Chapter XIII: Part I: , Page 1203; Reichsgesetzblatt 1934, Part I, Page 295; and (6)

MOEHLE: That I cannot say.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know that the order of September 1942 was given in consequence of an incident in which German U-boats, contrary to orders, had undertaken rescue measures?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And the U-boats were then attacked by Allied aircraft?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A minute ago you classified the order of September 1942 as ambiguous, did you not?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You interpreted it to the commanders in the sense that the order should include the destruction of rescue facilities and of the shipwrecked crew?

MOEHLE: No, not quite; I gave the two examples to the commanders only if they made an inquiry and I passed them on in the same way as I had received them from the Commander-in-Chief Submarine Fleet and they themselves could draw that conclusion from these two examples.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In which sentence of the order do you see a hidden invitation to kill survivors or to destroy the rescue facilities?

MOEHLE: In the sentence. . .

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Just a second, I shall read to you each sentence of the order separately.

MOEHLE: Very well.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I read from the Document D-630:

“1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of
ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water
and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and
handing over food and water. These are absolutely forbidden.”

Do you see it in this sentence?

MOEHLE: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: “Rescue measures contradict the most
primitive demands of warfare that crews and ships should be
destroyed.”

Do you see that in this sentence?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does that sentence contain anything as to the destruction of shipwrecked persons?

MOEHLE: No, of crews.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: At the end of the order is the phrase “Be harsh.” Did you hear that phrase there for the first time?

MOEHLE: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this phrase used by Commander-in-Chief of U-boats to get the commanders to be severe themselves and to their crews?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you discuss the order with Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you remember that exactly?

MOEHLE: As far as I can rely upon my recollection after such a long time.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Where did that conversation take place?

MOEHLE: At the staff headquarters of the U-boat command, probably in Paris.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What position did Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch occupy at the time?

MOEHLE: As far as I can remember, he was the man in charge of the Enemy Convoys Department, but I could not say that with any certainty.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the superior officer of Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch, Commander Hessler?

MOEHLE: Superior officer? I would not say so, because Commander Hessler was on the same level as Kuppisch, a departmental chief.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch’s superior Admiral Goth?

MOEHLE: Yes, in his capacity of Chief of Staff.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you speak to Commander Hessler or Admiral Goth or with the Grossadmiral himself with regard to the interpretation to be given to the order of September?

MOEHLE: Whether I spoke to Commander Hessler, I do not remember, but in any case not to Admiral Goth or the Grossadmiral himself.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch had told you about the opinion which was prevalent in the staff of the U-boat command.

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With regard to the attitude towards the aviators in the Bay of Biscay, did he tell you that it was the opinion of the Grossadmiral himself?

MOEHLE: I do not remember that. It is too far back. When explanations were given at staff meetings of the U-boat command and an opinion was expressed by a responsible departmental chief, we flotilla leaders naturally took this to be the official opinion of the Commander-in-Chief of the U-boat arm. Admiral Goth personally or the Commander-in-Chief of the U-boat arm was only approached in cases where the departmental chiefs refused to commit themselves definitely or to assume the responsibility for an answer.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you not get to know that the story of the airmen who had been shot down in the Bay of Biscay was in actual fact just the opposite. . .

MOEHLE: I do not understand.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I continue: That the commander was reprimanded because he did not bring home these flyers even if it meant breaking off his operation.

MOEHLE: No, I do not know that.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch tell you in connection with that second example you mentioned, that the shipwrecked or their rescue equipment off the American coast should have been destroyed?

MOEHLE: No; he only said it was regrettable that the crews had been rescued.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And you concluded from that that it was desired to have the shipwrecked killed?

MOEHLE: I did not draw any conclusions at all from that for I passed on these examples without any commentary.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know the standing orders of the U-boat command?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do they contain the guiding principles of U-boat warfare?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is there any order in the standing orders directing or advising the killing of shipwrecked persons or the destruction of rescue facilities?

MOEHLE: As far as I know, no.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What grade of secrecy was attached to these standing orders?

MOEHLE: As far as I remember, top secret.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you remember that in Standing Order 511 the following was ordered. . .

Mr. President, I read from an order which I shall submit in evidence later on. I cannot do it now because I have not yet the original.

“Standing Order of the U-boat Command Number 511; 20 May 1943;
taking on board of officers of sunken ships.

“1. As far as accommodation facilities on board permit, captains
and chief engineers of sunken ships are to be brought in. The
enemy tries to thwart this intention and has issued the
following order: (a) masters are not allowed to identify
themselves when questioned, but should if possible use sailors
selected especially for this purpose; (b) crew has to state that
masters and chief engineers remained on board.

