Chapter XXI: Part I: , Page 713 (13)

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Since Your Lordship was good enough to ask me whether I wanted to put any questions, I have had some further information and I should be very grateful if the Tribunal would be good enough to allow me to ask one or two questions.

[_Turning to the witness._] Would you direct your mind to a conversation between the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, Gruppenführer Nebe, and Gruppenführer Müller, in the spring of 1944, in Berlin at Wilhelmstrasse 102.

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With what was that conversation concerned?

SCHELLENBERG: This conversation, as far as I could gather—for I took no part in it—concerned the subsequent covering for the shooting of about 50 English or American prisoners of war. The gist of the conversation was, as far as I remember, that there had evidently been an inquiry from the International Red Cross as to the whereabouts of 50 English and American prisoners of war. This request for information by the International Red Cross appears to have been passed on to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD by way of the Foreign Office. From the conversation I could . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was it already in the form of a protest against the shooting of prisoners of war?

SCHELLENBERG: I believe it was lodged in the form of a protest, since from fragments of this conversation I gathered that there was a discussion as to how the shooting of these prisoners of war, which had already taken place, could be covered up or disguised.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did Kaltenbrunner discuss this with Müller and Nebe?

SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner discussed this matter with Müller and Nebe, but I heard merely fragments of the conversation. I heard, incidentally, that they meant to discuss the details in the course of the afternoon.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you hear any suggestion put forward as to what explanations should be given to cover the shooting of these prisoners?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, Kaltenbrunner himself offered these suggestions.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What were the suggestions?

SCHELLENBERG: That the majority should be treated as individual cases, as “having perished in air raids”; some, I believe, because they “offered resistance,” that is, “physical resistance,” while others were “pursued when escaping.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean—shot while trying to escape?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, shot in flight.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And these were the excuses which Kaltenbrunner suggested?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, these were the excuses that Kaltenbrunner suggested.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to try and remember as well as you can about these prisoners. Does any number remain in your mind? Can you remember any number of prisoners that they were discussing or how these explanations arose? About how many?

SCHELLENBERG: I remember only that the number “50” was mentioned over and over again, but what the actual details were I cannot say because I just caught fragments of the conversation. I could not follow the whole conversation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the number “50” remains in your mind?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes, I heard “50.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you remember anything of the place or the camp in which these people had been, who were said to have been shot?

SCHELLENBERG: I cannot tell you under oath. There is a possibility that I might add something I heard afterwards. I believe it was Breslau, but I cannot say it exactly, as a fact.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And can you remember anything of what service the people belonged to? Were they Air Force or Army? Have you any recollection on that point?

SCHELLENBERG: I believe they were all officers.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were officers?

SCHELLENBERG: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you cannot remember what service?

SCHELLENBERG: No, that I cannot tell you.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very grateful to the Tribunal for letting me ask these questions.

COL. AMEN: That is all for this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the witness can go then.

[_The witness left the stand._]

COL. AMEN: I wish to call as the next witness, Alois Höllriegel.

[_The witness, Höllriegel, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

ALOIS HÖLLRIEGEL (Witness): Alois Höllriegel.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you take this oath: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: You can sit down if you want to.

COL. AMEN: What position did you hold at the end of the war?

HÖLLRIEGEL: At the end of the war I was Unterscharführer at Mauthausen.

COL. AMEN: Were you a member of the Totenkopf SS?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes; in the year 1939 I was drafted into the SS.

COL. AMEN: What were your duties at the Mauthausen Concentration Camp?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I was until the winter of 1942 with a guard company, and I stood guard. From 1942 until the end of the war I was detailed to the inner service of the concentration camp.

COL. AMEN: And you therefore had occasion to witness the extermination of inmates of that camp by shooting, gassing, and so forth?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, I saw that.

COL. AMEN: And did you make an affidavit in this case to the effect that you saw Kaltenbrunner at that camp?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And that he saw and was familiar with the operation of the gas chamber there?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you also have occasion to see any other important personages visiting that concentration camp?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I remember Pohl, Glücks, Kaltenbrunner, Schirach, and the Gauleiter of Styria, Uiberreither.

COL. AMEN: And did you personally see Schirach at that concentration camp at Mauthausen?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Do you remember what he looks like so that you could identify him?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I think that he has probably changed a little in recent times, but I would certainly remember him.

COL. AMEN: How long ago was it that you saw him there?

HÖLLRIEGEL: That was in the fall of 1942. Since then I have not seen him.

COL. AMEN: Will you look around the courtroom and see whether you can see Schirach in the courtroom?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Which person is it?

HÖLLRIEGEL: In the second row, the third person from the left.

