Chapter XXIII: Part I: , Page 713 (15)

“Accordingly, all units have to keep the initiative against the
foe by quick action and ruthless attacks.”

Finally, a week before the actual attack on Poland, and when all the military plans are laid, we find the group as defined in the Indictment all in one place, in fact, all in one room. On August 23 the Oberbefehlshaber assembled at Obersalzberg to hear Hitler’s explanation of the timing of the attack and for political and diplomatic orientation from the head of the State. This speech has already been read from at length. It is found in Document 798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-29; and I pass over it, except to note and emphasize that it is addressed to the very group defined in the Indictment as the General Staff and High Command group. It is, incidentally, the second of the two examples referred to in the affidavits by Halder and Brauchitsch, Numbers 1 and 2, which I read previously.

We have now come to the point where Germany actually launched the war. Within a few weeks, and before any important action on the Western Front, Poland was overrun and conquered; German losses were insignificant.

The three principal territorial questions mentioned in the Blomberg and Blaskowitz affidavits were all solved. The Rhineland had been reoccupied and fortified; Memel was annexed; the Polish Corridor had been annexed. And a good deal more, too: Austria, a part of the Reich; Czechoslovakia occupied; all of western Poland in German hands. Germany was superior in arms and in experience to her Western enemies, France and England.

Then came the 3 black years of the war, 1939, 1940, and 1941, when German armed might swung like a great scythe from north to south to east: Norway and Denmark; the Low Countries; France; Italy became an ally of Germany; Tripoli and Egypt; Yugoslavia and Greece; Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria became allies; the western part of the Soviet Union overrun.

I would like to deal as a whole with this period from the fall of Poland in October 1939 to the attack against the Soviet Union in June of 1941. In this period occurred the aggressive wars in violation of treaties, as charged in the Indictment, against Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece.

I cannot improve on or add much to the presentation of these matters by the British Delegation. From the standpoint of proving Crimes against Peace, our case is complete. But I would like to review this period briefly from the military standpoint and view it as the German military leaders viewed it. And of one thing we may be sure: neither the Nazis nor the generals thought during this period in terms of a series of violations of neutrality and treaties. They thought in terms of a war, a war of conquest, a war for the conquest of Europe. Neutrality, treaties, non-aggression pacts—these were not the major considerations. They were annoying obstacles, and devices had to be formed and excuses manufactured to fit the circumstances.

Von Blomberg has told us in his affidavit, which I have read, that after 1939 some generals began to condemn Hitler’s methods and lost confidence in his judgment. Which particular Hitler methods some of the generals condemned is not stated, but I think the Tribunal will not hear any substantial evidence that many of the generals condemned the march of conquest during the years 1939 to 1941. In fact the evidence is rather that most of the generals were having the time of their lives during those years.

Six weeks after the outbreak of war and upon the successful termination of the Polish campaign, 9 October 1939, there was issued a memorandum and directive for the conduct of the war in the West. This is Document Number L-52, and becomes Exhibit Number USA-540. It is not signed. It was distributed only to the four service chiefs, Keitel, Brauchitsch, Göring, and Raeder. From the wording there is every indication that it was issued by Hitler. I will read the pertinent extracts, starting with Page 2 of the document, about two-thirds of the way down in the first paragraph, starting with the words, “The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war”:

“The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or
disintegrate the 80-million-state”—meaning Germany—“again so
that in this manner the European equilibrium, in other words,
the balance of power which serves their ends, may be restored.
This battle, therefore, will have to be fought out by the German
people one way or another. Nevertheless, the very great
successes of the first month of the war could serve, in the
event of an immediate signing of peace, to strengthen the Reich
psychologically and materially to such an extent that from the
German viewpoint there would be no objection to ending the war
immediately, insofar as the present achievement with arms is not
jeopardized by the peace treaty.

“It is not the object of this memorandum to study the
possibilities in this direction, or even to take them into
consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively
to the other case: the necessity to continue the fight, the
object of which, as already stressed, consists, insofar as the
enemy is concerned, in the dissolution or destruction of the
German Reich. In opposition to this the German war aim is the
final military dispatch of the West, that is, destruction of the
power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to
oppose the state consolidation and further development of the
German people in Europe. As far as the outside world is
concerned, however, this internal aim will have to undergo
various propaganda adjustments, necessary from a psychological
point of view. This does not alter the war aim. It is and
remains the destruction of our Western enemies.”

I now pass to Page 3 of the translation, Paragraph 2, and the subheading “Reasons”:

“The successes of the Polish campaign have made possible first
of all a war on a single front, awaited for past decades without
any hope of realization; that is to say, Germany is able to
enter the fight in the West with all her might, leaving only a
few covering troops in the East. The remaining European states
are neutral either because they fear for their own fates or lack
interest in the conflict as such or are interested in a certain
outcome of the war, which prevents them from taking part at all,
or at any rate too soon. The following is to be, firmly borne in
mind. . . .”