“If in spite of energetic questioning it is not possible to find
the masters or the chief engineers, then other ships’ officers
should be taken aboard.

“2. Masters and officers of neutral ships, which, according to
Standing Order Number 101, can be sunk (for instance, Swedish
ships outside Göteborg traffic), are not to be brought in
because internment of these officers would violate international
law.

“3. In case ship officers cannot be taken prisoner, other white
members of the crew should be taken along as far as
accommodation facilities and further operations of the craft
permit, for the purpose of interrogation for military and
propaganda purposes.

“4. In case of the sinking of a single cruising destroyer,
corvette, or escort vessel, try at all costs to take prisoners,
if that can be done without endangering the boat. Interrogation
of the prisoners at transit camps . . . can produce valuable
hints as to antisubmarine tactics, devices, and weapons used by
the enemy; the same applies to air crews of shot-down planes.”

[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know that order?

MOEHLE: Yes. The order seems familiar to me.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know the order 513?

“Standing Order of U-boat Command; 1 June 1944; taking along of
prisoners.

“1. Statements of prisoners are the safest and best source of
information regarding enemy tactics, weapons, location
appliances and methods. Prisoners from planes and destroyers may
be of the greatest importance to us; therefore, as far as
possible and without endangering the boat, the utmost is to be
done to take such prisoners.

“2. As prisoners are extremely willing to talk when captured,
interrogate them at once on board. It is of special interest to
know the manner of locating U-boats by aircraft, whether by
radar or by passive location methods; for instance, by
ascertaining, through electricity or heat, the location of the
boat. Report prisoners taken as soon as possible in order to
hand them over to returning boats.”

Do you know that order?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you not notice and try to clarify a contradiction between these orders concerning the rescue of air crews in every case and the story you passed on about the destruction of air crews?

MOEHLE: No; because in the order of September 1942 it also says that the order about the bringing in of ships’ captains and chief engineers remains in force.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you hear of any instance where a U-boat brought in captains and chief engineers but shot the rest of the crew?

MOEHLE: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you consider it at all possible that such an order can be given—that is, that part of the crew should be rescued and the rest of the crew should be killed?

MOEHLE: No, Sir. One cannot make such an order.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you ever hear of any case where a U-boat commander, on the basis of your briefings, destroyed rescue equipment or killed shipwrecked persons?

MOEHLE: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it permitted to attack neutral vessels outside the fixed blockade zones?

MOEHLE: Only in cases where they were not marked as neutrals according to regulations.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the Commander of the U-boat fleet particularly severe in enforcing this order for the protection of neutral ships?

MOEHLE: As I know of no such cases, I cannot say anything on that subject.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know that the commanders were threatened with court-martial if they did not obey the orders given for the protection of neutrals?

MOEHLE: Yes; I remember one case which happened in the Caribbean Sea.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you remember an order of 1944 directing that neutral ships be stopped and searched?

MOEHLE: Yes, it was ordered, but I do not remember the date, that particular Spanish and Portuguese ships in the North Atlantic should be stopped and searched.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you pass on that order to the commanders?

MOEHLE: As far as I recollect, this order was given in writing and was contained in one of the official sets of orders. I passed on orders to commanders only when they were not contained in a set of orders.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In passing that order on, did you make an addition as to whether that order should be executed or not?

MOEHLE: Yes, I remember that I said—when that order came by radio and the commanders did not know of it yet—that they should be exceedingly careful, when stopping neutrals, as there was always the danger that also a neutral ship might disclose the position of the U-boat by radio. Owing to the air superiority of the enemy in the North Atlantic, it would always be safer or better not to be compelled to stop these ships.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Had you orders from the Commander of the U-boat fleet to make this additional remark?

MOEHLE: As far as I remember, one of the departmental chiefs in the U-boat command—I assume it was Commander Hessler—told me or took particular care to point out that any stopping of ships, even neutrals, involved considerable danger to the U-boat.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Because of the air patrol?

MOEHLE: Because of the air patrol.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Your attention has been called to the order concerning the so-called rescue ships.

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you remember that?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these “rescue ships” recognized under international law as hospital ships, with appropriate markings?

MOEHLE: As far as I know, they were not.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What orders existed that hospital ships should be protected?

MOEHLE: Where these orders were laid down—whether in writing I do not remember—I only know that the Commander of the U-boats fleet frequently reminded the commanders of the absolute inviolability of hospital ships.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know of any case in which a hospital ship was attacked by a U-boat?

MOEHLE: No; I don’t know of such a case.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If the Commander of the U-boat fleet had been interested in destroying helpless human beings in violation of international law, the destruction of hospital ships would have been an excellent means, don’t you think?

MOEHLE: Without any doubt.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to cross-examine this witness?

