Chapter XIV: Part I: , Page 1203; Reichsgesetzblatt 1934, Part I, Page 295; and (7)

There is here, the Tribunal sees, no trace of reluctance in co-operating with the Nazi program. On the contrary, the evidence points to the fact that Raeder welcomed and became one of the pillars of Nazi power. And it will now be my purpose to develop the relationship between Raeder, the Navy, and the Nazi Party.

The Prosecution’s submission is that Raeder, more than anyone else, was responsible for securing the unquestioned allegiance of the German Navy to the Nazi movement, an allegiance which Dönitz was to make even more firm and fanatical.

Raeder’s approval of Hitler was shown particularly clearly on the 2d of August 1934, the day of Hindenburg’s death, when he and all the men under him swore a new oath of loyalty with considerable ceremony, this time to Adolf Hitler and no longer to the fatherland. The oath is found in the Document D-481 at Page 101 of the document book. That will be Exhibit GB-215, and it may be of interest to the Court to see what the new oath was. The last paragraph reads:

“The service oath of the soldiers of the armed forces:

“‘I swear this holy oath by God that I will implicitly obey the
Leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces and that, as a brave soldier, I
will be willing to stake my life at any time for this oath.’”

The Tribunal will see that for his fatherland Raeder substituted a Führer.

I am not proposing to take the Tribunal’s time with reiterating the steps by which the German Navy was progressively drawn into the closest alliance with the Nazi Party. I would remind the Court of facts of history, like the incorporation of the swastika into the ensign under which the German Fleet sailed and the wearing of the swastika on the uniform of naval officers and men, which are facts which speak for themselves.

The Nazis for their part, were not ungrateful for Raeder’s obeisance and collaboration. His services in rebuilding the German Navy were widely recognized by Nazi propagandists and by the Nazi press. On his 66th birthday, the chief Party organ, the _Völkischer Beobachter_, published a special article about him, to which I desire to draw the Tribunal’s attention. It is at Page 100 of the document book; it is Document D-448, Exhibit GB-216. It is a valuable summing-up of Raeder’s contribution to Nazi development:

“It was to Raeder’s credit”—writes the _Völkischer
Beobachter_—“to have already built up by that time a powerful
striking force from the numerically small fleet, despite the
fetters of Versailles.

“With the assumption of power, National Socialism began the most
fruitful period in the reconstruction of the German fleet.

“The Führer openly expressed his recognition of Raeder’s
faithful services and unstinted co-operation, by appointing him
Grossadmiral on the 20th of April 1936.”

THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it necessary to read the entire document?

MAJOR JONES: I was going to turn to the last paragraph but one, My Lord, which I think is helpful.

“As a soldier and a seaman, the Grossadmiral has proved himself
to be the Führer’s first and foremost naval collaborator.”

This, in my submission, is a summing-up of his status and position in Nazi Germany.

I now propose to deal with Raeder’s personal part in the Nazi conspiracy. The evidence indicates that Raeder, from the time of the Nazi seizure of power, became increasingly involved in responsibility for the general policies of the Nazi State.

Long before he was promoted to General-Admiral in 1936, he had become a member of the very secret Reich Defense Council, joining it when it was founded on the 4th of April 1933. And thus, at an early date, he was involved, both militarily and politically, in the Nazi conspiracy. The relevant document upon that is Document EC-177, Exhibit Number USA-390, at Page 68 of the document book, which I would remind the Tribunal contains the classic Nazi directive: “Matters communicated orally cannot be proven; they can be denied by us in Geneva.”

On the 4th of February 1938 Raeder was appointed to be a member of a newly-formed secret advisory council for foreign affairs; and the authority for that statement is Document 2031-PS at Page 88 of the document book, which will be Exhibit GB-217.

Three weeks after this a decree of Hitler’s stated that, as well as being equal in rank with a cabinet minister, Raeder was also to take part in the sessions of the Cabinet. That has already been established in Document 2098-PS, which was submitted as Exhibit GB-206.

In my submission, therefore, it is thus clear that Raeder’s responsibility for the political decisions of the Nazi State was steadily developed from 1933 to 1938 and that in the course of time he had become a member of all the main political advisory bodies. He was, indeed, very much a member of the inner councils of the conspirators and, I submit, must carry with them the responsibility for the acts that led to the German invasion of Poland in 1939 and the outbreak of war.

As an illustration, I would remind the Tribunal that Raeder was present at two of the key meetings at which Hitler openly declared his intention of attacking neighboring countries. I refer the Tribunal to Document 386-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-25 and is found at Page 81 of the document book, which the Tribunal will remember is the record of Hitler’s conference at the Reich Chancellery on the 5th of November 1937 about matters which were said to be too important to discuss in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet. The document, which Mr. Alderman submitted, establishes conclusively that the Nazis premeditated their Crimes against Peace.

Then there was the other conference of Hitler’s on the 23rd of May 1939, the minutes of which are found in the Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27, at Page 74 of the document book. That, the Tribunal will remember, was the conference at which Hitler confirmed his intention to make a deliberate attack upon Poland at the first opportunity, well knowing that this must cause widespread war in Europe.

Now, those two were key conferences. At many, many others Raeder was also present to place his knowledge and his professional skill at the service of the Nazi war machine.