At this point I interpolate that here follows a succession of references to countries, and I pass to Belgium and Holland at the foot of Page 3:

“Belgium and Holland: Both countries are interested in
preserving their neutrality but incapable of withstanding
prolonged pressure from England and France. The preservation of
their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and thus the
securing of their interior economy, even of their very life,
depend wholly upon the will of England and France. Therefore in
their decisions, in their attitude, and in their actions both
countries are dependent upon the West in the highest degree. If
England and France promise themselves a successful result at the
price of Belgian neutrality, they are at any time in a position
to apply the necessary pressure. That is to say, without
covering themselves with the odium of a breach of neutrality,
they can compel Belgium and Holland to give up their neutrality.
Therefore, in the matter of the preservation of Belgo-Dutch
neutrality, time is not a factor which might promise a favorable
development for Germany.”

The final paragraph to be read is as follows:

“The Nordic States: Provided no completely unforeseen factors
appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed.
The continuation of German trade with these countries appears
possible even in a war of long duration.”

Six weeks later, on 23 November 1939, our group as defined in the Indictment—the Oberbefehlshaber—again assembled, as found in Document Number 789-PS, already in the record as Exhibit Number USA-23, and heard from Hitler much of what he had said previously to the four service chiefs. This speech, part of which is already in the record, contains other portions, not previously read, which are now of interest; and the first extract which I would like to read is on Page 2 of the translation, about half-way down in Paragraph 1, starting with the words, “For the first time in history we have to fight only on one front . . .” I quote:

“For the first time in history we have to fight only on one
front; the other front is at present free. But no one can know
how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time
whether I should strike first in the East and then in the West.
In principle I did not organize the Armed Forces in order not to
strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Sooner or later
I wanted to solve the problem. Inevitably it was decided that
the East was to be annihilated first. If the Polish war was won
so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our Armed Forces.
The most glorious experience in our history. Unexpectedly small
expenditures of men and material. Now the Eastern front is held
by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed
previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The
opponent in the West lies behind his fortifications. There is no
possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question
is: How long can we endure this situation?”

Passing to Page 3 of that document, line 3:

“Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is
favorable now; in 6 months it might not be so any more.”

The final passage on Page 4 of the translation, in the long paragraph about half-way down, beginning, “England cannot live without its imports. We can feed . . .”:

“England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves.
The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring
England to her knees. However, this can occur only if we have
occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me.
None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no
importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great
height, even if the world does hate us now. I risk the loss of
this achievement. I have to choose between victory or
destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be
compared with the decision of Frederick the Great before the
first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one
man. Even there, the closest advisers were disposed to
capitulation. Everything depended on Frederick the Great. Even
the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great.
My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England
at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the
neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will
question that when we have won. The arguments we will choose for
the breach of neutrality shall not be as idiotic as they were in
1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France
will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I
consider it possible to end the war only by means of an attack.
The question as to whether the attack will be successful, no one
can answer. Everything depends upon favorable providence.”

Thereafter the winter of 1939 and 1940 passed quietly, the winter of so-called “phony war.”

The General Staff and High Command group all knew what the plan was—they had all been told. To attack ruthlessly at the first opportunity; to smash the French and English forces; to pay no heed to treaties with, or neutrality of, the Low Countries. “Breaking of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won.” That is what Hitler told the Oberbefehlshaber. The generals and admirals agreed and went forward with their plans.

Now it is not true that all the steps in this march of conquest were conceived by Hitler and that the military leaders embarked on them with reluctance and misgivings. To show this we need only hark back for a moment to what Major Elwyn Jones told the Tribunal about the plans for the invasion of Denmark and Norway.

The Tribunal will recall that Hitler’s utterances in October and November, which I have just read, although they are full of threatening comments about France and England and the Low Countries, contain no suggestion of an attack on Scandinavia. Indeed, Hitler’s memorandum of 9 October, from which I read Document L-52, affirmatively indicates that Hitler saw no reason to disturb the situation to the north, because he said that unless unforeseen factors appeared the neutrality of the northern states could be assumed. Trade could be continued with those countries even in a long war. But a week previously, on the 3rd of October 1939, the Defendant Raeder had caused a questionnaire to be circulated within the Naval Staff seeking comments on the advantages which might be gained from a naval standpoint by securing bases in Norway and Denmark. That document is C-122, Exhibit Number GB-82. And another document introduced by Major Elwyn Jones, Document C-66, which is Exhibit Number GB-81, shows that Raeder was prompted to circulate this questionnaire by a letter from another admiral named Carls, who pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. Admiral Carls, Rolf Carls, later attained the rank of Admiral of the Fleet and commanded Naval Group North and in that capacity is a member of the group as defined in the Indictment, as well as Raeder.