[_No response._]

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you ever save any of the survivors of the vessels that you torpedoed?

MOEHLE: I have not been in a position to do that due to the military situation.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You mean to say it was dangerous to your boat to do it?

MOEHLE: Not only that. A great number of the ships which I sunk were in a convoy or else there was a rough sea, so that it was impossible to undertake any rescue measures owing to navigation conditions.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, do you want to re-examine?

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I have about three questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

COL. PHILLIMORE: [_Turning to the witness._] When you were a U-boat commander yourself, what was the order with regard to rescue?

MOEHLE: At the beginning of the war we had been told that the safety of one’s own boat was the decisive thing, and that the boat should not be endangered by rescue measures. Whether these orders already existed in writing at the outbreak of the war I do not remember.

COL. PHILLIMORE: When you got this order of the 17th of September 1942, did you take it merely as prohibiting rescue or as going further?

MOEHLE: When I received that order I noticed that it was not entirely clear, as orders of the B. d. U. normally were. One could see an ambiguity in it.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You have not answered my question. Did you take the order to mean that a U-boat commander should merely abstain from rescue measures, or as something further?

MOEHLE: I took the order to mean that something further was implied, only it was not actually ordered but was considered desirable.

COL. PHILLIMORE: The instance you were given about the Bay of Biscay, had you any knowledge of the facts of that incident?

MOEHLE: No, the circumstances of that case are not known to me.

COL. PHILLIMORE: What were the actual words you used when you passed that order on to commanders?

MOEHLE: I told the commanders in so many words: We are now approaching a very delicate and difficult chapter; it is the question of the treatment of lifeboats. The Commander of the U-boat fleet issued the following radio message in September 1942—I then read the radio message of September 1942 in full. For most of those present the chapter was closed; no commander had any questions to ask. Explanations were not given unless questions were asked. In some few instances the commanders asked, “How should this order be interpreted?” Then as a means of interpretation I gave the two examples which had been related to me at the U-boat command and added, “Officially such a thing cannot be ordered; everybody has to reconcile that with his own conscience.”

COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember any comment being made by commanding officers after you had read the order?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. Several commanders, following the reading of this radio message said, without making any further comment, “That is very clear, but damned hard.”

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I would now put before the Tribunal two cases where that order of the 17th of September 1942 was apparently put into effect. The first case is set out at the next document in the document book, which is D-645. My Lord, I put that document in and it becomes Exhibit GB-203. It is a report of the sinking of a steam trawler, a fishing trawler, the _Noreen Mary_, which was sunk by _U-247_ on the 5th of July 1944. The first page of the document contains an extract from the log of the U-boat. The time reference 1943 on the document is followed by an account of the firing of two torpedoes which missed, and then, at 2055 hours, the log reads:

“Surfaced. Fishing Vessels. . . .”—bearings given of three
ships—“Engaged the nearest. She stops after 3 minutes.”

Then there is an account of a shot fired as the trawler lay stopped, and then, the final entry:

“Sunk by flak, with shots into her side. Sank by the stern.”

The Tribunal will notice there is no mention in the log of any action against the torpedoed or the shipwrecked seamen.

THE PRESIDENT: Why is it entered as 5. 7. 1943?

COL. PHILLIMORE: It is a typing error. I should have pointed it out.

My Lord, the next page of the document is a comment on the action by the U-boat command, and the last line reads:

“Recognized success: Fishing vessel _Noreen Mary_ sunk by flak.”

And then there is an affidavit by James MacAlister, who was a deckhand on board the _Noreen Mary_ at the time of the sinking. My Lord, reading the last paragraph on the first page of the affidavit. He has dealt earlier with having seen the torpedo tracks, which missed the trawler. The last paragraph reads:

“At 2110 hours, while we were still trawling, the submarine
surfaced on our starboard beam, about 50 yards to the northeast
of us, and without any warning immediately opened fire on the
ship with a machine gun. We were 18 miles west from Cape Wrath,
on a northwesterly course, making 3 knots. The weather was fine
and clear, sunny, with good visibility. The sea was smooth, with
light airs.”

My Lord, then there is an account of the firing in the next, paragraph, and then, if I might read from the second paragraph, on Page 2.

THE PRESIDENT: Why not read the first?

COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Lordship pleases:

“When the submarine surfaced I saw men climbing out of the
conning tower. The skipper thought at first the submarine was
British, but when she opened fire he immediately slackened the
brake to take the weight off gear”—that is, the trawl—“and
increased to full speed, which was about 10 knots. The submarine
chased us, firing her machine gun, and with the first rounds
killed two or three men, including the skipper, who were on deck
and had not had time to take cover. The submarine then started
using a heavier gun from her conning tower, the first shot from
which burst the boiler, enveloping everything in steam and
stopping the ship.

