Chapter I: Front Matter (1)

[Cover Illustration]

TRIAL
OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

BEFORE

THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL

N U R E M B E R G
14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946

P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y
1 9 4 7

This volume is published in accordance with the
direction of the International Military Tribunal by
the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction
of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.

Editor’s Note

In spite of the meticulous care given to this edition certain
inexactitudes may slip in, some originating with the speakers
themselves. In order to give a faithful rendering of the Record
we are avoiding alterations, but corrective notes will be
printed in the final volume.

The General Secretary’s Office would be grateful if the reader
would draw to his attention any errors or omissions, so that
they may also be included in the list of corrections.

_S. Paul A. Joosten_
Deputy General Secretary.

Address: Lawrence Deems Egbert, Editor International Military Tribunal Record APO 696 A, United States Army.

VOLUME V

O F F I C I A L T E X T

I N T H E

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

P R O C E E D I N G S

9 January 1946 — 21 January 1946

CONTENTS

Thirtieth Day, Wednesday, 9 January 1946,
Morning Session 1
Afternoon Session 31

Thirty-first Day, Thursday, 10 January 1946,
Morning Session 65
Afternoon Session 100

Thirty-second Day, Friday, 11 January 1946,
Morning Session 131
Afternoon Session 159

Thirty-third Day, Monday, 14 January 1946,
Morning Session 197

Thirty-fourth Day, Tuesday, 15 January 1946,
Morning Session 230
Afternoon Session 260

Thirty-fifth Day, Wednesday, 16 January 1946,
Morning Session 296
Afternoon Session 329

Thirty-sixth Day, Thursday, 17 January 1946,
Morning Session 368
Afternoon Session 399

Thirty-seventh Day, Friday, 18 January 1946,
Morning Session 434
Afternoon Session 459

Thirty-eighth Day, Saturday, 19 January 1946,
Morning Session 489

Thirty-ninth Day, Monday, 21 January 1946,
Morning Session 520
Afternoon Session 547

THIRTIETH DAY
Wednesday, 9 January 1946

_Morning Session_

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): If the Tribunal please, when the Tribunal adjourned I had just dealt with the last of the two Norway documents, which I how put in as Exhibits GB-140 and GB-141. Their numbers are 004-PS and D-629.

My Lord, for convenience the first document, to which I shall refer in a few minutes, will be Document Number 1871-PS.

THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): I have that here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, before I come to that, I just want to say one word about the aggression against the Low Countries—Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

The facts as to the aggression against these countries, during the period when this defendant was Foreign Minister, were stated in full by my friend Mr. Roberts, and I think if I give the Tribunal the reference to the transcript at Pages 1100 to 1125 (Volume III, Pages 289 to 307), I do not need to detain the Tribunal on that part of the case. I only remind the Tribunal that the action of this defendant as Foreign Minister to which attention may be called is the making of a statement on the 10th of May 1940 to representatives of the foreign press with regard to the reasons for the German invasion of the Low Countries; and these reasons were, in my respectful submission, demonstrated to be false by the evidence called by Mr. Roberts, which appears in that part of the transcript.

My Lord, I then proceed to the aggression in southeastern Europe against Greece and Yugoslavia, and the first moment of time in that regard is the meeting at Salzburg in August 1939, at which the Defendant Von Ribbentrop participated, when Hitler announced that the Axis had decided to liquidate certain neutrals. That is Document 1871-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-142, and the passage to which I should like to refer the Tribunal is on Page 2 of the English version, two-thirds down the page in the middle of the fifth paragraph, six lines from the top. Your Lordship will find the words “Generally speaking.”

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I desire to quote from there:

“Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the
pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done
if one Axis partner protects the rear of the other, as the
latter finishes off one of the uncertain neutrals. Italy may
consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the visit of
Prince Regent Paul he (the Führer) suggested, particularly with
regard to Italy, that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude
towards the Axis by a gesture. He had thought of a closer
connection with the Axis and the withdrawal of Yugoslavia from
the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the latter.
Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reassurance
from the Western Powers. The same thing was repeated that
happened in the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable
during his visit to Germany and who denied any interest in the
aims of the Western Democracies. Afterwards it was learned that
he had later assumed a contrary standpoint in England. Among the
Balkan countries the Axis can completely rely only on Bulgaria,
which is, in a sense, a natural ally of Italy and Germany.”

Then missing a sentence:

“At the moment of a turn for the worse for Germany and Italy,
however, Yugoslavia would join the other side openly, hoping
thereby to give matters a final turn to the disadvantage of the
Axis.”

That demonstrates the policy with regard to uncertain neutrals.

Then, as early as September 1940 this defendant reviewed the war situation with Mussolini. This defendant emphasized the heavy revenge bombing raids in England and the fact that London would soon be in ruins. It was agreed between the parties that only Italian interests were involved in Greece and Yugoslavia and that Italy could count on German support.