The Tribunal will also recall that the Defendant Dönitz, who at that time was flag officer of submarines, replied to the questionnaire from Raeder on 9 October 1939. The document in question is Document C-5, Exhibit Number GB-83. And Dönitz replied that from his standpoint Trondheim and Narvik met the requirements for a submarine base, that Trondheim was better, and that he proposed the establishment of a U-boat base there. The next day Raeder visited Hitler, and this visit and certain subsequent events are described in a document which has not previously been introduced.

Now, Your Honors, owing to a confusion in numbering, the German document is C-71, but the translation appears in your books in Document L-323, and that will be Exhibit Number USA-541. The translation will be found in L-323, the middle of the page, entitled, “Entry in the War Diary of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, naval war staff, on ‘Weserübung’,” that being the code name for the operation against Norway and Denmark. Diary entry for 10 October 1939:

“First reference of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, when
visiting the Führer, to the significance of Norway for sea and
air warfare. The Führer intends to give the matter
consideration.

“12 December 1939. Führer received Q and H”—those being
presumably Quisling and Hagelin.

“Subsequent instructions to the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces to make mental preparations. The Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy is having an essay prepared which will be ready in
January.”

I may interpolate. The translation of the next sentence is somewhat in error and should read:

“With reference to this essay Kapitän zur See Krancke is working
on ‘Weserübung’ at OKW.”

“During the time which followed H”—Hagelin—“maintained contact
with the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
His aim was to develop the Party Q”—Quisling—“with a view to
making it capable of action and to give the Supreme Command of
the Navy information on the political developments in Norway and
military questions. In general he pressed the speeding up of
preparations, but considered that it was first necessary to
expand the organization.”

I think that is all I need read of that.

Another document, which is Document C-64, Exhibit Number GB-86, already in the record, shows that on 12 December the Naval War Staff discussed the Norwegian project with Hitler—I am not going to read from that document, Your Honors—at a meeting which the Defendants Keitel and Jodl also attended. In the meantime Raeder was in touch with the Defendant Rosenberg on the possibilities of using Quisling; and Major Elwyn Jones very properly pointed out to the Tribunal the close link between the service chiefs and the Nazi politicians. As a result of all this, on Hitler’s instructions, Keitel issued an OKW directive on 27 January 1940 stating that Hitler had commissioned him to undertake charge of preparations for the Norway operation, to which he then gave the code name Weserübung.

On 1 March 1940 Hitler issued the directive setting forth the general plan for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. That is Document C-174, Exhibit Number GB-89, which Major Elwyn Jones put in the record. The directive was initialed by Admiral Kurt Fricke, who at that time was head of the operations division of the naval war staff and who at the end of 1941 became Chief of the naval war staff and in that capacity is a member of the group as defined in the Indictment. So, as these documents make clear, the plan to invade Norway and Denmark was not conceived in Nazi Party circles or forced on the military leaders; on the contrary, it was conceived in the naval part of the General Staff and High Command group, and Hitler was persuaded to take the idea up. Treaties and neutrality meant just as little to the General Staff and High Command group as to the Nazis.

As to the Low Countries, neither Hitler nor the military leaders were disturbed about treaty considerations. The Tribunal will remember that at a conference between Hitler and the principal military leaders in May 1939, as shown in Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27, already in the record, when the intention to attack Poland was announced, Hitler, in discussing the possibility of war with England, said that the Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. “Declarations of neutrality will be ignored.” And later, in his speech to the Oberbefehlshaber in November 1939, Hitler said that they must first invade the Low Countries and “no one will question that when we have won.”

Accordingly, one can well imagine that the winter of 1939 and 1940 and the early spring of 1940 was a period of very intensive planning in German military circles. The major attack in the West through the Low Countries had to be planned and the attack on Norway and Denmark had to be planned. The Defendant Jodl’s diary for the period 1 February to 26 May 1940, Document 1809-PS, Exhibit Number GB-88, contains many entries reflecting the course of this planning. Some of the entries have been read into the record and others are now of interest.

The Tribunal will see from these entries which have already been read that during February and early March there was considerable doubt in German military circles as to whether the attack on Norway and Denmark should precede or follow the attack on the Low Countries and that at some points there even was doubt as to whether all these attacks were necessary from a military standpoint. But the Tribunal will not find a single entry which reflects any hesitancy from a moral angle, on the part of Jodl or any of the people he mentions, to overrun these countries.