His active promotion of the military planning and preparation for the Polish campaign is by now well-known to the Tribunal, and I am not proposing to reiterate that evidence again. Once the war did start, however, the Defendant Raeder showed himself to be a master of the most typical of the conspirators’ techniques, namely that of deceit on a grand scale. There are few better examples of this allegation than that of his handling of the case of the _Athenia_.

The _Athenia_, as the Tribunal will be aware, was a passenger liner which was sunk in the evening of the 3rd of September 1939, when she was outward bound to America, about a hundred lives being lost.

On the 23rd of October 1939 the Nazi Party paper, the _Völkischer Beobachter_, published in screaming headlines the story, “Churchill Sank the _Athenia_.” I would refer the Court to Document 3260-PS, at Page 97 of the document book, which will be Exhibit GB-218. And I would like the Tribunal to look for a moment at the copy of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ here, and see the scale with which this deliberate lie was perpetrated. I have a photostat of the relevant page of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ for that day. That is the third page and the Tribunal will see on this front page, with the big red underlining, there are the words, “Now We Indict Churchill.”

The extract from the _Völkischer Beobachter_, which is at Page 97 of the document book, reads as follows:

“Churchill Sank the _Athenia_. The above picture”—and the
Tribunal will see it is a fine picture of this fine ship—“shows
the proud _Athenia_, the ocean giant, which was sunk by
Churchill’s crime. One can clearly see the big radio equipment
on board the ship. But nowhere was an SOS heard from the ship.
Why was the _Athenia_ silent? Because her captain was not
allowed to tell the world anything. He very prudently refrained
from telling the world that Winston Churchill attempted to sink
the ship through the explosion of a time bomb. He knew it well,
but he had to keep silent. Nearly 1,500 people would have lost
their lives if Churchill’s original plan had resulted as the
criminal wanted. Yes, he longingly hoped that the 100 Americans
on board the ship would find death in the waves so that the
anger of the American people, who were deceived by him, should
be directed against Germany, as the presumed author of the deed.
It was fortunate that the majority escaped the fate intended for
them by Churchill. Our picture on the right shows two wounded
passengers. They were rescued by the freighter _City of Flint_,
and as can be seen here, turned over to the American coast guard
boat _Gibb_ for further medical treatment. They are an unspoken
accusation against the criminal Churchill. Both they and the
shades of those who lost their lives call him before the
tribunal of the world and ask the British people, ‘How long will
the office, one of the richest in tradition known to Great
Britain’s history, be held by a murderer?’”

Now, in view of the maliciousness of this _Völkischer Beobachter_ announcement and in fairness to the men of the British Merchant Navy, I think it is proper that I should say, that contrary to the allegation in this Nazi sheet, the _Athenia_ of course made repeated wireless distress signals which were in fact intercepted and answered by His Majesty’s ship _Electra_, in escort, as well as by the Norwegian steamship _Knut Nelson_ and the yacht _Southern Cross_.

I shall submit evidence to the Tribunal to establish that, in fact, the _Athenia_ was sunk by the German U-boat _U-30_. So unjustifiable was the torpedoing of the _Athenia_, however, that the German Navy embarked upon a course of falsification of their records and on other dishonest measures, in the hope of hiding this guilty secret. And for their part, as the Tribunal has seen, the Nazi propagandists indulged in their favorite falsehood of seeking to shift the responsibility to the British.

The captain of the _U-30_, Oberleutnant Lemp, was later killed in action; but some of the original crew of the _U-30_ have survived to tell the tale, and they are now prisoners of war. And so that the truth of this episode may be placed beyond a peradventure, I submit to the Tribunal an affidavit by a member of the crew of the _U-30_, as to the sinking of the _Athenia_ and as to one aspect of the attempt to conceal the true facts.

I refer to Document C-654, Exhibit GB-219, at Page 106 of the document book. The affidavit reads:

“I, Adolf Schmidt, Official Number N 1043-33T, of the German
Navy and former member of the crew of the _U-30_, do solemnly
declare that:

“1. I am now confined to Camp No. 133, Lethbridge, Alberta.

“2. That on the first day of war, 3 September 1939, a ship of
approximately 10,000 tons was torpedoed in the late hours of the
evening by the _U-30_.

“3. That after the ship was torpedoed and we surfaced again,
approximately half an hour after the explosion, the commandant
called me to the tower in order to show me the torpedoed ship.

“4. That I have seen the ship with my very eyes, but that I do
not think that the ship could see our U-boat at that time on
account of the position of the moon.

“5. That only a few members of the crew had an opportunity to go
to the tower in order to see the torpedoed ship.

“6. That apart from myself, Oberleutnant Hinsch was in the tower
when I saw the steamer after the attack.

“7. That I observed that the ship was listing.

“8. That no warning shot was fired before the torpedo was
launched.

“9. That I myself observed much commotion on board the torpedoed
ship.

“10. That I believe that the ship had only one smoke stack.

“11. That in the attack on this steamer one or two torpedoes
were fired which did not explode but that I myself heard the
explosion of the torpedo which hit the steamer.

“12. That Oberleutnant Lemp waited until darkness before
surfacing.

“13. That I was severely wounded by aircraft 14 September 1939.