Then Von Ribbentrop went on further to explain to Mussolini the Spanish plan for the attack on Gibraltar and Germany’s participation therein and that he was expecting to sign the protocol with Spain, bringing the latter country into the war, on his return to Berlin.

This is Document 1842-PS, which is the next document in the book to the one at which the Tribunal has just been looking, and the passage with regard to Greece and Yugoslavia occurs in the middle of the first page—if I might just read a very short extract:

“With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia the Foreign Minister
stressed that it was exclusively a question of Italian
interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone
and in which Italy would be certain of Germany’s sympathetic
assistance.”

I don’t think I need trouble the Tribunal with the rest.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, member for the United States): I think you had better read the next paragraph.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “But it seemed to us to be better not to
touch on these problems for the time being, but instead to
concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces.
Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern
German districts (Norway, _et cetera_), and this was
acknowledged by the Duce.”

I am very grateful to you, Your Honor. That I put in as Exhibit GB-143.

A month or two later, in January 1941, at the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, in which this defendant participated, the Greek operation was discussed. Hitler had stated that the German troops in Romania were for use in the planned campaign against Greece. That document is C-134, which was put in as Exhibit GB-119, and therefore I do not propose to give it again but to give the Tribunal the reference to the points which are mentioned at the foot of Page 3 of the English text.

With regard to that meeting there is a cross-reference in Count Ciano’s diary, Count Ciano having attended as Italian Foreign Minister, and he recalls his impression of that meeting in the diary for the 20th and 21st of January by saying:

“The Duce is pleased with the conversation on the whole. I am
less pleased. Above all, because Ribbentrop, who had always been
so boastful in the past, told me, when I asked him outright how
long the war would last, that he saw no possibility of its
ending before 1942.”

Despite that somewhat pessimistic statement to Count Ciano, a short time later, 3 weeks later, when it was a question of encouraging the Japanese, this defendant took a more optimistic line.

On the 13th of February 1941 he saw Ambassador Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, and that conversation appears in Document 1834-PS, which is Exhibit USA-129. That was read previously, and again I simply give the reference on Page 3 of the English version.

The second from the last paragraph dealt with the optimistic account of the military position and the position of Bulgaria and Turkey. I do not think I need read it further, but I will give the Tribunal the reference.

Then after that, in March, this defendant put forth his efforts to get Yugoslavia to join the Axis, and on the 25th of March the defendant, in a note to the Prime Minister Cvetković—and this is Document 2450-PS, which is Exhibit GB-123—gave the assurance:

“The Axis-Power Governments, during this war, will not direct a
demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of
troops through the Yugoslav state or territory.”

After that, it is only fair to point out that there was the _coup d’état_ in Yugoslavia. General Simovic took over the government; and two days after the assurance which I just read, at the meeting of the 27th of March 1941, at which this defendant was present, Hitler outlined the military campaign against Yugoslavia and promised the destruction of Yugoslavia and the demolition of Belgrade by the German Air Force. That is contained in Document 1746-PS, which is Exhibit GB-120; and that was read by my friend, Colonel Phillimore at an earlier stage so I do not need to read it again.

The final action of this defendant with regard to Yugoslavia was that after the invasion of Yugoslavia Von Ribbentrop was one of the persons directed by Hitler to draw up the boundaries for the partition and division of Yugoslavia. The preliminary directive for that is Document 1195-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-144.

We now come to the aggression against the Soviet Union, and the first. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Has that been read, 1195?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, it has not. I am much obliged, Your Lordship. I will now read the relevant sentence with regard to this.

On Page 2, Section 2, Your Lordship will see the words “the drawing up of boundaries.” And in Paragraph 1 it says:

“Insofar as the drawing up of boundaries has not been laid down
in the above Part I, it will be carried out by the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign
Office,”—that is this defendant—“the Delegate for the Four
Year Plan,”—the Defendant Göring—“and the Reich Minister of
the Interior.”

THE PRESIDENT: Who is the Reich Minister of the Interior?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think the Defendant Frick.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think it is.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am grateful to Your Lordship. I had forgotten that had not been read before.

Now then, as I say, we come to the aggression against the Soviet Union; and the first document which has not been put in so far, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-145, is TC-25, the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact.

On 23 August 1939 this defendant had signed the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact. Now the first point at which this defendant seems to have considered special problems of aggression against the Soviet Union was just after the 20th of April 1941, when the Defendant Rosenberg and this defendant met or communicated to consider the problems which were expected to arise in Occupied Eastern Territory. This defendant appointed his Counselor, Grosskopf, to be his liaison man with Rosenberg and also assigned a consul general called Bräutigam, who had many years experience in the U.S.S.R., as collaborator with Rosenberg. That is shown in Document 1039-PS, which is already Exhibit USA-146. I did not propose to read it again, as it had been read. But the passage to which I have referred is the first paragraph on the top of Page 2, beginning, “After notification to the Reich Foreign Minister.” It is that paragraph which I have just mentioned.