I will make several references now to Document 1809-PS and several of the entries in it. I do not plan to quote verbatim from any one of them. The Court will note that on 1 February 1940 General Jeschonnek, the Chief of the Air Staff and a member of the group as defined in the Indictment, visited Jodl and made a suggestion that it might be wise to attack only Holland, on the ground that Holland alone would offer a tremendous improvement for Germany’s aerial warfare.

On 6 February Jodl conferred with Jeschonnek, Warlimont, and Colonel Von Waldau, and what Jodl calls a “new idea” was proposed at this meeting: That the Germans should carry out only “Action H” (Holland) and the Weser Exercise (Norway and Denmark) and should guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of the war.

I suppose the German Air Force may have felt that the occupation of Holland alone would give them sufficient scope for air bases for attacks on England and that if Belgium’s neutrality were preserved the German bases in Holland would be immune from attack by the French and British armies in France. If, to meet this situation, the French and British should attack through Holland and Belgium, the violation of neutrality would be on the other foot. But whether or not this new idea made sense from a military angle, it appears to be a most extraordinary notion from a diplomatic angle. It was a proposal to violate without any excuse the neutrality of three neighboring small countries and simultaneously to guarantee the neutrality of a fourth. What value the Belgians might have attributed to a guarantee of neutrality offered under such circumstances, it is difficult to imagine; and in fact, the “new idea” projected at this meeting seems a most extraordinary combination of cynicism and naïveté.

In the meantime, as Jodl’s diary shows, on 5 February 1940 the “special staff” for the Norway invasion met for the first time and got its instructions from Keitel. On 21 February Hitler put General Von Falkenhorst in command of the Norway undertaking; and Jodl’s diary records that “Falkenhorst accepts gladly.”

On 26 February Hitler was still in doubt whether to go first to Norway or the Low Countries, but on 3 March he decided to do Norway first and the Low Countries a short time thereafter. This decision proved final. Norway and Denmark were invaded on 9 April and the success of the adventure was certain by the 1st of May. The invasion of the Low Countries took place 10 days later.

So France and the Low Countries fell, Italy joined the war on the side of Germany, and the African campaign began. In October 1940 Italy attacked Greece. The Italo-Greek stalemate and the uncertain attitude of Yugoslavia became embarrassing to Germany, particularly because the attack of the Soviet Union was being planned and Germany felt she could not risk an uncertain situation at her rear in the Balkans.

Accordingly, it was decided to end the Greek situation by coming to Italy’s aid, and the Yugoslavian _coup d’état_ of 26 March 1941 brought about the final German decision to crush Yugoslavia also. The documents have already been introduced by Colonel Phillimore, and there is little that I need to add for my present purpose. The decisions were made; the Armed Forces drew up the necessary plans and executed the attacks. The onslaught was particularly unmerciful and ruthless against Yugoslavia for the special purpose of frightening Turkey and Greece. The final deployment instructions were issued by Brauchitsch and appear in Document R-95, Exhibit Number GB-127, which has not been read before. Two extracts from this are of interest. These extracts are very short:

“The political situation in the Balkans having changed by reason
of the Yugoslav military revolt, Yugoslavia has to be considered
an enemy even should it make declarations of loyalty at first.

“The Führer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore to
destroy Yugoslavia as quickly as possible.”

And turning to Paragraph Number 5, the “Timetable for the Operations”:

“On 5 April as soon as sufficient forces of the Air Forces are
available and weather permitting, the Air Forces should attack
continuously by day and night the Yugoslav ground organization
and Belgrade.”

The German attack on the Soviet Union I have little more to say about. The documents showing the aggressive nature of the attack have been put in by Mr. Alderman. I suppose it is quite possible that some members of the General Staff and High Command group opposed Barbarossa as unnecessary and unwise from a military standpoint. The Defendant Raeder so indicated in a memorandum he wrote on 10 January 1944, Document C-66, Exhibit Number GB-81. C-66 is the translation and the only document I propose to read on this subject, from which a few extracts are of interest. The quotation starts at the very outset of the Document C-66:

“At this time the Führer had made known his ‘unalterable
decision’ to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all
remonstrances. After that further warnings, if no new situation
had arisen, were found to be, according to previous experiences,
completely useless. As Chief of naval war staff I was never
convinced of the ‘compelling necessity’ for Barbarossa.”

And passing to the third paragraph:

“The Führer very early had the idea of one day settling accounts
with Russia; doubtless his general ideological attitude played
an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that he
intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they would
then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian Gulf.
The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic
States in 1939-1940 probably further strengthened him in this
idea.”