“By now the crew had taken cover, but in spite of this all but
four were killed. The submarine then commenced to circle round
ahead of the vessel, and passed down her port side with both
guns firing continuously. We were listing slowly to port all the
time but did not catch fire.

“The mate and I attempted to release the lifeboat, which was
aft, but the mate was killed whilst doing so, so I abandoned the
attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which was below the
waterline, for shelter. The ship was listing more and more port,
until finally at 2210 she rolled right over and sank, and the
only four men left alive on board were thrown into the sea. I do
not know where the other three men had taken cover during this
time, as I did not hear or see them until they were in the
water.

“I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our
lifeboat which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top
of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge, but deliberately
steamed in my direction and when only 60 to 70 yards away fired
directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As their
intention was quite obvious, I fell into the water and remained
there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, after
which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat. The submarine
had been firing her guns for a full hour.”

My Lord, then the affidavit goes on to describe the deponent and others attempting to rescue themselves and to help each other, and then they were picked up by another trawler.

The last paragraph on that page:

“Whilst on board the _Lady Madeleine_ the second engineer and I
had our wounds dressed. I learned later that the second engineer
had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of steel wire 2½ inches
long embedded in his body.”

And there is a sentence on which I don’t rely, and the last sentence:

“I had 14 shrapnel wounds.”

My Lord, and then the last two paragraphs of the affidavit:

“This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in the
whalers _Sylvester_ (mined) and _New Seville_ (torpedoed), and
the trawler _Ocean Tide_, which ran ashore.

“As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties were six
killed . . . two missing . . . two injured. . . .”

My Lord, the next document, D-647, I put in as Exhibit GB-204. My Lord, this is an extract from a statement given by the second officer of the ship _Antonico_, torpedoed, set afire, and sunk, on the 28th of September 1942, on the coast of French Guiana. The Tribunal will observe that the date of the incident is some 11 days after the issue of the order. My Lord, I would read from the words “that the witness saw the dead,” slightly more than halfway down on the first page. An account has been given of the attack on the ship, which by then was on fire:

“. . . that the witness saw the dead on the deck of the
_Antonico_ as he and his crew tried to swing out their lifeboat;
that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20 minutes; and
that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to get away from
the side of the _Antonico_ in order to avoid being dragged down
by the same _Antonico_ and also because she was the aggressor’s
target; that the night was dark, and it was thus difficult to
see the submarine, but that the fire aboard the _Antonico_ lit
up the locality in which she was submerging, facilitating the
enemy to see the two lifeboats trying to get away; that the
enemy ruthlessly machine-gunned the defenseless sailors in
Number 2 lifeboat, in which the witness found himself, and
killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade de Lima, and wounded
three of the crew; that the witness gave orders to his company
to throw themselves overboard to save themselves from the
bullets: in so doing, they were protected and out of sight
behind the lifeboat, which was already filled with water; even
so the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At that time the
witness and his companions were about 20 meters in distance from
the submarine. . . .”

My Lord, I haven’t got the U-boat’s log in that case, but you may think that, in view of the order with regard to entries in logs, namely that anything compromising should not be put in, it would be no more helpful than in the case of the previous incident.

My Lord, the next Document, D-646(a), I put in as Exhibit GB-205. It is a monitored account of a talk by a German naval war reporter on the long wave propaganda service from Friesland. The broadcast was in English, and the date is the 11th of March 1943. It is, if I may quote:

“Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for
romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these
waters—dangerous for the British and Americans and for all the
colored people who were at their beck and call. Recently a
U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer.
Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of
the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a
decoy ship, the submarine steamed close, within 20 yards, when
hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder of the
Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank. There
remained only wreckage, lifeboats packed with men, and sailors
swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth in
expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed for Britain
and America.”

My Lord, the next page of the document I don’t propose to read. It is an extract from the log of the U-boat believed to have sunk this ship. It was, in fact, the _C. S. Flight_.

My Lord, I read that because, in my submission, it shows that it was the policy of the enemy at the start to seek to terrorize crews, and it is a part with the order with regard to rescue ships and with the order on the destruction of seamen.

If I might say so, in view of the cross-examination, the Prosecution do not complain of rescue ships being attacked. They are not entitled to protection. The point of the order was that they were to be given priority in attack, and the order, therefore, is closely allied with the order of the 17th of September 1942. In view of the Allied building program, it had become imperative to prevent the ships being manned.