That was in April 1941. The following month, on 18 May 1941, the German Foreign Office prepared a declaration setting forth operational zones in the Arctic Ocean, the Baltic and the Black Seas, to be used by the German Navy and the Air Force in the coming invasion of the Soviet Union. That is the next document, C-77, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-146, and it is very short. Therefore I think I should quote it; it has not been read before:

“The Foreign Office has prepared for the use in ‘Barbarossa’ the
attached draft of a declaration of operational zones. The
Foreign Office, however, has reserved the decision as to the
date when the declaration will be issued as well as the
discussion of particulars.”

These last two documents show quite clearly that this defendant was again implicated in the preparation for this act of aggression. Then, on the 22d of June 1941, this defendant announced to the world that the German armies were invading the U.S.S.R., as was seen by the Tribunal in the film shown on the 11th of December. And how untrue were the reasons given is shown by the report of his own Ambassador in Moscow who said that everything was being done to avoid a conflict. The Tribunal will find the reference to that in the speech of my learned friend, the Attorney General, the transcript at Page 888 (Volume III, Page 143).

We now come to the aggression which involved Japan and was directed against the United States of America. And there the initial document is 2508-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-147. That shows that on the 25th of November 1936, as a result of negotiations of this defendant as Ambassador-at-large, Germany and Japan had signed the Anticomintern Pact. I do not think that has been read, but if I might just read the introduction, the recital that gives the purposes of the agreement:

“The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese
Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist
International, known as the Comintern, is to disintegrate and
subdue existing states by all the means at its command,
convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist
International in the internal affairs of the nations not only
endangers their internal peace and social well-being but is also
a menace to the peace of the world, desirous of co-operating in
the defense against Communist subversive activities, have agreed
as follows. . . .”

And then there follow the effective terms of the agreement under which they will act together for 5 years. It is signed by this defendant.

On the 27th of September 1940 this defendant, as Foreign Minister, signed the Tripartite Pact with Japan and Italy, thereby bringing about a full-scale military and economic alliance for the creation of a “New Order” in Europe and East Asia. That is 2643-PS, Exhibit USA-149, and has been read.

Then, on the 13th of February of 1941—that is a month or two later—this defendant was urging the Japanese to attack British possessions in the Far East. And that is shown in Document 1834-PS, which is Exhibit USA-129 and which has already been read by my friend, Mr. Alderman. That was February.

Then, in April of 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Matsuoka, representing Japan, at which this defendant was present, Hitler promised that Germany would declare war on the United States in the event of war occurring between Japan and the United States as a result of Japanese aggression in the Pacific. That is shown in Document 1881-PS, Exhibit USA-33, which has already been read and which I did not intend to read again.

Then the next document which reinforces that point is 1882-PS, which is Exhibit USA-153. If I might trouble the Tribunal with just two short paragraphs of that; it is interesting, showing the psychological development of this defendant and his views at that time. They are the first two paragraphs that are quoted, under the heading “Pages 2 and 3,” where it begins “Matsuoka”; it is on the first page of the document:

“Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in Germany,
referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the
workers during his recent visit to the Borsig works. He
expressed his regret that developments in Japan were not yet as
far advanced as in Germany and that in his country the
intellectuals still exercised considerable influence.

“The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which
had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of
intellectuals, some of whom are parasites, anyway.”

THE PRESIDENT: It is “most,” according to my document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, “most”; I beg Your Lordship’s pardon, it is completely my fault, it should be “most,” “most of whom are parasites, anyway.”

“A nation, however, which has to fight for a place in the sun
must give them up. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany
they had already started their pernicious activities when
National Socialism put a stop to these doings; they will surely
be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected
with certainty.”

Then it continues on the usual lines. That last document was on the 5th of April.

Then, the next stage: Within a month after the German Armies invaded the Soviet Union, the 22d of June 1941, Ribbentrop was urging his Ambassador in Tokyo to do his utmost to cause the Japanese Government to attack the Soviet in Siberia; and that is proved by two documents which have already been put in—2896-PS, which is Exhibit USA-155, a telegram to the German Ambassador, in Tokyo, one Ott; and 2897-PS, USA-156, which is the reply from Ambassador Ott. Both of these were read by my friend, Mr. Alderman, and I won’t trouble the Tribunal again.

But the next document, which is D-656, is a new document which I put in as GB-148. That was captured from the Japanese, and it is a message—intercepted—which was sent by the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin just before the attack on the United States. If I might just read one short extract from this defendant’s speech; on the 29th of November 1941, that is roughly a week before Pearl Harbor, this defendant was saying—it is in Paragraph 1, and I will read it all because it is new:

“Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had
received any reports regarding the Japanese-United States
negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.

“Ribbentrop: ‘It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in
East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been
and probably never will be a time when closer co-operation under
the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this
time and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New
Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States
will be concentrated against Japan.