And passing to the very end of the document, Paragraph 7, Page 4:

“As no other course is possible, I have submitted to compulsion.
If thereby a difference of opinion arises between 1 SKL and
myself”—that, if I may interpolate, is a division of the naval
war staff having to do with operations—“it is perhaps because
the arguments the Führer used on such occasions (dinner speech
in the middle of July to the officers in command) to justify a
step he had planned usually had a greater effect on people not
belonging to the inner circle than on those who often heard this
type of reasoning.

“Many remarks and plans indicate that the Führer calculated on
the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941,
whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very
skeptical.”

That, to be sure, indicates division of opinion as to the military chances of a rapid success, but the part last quoted indicates that other members of the group favored Barbarossa and Raeder’s memorandum actually says and substantiates what Blomberg’s affidavit says: That some of the generals lost confidence in the power of Hitler’s judgment, but that the generals failed as a group to take any definite stand against him, although a few tried and suffered thereby. Certainly the High Command took no stand against Hitler on Barbarossa and the events of 1941 and 1942 do not suggest that the High Command embarked on the Soviet war tentatively or with reservations, but rather with ruthless determination backed by careful planning. The plans themselves have all been read and cited to the Court previously.

That concludes the evidence on the criminal activities of the group under Counts One and Two. The documents written by the military leaders are not the writings of men who were reluctant to plan and execute these manifold wars.

I want to make clear again the nature of the accusations against this group under Counts One and Two. They are not accused on the ground that they are soldiers. They are not accused merely for doing the usual things a soldier is expected to do, such as making military plans and commanding troops. It is, I suppose, among the normal duties of a diplomat to engage in negotiations and conferences, to write notes and _aide-memoire_, to entertain at dinner parties, and cultivate good will toward the government he represents. The Defendant Ribbentrop is not indicted for doing these things. It is the usual function of a politician to draft regulations and decrees, to make speeches. The Defendants Hess and Frick are not indicted for doing those things.

It is an innocent and respectable business to be a locksmith; but it is none the less a crime, if the locksmith turns his talents to picking the locks of neighbors and looting their homes. And that is the nature of the charge under Counts One and Two against the defendants and the General Staff and High Command group. The charge is that, in performing the functions of diplomats, politicians, soldiers, sailors, or whatever they happened to be, they conspired, and did plan, prepare, initiate, and wage illegal wars and thereby committed crimes under Article 6 (a) of the Charter.

It is no defense for those who committed such crimes to plead that they practice a particular profession. It is perfectly legal for military men to prepare military plans to meet national contingencies, and such plans may legally be drawn whether they are offensive or defensive in a military sense. It is perfectly legal for military leaders to carry out such plans and engage in war, if in doing so they do not plan and launch and wage wars which are illegal because they are aggressive and in contravention of the Charter.

I am very far from saying that there may not be individual cases, involving some individual members of this group, where drawing the line between legal and illegal behavior might involve some difficulties. That is not an uncommon situation in the legal field. But I do not believe that there is any doubt or difficulty here, before this Tribunal, as to the criminality of the General Staff and High Command group as a group under Counts One and Two, or as to the guilt of the five defendants who are members of the group.

In the case of the Defendants Göring, Keitel, and Jodl, the evidence is voluminous and their participation in aggressive plans and wars is more or less constant. The same is true of Defendant Raeder, and his individual responsibility for the aggressive and savage attack on Norway and Denmark is especially clear. The evidence so far offered against Dönitz is less voluminous for the reason that he was younger and not one of the top group until later in the war.

But numerous other members of the General Staff and High Command group, including its other leaders, are shown to have participated knowingly and wilfully in these illegal plans and wars: Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and his Chief of Staff, Halder; Warlimont, the deputy of Jodl. In the nature of things these men knew all that was going on and participated fully, as the documents show. Reichenau and Sperrle helped to bully Schuschnigg; Reichenau, and Von Schober, together with Göring, were immediately sent for by Hitler when Schuschnigg ordered the plebiscite. At a later date we have seen Blaskowitz as an Oberbefehlshaber in the field, knowingly preparing for the attack on Poland; Field Marshal List educating the Bulgarians for their role during the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece; Von Falkenhorst “gladly” accepting the assignment to command the invasion of Norway and Denmark. On the air side, Jeschonnek has been recorded proposing that Germany attack Norway, Denmark, and Holland and simultaneously assuring Belgium that there is nothing to fear. On the naval side, Admiral Carls, member of the group, foresees at an early date that German policy is leading to a general European war, and at a later date the attack on Norway and Denmark is his brainchild; Krancke, later one of the group, is one of the chief planners of this attack; Schniewind is in the inner circle for the attack on Poland; Fricke certifies the final orders for Weserübung and a few months later proposes that Germany annex Belgium and northern France and reduce the Netherlands and Scandinavia to vassalage.

