of SS generals at Posen. In this speech Himmler mentioned the appointment of Von dem Bach to be chief of all anti-partisan units, and I would like to read one paragraph from Page 3 of the document merely for purpose of identification of the witness:
“Chief of the anti-partisan combat units:
“In the meantime I have also set up the department of the Chief
of the anti-partisan combat units. Our comrade SS
Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan
combat units. I considered it necessary for the Reichsführer SS
to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I am
convinced that we are best in a position to take action in this
struggle, which is decidedly a political one. Except where the
units which had been supplied and which we had formed for this
purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have
been very successful.”
There is one further document which has already been introduced from which I wish to read new material. That is L-180, which is already in evidence as Exhibit USA-276. It is the report of Einsatzgruppe A, covering the period up to 15 October 1941. I think the excerpts which I will read will make clear beyond doubt the participation of the German military leaders and Armed Forces in the activities of these Einsatzgruppen. I read first from Page 2 of the translation, the top of the page:
“Einsatz Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action,
proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June
1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group
North, consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer Group
4, had started the advance the day before. Our task was to
establish hurriedly personal contact with the commanders of the
armies and with the commander of the army rear area. It must be
stressed from the beginning that co-operation with the Armed
Forces was generally good; in some cases, for instance with
Panzer Group 4 under Colonel General Höppner, it was very close
and almost cordial. Misunderstandings which cropped up with some
authorities in the first days were cleared up mainly through
personal discussions.”
This ends that particular extract. I read next a series of extracts, of which the first is at the bottom of Page 2:
“Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start
pogroms against Jews during the first hours after the entry,
though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following
out orders the Security Police was determined to solve the
Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But
it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an
immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the
extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German
circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native
population itself took the first action by way of natural
reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades
and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the
preceding period.”
Next I pass to Page 4 of the translation, about half way down the page, the middle of the first complete paragraph:
“After the failure of purely military activities, such as the
placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied
territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to
look out for new methods. The Einsatz group undertook the search
for new methods as an essential task. Soon, therefore, the Armed
Forces adopted the experiences of the Security Police and their
methods of combatting the partisans. For details I refer to the
numerous reports concerning the struggle against the partisans.”
I pass next to Page 6 under “Instigation of self-cleansing actions”:
“Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had
suffered very heavily under the government of bolshevism and
Jewry while they were incorporated in the U.S.S.R., it was to be
expected that after the liberation from that foreign government,
they (that is, the population themselves) would render harmless
most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red
Army. It had to be the duty of the Security Police to set in
motion these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into
the correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the
cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less
important, in view of the future, to establish the unshakeable
and provable fact that the liberated population themselves took
the most severe measures against the bolshevist and Jewish enemy
quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities
could not be found out.
“In Lithuania this was achieved for the first time by partisan
activities in Kovno. To our surprise it was not easy, at first,
to set in motion an extensive pogrom against the Jews. Klimatis,
the leader of the partisan unit mentioned above, who was used
for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on
the basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment
acting in Kovno and in such a way that no German order or German
instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first
pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June, the Lithuanian partisans
did away with more than 1,500 Jews, setting fire to several
synagogues or destroying them by other means and burning down a
Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During
the following nights 2,300 Jews were eliminated in a similar
way. In other parts of Lithuania similar actions followed the
example of Kovno, though smaller and extending to the Communists
who had been left behind.
“These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army
authorities, who had been informed, showed understanding for
this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the
first days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for
carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the
self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.”
I pass to Page 10 of the translation, toward the bottom under “Other jobs of the Security Police”:
“Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums
necessitated operations of the Security Police.”
Passing to the next paragraph:
“In some cases authorities of the Armed Forces asked us to clean
out, in a similar way, other institutions which were wanted as
billets. However, as interests of the Security Police did not
require any intervention, it was left to the authorities of the
Armed Forces to take the necessary action with their own
forces.”
I pass on to Page 17 of the translation, the paragraph at the top of the page: “But it was decided . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, did you read Paragraph 5 (1) on Page 10?
COL. TAYLOR: 5 (1) on Page 10? I read the first passage, Your Honor. If you would like it in full . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps you might go to the end of it.
COL. TAYLOR: “Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the
lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police.
Many institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of
their whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel
had fled. The inmates of several institutions broke out and
became a danger to the general security; therefore, in Aglona
(Lithuania) 544 lunatics, in Mariampol (Lithuania) 109 lunatics,
and in Mogutowo, near Luga, 95 lunatics were liquidated.”