“‘As Führer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences
in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the
United States. We have received advice to the effect that there
is practically no hope of the Japanese-United States
negotiations being concluded successfully because of the fact
that the United States is putting up a stiff front.

“‘If this is indeed the fact of the case and if Japan reaches a
decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident
that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan
jointly but would bring about favorable results for Japan
herself.’”

Then the Ambassador replied:

“‘I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any
concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that
a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and
the United States?’”

The Defendant Ribbentrop:

“‘Roosevelt’s a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he
would do.’”

Then:

“Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has
said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to
avoid meeting German troops, and from the tone of Hitler’s
recent speech as well as that of Ribbentrop’s, I feel that the
German attitude toward the United States is being considerably
stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would
not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.”

Then the next part, Section 2, is an extremely optimistic prognosis of the war against the Soviet Union. I do not think, in view of the date in which we are reading it, that I need trouble the Tribunal with that.

There are then a few remarks about the intended landing operations against England, which is also _vieux jeu_ at this time.

If the Tribunal would go to Part 3, there again we get the international attitude of mind of this defendant—at the foot of Page 2, Part 3; and I am quoting:

“‘In any event Germany has absolutely no intention of entering
into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all
British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this
war, England will have no influence whatsoever in international
affairs. The island empire of Britain may remain, but all of her
other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided
three ways by Germany, the United States and Japan. In Africa,
Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were
formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share
of the African colonies. Germany desires, above all else, to
control European Russia.’”

And after hearing this defendant, the Ambassador said; and I quote:

“‘I am fully aware of the fact that Germany’s war campaign is
progressing according to schedule smoothly. However, suppose
that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only
Great Britain as an actual enemy but also all of those areas in
which Britain has influence, and those countries which have been
aiding Britain as actual enemies, as well. Under such
circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion,
of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under
such an eventuality?’”

The Defendant Ribbentrop:

“‘We would like to end this war during next year.’”—that is,
1942—“‘However, under certain circumstances it is possible that
it will have to be continued into the following year.

“‘Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United
States. . .’”

THE PRESIDENT: You are going a little bit too fast.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, I am sorry. I will go back to the paragraph I have just finished.

The Defendant Ribbentrop—and I am still quoting:

“‘We would like to end this war during next year. However, under
certain circumstances it is possible that it will have to be
continued into the following year.

“‘Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United
States, Germany, of course, would join the war immediately.
There is absolutely no possibility of Germany’s entering into a
separate peace with the United States under such circumstances.
The Führer is determined on that point.’”

That document associates this defendant with the aggression by Japan against the United States in the closest possible way.

Another new document, which is also an intercepted Japanese diplomatic message, is the next one, D-657, which I put in as Exhibit GB-149; and if I might read the first two sentences that show what it is—and I quote—the Japanese Ambassador says:

“At 1:00 p. m. today”—the 8th of December—“I called on Foreign
Minister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany
and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once.
Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a
conference at general headquarters, discussing how the
formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make
a good impression on the German people, and that he would
transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he could to
have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me
that on the morning of the 8th”—that is before the declaration
of war—“Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to
attack American ships whenever and wherever they might meet
them.

“It goes without saying that this is only for your secret
information.”

Then, as a matter of fact, as the Tribunal are aware, on the 11th of December 1941 this Defendant Ribbentrop, in the name of the German Government, announced a state of war between Germany and the United States.

The next stage concerns his attempt to get Japan to attack the Soviet Union.

In Ribbentrop’s conversations with Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, in July 1942 and in March and April 1943, he continued to urge Japanese participation and aggression against the Soviet Union. This is shown in Document 2911-PS, which has been put in as Exhibit USA-157 and already read, and Document 2954-PS, which I now put in as GB-150. That is a new document; and if I might just indicate the effect of it by a very short quotation—it is a discussion between the Defendant Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima. It begins:

“Ambassador Oshima declared that he has received a telegram from
Tokyo; and he is to report, by order of his Government, to the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following:

“The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was
the object of a common conference between the Japanese
Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the
question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The
outcome is the following: The Japanese Government thoroughly
recognize the danger which threatens from Russia and completely
understand the desire of their German ally that Japan on her
part also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not
possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present
war situation, to enter the war. They are rather of the
conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start
the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese
Government will never lose sight of the Russian question.”

And then, in the middle of the next paragraph, this defendant returns to the attack. The third sentence—it begins on the fourth line—says:

“However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the
Three Power Pact, would combine their forces to strike together
at not only England and America, but also Russia. It is not good
if one part must fight alone.”

Then the pressure on Japan to attack Russia is shown again in the next document, 2929-PS, which was put in as Exhibit USA-159. And, if I might just close this part of the case, if I might read that—it is very short:

“The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that
without any doubt this year presented the most favorable
opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had
sufficient antitank weapons at her disposal to attack Russia,
which certainly would never again be as weak as at the
moment”—the moment being 18 April 1943.