Most of the 19 officers I have mentioned were at that time members of the group, as defined, and the few who were not, subsequently became members. At the final conference for Barbarossa 17 additional members were present and at the two meetings with Hitler, at which the aggressive plans and the contempt for treaties were fully disclosed, the entire group was present.

The military defendants will perhaps argue that they are pure technicians. This amounts to saying that military men are a race apart from and different from the ordinary run of human beings—men above and beyond the moral and legal requirements that apply to others, incapable of exercising moral judgment on their own behalf.

What we are discussing here is the crime of planning and waging aggressive war. It stands to reason that that crime is committed most consciously and culpably by a nation’s leaders—the leaders in all the major fields of activity which are necessary to and closely involved in the waging of war. It is committed by propagandists and publicists. It is committed by political leaders, by diplomats, by the chief ministers, by the principal industrial and financial leaders. It is no less committed by the military leaders.

In the nature of things, planning and executing aggressive war is accomplished by agreement and consultation among all these types of leaders. And if the leaders in any notably important field of activity stand aside or resist or fail to co-operate, then the program will at the very least be seriously obstructed. That is why the principal leaders in all these fields of activity share responsibility for the crime, and the military leaders no less than the others. Leadership in the military field, as well as in other fields, calls for moral wisdom as well as technical astuteness.

I do not think that the responsible military leaders of any nation will be heard to say that their role is that of a mere janitor, or custodian, or pilot of the war machine which is under their command and that they bear no responsibility whatsoever for the use to which that machine is put.

The prevalence of such a view would be particularly unfortunate today, when the military leaders control forces infinitely more powerful and destructive than ever before. Should the military leaders be declared exempt from the declaration in the Charter that planning and waging aggressive war is a crime, it would be a crippling, if not a fatal blow to the efficacy of that declaration.

Such is certainly not the view of the United States. The Prosecution here representing the United States believes that the profession of arms is a distinguished profession. We believe that the practice of that profession by its leaders calls for the highest degree of integrity and moral wisdom no less than for technical skill. We believe that, in consulting and planning with the leaders in other fields of national activities, the military leaders must act in accordance with international law and the dictates of the public conscience. Otherwise the military resources of the nation will be used, not in accordance with the laws of modern society, but in accordance with the law of the jungle. The military leaders share responsibility with other leaders. I use the word “share” advisedly. Obviously the military leaders are not the final and exclusive arbiters, and the German military leaders do not bear exclusive responsibility for the criminal holocaust which was committed. But the German military leaders conspired with others to undermine and destroy the conscience of the German nation. The German military leaders wanted to aggrandize Germany and, if necessary, to resort to war for that purpose.

As the Chief Prosecutor for the United States said in his opening statement, the German military leaders are here before you because they, along with others, mastered Germany and drove it to war.

Your Lordship, that concludes the evidence under Counts One and Two, and if this would be a convenient stopping point . . .

THE PRESIDENT: You have another branch of the argument?

COL. TAYLOR: Counts Three and Four, Your Honor, which will take considerable time.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 7 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

TWENTY-EIGHTH DAY
Monday, 7 January 1946

_Morning Session_

COL. TAYLOR: May it please the Court, Sir, when the Court rose on Friday I had completed that part of the presentation on Counts One and Two. I now turn to that part of the Indictment which charges that the General Staff and High Command group had a major responsibility for the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved in the execution of the Common Plan or Conspiracy set forth in Counts Three and Four of the Indictment. For purpose of brevity I shall refer to these crimes simply as War Crimes.

The presentation of the documents under this part of the case should take all or the better part of the morning session. At the conclusion of that, I propose to call a single witness, one witness, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, whose testimony on direct examination should not exceed 25 or 30 minutes. After that, I shall take possibly 10 minutes to conclude, and that will be the entire presentation.

On this part of the case I propose to show that members of the General Staff and High Command group, including the defendants who are members of the group, ordered and directed the commission of War Crimes, and thereby participated in the commission of War Crimes in their official capacity as members of the group. I also propose to show, in certain instances, the actual commission of War Crimes by members of the German Armed Forces as a result of these orders or as a result of other orders and arrangements made by members of the General Staff and High Command group which controlled the German Armed Forces. However, I do not propose to make a full showing of War Crimes committed by the German Armed Forces. The full presentation of the evidence under Counts Three and Four will be made, pursuant to agreement among the Chief Prosecutors, by the French and Soviet Delegations, and a substantial amount of the evidence to be presented by them will be relevant to the charges against the General Staff and High Command group.