My Lord, I pass to the period after the defendant had succeeded the Defendant Raeder. My Lord, the next document is 2098-PS. It has been referred to but not, I think, put in. I put it in formally as Exhibit GB-206. My Lord, I won’t read it. It merely sets out that the Defendant Raeder should have the equivalent rank of a minister of the Reich, and I ask the Tribunal to infer that on succeeding Raeder the Defendant Dönitz would presumably have succeeded to that right.

THE PRESIDENT: This is from 1938 onward?

COL. PHILLIMORE: From 1938 onward.

The next document, D-648, I put in as Exhibit GB-207. It is an affidavit by an official, or rather it is an official report certified by an official of the British Admiralty. The certificate is on the last page, and it sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings and those present, on the occasion of meetings between the Defendant Dönitz or his representative with Hitler from the time that he succeeded Raeder until the end. The certificate states:

“. . . I have compiled from them”—that is, from captured
documents—“the attached list of occasions on which Admiral
Dönitz attended conferences at Hitler’s headquarters. The list
of other senior officials who attended the same conferences is
added when this information was contained in the captured
documents concerned. I certify that the list is a true extract
from the collective documents which I have examined, and which
are in the possession of the British Admiralty, London.”

My Lord, I won’t go through the list. I would merely call the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that either Admiral Dönitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss, was present at each of these meetings; and that amongst those who were also constantly there were the Defendants Speer, Keitel, Jodl, Ribbentrop, and Göring, and also Himmler or his lieutenants, Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner.

My Lord, the inference which I ask the Tribunal to draw from the document is that from the time that he succeeded Raeder, this defendant was one of the rulers of the Reich and was undoubtedly aware of all decisions, major decisions of policy.

My Lord, I pass to the next document, C-178. That has already been put in as Exhibit Number USA-544. It is an internal memorandum of the naval war staff, written by the division dealing with international law to another division, and the subject is the order with regard to the shooting of Commandos, of the 18th of October 1942, with which the Tribunal are, I think, familiar.

The point of the document is that some doubt appeared to have arisen in some quarters with regard to the understanding of the order, and in the last sentence of the memorandum it is suggested:

“As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether
or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference
with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, that all departments
concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the
treatment of members of Commando units.”

My Lord, whether that conference took place or not I do not know. The document is dated some 11 days after this defendant had taken over from the Defendant Raeder.

But the next document in the book, D-649, which I put in as Exhibit GB-208, is an instance of the Navy in July of that year—July 1943—handing over to the SD for shooting Norwegian and British naval personnel whom the Navy decided came under the terms of the order. My Lord, it is an affidavit by a British barrister-at-law who served as judge advocate at the trial of the members of the SD who executed the order.

Paragraph 1 sets out that the deponent was judge advocate at the trial of 10 members of the SD by a military court held at the law courts, Oslo, Norway, which sat on Thursday, 29 November 1945, and concluded its sitting on Tuesday, 4 December 1945.

My Lord, the next paragraph sets out who convened the court and the names of the prosecuting and defending counsel, and the third paragraph states:

“The accused were charged with committing a war crime, in that
they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July 1943, in
violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the
killing of. . .”

Then there follow the names of six personnel of the Norwegian Navy, including one officer, and one leading telegraphist of the Royal Navy, prisoners of war. I might read from Paragraph 4:

“There was evidence before the court which was not challenged by
the Defense that Motor Torpedo Boat Number 345 set out from
Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of
making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian
coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area. The
persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the torpedo
boat.”

Paragraph 5:

“The Defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was
wearing uniform at the time of capture, and there was abundant
evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that
they were wearing uniform at all times after their capture.”

Paragraph 6:

“On 27th July 1943, the torpedo boat reached the island of Aspo
off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day
the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a
German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral Von
Schrader, the admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to
the Bergenhus where they had arrived by 11 p. m. on 28th July.
The crew were there interrogated by Lieutenant H. P. K. W.
Fanger, a naval lieutenant of the Reserve, on the orders of
Korvettenkapitän Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval
Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon
the orders of the staff of the admiral of the west coast.
Lieutenant Fanger reported to the officer in charge of the
intelligence branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the
members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of
war, and that officer in turn reported both orally and in
writing to the Sea Commander Bergen, and in writing to the
admiral of the west coast.

“7. The interrogation by the naval intelligence branch was
concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost
immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the
immediate orders of the Sea Commander Bergen, to
Obersturmbannführer of the SD Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was at
that time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen. This
followed a meeting between Blomberg and Admiral Von Schrader, at
which a copy of the Führer Order of 18 October 1942 was shown to
Blomberg. This order dealt with the classes of persons who were
to be excluded from the protection of the Geneva Convention and
were not to be treated as prisoners of war, but when captured
were to be handed over to the SD. Admiral Von Schrader told
Blomberg that the crew of this torpedo boat were to be handed
over, in accordance with the Führer Order, to the SD.