If the Tribunal please, that concludes my evidence on the second allegation dealing with aggressive war; and I submit that that allegation in the Indictment is more than amply proved.

The third allegation is that the Defendant Ribbentrop authorized, directed, and participated in War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

Of course, I am considering this from the point of view of planning these crimes only. The execution of the crimes will be dealt with by my friends and Soviet colleagues, but it is relevant to show how this defendant participated in the planning of such crimes. I deal, first, with the killing of Allied aviators; secondly, with the destruction of peoples in Europe; and thirdly, with the persecution of the Jews.

First, the killing of Allied aviators:

With the increasing air raids on German cities in 1944 by Allied Air Forces, the German Government proposed to undertake a plan to deter Anglo-American fliers from further raids on the Reich cities. In a report of a meeting at which a definite policy was to be established, there is stated what was the point of view that this Defendant Ribbentrop had been urging. That is in Document 735-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-151. That is a discussion of a meeting at the Führer’s headquarters on the 6th of June 1944. If I might read the first paragraph:

“Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner informed the Deputy Chief of
Operations Staff”—WFSt—“in Klessheim on the afternoon of the
6th of June that a conference on this question had been held
shortly before by the Reich Marshal”—the Defendant Göring—“the
Reich Foreign Minister”—the Defendant Von Ribbentrop—“and the
Reichsführer SS.”—Himmler—“Contrary to the original suggestion
made by the Reich Foreign Minister, who wished to include every
type of terror attack on the German civilian population,
including bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed in the above
conference that merely those attacks carried out with aircraft
armament aimed directly at the civilian population and their
property should be taken as the standard for the evidence of a
criminal action in this sense. Lynch law would have to be the
rule, there was no mention of trial by court-martial or handing
over to the police.”

That is, this defendant was pressing that even where there was an attack on a German city, the airmen should be handed over to be lynched by the crowd. The others were saying that that should be restricted to cases where there were attacks by machine guns, and the like, on the civilian population.

I do not think we need trouble with Paragraph (a) of the statement of the Deputy Chief of WFSt. The importance of (a) goes because Kaltenbrunner says that there were no such cases as were mentioned.

If you look at (b):

“The Deputy Chief of the WFSt pointed out that, besides the
lynch law, a procedure must be worked out for segregating such
enemy aviators who are suspected of criminal action of this kind
by sending them to the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel
and, if the suspicion was confirmed, handing them over to the SD
for special treatment.”

As I understand that, it is that if they were not lynched under the first scheme, by the crowd, then they were to be kept from prisoners of war, where they would, of course, be subject to the protecting power’s intervention. And if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD to be killed.

Then in Paragraph 3 we have what was decided to justify the lynch law. Paragraph 3 says:

“At a conference with Colonel Von Brauchitsch (Colonel of the
Air Force) on the 6th of June, it was settled that the following
actions are to be regarded as terror actions justifying lynch
law:

“Low-level attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian
population, single persons as well as crowds.

“Shooting in the air our own (German) men who had bailed out.

“Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains in the
public service.

“Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals,
hospitals, and hospital trains, which are clearly marked with
the red cross.”

These were to be the subject of lynching and not, as this defendant had suggested, a case where there was the bombing of a city.

Then on the next page, the last page of this document, we have a somewhat curious comment from the Defendant Keitel:

“Remarks by the Chief of the OKW on the agenda dated 6 June
1944.”

The number is that of the document at which the Tribunal has just been looking.

“Most secret; Staff officers only.

“If one allows the people to carry out lynch law, it is
difficult to enforce rules.

“Ministerial Director Berndt got out and shot the enemy aviator
on the road. I am against legal procedure. It doesn’t work
out.”—Signed—“Keitel.”

Then the Defendant Jodl’s comment appears:

“This conference is insufficient. The following points must be
decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Office:

“1. What do we consider as murder? Is the Foreign Office in
agreement with point 3b?

“2. How should the procedure be carried out? a. By the people?
b. By the authorities?

“3. How can we guarantee that the procedure will not be also
carried out against other enemy aviators?

“4. Should some legal procedure be arranged or
not?”—Signed—“Jodl.”

It is important, I respectfully submit, to note that this defendant and the Foreign Office were fully in on these breaches of the laws and usages of war, and indeed the clarity with which the Foreign Office perceives that there were breaches of the laws and usages of war, is shown by the next document, which is 728-PS, which I now put in as GB-152. That is a document from the Foreign Office, approved of by the Defendant Ribbentrop and transmitted by one of his officials called Ritter; and the fact that it is approved by this defendant is specifically stated in the next Document 740-PS, which I put in as GB-153. I do not think this Document 728-PS has been read before, and therefore, again, I would like to read just one or two passages in it. It begins:

“In spite of the obvious objections, based on international law
and foreign policy, the Foreign Office is basically in agreement
with the proposed measures.