We will at this time show the Tribunal that the General Staff and High Command became wedded to a policy of terror. In some cases, the evidence of this policy is in documentary form, and we will present the activating papers which were signed by, initialed by, and circulated among the members of the group. In other instances, where the actual crimes were committed by others than members of the German Armed Forces, where, for example, prisoners of war were handed over to and mistreated by the SS or SD, we will show that in those cases members of this group were well aware that they were assisting in the commission of War Crimes. We will show that many crimes committed by the SS and SD were committed with the knowledge and necessary support of the General Staff and High Command group.

The first matter which I will take up relates to the killing, in violation of international law and the rules of war, of Allied commandos, paratroopers, and members of military missions, and the first document to which I wish to refer is 498-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-501.

This story starts with the order embodied in that document, which is an order issued by Hitler on 18 October 1942, and which Mr. Storey has already mentioned in the presentation of charges against the Sicherheitsdienst. The order begins with a recital that Allied commandos were using methods of warfare alleged to be outside the scope of the Geneva Convention, and thereafter proceeds to specify the methods of warfare which German troops should use against Allied commandos, and the disposition which should be made of captured commandos.

This order is one of the two basic documents in the story. I will read it in full:

“1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare
methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions.
Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the
so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially
recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From
captured orders it is divulged that they are directed not only
to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on
the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter, as
prisoners, represent a burden in the further pursuit of their
purpose or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have
been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded
in principle.

“2. For this reason it was already announced, in an addendum to
the Armed Forces communiqué of 7 October 1942, that in the
future, Germany, in the face of the sabotage troops of the
British and their accomplices, will resort to the same
procedure, that is, that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by
the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.

“3. I therefore order:

“From now on all enemies on so-called commando missions in
Europe or Africa, challenged by German troops, even if they are
to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops,
whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be
slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference
whether they are landed from ships and airplanes for their
actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these
individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give
themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In
each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW
for publication in the communiqué of the Armed Forces.

“4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents,
saboteurs, _et cetera_, fall into the hands of the Armed Forces
by some other means, through the police in occupied territories,
for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD.
Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades, for
instance, _et cetera_, is strictly prohibited, even if this is
only intended for a short time.

“5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any soldiers
who, in the course of normal hostilities, large-scale offensive
actions, landing operations, and airborne operations, are
captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this
order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after
battles at sea, or to enemy soldiers trying to save their lives
by parachute after air battles.

“6. I will hold responsible under military law, for failing to
carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either
have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this
order, or acted against this order when it was to be executed.”

It is signed Adolf Hitler, and the Tribunal will note that this order was issued by OKW in 12 copies, and the distribution shown on the second page included the three Supreme Commands, Army, Sea, and Air, and the principal field commands.

Now, the same day Hitler issued a supplementary order, that is, Document 503-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-542. This was issued for the purpose of explaining the reasons why the basic order was issued. In this explanation, Hitler gave a rather different set of reasons for the issuance of the order and pointed out that Allied commando operations had been extraordinarily successful in the destruction of rear communications, intimidating laborers, and destroying important war plants in occupied areas. This is the other basic document; and while I need not read it in full, I would like to read substantial excerpts, starting with the first paragraph at the top of the page:

“Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and
sabotage troops”—then in parentheses was a cross reference to
the order which I have just read—“a supplementary order of the
Führer is enclosed.

“This order is intended for commanders only and must not, under
any circumstances, fall into enemy hands.

“The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the
receiving bureaus.

“The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible
for the return and destruction of all distributed copies of this
order and copies made thereof.”

It is signed, “The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, by order of Jodl.”

Thereafter follows a distribution list and then the supplementary order itself, signed by Hitler. I will start reading the first two paragraphs of the supplementary order which appear at the bottom of Page 1 of the translation:

“I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the
destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare
non-compliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it
necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and
commanders the reasons for this decree.

“As in no previous war, a method of destruction of
communications behind the front, intimidation of the populace
working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important
industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been
developed in this war.”

I propose to skip to the bottom of Page 2, the last two paragraphs on Page 2 of the translation:

“The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary
weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is
cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single
electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of
many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the
construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the
fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the
homeland as well as to bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.

“Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the
adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at
the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can,
according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they
themselves have orders ruthlessly to remove any German soldiers
or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of
suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at
the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender
and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the
provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however,
that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva
agreements, especially since part of these elements are even
criminals liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate
themselves through these activities.

“England and America will therefore always be able to find
volunteers for this kind of warfare, as long as they can
truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life
for them. At worst, all they have to do is successfully to
commit their attacks on people, traffic installations, or other
installations and, upon being encountered by the enemy, to
capitulate.

“If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage
through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary
that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without
exception, to the last man.

“This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is
nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that
a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to
be captured, expecting to be treated according to the rules of
the Geneva Convention. It must, under all circumstances, be
ruthlessly exterminated.