COL. AMEN: The affidavit to which I referred was Exhibit Number USA-515.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the PS number?

COL. AMEN: 2753-PS.

[_Turning to the witness._] I now show you a copy of Document Number 2641-PS and ask you whether you can recognize the place where those individuals are standing?

HÖLLRIEGEL: As far as can be seen from the picture, it is a quarry. Whether it is at Mauthausen or not one cannot determine exactly, because the view is too small.

COL. AMEN: Would you repeat that answer please?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Certainly. As far as can be seen from this picture, it is not possible to say definitely if this is the Wiener-Graben quarry which adjoined Mauthausen. It might easily be another quarry. A larger range of vision is required. But I think that visits were often made there. I assume that this is the Wiener-Graben quarry.

COL. AMEN: Very good. Just lay the picture aside for the time being. Did you have occasion to observe the killing of inmates of the concentration camp by pushing them off a cliff?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal what you saw with respect to that practice?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I remember, it was in 1941. At that time I was with a guard company on the tower which closed off the area of the Wiener-Graben quarry. I was able to observe in the morning about six to eight prisoners who came with two SS men. One was Hauptscharführer Spatzenöcker and the other, Unterscharführer Edenhofer; they moved about and made strange gestures . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Wait, you are going too fast. You should go slower.

HÖLLRIEGEL: I saw that they were approaching the precipice near the quarry. I saw from my watchtower that these two SS men were beating the prisoners and I realized immediately that they intended to force them to throw themselves over the precipice or else to push them over. I noticed how one of the prisoners was kicked while lying on the ground, and the gestures showed that he was supposed to throw himself down the precipice. This the prisoner promptly did under the pressure of the blows—presumably in despair.

COL. AMEN: How steep was the precipice?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I estimate it to be 30 to 40 meters.

COL. AMEN: Was there a term used amongst you guards for this practice of having the prisoners fall from the top of the precipice?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, in Mauthausen Camp they were called paratroopers.

COL. AMEN: The witness is available to other counsel.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Russian Prosecutor or the French Prosecutor or any defense counsel have any questions?

DR. SAUTER: Witness, I am interested in the following points: You said just now that in 1939 you were taken into the SS?

HÖLLRIEGEL: That is true; on the 6th of September . . .

DR. SAUTER: One moment; please repeat your answer.

HÖLLRIEGEL: That is right. On the 6th of September 1939 I was taken into the SS at Ebersberg near Linz.

DR. SAUTER: Had you no connection at all with the Party before then?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes. In April 1938 I enlisted in the civilian SS, because I was out of work during the entire previous period of the Schuschnigg Government and without any support, and consequently I thought, I would join the civilian SS; there I would get work in order to marry my wife.

DR. SAUTER: Then, if I understood you correctly, you were drafted into the SS in 1939, because you had already voluntarily enlisted in the civilian SS in the spring of 1938?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot say that exactly. Many were drafted into the Armed Forces, into the Air Force, and into the General SS.

DR. SAUTER: Are you an Austrian?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: Then at that time you lived in Austria?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, in Graz.

DR. SAUTER: Then I should be interested in a certain point in regard to the Defendant Von Schirach. You saw the Defendant Von Schirach at Mauthausen. How often did you see him there?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I can remember quite clearly—once.

DR. SAUTER: Once?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: Was Von Schirach alone at Mauthausen, or was he together with other people?

HÖLLRIEGEL: No. Von Schirach was accompanied by other gentlemen. There was a group of about 10 people, and among them I recognized Von Schirach and Gauleiter Uiberreither.

DR. SAUTER: There are supposed to have been 20 persons at least and not 10 on that occasion.

HÖLLRIEGEL: I did not know at that time that I might have to use these figures; I did not count them.

DR. SAUTER: This point is important to me, because the Defendant Schirach told me it was a visiting inspection, an official inspection tour of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, as a result of a meeting of the economic advisors of all six Gaue of the Ostmark.

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, I naturally did not know why he came to the camp, but I remember that this group came with Von Schirach and Schutzhaftlagerführer (Protective Custody-Camp Leader) Bachmeyer. At any rate I could see that it looked like an inspection.

DR. SAUTER: Did you know that this inspection was announced in the camp several days before and that certain preparations were made in the camp because of this inspection?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember any specific preparations but I do remember it was in the evening. I can’t tell you the exact time; it was the time of the evening roll call. The prisoners had assembled for roll call and all the hands on duty also had to fall in. Then this group came in.

DR. SAUTER: Did you or your comrades not know on the day before that this inspection would take place the very next day?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember that.

DR. SAUTER: And did it not strike you that certain definite preparations had been made in this camp?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember noticing that any preparations had been made.