“14. That Oberleutnant Lemp, shortly before my disembarkation in
Reykjavik 19 September 1939, visited me in the forenoon in the
petty officers’ quarters where I was lying severely wounded.

“15. That Oberleutnant Lemp then had the petty officers’
quarters cleared in order to be alone with me.

“16. That Oberleutnant Lemp then showed me a declaration under
oath according to which I had to bind myself to mention nothing
concerning the incidents of 3 September 1939 on board the
_U-30_.

“17. That this declaration under oath had approximately the
following wording:

“‘I, the undersigned, swear hereby that I shall shroud in
secrecy all happenings of 3 September 1939 on board the _U-30_,
regardless whether foe or friend, and that I shall erase from my
memory all happenings of this day.’

“18. That I have signed this declaration under oath, which was
drawn up by the commandant in his own handwriting, with my left
hand very illegibly.

“19. That later on in Iceland when I heard about the sinking of
the _Athenia_ the idea came into my mind that the _U-30_ on the
3 September 1939 might have sunk the _Athenia_, especially since
the captain caused me to sign the above-mentioned declaration.

“20. That up to today I have never spoken to anyone concerning
these events.

“21. That due to the termination of the war I consider myself
freed from my oath.”

Dönitz’ part in the _Athenia_ episode is described in an affidavit which he has sworn, which is Document D-638, Exhibit GB-220, at Page 102 of the document book. The affidavit was sworn in English, and I invite the Tribunal to look at it and observe the addition in Dönitz’ handwriting of four words at the end of the affidavit, the significance of which will be seen in a moment.

The Defendant Dönitz states:

“_U-30_ returned to harbor about mid-September. I met the
captain, Oberleutnant Lemp, on the lockside at Wilhelmshaven, as
the boat was entering harbor, and he asked permission to speak
to me in private. I noticed immediately that he was looking very
unhappy and he told me at once that he thought he was
responsible for the sinking of the _Athenia_ in the North
Channel area. In accordance with my previous instructions he had
been keeping a sharp lookout for possible armed merchant
cruisers in the approaches to the British Isles, and had
torpedoed a ship he afterwards identified as the _Athenia_ from
wireless broadcasts, under the impression that she was an armed
merchant cruiser on patrol. I had never specified in my
instructions any particular type of ship as armed merchant
cruiser nor mentioned any names of ships. I dispatched Lemp at
once by air to report to the SKL at Berlin; in the meantime, I
ordered complete secrecy as a provisional measure. Later in the
same day or early on the following day, I received a verbal
order from Kapitän zur See Fricke”—who was head of the
operations division of the naval war staff—“that:

“Firstly, the affair was to be kept a total secret.

“Secondly, the OKM considered that a court-martial was not
necessary as they were satisfied that the captain had acted in
good faith.

“Thirdly, political explanations would be handled by the OKM.

“I had had no part whatsoever in the political events in which
the Führer claimed that no U-boat had sunk the _Athenia_.

“After Lemp returned to Wilhelmshaven from Berlin, I
interrogated him thoroughly on the sinking and formed the
impression that, although he had taken reasonable care, he had
still not taken sufficient precaution to establish fully the
identity of the ship before attacking. I had previously given
very strict orders that all merchant vessels and neutrals were
to be treated according to naval prize law before the occurrence
of this incident. I accordingly placed him under cabin arrest,
as I felt certain that a court-martial would only acquit him and
would entail unnecessary publicity”—and then Dönitz had added
the words “and loss of time.”

It is right, I think, that I should add the Dönitz’ suggestion that the captain of the _U-30_ sank the _Athenia_ in mistake for a merchant cruiser must be considered in the light of a document which Colonel Phillimore submitted—the Document C-191, Exhibit GB-193, dated the 22 of September 1939—in this period, which contained Dönitz’ order that “the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser.”

Now, the _U-30_ returned to Wilhelmshaven on 27 September 1939. I submit another fraudulent naval document, Document D-659, Page 110 of the document book, which will be Exhibit GB-221, which is an extract from the War Diary of the chief of U-boats, and it is an extract for the 27th of September 1939. The Tribunal will see that it reads:

“_U-30_ comes in. She had sunk: S. S. _Blairlogies_; S. S.
_Fanad Head_.”

There is no reference at all, of course, to the sinking of the _Athenia_.

But perhaps the most elaborate forgery in connection with this episode was the forgery of the log book of the _U-30_, which was responsible for sinking the _Athenia_; and I now submit that original log book to the Tribunal as Document D-662, which will be Exhibit GB-222, and an extract from the first and relevant page of it is found at Page 111 of the document book. I would like the Tribunal to examine the original, if you will be good enough to do so, because the Prosecution’s submission is that the first page of that log book is a forgery, but a forgery which shows a curiously un-German carelessness about detail. The Tribunal will see that the first page of the text is a clear substitute for pages that have been removed. The dates in the first column of that page are in Arabic numerals. On the second and more authentic looking page, and throughout the other pages of the log book, they are in Roman numerals.

The Tribunal will also see that all reference to the action of the sinking of the _Athenia_ on the 3rd of September is omitted. The entries are translated on Page 111 of the document book for the Court’s assistance.