Passing back to Page 17, the first paragraph on that page:
“When it was decided to extend the German operations to
Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Einsatz Group A
to this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941, to parts of
Einsatzkommandos 2 and 3 and to the staff of the group to
advance to Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and
to be able to advance as early as possible into the area around
Leningrad and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of
Einsatz Group A, which were intended to be used for Leningrad,
was effected in agreement with and on the express wish of Panzer
Group 4.”
The final quotation from this document is Page 18, last paragraph:
“Einsatzkommandos of Einsatz Group A of the Security Police
participated from the beginning in the fight against the
nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the
Armed Forces and the exchange of experiences which were
collected in the fight against partisans, brought about a
thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength,
equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on.”
Now, in the light of these documents, I would like to turn to some of the remaining affidavits which are before the Tribunal in Document Book I. These affidavits have been furnished by responsible officials in both the Wehrmacht and the SS and fill in much of the background for the documents.
Affidavit Number 12 is an affidavit by Schellenberg, which in view of the fact that its contents have been covered in Schellenberg’s and Ohlendorf’s testimony, I do not propose to read. It covers much of the same ground, and I see no reason to take the time of the Tribunal by reading it. I should like to have it considered, subject to the usual rule that Schellenberg can be questioned on any of these matters by the Defense. The affidavit itself is available in French and Russian as well as in English and in German for the Defense, so I will pass over that one.
I turn to Affidavit Number 13, which will be Exhibit USA-558, Document Number 3711-PS. Schellenberg’s affidavit will be Exhibit USA-557, Document Number 3710-PS; Number 13 is 558. This is an affidavit by Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of the German Army, who worked in the War History Section of the OKW from 1941 to 1945. It sheds considerable light on the relations between the Wehrmacht and the SS at the top with respect to anti-partisan warfare. I will read the affidavit:
“I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section of the
OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.
“Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I
remember the following from my knowledge of the documents of the
Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my conversations in
the Führer’s headquarters with Major General Walter Scherff, the
Führer’s appointee for the compilation of the history of the
war.
“Counter-partisan warfare was originally a responsibility of
Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, who sent police forces to
handle this matter.
“In the years 1942 and 1943, however, counter-partisan warfare
developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of the OKW
had to give it special attention. In the Army Operations Section
of the Operations Staff of the OKW, a specific officer was
assigned the development of counter-partisan warfare as his
special task. It proved necessary to conduct extensive
operations against the partisans with Wehrmacht troops in
Russian, as well as Yugoslavian territory. Partisan operations
for a long while threatened to cut off the lines of
communication and transport routes that were necessary to
support the German Wehrmacht. For instance, a monthly report
concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in occupied Russia
revealed that in the Russian area alone from 800 to 1,000
attacks occurred each month during that period causing among
other things the loss of from 200 to 300 locomotives.
“It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was conducted
with cruelty on both sides. It was well known that reprisals
were inflicted on hostages and communities whose inhabitants
were suspected of being partisans or of supporting them. It is
beyond question that these facts must have been known to the
leading officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW and in the
Army’s General Staff. It was further well known that Hitler
believed that the only successful method of conducting
counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments as
deterrents.
“I remember that, at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw, SS
Gruppenführer Fegelein reported to Colonel General Guderian and
Jodl about the atrocities of the Russian SS Brigade Kaminski,
which fought on the German side.”
Now, the foregoing documents and the testimony of Ohlendorf and Schellenberg relate to the arrangements which were made between the OKW, OKH, and Himmler’s headquarters with respect to anti-partisan warfare. They show conclusively that these arrangements were made jointly and that the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only fully aware of, but was an active participant in, these plans.
Turning now to the field, I would like to read three statements by General Hans Röttiger, which will be Affidavits Numbers 15 and 16: Exhibit USA-559, Document Number 3713-PS; and USA-560, Document Number 3714-PS. General Röttiger attained the rank of general of panzer troops, the equivalent of a lieutenant general in the American Army, and was Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army, and later of Army Group Center on the Eastern Front, during the period of which he speaks.
The first statement is as follows:
“As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June 1943,
to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I often had
occasion to concern myself officially with anti-partisan
warfare. For the execution of these operations the troops
received orders from the highest authority, as for example even
the OKH, to use the harshest methods. These operations were
carried out by troops of the army group and of the army, as, for
example, security battalions.
“At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were issued
through official channels, only a few prisoners were taken. In
accordance with orders Jews, political commissars, and agents
were delivered up to the SD.
“The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very
high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which
have been shown to me I have now come to realize that the order
from the highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the
anti-partisan war can only have been intended to make possible a
ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by
using for this purpose the military struggle of the Army against
the partisans.”
The second statement:
“Supplementary to my first declaration of 8 December 1945, I
declare:
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Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 04Chapter XXIV: Part I: , Page 713 (16)
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