DR. SAUTER: I have no further questions to ask this witness.

DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Witness, you described an incident which, judged by the concepts of civilized people, cannot be termed anything but murder—that is, the hurling of people over the side of the quarry. Did you report this incident to your superiors?

HÖLLRIEGEL: These incidents happened frequently and one can take it that the chances were a thousand to one that the superiors knew about them.

DR. STEINBAUER: In other words, you did not report this. Is it true that not only the internees but also the guards were forbidden under pain of death to report incidents of this sort to a third person?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: I have no other question.

COL. AMEN: Would you just look at that picture again?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you look at it carefully and tell me whether that is the quarry underneath the cliff which you have just described?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes. As far as I can tell from this picture, and I assume with a 100 percent degree of accuracy that it is the quarry Wiener-Graben; but one would have to see more, more background, to decide whether it is really this quarry. One sees too little, but I think quite certainly . . .

COL. AMEN: Do you recognize the individuals whose faces appear in the picture?

HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal the ones which you do recognize?

HÖLLRIEGEL: I recognize of course Reichsführer SS Himmler first of all, next to him the commandant of Mauthausen Concentration Camp Ziereis and way to the right I recognize Kaltenbrunner.

COL. AMEN: That is all, may it please the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can go and we will adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the next and final subject of the criminal organizations is the General Staff and High Command, to be presented by Colonel Taylor.

COLONEL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): Your Lordship and members of the Tribunal, the Indictment seeks a declaration of criminality, under Articles 9 to 11 of the Charter, against six groups or organizations; and the last one listed in the Indictment is a group described as the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.

At first sight these six groups and organizations seem to differ rather widely one from another, both in their composition and in their functions. But all of them are related, and we believe that they are logically indicted together before the Tribunal because they are the primary agencies and the chief tools by means of which the Nazi conspirators sought to achieve their aims. All six of them were either established by, controlled by, or became allied with the Nazis; and they were essential to the success of the Nazis. They were at once the principal and indispensable instruments: The Party, the Government, the Police, and the Armed Forces. It is my task to present the case in chief against the General Staff and High Command group.

Now, in one respect this group is to be sharply distinguished from the other groups and organizations against which we have sought this declaration. For example, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party—of the NSDAP—is the Leadership Corps of the Party itself, the Party which was the embodiment of Nazism and which was the instrument primarily through which Hitlerism rode to full power and tyranny in Germany. The SA and the SS were branches—to be sure, large branches—of the Nazi Party. The German Police did, indeed, have certain roots and antecedents which antedated Hitlerism; but it became 99 per cent a creature of the Nazi Party and the SS. The Reich Cabinet was in essence merely a committee or series of committees of Reich Ministers; and when the Nazis came to power, quite naturally these ministerial positions were filled for the most part by Nazis. All these groups and organizations, accordingly, either owe their origin and development to Nazism or automatically became Nazified when Hitler came to power.

Now, that is not true of the group with which we are now concerned. I need not remind the Tribunal that German armed might and the German military tradition antedate Hitlerism by many decades. One need not be a graybeard to have very vivid personal recollections of the war of 1914 to 1918, of the Kaiser, and of the “scrap of paper.” For these reasons I want to sketch very briefly, before going into the evidence, the nature of our case against this group, which is unique in the particulars I have mentioned.

As a result of the German defeat in 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles, the size and permissible scope of activities of the German Armed Forces were severely restricted. That these restrictions did not destroy or even seriously undermine German militarism, the last few years have made abundantly apparent. The full flowering of German military strength came about through collaboration; collaboration between the Nazis on the one hand and the career leaders of the German Armed Forces—the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen.

When Hitler came to power, he did not find a vacuum in the field of military affairs. He found a small Reichswehr and a body of professional officers with a morale and outlook nourished by German military history. The leaders of these professional officers constitute the group named in the Indictment, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. This part of the case concerns that group of men.

Now, needless to say, it is not the Prosecution’s position that it is a crime to be a soldier or a sailor or to serve one’s country as a soldier or sailor in time of war. The profession of arms is an honorable one and can be honorably practiced. But it is too clear for argument that a man who commits crimes cannot plead as a defense that he committed them in uniform.

It is not in the nature of things, and it is not the Prosecution’s position that every member of this group was a wicked man or that they were all equally culpable. But we will show that this group not only collaborated with Hitler and supported the essential Nazi objectives, but we will show that they furnished the one thing which was essential and basic to the success of the Nazi program for Germany; and that was skill and experience in the development and use of armed might.