“In the examination of the individual cases a distinction must
be made between the cases of lynching and the cases of special
treatment by the SD.

“I. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment of the
facts involving punishment, according to points 1 through 4 of
the communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the
German authorities are not directly responsible, since the death
will have occurred before a German official becomes concerned
with the case. Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances will
be such, that it will not be difficult to represent the case in
an appropriate manner upon publication. Hence, in cases of
lynching it will be of primary importance correctly to handle
the individual case upon publication.

“II. The suggested procedure for special treatment by the SD,
including subsequent publication, would be feasible only if
Germany would at the same time openly repudiate the commitments
of international law, at present in force and still recognized
by Germany. When an enemy aviator is seized by the Army or by
the Police and is delivered to the reception camp for aviators
at Oberursel, he has acquired by this very fact the legal status
of a prisoner of war.

“The Prisoner-of-War Agreement of 27 July 1929 established
definite rules for the prosecution and sentencing of prisoners
of war and the execution of the death penalty, as for example in
Article 66: Death sentences may be carried out only 3 months
after the Protecting Power has been notified of the sentence. In
Article 63: A prisoner of war will be tried only by the same
courts and under the same procedure as members of the German
Armed Forces. These rules are so specific that it would be
futile to try to cover up any violation of them by clever
wording of the publication of an individual incident. On the
other hand, the Foreign Office cannot recommend on this occasion
a formal repudiation of the Prisoner-of-War Agreement.

“An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected enemy
fliers from ever attaining a legal prisoner-of-war status, that
is, that immediately upon capture they be told that they are not
considered prisoners of war but criminals, that they would not
be turned over to the agencies having jurisdiction over
prisoners of war, hence not go to a prisoner-of-war camp, but
that they be delivered to the authorities in charge of the
prosecution of criminal acts, and that they be tried in summary
proceedings. If the evidence at the trial should reveal that the
special procedure is not applicable to a particular case, the
fliers concerned may subsequently be given the status of
prisoner of war by transfer to the reception camp for aviators
at Oberursel.

“Naturally, not even this expedient will prevent the possibility
of Germany’s being accused of violation of existing treaties or
even the adoption of reprisals upon German prisoners of war. At
any rate this solution would enable us to follow a clearly
defined course, thus relieving us of the necessity of openly
having to renounce the present agreements or of the need of
having to use excuses which no one would believe, upon the
publication of each individual case.”

I do not want to take this in detail, but I ask the Tribunal to look at the first sentence of Section III:

“It follows from the above that the main weight of the action
will have to be placed on lynchings. Should the campaign be
carried out to such an extent that the purpose, to wit: the
deterrence of enemy aviators, is actually achieved, which goal
is favored by the Foreign Office, then the strafing attacks by
enemy fliers directing the fire of their weapons upon the
civilian population must be stressed in a completely different
propagandist manner than heretofore.”

I don’t think I need trouble the Tribunal, but that shows quite clearly the defendant’s point of view. If the Tribunal would look at the next document, it is stated at the beginning of the second paragraph:

“Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone on 29 June that
the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft. . . .”

That is the position as to the treatment of aviators, where there is, in my suggestion, a completely cold-blooded and deliberate adoption of a procedure evading international law.

The second section is the destruction of the peoples in Europe. With regard to Poland, again I want scrupulously to avoid going into details; but I remind the Tribunal of the evidence of the Witness Lahousen, which appears in the transcript, Pages 618 and 619 (Volume II, Pages 448-449) on the 30th of November of last year, and on Pages 713 to 716 (Volume III, Pages 20-25), when he was cross-examined on the 1st of December.

Secondly, Bohemia and Moravia: On the 16th of March 1939 there was promulgated the decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, signed by Ribbentrop, concerning the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. That is already in as Exhibit GB-8, Document TC-51. The effect of that was to place the Reich Protector in a remarkable position of supremacy under the Führer. The only part which I would like the Tribunal to have in mind is Article 5 and Subarticle 2:

“2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the Führer and
Chancellor of the Reich and as Commissioner of the Reich
Government, is charged with the duty of seeing to the observance
of the political principles laid down by the Führer and
Chancellor of the Reich.

“3. The members of the Government of the Protectorate shall be
confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be
withdrawn.

“4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself of all
measures taken by the Government of the Protectorate and to give
advice. He can object to measures calculated to harm the Reich
and, in cases of danger, issue ordinances required for the
common interest.

“5. The promulgation of laws, decrees, and other legal
provisions and the execution of administrative measures and
legal judgments shall be suspended if the Reich Protector enters
an objection.”

As a result of this law, the two Reich Protectors of Bohemia and Moravia and their various deputies were appointed; and then there were committed the various crimes which will be detailed by my Soviet colleague.