“The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces
communiqué will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage,
terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and
exterminated to the last man.

“I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies
subordinate to them, as well as individual commanders, not only
to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry
out this order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned
officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported
without fail or, if the circumstances require it, e.g. if danger
is imminent, to be at once made strictly accountable. The
homeland, as well as the fighting soldier at the front, has the
right to expect that behind their backs the essentials of
nourishment as well as the supply with war-important weapons and
ammunition remains secure.

“These are the reasons for the issuance of my decree.

“If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation,
initially to spare one man or two, then they are to be shot
immediately after interrogation.”

Your Lordship, the next is Document C-179, which will be Exhibit USA-543. As this document shows, 10 days later on 28 October 1942 and while the Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, the naval war staff in Berlin transmitted its copy of the basic order of 18 October to the lower naval commands. The copy distributed by the Navy and the covering memorandum from the naval war staff show clearly the secrecy which surrounded the dissemination of this order; and I read the first sheet of this document only, the cover sheet:

“Enclosed please find an order of the Führer regarding
annihilation of terror and sabotage units. This order must not
be distributed in writing by flotilla leaders, section
commanders, or officers of this rank. After verbal notification
to subordinate sections, the above officers must hand this order
over to the next higher section, which is responsible for its
withdrawal and destruction.”

Passing over to Page 3 of this document, at the very end we find a similar admonition in the notice for distribution, at the very end of the document; I read:

“These instructions are not to be distributed over and above the
battalions and the corresponding staffs of the other services.
After notification, those copies distributed over and above the
regimental and corresponding staffs of the other services must
be withdrawn and destroyed.”

The next document, Your Lordship, is C-178, which becomes Exhibit USA-544. This document is dated 11 February 1943, which was 12 days after the Defendant Dönitz had become Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. On that day, this memorandum was circulated within the naval war staff in order to clear up certain misunderstandings as to the scope of the basic order of 18 October 1942. This document, of which I will read the first four paragraphs, indicates why the earlier order had been treated as such a secret matter and also directs that all naval commanders and officers who failed to carry out the order, or to instruct their units concerning the order, would run the risk of serious court-martial penalties. I’ll read the first four paragraphs only:

“From the notice given by the 3rd Section of the Naval
Operations Staff on 1 February 1943 it has been discovered that
the competent departments of the General Staff of the Army, as
well as those of the Air Force Operations Staff, have a wrong
conception regarding the treatment of saboteurs. A telephone
inquiry at the 3rd Section of the Operations Staff proved that
this naval authority was not correctly informed either.

“In view of this situation, reference is made to Paragraph 6 of
the Führer Order of 18 October 1942”—and then a
cross-reference—“according to which all commanders and officers
who have neglected their duty in instructing their units about
the order referring to treatment of saboteurs are threatened
with punishment by court-martial.

“The first Führer order concerning this matter of 18 October
1942 was given the protection of top secret merely because it
stated therein (1) that according to the Führer’s views, the
spreading of military sabotage organizations in the East and
West may have tremendous consequences for our whole conduct of
the war, and (2) that the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting
on military orders must be carried out even after they have
surrendered voluntarily and asked for pardon.

“On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in battle
is not at all to be kept secret; but on the contrary, to be
currently published in the OKW reports. The purpose of these
measures to act as a deterrent will not be achieved if those
taking part in enemy commando operations would not learn that
certain death and not safe imprisonment awaits them. As the
saboteurs are to be annihilated immediately, unless their
statements are first needed for military reasons, it is
necessary that not only all members of the Armed Forces must
receive instructions that these types of saboteurs, even if they
are in uniform, are to be annihilated but also all departments
of the home staff, dealing with this kind of questions, must be
informed of the course of action which has been ordered.”

I will call the Tribunal’s attention to the two reasons given in that quotation for keeping secret from the public knowledge of the fact that uniformed prisoners would be shot, even after they had surrendered and asked for pardon. This shows a clear awareness that that was in direct contravention of the Hague and Geneva Conventions.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, did you read the paragraph beginning, “Practical difficulties . . .”?

COL. TAYLOR: No, Your Honor. I’ll read that.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you should.

COL. TAYLOR: “Practical difficulties may develop because of the
definition of the term ‘sabotage units.’ The annihilation and
destruction, according to Paragraph 5 of the Führer Order of 18
October 1942, do not apply to troops participating in
large-scale landing operations and large-scale airborne
operations. The criterion is to be found in that, in the latter
case, an open battle takes place, whereas, for instance, 10 or
more people who land by sea or air, or drop by parachute not to
fight an open battle but to destroy either a factory, a bridge,
or a railway installation, would fall into the category of those
who must be annihilated.”