“9. The SD then conducted their own interrogation. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: You can summarize the rest, can’t you?

COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Lordship pleases.

My Lord, Paragraph 9 described the interrogation by officials of the SD, and that these officials took the same views as the naval intelligence officers, that the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war; that despite this they were taken out and shot by an execution squad composed of members of the SD. Then there is a description of the disposal of the bodies.

My Lord, the last paragraph is perhaps important in connection with the case against the Defendant Keitel.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, read it.

COL. PHILLIMORE: “11. It appeared from the evidence that in
March or April, 1945, an order from the Führer headquarters,
signed by Keitel, was transmitted to the German authorities in
Norway. The substance of the order was that members of the crew
of Commando raids who fell into German captivity were from that
date to be treated as ordinary prisoners of war. This order
referred specifically to the Führer Order referred to above.”

The member of the Tribunal will of course have noted the date; it was time to put their affairs in order.

My Lord, the next document, C-158, I put in as Exhibit GB-209. It consists of two extracts from minutes of conferences on the 19th and 20th of February 1945, conferences between the Defendant Dönitz and Hitler. If I might read the first and last sentence from the first paragraph of the first extract:

“The Führer is considering whether or not Germany should
renounce the Geneva Convention.”

That is of course the 1929 prisoners-of-war convention. And the last sentence:

“The Führer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to
consider the pros and cons of this step and to state his opinion
as soon as possible.”

Then the second extract—the Defendant Dönitz states his opinion in the presence of the Defendant Jodl and the representative of the Defendant Ribbentrop. It is the last two sentences on which I rely:

“. . . On the contrary, the disadvantages”—that is, the
disadvantages of renouncing the convention—“outweigh the
advantages. Even from a general standpoint it appears to the
Commander-in-Chief that this measure would bring no advantage.
It would be better to carry out the measures considered
necessary without warning, and at all costs to save face with
the outer world.”

My Lord, it is no small matter, that document, when one reflects that it was to that convention that we owe the fact that upwards of 165,000 British and 65,000 to 70,000 American prisoners of war were duly recovered at the end of the war. And to advocate breaching that convention, preferably without saying so, is not a matter to be treated lightly.

My Lord, the next document, C-171; I put in as Exhibit GB-210. It is another extract from the minutes of a meeting between the Defendant Dönitz and Hitler, on the 1st of July 1944. The extract is signed by the defendant:

“Regarding the general strike in Copenhagen, the Führer says
that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror.
Court-martial proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the
names of such men are on everybody’s lips, whereas there is
silence with regard to the many thousands who have lost their
lives in similar circumstances without court-martial
proceedings.”

My Lord, the next document, C-195, I put in as Exhibit GB-211. It is a memorandum signed by the defendant, dated late in 1944. There is no specific date on the document, but it is late in 1944—in December, I think, of 1944. The distribution on the third page includes Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Speer, and the Supreme Command of the Air Force.

My Lord, if I might read the second paragraph. He is dealing with the review of German shipping losses:

“Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working parties
by prisoners from the concentration camps, and as a special
measure for relieving the present shortage of coppersmiths,
especially in U-boat construction, I propose to divert
coppersmiths from the reduced construction of locomotives to
shipbuilding.”

Then he goes on to deal with sabotage, and the last two paragraphs on that page are:

“Since, elsewhere, measures for exacting atonement taken against
whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have
proved successful, and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in
France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for
the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration.”

THE PRESIDENT: Do you need to read any more than that?

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, no. The last sentence of the document in the next page is Item 2 of the summing-up:

“12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the
shipyards as additional labor (Security Service agrees to
this)”—that is the SD.

My Lord, this man was one of the rulers of Germany, and in my submission, that document alone is sufficient to condemn him. It was not for nothing that at these meetings Himmler and his lieutenants, Fegelein and Kaltenbrunner, were present.

My Lord, they were not there to discuss U-boats or the use of battleships. It is clear, in my submission, from this document that this defendant knew all about concentration camps and concentration camp labor, and as one of the rulers of Germany he must bear his full share of that responsibility.

My Lord, I pass to the last document, D-650, which I put in as Exhibit GB-212.

My Lord, this contains the orders issued by the defendant in April. The document, in my submission, shows the defendant’s fanatical adherence to the Nazi creed, and his preparedness even at that stage to continue a hopeless war at the expense of human life and with the certainty of increased destruction and misery to the men, women, and children of his country. I read the last paragraph on the second page:

“I therefore demand of the commanding officers of the Navy:
. . . that they clearly and unambiguously follow the path of
military duty, whatever may happen. I demand of them that they
stamp out ruthlessly all signs and tendencies among the men
which endanger the following of this path.”