Why did this group support Hitler and the Nazis? I think Your Honors will see, as the proof is given, that the answer is very simple. The answer is that they agreed with the truly basic objectives of Hitlerism and Nazism and that Hitler gave the generals the opportunity to play a major part in achieving these objectives. The generals, like Hitler, wanted to aggrandize Germany at the expense of neighboring countries and were prepared to do so by force or threat of force. Force, armed might, was the keystone of the arch, the thing without which nothing else would have been possible.

As they came to power and when they had attained power, the Nazis had two alternatives: either to collaborate with and expand the small German Army, known as the Reichswehr, or to ignore the Reichswehr and build up a separate army of their own. The generals feared that the Nazis might do the latter and accordingly were the more inclined to collaborate. Moreover, the Nazis offered the generals the chance of achieving much that they wished to achieve by way of expanding German armies and German frontiers; and so, as we will show, the generals climbed onto the Nazi bandwagon. They saw it was going in their direction for the present. No doubt they hoped later to take over the direction themselves. In fact, as the proof will show, ultimately it was the generals who were taken for a ride by the Nazis.

Hitler, in short, attracted the generals to him with the glitter of conquest and then succeeded in submerging them politically; and, as the war proceeded, they became his tools. But if these military leaders became the tools of Nazism, it is not to be supposed that they were unwitting or that they did not participate fully in many of the crimes which we will bring to the notice of the Tribunal. The willingness—and, indeed, the eagerness—of the German professional officer corps to become partners of the Nazis, will be fully developed.

Your Lordship, there will be three principal parts to this presentation. There will be first a description of the composition and functioning of the General Staff and High Command group as defined in the Indictment; next, the evidence in support of the charges of criminality under Counts One and Two of the Indictment; finally, the evidence in support of the charges under Counts Three and Four.

The members of the Tribunal should have before them three document books which have been given the designation “CC.” The first of these books is a series of sworn statements or affidavits which are available to the Tribunal in English, Russian, and French and which have been available to the defendants in German. The second and third books are the usual type of document books, separated merely for convenience of handling. The second book contains documents in the C- and L-series, and the third book, in the PS- and R-series. For the convenience of the Tribunal we have had handed up a list of these documents in the order in which they will be referred to.

The Tribunal should also have one other document, and that is a short mimeographed statement entitled, “Basic Information on the Organization of the German Armed Forces.” That has also been handed up in English, Russian, and French and has been made available to the defendants’ Information Center in German.

So I turn first to the description of the group as defined in the Indictment.

During the first World War there was an organization in the German Armed Forces known as the Great General Staff. This name, the German General Staff or Great General Staff, persists in the public mind; but the Grosse Generalstab no longer exists in fact. There has been no such single organization, no single German General Staff, since 1918; but there has, of course, been a group of men responsible for the policy and the acts of the German Armed Forces, and the fact that these men have no single collective name does not prevent us from collecting them together. They cannot escape the consequences of their collective acts by combining informally instead of formally. The essence of a general staff or a high command lies, not in the name you give it, but in the functions it performs; and the men comprised within the group as we have defined it in the Indictment do constitute a functional group, welded together by common responsibility, of those officers who had the principal authority and responsibility under Hitler for the plans and operations of the German Armed Forces.

Let us examine first the general structure and organization of the German Armed Forces and then look at the composition of the group as specified in the Indictment. As I just mentioned, we have prepared a very short written exposition of the organization of the German Armed Forces, which we have handed up to the Tribunal. That document contains a short sketch setting forth the basic history and development of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces since 1933 and the structure as it emerged after its reorganization in 1938. It also contains a simple chart which, in a few moments, will be displayed at the front of the courtroom. It also contains a short glossary of German military expressions; and it contains a comparative table of ranks in the German Army and in the SS, showing the equivalent ranks in the American Army and the equivalent ranks for the German Navy and the British Navy. I may say that military and naval ranks differ slightly among the principal nations, but that by and large they follow the same general pattern and terminology.

When the Nazis came to power in 1933, the German Armed Forces were controlled by a Reich Defense Minister, who at that time was Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg. Under Von Blomberg were the Chief of the Army Staff, who at that time was Von Fritsch, and of the Naval Staff, the Defendant Raeder. Owing to the limitations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, the German Air Force at that time had no official existence whatever. The Army and Naval Staffs were renamed “High Command”—Oberkommando des Heeres and Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine—from which are derived the initials by which they are generally known, OKH and OKM.

In May 1935 at the time that military conscription was introduced in Germany, there was a change in the titles of these offices; but the structure remained basically the same. Field Marshal Von Blomberg remained in supreme command of the Armed Forces, with the title of Reich Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Von Fritsch assumed the title Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

The German Air Force came into official and open existence at about this same time, but it was not put under Von Blomberg. It was an independent institution under the personal command of the Defendant Göring who had the double title of Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

I will now ask that that chart be displayed, please.