Similarly, with regard to the Netherlands on the 18th of May 1940, a decree of the Führer was signed by Ribbentrop concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands, and that—Document 639-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-154, Section 1—says:

“The Occupied Netherlands Territories shall be administered by
the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories
. . . the Reich Commissioner is guardian of the interests of the
Reich and vested with supreme civil authority.

“Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart is hereby appointed Reich Commissioner
for the Occupied Netherlands Territories.”

On the basis of this decree, the Reich Commissioner—the Defendant Seyss-Inquart—promulgated such orders as that of the 4th of July 1940, dealing with the confiscation of property of those who had, or might have, furthered activities hostile to the German Reich; and tentative arrangements were made for the resettlement of the Dutch population. But all this will also be dealt with fully by my French colleagues.

I simply for the moment put in as a matter of reference the general order of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, which is GB-155, the document being 2921-PS. I do not intend to read it. I have summarized the effect of it and it will be dealt with more fully by my French colleagues.

I want the Tribunal to appreciate, with regard to these two matters, Bohemia and the Netherlands, that the charge against this defendant is laying the basis and procuring the governmental structure under which the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity were directed.

I should also put in formally Exhibit GB-156, the discussion on the question of the Dutch population, which is contained in Document 1520-PS. Again I have explained it generally and I do not want to occupy time by reading it in full now.

Then coming to the Jews: In December 1938 the Defendant Ribbentrop, in a conversation with M. Bonnet, who was then Foreign Minister of France, expressed his opinion of the Jews. That was reported by the United States Ambassador, Mr. Kennedy, to the State Department. The report of Mr. Kennedy is Document L-205, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-157. If I might read to the Tribunal the second paragraph, which concerns this point:

“During the day we had a telephone call from Berenger’s office
in Paris. We were told that the matter of refugees had been
raised by Bonnet in his conversation with Von Ribbentrop. The
result was very bad. Ribbentrop, when pressed, had said to
Bonnet that the Jews in Germany, without exception, were
pickpockets, murderers, and thieves. The property they possessed
had been acquired illegally. The German Government had therefore
decided to assimilate them with the criminal elements of the
population. The property which they had acquired illegally would
be taken from them. They would be forced to live in districts
frequented by the criminal classes. They would be under police
observation like other criminals. They would be forced to report
to the police as other criminals were obliged to do. The German
Government could not help it if some of these criminals escaped
to other countries which seemed so anxious to have them. It was
not, however, willing for them to take the property which had
resulted from illegal operations with them. There was in fact
nothing that it could or would do.”

That succinct statement of this defendant’s views on Jews is elaborated in a long document which he had sent out by the Foreign Office, which is numbered 3358-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-158. I do not want to read the whole of that document because it is excessively dreary; it is also an excessively clear indication of the defendant’s views on the treatment of Jews. But if the Tribunal would look at, first of all, Page 3—it is headed, “The Jewish Question as a Factor in German Foreign Policy in the Year 1938”; after the four divisions the document goes on to say:

“It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has
brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question
simultaneously with the realization of the ‘idea of Greater
Germany,’ since the Jewish policy was both the basis and
consequence of the events of the year 1938.”

That is elaborated. If the Tribunal will turn over to Page 4 at the beginning of the second paragraph, they will see the first sentence:

“The final goal of German Jewish policy is the emigration of all
the Jews living in Reich territory.”

Then that is developed at great length through a large number of pages. The conclusion which is—if the Tribunal would turn to the foot of Page 7 and examine it—it goes on this way:

“These examples from reports from authorities abroad can, if
desired, be amplified. They confirm the correctness of the
expectation that criticism of the measures for excluding Jews
from German Lebensraum, which were misunderstood in many
countries for lack of evidence, would be only temporary and
would swing in the other direction the moment the population saw
with its own eyes and thus learned what the Jewish danger was to
them. The poorer and therefore the more burdensome the immigrant
Jew is to the country absorbing him, the stronger this country
will react and the more desirable is this effect in the interest
of German propaganda. The object of this German action is to be
a future international solution of the Jewish question, dictated
not by false compassion for the ‘United Religious Jewish
Minority’ but by the full consciousness of all peoples of the
danger which it represents to the racial composition of the
nations.”

The Tribunal will appreciate that this document was circulated by the defendant’s ministry, widely circulated to all senior Reich authorities and to numerous people before the war, on the 25th of January 1939, just after the statement to M. Bonnet. Apparently the anti-Semitism of the defendant went from—I was going to say from strength to strength, if that is the correct term, or at any rate from exaggeration to exaggeration, for in June 1944 the Defendant Rosenberg made arrangements for an international anti-Jewish congress to be held in Kraków on the 11th of July 1944. The honorary members were to be Von Ribbentrop, Himmler, Goebbels, and Frank—I think the Defendant Frank. The Foreign Office was to take over the mission of inviting prominent foreigners from Italy, France, Hungary, Holland, Arabia, Iraq, Norway, et cetera, in order to give an international aspect to the congress. However, the military events of June 1944 prompted Hitler to call off the congress which had lost its significance by virtue of the landings in Normandy.