Then he refers to an order.

“I demand from senior commanders that they should take just as
ruthless action against any commander who does not do his
military duty. If a commander does not think he has the moral
strength to occupy his position as a leader in this sense, he
must report this immediately. He will then be used as a soldier
in this fateful struggle in some position in which he is not
burdened with any task as a leader.”

And then the last paragraph on that page, from a further order of 19th of April, he gives an example of the type of under-officer who should be promoted.

“An example: In a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser
_Cormoran_, in Australia, a petty officer acting as camp senior
officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among
the inmates of the camp systematically done away with in such a
way that the guards did not notice this. This petty officer is
sure of my full recognition for his decision and his execution.
After his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has
shown that he is fitted to be a leader.”

My Lord, of course the point is not whether the facts were true or not, but the type of order that he was issuing. My Lord, if I might just sum up, the defendant was no plain sailor, playing the part of a service officer, loyally obedient to the orders of the government of the day; he was an extreme Nazi who did his utmost to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people with the Nazi creed. It is no coincidence that it was he who was chosen to succeed Hitler; not Göring, not Ribbentrop, not Goebbels, not Himmler. He played a big part in fashioning the U-boat fleet, one of the most deadly weapons of aggressive war. He helped to plan and execute aggressive war, and we cannot doubt that he knew well that these wars were in deliberate violation of treaties. He was ready to stoop to any ruse where he thought he would not be found out: Breaches of the Geneva Convention or of neutrality, where he might hope to maintain that sinking was due to a mine. He was ready to order, and did order, the murder of helpless survivors of sunken ships, an action only paralleled by that of his Japanese ally.

My Lord, there can be few countries where widows or parents do not mourn for men of the merchant navies whose destruction was due to the callous brutality with which, at the orders of this man, the German U-boats did their work.

My Lord, my learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones, now deals with the Defendant Raeder.

MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, it is my duty to present to the Tribunal the evidence against the creator of the Nazi Navy, the Defendant Raeder. The allegations against him are set out in Appendix A of the Indictment at Pages 33 and 34 (Volume I, Page 78), and the Tribunal will see that the Defendant Raeder is charged with promoting and participating in the planning of the Nazi wars of aggression; with executing those plans; and with authorizing, directing, and participating in Nazi War Crimes, particularly war crimes arising out of sea warfare.

At the outset the Tribunal may find it convenient to look at Document 2888-PS, which is already before the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USA-13, which the Tribunal will find at Page 96 of the document book. That is a document which sets out the offices and positions held by the Defendant Raeder. The Tribunal will see that he was born in 1876 and joined the German Navy in 1894. By 1918 he had become commander of the cruiser _Köln_. In 1928 he became an admiral, chief of naval command, and head of the German Navy. In 1935 he became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. In 1936, on Hitler’s 47th birthday, he became general admiral, a creation of Hitler’s. In 1937 he received the high Nazi honor of the Golden Badge of Honor of the Nazi Party. In 1938 he became a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. And in 1939 he reached the empyrean of Grossadmiral, a rank created by Hitler, who presented Raeder with a marshal’s baton. In 1943 he became Admiral Inspector of the German Navy, which, as the Tribunal will shortly see, was a kind of retirement into oblivion, because from January 1943 on, as the Tribunal has heard, Dönitz was the effective commander of the German Navy.

In these eventful years of Raeder’s command of the German Navy from 1928 to 1943 he played a vital role. I would like in the first instance to draw the Tribunal’s attention to Raeder’s part in building up the German Navy as an instrument of war to implement the Nazis’ general plan of aggression.

The Tribunal is by now familiar with the steps by which the small navy permitted to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles was enormously expanded under the guidance of Raeder. I will do no more than to remind the Tribunal of some of the milestones upon Raeder’s road to Nazi mastery of the seas, which mercifully he was unable to attain.

With regard to the story of Germany’s secret rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, I would refer the Court to the Document C-156, which is already before the Court as Exhibit Number USA-41 and which the Tribunal will find at Page 26 of the document book. That document, as the Tribunal will remember, was _A History of the Fight of the German Navy against Versailles, 1919 to 1935_, which was published secretly by the German Admiralty in 1937. The Tribunal will remember that that history shows that before the Nazis came to power the German Admiralty was deceiving not only the governments of other countries, but its own legislature and at one stage its own Government. Their secret measures of rearmament ranged from experimental U-boat and S-boat building to the creation of secret intelligence and finance organizations. I only propose to trouble the Tribunal with a reference to the last paragraph at Page 33 of the document book, which refers to the role of Raeder in this development. It is an extract from Page 75 of this Document C-156, and it reads:

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral . . . Raeder, had
received hereby a far-reaching independence in the building and
development of the Navy. This was only hampered insofar as the
previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in
consideration of the Versailles Treaty.”