This chart, Your Honors, has been certified and sworn to by three principal German generals and the affidavits with reference to it will be introduced in a few moments. It shows the organization, the top organization, of the Armed Forces as it emerged in 1938 after the reorganization which I will now describe.

In February 1938 Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch were both retired from their positions and Blomberg’s ministry, the War Ministry, was wound up. The War Ministry had contained a division or department called the Wehrmachtsamt, meaning the Armed Forces Department; and the function of that department had been to co-ordinate the plans and operations of the Army and Navy. From this Armed Forces Department was formed a new over-all Armed Forces authority known as the High Command of the German Armed Forces—that is the box in the center, right under Hitler—known in German as Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, and usually known by the initials OKW.

Since the Air Force as well as the Army was subordinated to OKW, co-ordination of all Armed Forces matters was vested in the OKW, which was really Hitler’s personal staff for these matters. The Defendant Keitel was appointed Chief of the OKW. The most important division of the OKW, shown just to the right, was the Operations Staff, of which the Defendant Jodl became the chief.

Now, this reorganization and the establishment of OKW was embodied in a decree issued by Hitler on the 4th of February 1938. This decree appeared in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, and I invite the Court’s attention to it by way of judicial notice (1915-PS). Copies are available; and I would like to read the decree, which is very short, into the transcript. I quote:

“Command authority over the entire Armed Forces is from now on
exercised directly by me personally.”

THE PRESIDENT: Where do we find it?

COL. TAYLOR: That is not a document, Your Honor, because it is a decree from the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ and subject to judicial notice; but copies are available here if the Tribunal cares to look at it.

I will continue with the second paragraph of this decree:

“The Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry with its
functions becomes the High Command of the Armed Forces and comes
directly under my command as my military staff.

“The head of the Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces
is the Chief of the former Armed Forces Department, with the
title of Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. His
status is equal to that of a Reich Minister.

“The High Command of the Armed Forces also takes over the
affairs of the Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces, as my representative, exercises the
functions hitherto exercised by the Reich War Minister. The High
Command of the Armed Forces is responsible in peacetime for the
unified preparation of the defense of the Reich in all areas
according to my directives.”

Dated at Berlin, 4 February 1938; signed by Hitler, by Lammers, and by Keitel.

Underneath the OKW come the three supreme commands of the three branches of the Armed Forces: OKH, OKM, and the Air Force. The Air Force did not receive the official designation OKL until 1944. The Defendant Raeder remained after 1938 as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, but Von Fritsch, as well as Blomberg, passed out of the picture; Von Fritsch being replaced by Von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Göring continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. In 1941 Von Brauchitsch was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Army—that is the first box in the left column—by Hitler himself; and in 1943 Raeder was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy by the Defendant Dönitz. The Defendant Göring continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force until the last month of the war.

OKW, OKH, OKM, and OKL each had its own staff. These four staffs did not have uniform designations. The three staffs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are the three boxes in a horizontal line next to the bottom. The staff of the OKW is the little box to the right at the top, bearing the names of Jodl and Warlimont.

In the case of OKH—that is the Army—the staff was known as the Generalstab or the General Staff. In the case of OKW, it was known as the Führungsstab or Operations Staff, but in all cases the functions were those of a general staff in military parlance.

It will be seen, therefore, that in this war there was no single German General Staff; but, rather, that there were four, one for each branch of the service and one for the OKW as the over-all inter-service Supreme Command.

So we come to the bottom line on the chart. Down to the bottom line we have been concerned with the central staff organization at the center of affairs. Now we pass to the field. Under OKH, OKM, and OKL come the various fighting formations of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, respectively.

In the Army the largest army field formation was known to the Germans, as indeed it is among the nations generally, as an army group, or in German “Heeresgruppe.” Those are shown in the box in the lower left hand corner. An army group or Heeresgruppe controls two or more armies—in German, “Armeen.” Underneath the armies come the lower field formations, such as corps, divisions, and regiments, which are not shown on the chart.

In the case of the German Air Force, the largest formation was known as an air fleet or “Luftflotte,” and the lower units under the air fleet were called corps, “Fliegerkorps” or “Jagdkorps”; or divisions, “Fliegerdivisionen” or “Jagddivisionen.” These lower formations again we have not shown on the chart.

Under the OKM were the various naval group commands, which controlled all naval operations in a given area with the exception of the high seas fleet itself and submarines. The commanders of the fleet and the submarines were directly under the German Admiralty.

So we may now examine the group as defined in the Indictment; the group against which the Prosecution seeks the declaration of criminality. It is defined in Appendix B of the Indictment. The group comprises, firstly, German officers who held the top positions in the four supreme commands which I have just described and, secondly, the officers who held the top field commands.