The log book shows that the position at 1400 hours, of the _U-30_ on the 3rd of September, is given as AL 0278, which the Tribunal will notice is one of the very few positions quoted at all upon that page, and which was, in fact, some 200 miles west of the position where the _Athenia_ was sunk. The course due south, which is recorded in the log book, and the speed of 10 knots—those entries are obviously designed to suggest that the _U-30_ was well clear of the _Athenia’s_ position on the 3rd of September.

Finally, and most curiously, the Tribunal will observe that Lemp’s own signature upon the page dealing with the 3rd of September differs from the other signatures in the text. Page 1 shows Lemp’s signature with a Roman “p” as the final letter of his name. On the other signatures, there is a script “p,” and the inference I submit is that either the signature is a forgery or it was made up by Lemp at some other, and probably considerably later date.

Now, in my submission, the whole of this _Athenia_ story establishes that the German Navy under Raeder embarked upon deliberate fraud. Even before receiving Lemp’s reports, the German Admiralty had repeatedly denied the possibility that a German U-boat could be in the area concerned. The charts which showed the disposition of U-boats and the position of sinking of the _Athenia_, which Colonel Phillimore introduced, have shown the utter dishonesty of these announcements; and my submission upon this matter is this: Raeder, as head of the German Navy, knew all the facts. Censorship and information control in Nazi Germany were so complete that Raeder, as head of the Navy, must have been party to the falsification published in the _Völkischer Beobachter_, which was a wholly dishonorable attempt by the Nazi conspirators to save their faces with their own people and to uphold the myth of an infallible Führer backed by an impeccable war machine.

The Tribunal has seen that truth mattered little in Nazi propaganda, and it would appear that Raeder’s camouflage was not confined to painting his ships or sailing them under the British flag, as he did in attacking Norway and Denmark. With regard to that last matter—the invasion of Norway and Denmark—I think it is hardly necessary that I should remind the Tribunal of Raeder’s leading part in that perfidious Nazi assault, the evidence as to which has already been presented. I think I need only add Raeder’s proud comment upon those brutal invasions, which is contained in his letter in Document C-155 at Page 25 of the document book, which is already before the Tribunal as Exhibit GB-214. That document, which is a letter of Raeder’s to the Navy, part of which I have already read, states: “The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway will for all time remain the grand contribution of the Navy to this war.”

Now, with the occupation of Norway and of much of Western Europe safely completed, the Tribunal has seen that Hitler turned his eyes towards Russia. Now, in fairness to Raeder, it is right that I should say that Raeder himself was against the attack on Russia and tried his best to dissuade Hitler from embarking upon it. The documents show, however, that Raeder approached the problem with complete cynicism. He did not object to the aggressive war on Russia because of its illegality, its immorality, its inhumanity. His only objection to it was its untimeliness. He wanted to finish England first before going further afield.

The story of Raeder’s part in the deliberations upon the war against Russia is told in the Document C-170, at Page 37 of the document book, which has already been submitted as Exhibit Number USA-136. That document consists of extracts from a German compilation of official naval notes by the German naval war staff.

The first entry, at Page 47 of the document book, which bore the date of 26 September 1940, which is at Page 11 of Document C-170, showed that Raeder was advocating to Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean policy in which, of course, the Navy would play a paramount role, as opposed to a continental land policy. The entry reads:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Führer. Naval Supreme
Commander presents his opinion about the situation: The Suez
Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez,
advance through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power.
The Russian problem will then assume a different appearance.
Russia is fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is
questionable whether action against Russia from the north will
then be still necessary.”

The next entry at Page 48 of the document book, for the 14th of November:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Führer. Führer is ‘still
inclined’ to instigate the conflict with Russia. Naval Supreme
Commander recommends putting it off until the time after the
victory over England, since there is heavy strain on German
forces and the end of warfare is not in sight.”

Then there is the entry on Page 50 for 27 December 1940:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Führer. Naval Supreme
Commander emphasizes again that strict concentration of our
entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most
urgent need of the hour. On the one hand, England has gained
strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the
eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support. On
the other hand, however, she can be hit mortally by a
strangulation of her ocean traffic which is already taking
effect. What is being done for submarine and naval air force
construction is much too little. Our entire war potential must
work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for the
Navy and Air Force, every dispersion of strength prolongs the
war and endangers the final success. Naval Supreme Commander
voices serious objections against Russia campaign before the
defeat of England.”

At Page 52 of the document book, on the 18th of February 1941, there is the entry:

“Chief of Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of
Malta even before Barbarossa.”

On the next page, on the 23rd of February, there is this interesting entry:

“Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that
seizure of Malta ‘is contemplated for the fall of 1941 after the
execution of Barbarossa’”—which the Tribunal may think is a
sublime example of wishful thinking.

The next entry, for the 19th of March 1941, which is at Page 54 of the document book, shows that by March of 1941 Raeder had begun to consider what prospects of naval action the Russian aggression had to offer. There is the entry:

“In case of Barbarossa, Supreme Naval Commander describes the
occupation of Murmansk as an urgent request of the Navy; Chief
of Supreme Command Armed Forces considers compliance very
difficult. . . .”

In the meantime, the entries in this document show that Mussolini, the flunky of Nazism, was crying out for a more active Nazi Mediterranean policy. I refer the Court to Page 57 of the document book, the entry for the 30th of May. The word “Duce” is omitted from the first line, and the entry should read:

“Duce demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for fall
1941; 12 divisions needed for that. ‘This stroke would be more
deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London’; Chief,
Naval Operations, agrees completely. . . .”