That is contained in Document 1752-PS, GB-159. At the foot of Page 1 the Tribunal will see the following had been entered as honorary members: Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. So that there is no doubt that this defendant was behind the program against the Jews which resulted in the placing of them in concentration camps with anyone else who opposed the Nazi way of life; and it is submitted that he must, as a minister in special touch with the head of the government, have known what was going on in the country and in the camps. One who preached this doctrine and was in a position of authority cannot, I submit to anyone who has had any ministerial experience, suggest that he was ignorant of how the policy was carried out.

That is the evidence on the third allegation and it is submitted that by the evidence which I have recapitulated to the Tribunal the three allegations are proved.

With regard to the second, Hitler’s own words were:

“In the historic year of 1938 the Foreign Minister, Von
Ribbentrop, was of great help to me by virtue of his accurate
and audacious judgment and admirably clever treatment of all
problems of foreign policy.”

During the course of the war this defendant was in close liaison with the other Nazi conspirators. He advised them and made available to them, in his embassies and legations abroad, information which was required and at times participated, as I have shown, in the planning of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

It is submitted that all the allegations which I read from Appendix A of the Indictment are completely proved against this defendant. I want, if the Tribunal will allow me, to add only one fact on behalf of the British Delegation. In the preparation of these briefs we have received great assistance from certain of our American colleagues; and I should like to thank once, but nonetheless heartily, on behalf of us all, Dr. Kempner’s staff: Captains Auchincloss, Claggett, and Stoll, Lieutenants Felton and Heller, and Mr. Lachmann for the great help they have been to us.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for the Defendant Frank): May it please the Tribunal, I have a motion to make.

THE PRESIDENT: On behalf of whom?

DR. SEIDL: I want to make a motion which concerns the indictment of Frank.

The Charter of the Tribunal contains, in Part IV, regulations for a fair trial, and Article 16 prescribes that for the purpose of safeguarding the right of the defendants the following procedure shall be followed. “The Indictment shall include full particulars specifying in detail the charges against the defendant. A copy of the Indictment, and of all the documents lodged with the Indictment, translated into a language which he understands, shall be furnished to the defendant at a reasonable time before the Trial.”

At the beginning of the Trial the Defendant Frank was handed a copy of the Indictment. This is the Indictment which was read on the first day. This is, if I may say so, a general indictment. All actions are listed therein which, according to the opinion of the Signatories of the London Agreement, are regarded as Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity. The Indictment does not contain in detail the criminal actions of each defendant. I am now thinking about positive actions or concrete actions or omissions.

This morning I received a document. It has the title, “The Individual Responsibility of the Defendant Hans Frank for Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity”—or in German “Die persönliche Verantwortlichkeit des Angeklagten Frank für Verbrechen gegen den Frieden, für Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschheit.” This document is without any table of contents. It consists of 30 typewritten pages. In addition to this document, or indictment, as I should like to call it, another document book has been given to me, namely, “Document Book Hans Frank.” The first document, as well as the second document is not in German but in English. This first document is in reality what I should call the indictment against Frank, because here in this document of 30 pages for the first time those individual activities of Frank are listed which are to be regarded as criminal actions. At least one ought to say that this document is an essential part of the Indictment. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Forgive me for interrupting you. The Tribunal has already expressed its desire that a motion such as this should be made in writing. The Tribunal considers that a motion of the sort which you are now making orally is a waste of the Tribunal’s time and it therefore desires you to put your motion in writing. It will then be considered.

DR. SEIDL: I regret myself that I must make this motion now, but I was not able to make this motion in writing before receiving this document only two and a half hours ago. My motion is that the Prosecution should submit these two documents to the Defendant Frank in the German language.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has not got the documents to which you are referring. It is quite impossible for us to understand the motion you are making unless you make it in writing and attach the documents or in some other way describe or explain to us what the documents are. We have not got the documents that you are referring to.

DR. SEIDL: Then I shall make my motion in writing.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, can you explain to me what the counsel who has just spoken is complaining about?

MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): I gather he was complaining that the trial brief and the document book which had been served on his client, Frank, were in English and not in German.

THE PRESIDENT: Who is dealing with the case against Frank?

MR. ROBERTS: It is being dealt with by the United States.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps I had better ask Colonel Storey then.

COLONEL ROBERT G. STOREY (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): If the Tribunal please, I think what counsel is referring to is the practice we have made of delivering in advance a copy of the document book and a copy of the trial brief. In this particular instance I happen to know that what counsel refers to is the trial address, which is to be read over the microphone, and as a courtesy to counsel they have been delivered in advance of the presentation, just like all the other document books and briefs against the other individual defendants. That’s what it is, as I understand it.

THE PRESIDENT: The documents which will be presented against the Defendant Frank will be all translated?