Turning first to the officers who held the principal positions in the supreme commands, we find that the holders of nine such positions are included in the group. Four of these are positions of supreme authority: The Chief of the OKW, Keitel; the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Von Brauchitsch, later Hitler; Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Raeder, and later Dönitz; Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Göring, and later Von Greim.

Four other positions are those of the chiefs of the staffs to those four commanders-in-chief: The Chief of the Operations Staff of the OKW, Jodl; the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Halder, and later others; the Chief of-the General Staff of the Air Force, Jeschonnek, and later others; the Chief of the Naval War Staff.

The ninth position is that of Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW. Throughout most of the war that was General Warlimont, whose name is shown under Jodl’s on the chart. The particular responsibility of Jodi’s deputy was planning—strategic planning—and for that reason his office has been included in the group as defined in the Indictment.

The group named in the Indictment includes all individuals who held any of those nine staff positions between February 1938 and the end of the war in May 1945. February 1938 was selected as the opening date because it was in that month that the top organization of the German Armed Forces was reorganized and assumed substantially the form in which you see it there and in which it persisted up until the end of the war.

Twenty-two different individuals occupied those nine positions during that period, and of those 22, 18 are still living.

Turning next to the officers who held the principal field commands, the Indictment includes, as members of the group, all commanders-in-chief in the field who had the status of Oberbefehlshaber in the Army, Navy, or Air Force. The term “Oberbefehlshaber” rather defies literal translation into English. Literally, the components of the word mean “over-command-holder;” and we can perhaps best translate it as “commander-in-chief.”

In the case of the Army, commanders of the army groups and armies always had the status and title of Oberbefehlshaber. In the Air Force the commanders-in-chief of air fleets always had the status of Oberbefehlshaber, although they were not formally so designated until 1944. In the Navy officers holding the senior regional commands and, therefore, in control of all naval operations in a given sector had the status of Oberbefehlshaber.

Roughly 110 individual officers had the status of Oberbefehlshaber in the Army, Navy, or Air Force during the period in question. All but approximately a dozen of them are still alive. The entire General Staff and High Command group, as defined in the Indictment, comprises about 130 officers, of whom 114 are believed to be still living. These figures, of course, are the cumulative total of all officers who at any time belonged to the group during the 7 years and 3 months from February 1938 to May 1945.

The number of active members of the group at any moment is, of course, much smaller. It was about 20 at the outbreak of the war and it rose to about 50 in 1944 and 1945. That is to say, that at any one moment of time in 1944 the group—the active group—would have consisted of the nine individuals occupying the nine staff positions and about 41 Naval, Air Force, or Army commanders-in-chief.

The structure and the functioning of the German General Staff and High Command group has been described in a series of affidavits by some of the principal German field marshals and generals. These affidavits are included in Volume I of Document Book CC. I want to state briefly how these statements were obtained.

In the first place two American officers who were selected for their ability and experience in interviewing high-ranking German prisoners of war were briefed by an intelligence officer and by the Trial counsel on the particular problems presented by this part of the case, the organizational side of the German Armed Forces. These officers were already well versed in military intelligence and were fluent in German. It was emphasized that the function of these interrogating officers was merely to inquire into and establish the facts with respect to the organization of the Armed Forces, to establish facts on which the Prosecution wanted to be accurately informed.

The German generals to be interrogated were selected on the basis of the special knowledge which they could be presumed to possess by reason of the positions which they had held in the past. After each interview the interrogator prepared a report, and from this report such facts as appeared relevant to the issues before the Tribunal were extracted and a statement embodying them was prepared. This statement was then presented to the German officer at a later interview in the form of a draft, and the German officer was asked whether it truly reproduced what he had said and was invited to alter it in any way he saw fit. The object was to procure the most accurate testimony on organizational matters that we could.

I will take up these affidavits one by one, and I think the members of the Tribunal will see that they fully support the Prosecution’s description of the group and conclusively establish that this group of officers was, in fact, the group which had the major responsibility for planning and for directing the operations of the German Armed Forces.

The Soviet and French Judges have copies in French and Russian, and the Defense has copies in German.

The first of these affidavits is that of Franz Halder, who held the rank of “Generaloberst” or colonel general—the equivalent of a four-star general in the American Army. His affidavit will be Exhibit Number USA-531 (Document 3702-PS). Halder was Chief of the General Staff of OKH. That would be the box second from the bottom on the left-hand side. He was Chief of the General Staff of the OKH from September 1938 to September 1942. He is, accordingly, a member of the group and well qualified by his position to testify as to the organization. His statement is short, and I will read it in full:

“Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in
Germany was vested in the head of the State, who prior to the 2d
of August 1934, was Field Marshal Von Hindenburg and thereafter,
until 1945, was Adolf Hitler.

“Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the
three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time head of
the State), that is to say, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force.
In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a
relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers
exercised such supervision on the basis of their official
instructions and by virtue of their training, their positions,
and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations, of the
German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group,
according to the instructions of the OKW, in the name of their
respective commanding officers and were presented to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time the
head of the State).

“The members of this group were charged with the responsibility
of preparing for military operations within their competent
fields, and they actually did prepare for any such operations as
were to be undertaken by troops in the field.

“Prior to any operation, the respective members of this group
were assembled occasionally and given appropriate directions by
the head of the State. Examples of such meetings are the speech
by Hitler to the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939 prior to
the Polish campaign and the conference at the Reich Chancellery
on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign.

“The composition of this group and the relationship of its
members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. This
was, in effect, the General Staff and High Command of the German
Armed Forces. Signed: Halder.”

The chart to which reference is made is the chart which is at the front of the room and which was attached to the affidavit. The two meetings referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavit are covered by documents which will be introduced subsequently.

I next offer a substantially identical statement by Von Brauchitsch, which will be Exhibit Number USA-532 (Document 3703-PS). Von Brauchitsch held the rank of field marshal and was Commander-in-Chief of the Army from 1938 to 1941—therefore also a member of the group. I need not read his statement, since it is practically the same as that given by Halder; but I will ask that it be set forth in full in the transcript at this point. The only difference between the two statements is in the last sentence of each. Halder states that the group described in the Indictment “was, in effect, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces,” whereas Von Brauchitsch puts it a little differently, saying, “In the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.” Otherwise, the two statements are identical.

[_The document referred to above is as follows_:]

“Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in
Germany was vested in the head of State who prior to 2 August
1934 was Field Marshal Von Hindenburg and thereafter until 1945
was Adolf Hitler.

“Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the
three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time head of State),
that is to say, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. In
practice supervision within this field was exercised by a
relatively small group of high ranking officers. These officers
exercised such supervision on the basis of their official
instructions and by virtue of their training, their positions,
and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations of the
German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group
according to the instructions of the OKW and were presented to
the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time head
of State).

“The members of this group were charged with the responsibility
of preparing for military operations within their competent
fields and they actually did prepare for any such operations as
might possibly be undertaken by troops in the field.

“Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled
occasionally and given appropriate directions by the head of
State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler to the
commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish
campaign and the conference at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June
1941 prior to the first Russian campaign.

“The composition of this group and the relationship of its
members to each other were as shown in the attached chart. In
the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the chart
lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces.”—Signed— “Von
Brauchitsch.”

Now, the Tribunal will see from these affidavits that the chart which is on display at the front of the Court and which is contained in the short expository statement has been laid before Von Brauchitsch and Halder and that these two officers have vouched for it under oath as an accurate picture of the top organization of the German Armed Forces. The statements by Von Brauchitsch and Halder also fully support the Prosecution’s statement that the holders of the positions shown on this chart constitute the group in whom lay the major responsibility for the planning and execution of all Armed Forces matters.

I would now like to offer another affidavit by Halder which sets forth some of the matters of detail to which I adverted in describing the group. It is quite short. Affidavit Number 6, which becomes Exhibit USA-533 (Document 3704-PS)—and I shall read it in full into the transcript:

“The most important department in the OKW was the Operations
Staff, in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army
and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel
there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in
status with Jodl but, in the planning and conduct of military
affairs, they and their departments were less important and less
influential than Jodl and Jodl’s staff.

“The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of
these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was
chief. It was called the National Defense Section, and it was
primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions.
From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same
duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.

“There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as
the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.

“Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out
by the group of high ranking officers described in my statement
of 7 November (in the Army, the General Staff of the Army; and
in the Air Force, the General Staff of the Air Force).

“Operational matters of the Navy were, even in World War I, not
worked out by the Great General Staff but by the Naval Staff.
Signed: Halder.”

The Tribunal will note that this affidavit is primarily concerned with the functions of the General Staffs of the four commands of OKW, OKL, OKH, and OKM and fully supports the inclusion in the group of the Chiefs of Staff of the four services, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy Chief of the OKW staff because of his strategic planning responsibilities.