And then, finally, the entry for the 6th of June, indicating strategic views of Raeder and the German Navy at this stage, reads as follows. It is at Page 58 of the document book:

“Supreme Naval Commander with the Führer. Memorandum of the
Chief, Naval Operations: ‘Observation of the strategic situation
in the eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan campaign and the
occupation of Crete and further conduct of the war.’”

A few sentences below:

“The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the decisive
aims of the war in the Near East. Their advancement has moved
into grasping distance by the successes in the Aegean area and
the memorandum emphasizes that the offensive utilization of the
present favorable situation must take place with the greatest
acceleration and energy, before England has again strengthened
her position in the Near East with help from the United States
of America. The memorandum realizes the unalterable fact that
the campaign against Russia would be opened very shortly; but
demands, however, that the undertaking Barbarossa ‘which,
because of the magnitude of its aims, naturally stands in the
foreground of the operational plans of the armed forces
leadership,’ must under no circumstances ‘lead to an
abandonment, diminishing, or delay of the conduct of the war in
the eastern Mediterranean.’”

So that Raeder was, throughout, seeking an active role for his Navy in the Nazi war plans.

Now, once Hitler had decided to attack Russia, Raeder sought a role for his Navy in the campaign against Russia; and the first naval operational plan against Russia was a particularly perfidious one. I refer the Tribunal to the Document C-170 which I have just been reading from, at Page 59 of the document book. There the Tribunal will see an entry for the 15th of June 1941:

“On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations . . . use of arms
against Russian submarines south of the northern boundary of the
Öland warning area is permitted immediately; ruthless
destruction is to be aimed at.”

The Defendant Keitel provided a characteristically dishonest pretext for this action in his letter, the Document C-38, which is at Page 11 of the document book and which will be Exhibit GB-223. The Tribunal sees that Keitel’s letter is dated the 15th of June 1941:

“Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in the
Baltic Sea.

“To: High Command of the Navy—OKM (SKL).

“Offensive action against submarines south of the line
Memel-southern tip of Öland is authorized if the boats cannot be
definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German
naval forces.

“The reason to be given up to B-day is that our naval forces
believed to be dealing with penetrating British submarines.”

Now, that was on the 15th of June 1941, and the Tribunal will remember that the Nazi attack on Russia did not take place until the 22d of June of 1941. In the meantime Raeder was urging Hitler, as early as the 18th of March 1941, to enlarge the scope of the world war by inducing Japan to seize Singapore. The relevant document is C-152, Exhibit GB-122, at Page 23 of the document book. There is just one paragraph which I would like to be permitted to read. The document describes the audience of Raeder with Hitler on the 18th of March and the entries in it, in fact, represent Raeder’s own views:

“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (whole
English fleet contained; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war
against Japan; inferiority of U.S. fleet _vis-à-vis_ the
Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action,
but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she
will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in England.
Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring
Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East
Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby
solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

“Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She
can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as
possible.”

The Japanese, of course, as events proved, had different ideas from that.

By the 20th of April 1941, the evidence is that Hitler had agreed with this proposition of Raeder’s of inducing the Japanese to take offensive action against Singapore. I refer the Tribunal again to the Document C-170 and to an entry at Page 56 of the document book, for the 20th of April 1941. A few sentences from that read:

“Naval Supreme Commander with Führer. Navy Supreme Commander
asks about result of Matsuoka’s visit and evaluation of
Japanese-Russian pact. . . . Führer has informed Matsuoka ‘that
Russia will not be touched if she behaves in a friendly manner
according to the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for
himself.’ Japan-Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with
Germany and is to prevent Japan from advancing against
Vladivostok and to cause her to attack Singapore.”

Now an interesting commentary upon this document is found in the Document C-66, at Page 13 of the document book. The Document C-66 has already been exhibited as GB-81. I would refer the Court to Paragraph 3 at Page 13 of the document book. At that time the Führer was firmly resolved on a surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the Russian attitude to Germany. This, according to reports coming in, was frequently changing; and there follows this interesting sentence: “The communication to Matsuoka was designed entirely as a camouflage measure and to ensure surprise.”

The Axis partners were not even honest with each other, and this, I submit, is typical of the kind of jungle diplomacy with which Raeder associated himself.

I now, with the Tribunal’s permission, turn from the field of diplomacy to the final aspect of the case against Raeder, namely, to crimes at sea.

The Prosecution’s submission is that Raeder throughout his career showed a complete disregard for any international rule or usage of war which conflicted in the slightest with his intention of carrying through the Nazi program of conquest. I propose to submit to the Tribunal only a few examples of Raeder’s flouting of the laws and customs of civilized states.

