Chapter XXV: Part I: , Page 713 (17)

“As I stated orally on 28 November 1945, my then commander of
the 4th Army instructed his troops many times not to wage war
against the partisans more severely than was required at the
time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the
annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a
surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily
had an interest in taking prisoners, since very many of them
could very well be used as members of native volunteer units
against the partisans.

“Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans, there
was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the
population with the object, by peaceful means, of causing them
to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way the
women, too, were continually urged to get their men back from
the forests or to keep them by other means from joining the
partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the spring
of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared of
partisans. Only on its boundaries, and then only from time to
time, were partisans in evidence when they crossed into the area
of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army was obliged on
this account, on the orders of Army Group Center, to give up
security forces to the neighboring army to the south.”

The third statement by Röttiger, Number 16:

“During my period of service, from May 1942 to June 1943, as
Chief of Staff of the 4th Army of the Army Group Center, SD
units were attached in the beginning, apparently for the purpose
of counter-intelligence activity in front-line areas. It was
clear later on that these SD units were causing great
disturbances among the local civilian population, with the
result that my commanding officer therefore asked the commander
of the Army Group, Field Marshal Von Kluge, to order the SD
units to clear out of the front-line areas, which took place
immediately. The reason for this, first and foremost, was that
the excesses of the SD units, by way of execution of Jews and
other persons, assumed such proportions as to threaten the
security of the army in its combat areas because of the
infuriated civilian populace. Although in general the special
tasks of the SD units were well known and appeared to be carried
out with the knowledge of the highest military authorities, we
opposed these methods as far as possible because of the danger
which existed for our troops, as I have mentioned above.”

I would like now to offer one final document, the last document, 1786-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-561. This is an extract from the war diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, dated 14 March 1943. I propose to read the last two paragraphs, which deal with the problem of shipping of suspected partisans to concentration camps in Germany.

The Tribunal will see, from the extracts which I will read, that the Army was chiefly concerned with preserving a sufficient severity of treatment for suspected partisans without at the same time obstructing the procurement of labor from the occupied territories.

I will read the last two paragraphs:

“The Quartermaster General, together with the Economic Staff
East, has proposed that the deportees should be sent either to
prison camps or to reformatory labor camps in their own area and
that deportation to Germany should take place only when the
deportees are on probation and in less serious cases.

“In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, this proposal
does not take sufficient account of the severity required and
leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the
‘peaceful population’ which has been called upon to work. He
recommends, therefore, transportation to concentration camps in
Germany which have already been introduced by the Reichsführer
SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to introduce for the
Armed Forces in the case of an extension to the province of the
latter. The High Command of the Armed Forces therefore orders
that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed
should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police
Leader, and orders that the difference between ‘punitive labor’
and ‘being set to labor in Germany’ be made clear to the
population.”

Finally, I would like to offer a group of four affidavits which show that the anti-partisan activities on the Eastern Front were under the command of and supported by the Wehrmacht, and that the nature of these activities was fully known to the Wehrmacht.

The first of these is Affidavit Number 17, Exhibit USA-562, Document Number 3715-PS by Ernst Rode, who was an SS Brigadeführer and major general of the Police, and was a member of Himmler’s personal command staff from 1943 to 1945:

“I, Ernst Rode, was formerly Chief of the Command Staff of the
Reichsführer SS, having taken over this position in the spring
of 1943 as successor to former SS Obergruppenführer Kurt
Knoblauch. My last rank was Major General of Police and of the
Waffen-SS. My function was to furnish the forces necessary for
anti-partisan warfare to the Higher SS and Police Leaders and to
guarantee the support of Army Forces. This took place through
personal discussions with the leading officers of the Operations
Staff of the OKW and OKH, namely with General Warlimont, General
Von Buttlar, Colonel General Guderian, Colonel General Zeitzler,
General Heusinger, later General Wenk, Colonel Graf Kielmannsegg
and later, Colonel Von Bonin. Since anti-partisan warfare also
was under the sole command of the respective army group
commander in operational areas—for instance, in Army Group
Center under Field Marshal Kluge and later Busch—and since
police troops for the most part could not be spared from the
Reich Commissariats, the direction of this warfare lay
practically always entirely in the hands of the Army. In the
same way orders were issued not by Himmler but by the OKH. SS
and Police troops transferred to operational areas from the
Reichskommissariate to support the army groups were likewise
under the latter’s command. Such transfers were frequent and
therefore resulted in harm to anti-partisan warfare in the
Reichskommissariate. According to a specific agreement between
Himmler and the OKW and OKH, the direction of individual
operations lay in the hands of the troop leader who commanded
the largest troop contingent. It was therefore possible that an
Army general could have SS and Police under him; and, on the
other hand, that army troops could be placed under a general of
the SS and Police. Anti-partisan warfare in operational areas
could never be ordered by Himmler. I could merely request the
OKH to order it, until 1944, mostly through the intervention of
Generalquartiermeister Wagner or through State Secretary
Ganzenmüller. The OKH then issued corresponding orders to the
army groups concerned for compliance.

“The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically
diabolical partisan warfare was conducted by the Russians had
already resulted in Draconian laws being issued by Hitler for
its conduct. These orders, which were passed on to the troops
through the OKW and OKH, were equally applicable to army troops
as well as to those of the SS and Police. There was absolutely
no difference in the manner in which these two components
carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were exactly as
embittered against the enemy as were those of the SS and Police.

“As a result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly carried
out by both components, a thing which was also quite in keeping
with Hitler’s desires or intentions. As proof of this, the order
of the OKW and OKH can be adduced which directed that all
captured partisans, for instance, such as Jews, agents, and
political commissars, should without delay be handed over by the
troops to the SD for special treatment. This order also
contained the provision that in anti-partisan warfare no
prisoners except the above-named be taken. That anti-partisan
warfare was carried on by army troops mercilessly and to every
extreme, I know as the result of discussions with army troop
leaders, for instance with General Herzog, Commander of the 38th
Army Corps, and with his Chief of Staff, Colonel Pamberg, in the
General Staff, both of whom support my opinion. Today it is
clear to me that anti-partisan warfare gradually became an
excuse for the systematic annihilation of Jewry and Slavism.”

Your Lordship, I am told that I misread and said “Hitler” instead of “Himmler”.

I next wish to offer another and shorter statement by Rode, which shows that the SD Einsatzgruppen were under Wehrmacht command. This is Number 18, Exhibit USA-563; Document Number 3716-PS:

“As far as I know, the SD Einsatz groups with the individual
army groups were completely subordinate to them, that is to say
tactically as well as in every other way. The commanders were
therefore thoroughly cognizant of the missions and operational
methods of these units. They approved of these missions and
operational methods because, apparently, they never opposed
them. The fact that prisoners, such as Jews, agents, and
commissars, who were handed over to the SD, underwent the same
cruel death as victims of so-called purifications, is a proof
that the executions had their approval. This also corresponded
with what the highest political and military authorities wanted.
Frequent mentions of these methods were naturally made in my
presence at the OKW and OKH; and they were condemned by most SS
and Police officers, just as they were condemned by most army
officers. On such occasions I always pointed out that it would
have been quite within the scope of the authority of the
commanders of army groups to oppose such methods. I am of the
firm conviction that an energetic and unified protest by all
field marshals would have resulted in a change of these missions
and methods. If they should ever assert that they would then
have been succeeded by even more ruthless commanders, this, in
my opinion, would be a foolish and even cowardly dodge.”

I would like next to read the final affidavit, Number 24, in Document