I have just one other very short affidavit covering a matter of detail. The Tribunal will remember that the highest fighting formation in the German Air Force was known as an air fleet or Luftflotte and that all commanders-in-chief of air fleets are included in this group. That is the box in the lower-right-hand corner. The commanders of air fleets always had the status of Oberbefehlshaber, but they were not formally so designated until 1944. These facts are set forth in an affidavit by the son of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. His son had the rank of Oberst, or colonel, in the German Air Force and was personal aide to the Defendant Göring as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. His affidavit is Number 9 and becomes Exhibit Number USA-534 (Document 3705-PS). It reads as follows:

“Luftflottenchefs have the same status as the Oberbefehlshaber
of an army. During the war they had no territorial authority
and, accordingly, exercised no territorial jurisdiction.

“They were the highest troop commanders of the Air Force units
subordinate to them and were directly under the command of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

“Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation Befehlshaber
and from then on that of Oberbefehlshaber. This change of
designation carried with it no change in the functions and
responsibilities that they previously had.”

Your Honor, that concludes the description of the composition of the group and the personnel of it. The staff of the Tribunal have referred to me two inquiries which have been addressed to the Tribunal by counsel for the group and it seemed to me it might be appropriate if I disposed of those inquiries now as to the composition of the group. The letters were turned over to me 2 days ago.

The first is from Hofrat Düllmann, and he has asked whether the group, as defined in the Indictment, is contingent upon rank, whether it includes officers holding a definite rank such as field marshal or “Generaloberst.”

The answer to that is clearly “no.” As has been pointed out, the criterion of membership in the group is whether one held one of the positions on the chart up there; and one would be in the group if one held one of the positions, no matter what one’s rank. Rank is no criterion. In point of fact, I suppose everybody in the group held at least the rank of general in the German Army, which is the equivalent of lieutenant general in ours.

He has also asked whether the group includes officers of the so-called General Staff Corps. The answer to that is “no.” There was in the German Army a war academy, and graduates of the war academy were in the branch of service described as the General Staff Corps. They signed themselves, for example, “Colonel in Generalstab.” They functioned largely as adjutants and assistants to the chief staff officers. I suppose there were some thousands of them—two or three thousand, but they are not included in the group. Many of them were officers of junior rank. They are not named in the Indictment, and there is no reason and no respect in which they are comprehended within the group as defined.

The other letter of inquiry is from Dr. Exner, who states that he is in doubt as to the meaning of Oberbefehlshaber and goes on to state that he believes that Oberbefehlshaber includes commanders-in-chief in theaters of war, the commanders-in-chief of army groups, and the commanders-in-chief of armies. That is quite right. Those are the positions as shown on the chart.

Let us now spend a few minutes examining the way this group worked. In many respects, of course, the German military leaders functioned in the same general manner as obtained in the military establishments of other large nations. General plans were made by the top staff officers and their assistants in collaboration with the field generals or admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision to wage a particular campaign would be made, needless to say, at the highest level; and the making of such a decision would involve political and diplomatic questions, as well as purely military considerations. When, for example, the decision was made to attack Poland, the top staff officers in Berlin and their assistants would work out general military plans for the campaign. These general plans would be transmitted to the commanders of the army groups and armies who would be in charge of the actual campaign; and then there would follow consultation between the top field commanders and the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, in order to revise and perfect and refine the plans.

The manner in which this group worked, involving as it did the interchange of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, on the one hand, and the principal field commanders on the other hand, is graphically described in two statements by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. That is Affidavit Number 4, which will be Exhibit Number USA-535 (Document 3706-PS). I invite the Tribunal’s attention to these and will read them into the transcript. The statement of 7 November 1945:

“In April 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military
preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was
immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan.
This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him, as
amended by a change which he desired. After the operational and
deployment orders had been given to the two commanders of the
army groups and the five commanders of the armies, conferences
took place with them about details, in order to hear their
desires and recommendations. After the outbreak of the war I
continued this policy of keeping in close and constant touch
with the commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies by
personal visits to their headquarters, as well as by telephone,
teletype, or wireless. In this way I was able to obtain their
advice and their recommendations during the conduct of military
operations. In fact, it was the accepted policy and common
practice for the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his
subordinate commanders-in-chief and maintain a constant exchange
of ideas with them.

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff
communicated with army groups and through them, as well as
directly, with the armies; through army groups on strategic and
tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply and
administration of conquered territory occupied by the armies. An
army group had no territorial executive power. It had a
relatively small staff, which was concerned only with military
operations. In all territorial matters it was the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and not of the army group, who
exercised executive power. Signed: Von Brauchitsch.”

There follows:

“Supplement to the statement of 7 November 1945:

“When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of
his political objectives through military pressure or through
the application of military force, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an
appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command.
Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the
OKH. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally
by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a
written order from the OKW to the three branches of the Armed
Forces. In the meanwhile the OKH began to transmit the
operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies
involved.