Raeder has himself summarized his attitude in the most admirable fashion in the Document UK-65, which the Tribunal will find at Page 98 of the document book, and which will be Exhibit GB-224. Now that Document UK-65 is a very long memorandum compiled by Raeder and the German naval war staff on the 15th of October 1939—that is to say, only a few weeks after the war started. And it is a memorandum on the subject of the intensification of the war at sea, and I desire to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the bottom paragraph at Page 98 of the document book. It is headed, “Possibilities of Future Naval Warfare”:

“I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against
Great Britain:

“Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means
at our disposal as expeditiously as possible. Military success
can be most confidently expected if we attack British sea
communications wherever they are accessible to us, with the
greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to cut
off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to
consider the interests of neutrals in so far as this is possible
without detriment to military requirements. It is desirable to
base all military measures taken on existing international law;
however, measures which are considered necessary from a military
point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from
them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered
by existing international law. In principle, therefore, any
means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance
should be based on some legal conception”—the nature of which
is not specified—“even if that entails the creation of a new
code of naval warfare.

“The supreme war council . . . will have to decide what measures
of military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been
decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form,
in fulfillment of military requirements, this decision is to be
adhered to under all circumstances. Under no circumstances may
such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare,
once it has been made, be dropped or released under political
pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in the World
War to our own detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must
be turned down. Even threats of further countries, particularly
of the United States, coming into the war, which can be expected
with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to
a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon.
The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will
it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end. The
economic effect of such military measures on our own war economy
must be fully recognized and compensated through immediate
reorientation of German war economy and the re-drafting of the
respective agreements with neutral states; for”—these are the
final words—“for this, strong political and economic pressure
must be employed if necessary.”

I submit that those comments are most revealing; and the general submission of the Prosecution is that as an active member of the inner council of the Nazi State right up to 1943, Raeder, holding such ideas as these, must share responsibility for the many War Crimes committed by his confederates and their underlings in the course of the war.

But quite apart from this over-all responsibility of Raeder, there are certain crimes which the Prosecution submits were essentially initiated and passed down the naval chain of command by Raeder himself.

I refer to the Document C-27, at Page 7 of the document book, which will be Exhibit GB-225. Those are minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Raeder on the 30th of December 1939. I will read with the Court’s approval the second paragraph beginning:

“The Chief of the Naval Operations Staff requests that full
power be given to the Naval Operations Staff in making any
intensification suited to the situation and to the means of war.
The Führer agrees in principle to the sinking without warning of
Greek ships in the American prohibited area and of neutral ships
in those sections of the American prohibited area in which the
fiction of mine danger can be upheld, e.g., the Bristol
Channel.”

At this time, of course, as the Tribunal knows, Greek ships were also neutral and I submit that this is yet another demonstration of the fact that Raeder was a man without principle.

This incitement to crime was, in my submission, a typical group effort, because in the Document C-12, which is at Page 1 of the document book, the Tribunal will see that a directive to the effect of those naval views was issued on the 30th of December 1939 by the OKW, being signed by the Defendant Jodl. And that Document C-12 will be Exhibit GB-226. It is an interesting document. It is dated the 30th of December 1939, and it reads:

“On the 30th of December 1939, according to a report of the
Supreme Commander of the Navy, the Führer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces decided that:

“1) Greek merchant ships in the area declared by England and the
U.S.A. to be a barred zone are to be treated as enemy vessels.

“2) In the Bristol Channel all shipping may be attacked without
warning—where the impression of a mining incident can be
created.

“Both measures are authorized to come into effect immediately.”

Another example of the callous attitude of the German Navy, when it was under Raeder’s command, towards neutral shipping, is found in an entry in Jodl’s diary. . .

THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps you should read the pencil note, oughtn’t you?

MAJOR JONES: The pencil note on the Document C-12 reads:

“Add to 1): Attack must be carried out without being seen. The
denial of the sinking of these steamships, in case the expected
protests are made, must be possible.”

As I was saying, My Lord, another example of the callous attitude of Raeder’s Navy towards neutral shipping is found in an entry in Jodl’s diary for the 16th of June 1942, at Page 112 of the document book, which is Document 1807-PS, and will be Exhibit GB-227. This extract from Jodl’s Diary is dated the 16th of June 1942 and it reads:

“The Operational Staff of the Navy (SKL) applied on the 29th May
for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The
SKL considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian warships
and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture because defense
measures are still incomplete, because there is the possibility
of achieving surprise, and because Brazil is actually fighting
Germany at sea.”

This, the Tribunal will see, was a plan for a kind of Brazilian “Pearl Harbor” because the Tribunal will recollect that war did not in effect break out between Germany and Brazil until the 22d of August 1942.

Raeder himself also caused the Navy to participate in War Crimes ordered by other conspirators, and I shall give one example only of that.

On the 28th of October 1942, as the Document C-179, Exhibit USA-543, at Page 63 of the document book shows, the head of the operations division of the naval war staff promulgated to naval commands Hitler’s notorious order of the 18th of October 1942 with regard to the shooting of Commandos which in my submission amounted to denying the protection of the Geneva Convention to captured Commandos.

The Tribunal will remember the document is dated the 28th of October 1942, and it reads:

“Enclosed please find a Führer order regarding annihilation of
terror and sabotage units.

“This order must not be distributed in writing to officers below
the rank of a flotilla leader or a section commander. After
verbal notification to subordinate sections such officers must
hand this order over to the next higher section which is
responsible for its withdrawal and destruction.”

What clearer indication could there be than the nature of these instructions as to the naval command’s appreciation of the wrongfulness of the murders Hitler ordered?

THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now for 10 minutes?

[_A recess was taken._]

MAJOR JONES: I have drawn the Tribunal’s attention to the circulation of Hitler’s order to shoot Commandos. I now draw the Tribunal’s attention to an example of the execution of that order by the German Navy during the period when Raeder was its commander.

My learned friend Mr. Roberts has already given the Tribunal an account of a Commando operation of December 1942, which had as its objective an attack on shipping in Bordeaux harbor. The Tribunal will recollect that the Wehrmacht account he quoted, Document UK-57, Exhibit GB-164, stated that six of the 10 participants in that commando raid were arrested and that all were shot on the 23 March 1943. In connection with that episode the Prosecution has a further document throwing more light on this Bordeaux incident and showing how much more expeditiously the Navy under Raeder had implemented Hitler’s order on this particular occasion. I draw the Court’s attention to Document C-176, at Page 61 of the document book, Exhibit GB-228.

That document consists of extracts from the war diary of Admiral Bachmann, who was the German flag officer in charge of western France. The first entry, at Page 61, is dated 10 December 1942 and reads:

“About 1015. Telephone call from personal representative of the
Commander of the SD in Paris, SS Obersturmführer Dr. Schmidt, to
flag lieutenant, requesting postponement of the shooting, as
interrogation had not been concluded. . . .

“After consultation with the Chief of Operations Staff, the SD
had been directed to get approval direct from headquarters.

“1820. SD, Bordeaux, requested Superior SD Office at Führer’s
headquarters to postpone the shooting for 3 days. Interrogations
continued for the time being.”

The next day, 11 December 1942:

“Shooting of two English prisoners was carried out by a unit
(strength 1/16 men) attached to the harbor command, Bordeaux, in
the presence of an officer of the SD on order of the Führer.”

Then there is a note in green pencil in the margin opposite this entry which reads:

“SD should have done this. Phone flag officer in charge in
future cases.”

The Tribunal will therefore see from this Document C-176, that the first two gallant men to be shot as a result of the Bordeaux operation were actually put to death by a naval firing party on the 11th of December 1942. They were Sergeant Wallace and Marine Ewart, who had the misfortune to be captured on the 8th of December in the preliminary stages of the operation.

Of interest is the comment of the naval war staff upon this shooting, which is found in Document D-658.

THE PRESIDENT: What do the last two lines in Document C-176 about the operation being “particularly favored” mean?

MAJOR JONES: “The operation was particularly favored by the weather conditions and the dark night”—that presumably, My Lord, is a reference to the operation of the marine Commandos in successfully blowing up a number of German ships in Bordeaux harbor. Alternately, I am advised by the naval officer who is assisting me, that it probably is a reference to the conditions prevailing at the time of the shooting of the two men.

THE PRESIDENT: I should have thought so.

MAJOR JONES: I stand corrected by the representative of the British Navy upon my interpretation of the matter.

THE PRESIDENT: Doesn’t it indicate that naval men had done it?

MAJOR JONES: The shooting was in fact, as the entry of 11 December shows, carried out by a naval party—by units belonging to the naval officer in charge of Bordeaux.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MAJOR JONES: I was seeking to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the comment of the naval war staff upon that shooting, which is in Document D-658, at Page 109, Exhibit GB-229. It reads:

“The Naval Commander, west France, reports that during the
course of the day explosives with magnets to stick on, mapping
material dealing with the mouth of the Gironde, aerial
photographs of the port installations at Bordeaux, camouflage
material, and food and water for several days were found.
Attempts to salvage the canoe were unsuccessful. The Naval
Commander west France has ordered that both soldiers be shot
immediately for attempted sabotage, if their interrogation,
which has begun, confirms what has so far been discovered; their
execution has, however, been postponed in order to obtain more
information.

“According to a Wehrmacht report, both soldiers have meanwhile
been shot. The measure would be in accordance with the Führer’s
special order but is nevertheless something new in international
law, since the soldiers were in uniform.”

I submit that that last sentence shows very clearly that the Naval High Command under Raeder accepted allegiance to the Nazi conspiracy as of greater importance than any question of moral principle or of professional honor and integrity. This operation of the shooting of those two Commandos was, as I submit, not an act of war, but a murder of two gallant men; and it is upon this somber note that it is my duty to summarize this part of the Prosecution’s case against the Defendant Raeder.

The Prosecution’s submission is that he was not just a military puppet carrying out political orders. The Tribunal has seen that, before the Nazis came, he had worked actively to rebuild the German Navy behind the back of the Reichstag. When the Nazis seized power, he unreservedly joined forces with them. He was the prime mover in transferring the loyalty of the German Navy to the Nazi Party. He was as much a member of the inner councils of the Nazis as possibly any other defendant. And he was a member of their main political advisory bodies.

He was well aware of their aggressive designs and I submit he assisted in their realization not only as a military technician, but also as a mendacious politician. And he furthered, as I have submitted, their brutal methods of warfare. And yet of all these conspirators Raeder was one of the first to fall from his high position. It is in fact true that the extension of war beyond the boundaries of Poland came as a disappointment to him. His vision of a Nazi armada mastering the Atlantic reckoned without Ribbentrop’s diplomacy and Hitler’s ideas of strategy.

I would draw the Tribunal’s attention to Document C-161, at Page 35 of the document book, which is an extract, Exhibit GB-230, from a memorandum of Raeder, dated 10 January 1943, just before his retirement, entitled, “The Importance of German Surface Forces for Conducting the War by the Powers Signatory to the Three Power Pact.” The material entry reads:

“. . . it was planned by the leaders of the National Socialist
Reich to give the German Navy by 1944-45 such a strength that it
would be possible to strike at the British vital arteries in the
Atlantic with sufficient ships, fighting power, and range.

“In 1939, the war having begun 5 years earlier, the construction
of these forces was still in its initial stages. . . .”

The Tribunal will see from that document how completely Raeder was cheated in his ambitious plans by miscalculation as to when his high seas fleet would be required. The Tribunal has seen that Raeder made a great effort to recover some of his lost glory with his attack on an inoffensive Norway. He made many efforts to liven up the war at sea, both at the expense of neutrals and also of the customs and laws of the sea. But his further schemes, however, were disregarded by his fellow conspirators, and in January 1943, Raeder retired, and thereafter he was a leader in name only.

I invite the Court’s attention to the Document D-655, at Page 108 of the document book, Exhibit GB-231, which is a record in Raeder’s handwriting of his interview with Hitler on the 6th of January 1943, which led to Raeder’s retirement. I am only proposing to read the fifth paragraph, in which Raeder records:

“. . . if the Führer was anxious to demonstrate that the parting
was of the friendliest character and wished that the name Raeder
should continue to be associated with the Navy, particularly
abroad, it would perhaps be possible to make an appointment to
the Inspector General, giving appropriate publicity in the
press, _et cetera_. But a new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy
with full responsibility for this office must be appointed. The
position of Inspector General, or whatever it was decided to
call it, must be purely nominal.

“The Führer”—the record reads—“accepted this suggestion with
alacrity. The Inspector General could perhaps carry out special
tasks for him, make tours of inspection, _et cetera_. The name
of Raeder was still to be associated with the Navy. After
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had repeated his request, the
Führer definitely agreed to 30th January as his release date. He
would like to think over the details.”

This was Raeder’s twilight, and indeed a very different occasion from the period of his ascendancy in 1939, when on the 12th of March Raeder spoke on the occasion of the German Heroes’ Day. I now refer the Court to the final document on Raeder, an account of that speech in March 1939, which is at Page 103 of the document book, in the Document D-653, Exhibit GB-232. The first paragraph reads:

“Throughout Germany celebrations took place on the occasion of
Hero Commemoration Day. . . . These celebrations were combined
for the first time with the celebration of the freedom to
rearm. . . . The day’s chief event was the traditional ceremony
held in the Berlin State Opera House in Unter den Linden.”

In the presence of Hitler and representatives of the Party and Armed Forces, General-Admiral Raeder made a speech, extracts from which are given below.

I turn to Page 2 of the record, Page 104 of the document book, to about the 15th line:

“National Socialism”—says Raeder—“which originates from the
spirit of the German fighting soldier, has been chosen by the
German people as its ideology. The German people follow the
symbols of its regeneration with as much great love as fanatical
passion. The German people has had practical experience of
National Socialism and it has not been imposed, as so many
helpless critics abroad believe. The Führer has shown his people
that in the National Socialist solidarity of the people lies the
great and invincible source of strength, whose dynamic power
ensures not only peace at home but also enables us to release
all the Nation’s creative powers.”

There follow eulogies of Hitler, and a few sentences below:

“This is the reason for the clear and unsparing summons to fight
Bolshevism and international Jewry, the nation-destroying
activities of which our own people have sufficiently suffered.
Therefore, the alliance with all like-minded nations who, like
Germany, are not willing to allow their strength, dedicated to
construction and peaceful work at home, to be disrupted by alien
ideologies and by parasites of a foreign race.”

Then a few sentences on:

“If later on we instruct in the technical handling of weapons,
this task demands that the young soldier should also be taught
National Socialist ideology and the problems of life. This part
of the task, which becomes for us both a duty of honor and a
demand which cannot be refused, can and will be carried out if
we stand shoulder to shoulder and in sincere comradeship to the
Party and its organizations. . . .”

The next sentence:

“The Armed Forces and the Party thus became more and more united
in attitude and spirit.”

And then just two sentences on the next page:

“Germany is the protector of all Germans within and beyond our
frontiers. The shots fired at Almeria are proof of that.”

That refers, of course, to the bombardment of the Spanish town of Almeria, carried out by a German naval squadron on the 31 May 1937 during the course of the Spanish Civil War.

There are further references to the Führer and his leadership, and then a final sentence of the first paragraph of Page 3:

“They all planted into a younger generation the great tradition
of death for a holy cause, knowing that with their blood they
will lead the way towards the freedom of their dreams.”

My submission is that that speech of Raeder’s is the final proof of his deep personal involvement in the Nazi conspiracy. There is the mixture of heroics and fatalism that led millions of Germans to slaughter. There are boasts of violence used on the people of Almeria. There is the lip service to peace by a man who planned conquest. “Armed Forces and the Party have become more and more united in attitude and spirit”—there is the authentic Nazi voice. There is the assertion of racialism. Finally, there is the anti-Semitic gesture, Raeder’s contribution to the outlook that produced Belsen. Imbued with these ideas he became an active participant on both the political and military level in the Nazi conspiracy to wage wars of aggression and to wage them ruthlessly.