As an illustration of Raeder’s concealment of rearmament, I would remind the Tribunal of the Document C-141, Exhibit Number USA-47, which is at Page 22 of the document book. In that document Raeder states that:

“In view of Germany’s treaty obligations and the disarmament
conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first S-boat
half-flotilla—which in a few months will comprise new S-boats
of the same type—from appearing openly as a formation of
torpedo-carrying boats, as it was not intended to count these
S-boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed
us.”

The next document, C-135, which will be Exhibit Number GB-213, and which is at Page 20 of the document book, is of unusual interest because it suggests that even in 1930 the intention ultimately to attack Poland was already current in German military circles. This document is an extract from the history of war organization and of the scheme for mobilization. The German text of this document is headed “850/38,” which suggests that the document was written in the year 1938. The extracts read:

“Since under the Treaty of Versailles all preparations for
mobilization were forbidden, these were at first confined to a
very small body of collaborators and were at first only of a
theoretical nature. Nevertheless, there existed at that time
. . . an ‘Assembling Order,’ and ‘Instructions for Assembling,’
the forerunners of the present-day scheme for mobilization, also
an assembling organization and adaptable instructions for
assembling which were drawn up for each ‘A-year’ (cover-name for
mobilization year).

“As stated, the ‘Assembling Organization’ at that time was to be
judged purely theoretically, for they had no positive basis in
the form of men and materials. They provided nevertheless a
valuable foundation for the establishment of a war organization
as our ultimate aim.”

Paragraph 2:

“The crises between Germany and Poland, which were becoming
increasingly acute, compelled us, instead of making theoretical
preparation for war, to prepare in a practical manner for a
purely German-Polish conflict.

“The strategic idea of a rapid forcing of the Polish base of
Gdynia was made a basis; and the fleet on active service was to
be reinforced by the auxiliary forces which would be
indispensable to attain this strategic end; and the essential
coastal and flak batteries, especially those in Pillau and
Swinemünde, were to be taken over. Thus in 1930 the
Reinforcement Plan was evolved.”

If the Tribunal turns over the page to Paragraph 3, to the second paragraph:

“Hitler had made a clear political request to build up for him
in 5 years, that is to say, by the 1st of April 1938, armed
forces which he could place in the balance as an instrument of
political power.”

Now that entry is a pointer to the fact that the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 was a signal to Raeder to go full speed ahead on rearmament. The detailed story of this development has already been told by my American colleague, Mr. Alderman; and I would simply refer the Court in the first place to the Document C-189, Exhibit Number USA-44, which is at Page 66 of the document book. In that document Raeder tells Hitler, in June 1934, that the German Fleet must be developed to oppose England and that therefore from 1936 on the big ships must be armed with big guns to match the British _King George_ class of battleship. It further, in the last paragraph, refers to Hitler’s demand that the construction of U-boats should be kept completely secret, especially in view of the Saar plebiscite. In November 1934 Raeder had a further talk with Hitler on the financing of naval rearmament, and on that occasion Hitler told him that in case of need he would get Doctor Ley to put 120 to 150 million from the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy. The reference to that is the Document C-190, Exhibit Number USA-45, at Page 67 of the document book. The Tribunal may think that that proposed fraud upon the German working people was a characteristic Nazi manifestation.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?

MAJOR JONES: If Your Lordship pleases.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, the next document which I desire to draw to the Tribunal’s attention is the Document C-23, Exhibit Number USA-49, at Page 3 of the document book, which states that the true displacement of certain German battleships exceeded by 20 percent the displacement reported to the British. That, I submit, is typical of Raeder’s use of deceit.

The next document to which I wish to refer briefly is C-166, Exhibit Number USA-48, Page 36 of the document book. It is another such deceitful document, which orders that auxiliary cruisers, which were being secretly constructed, should be referred to as “transport ships.”

Then there is the Document C-29, Exhibit Number USA-46, at Page 8 of the document book, which is signed by Raeder and deals with the support given by the German Navy to the German armament industry, and, I submit, is an illustration of Raeder’s concern with the broader aspects of Nazi policy and of the close link between Nazi politicians, German service chiefs, and German armament manufacturers.

THE PRESIDENT: Has that been put in before?

MAJOR JONES: That has been put in before, My Lord, as Exhibit Number USA-46.

A final commentary on the post-1939 naval rearmament is the Document C-155, at Page 24 of the document book, which is a new document and will be Exhibit GB-214 and is a letter from Raeder to the German Navy, dated 11 June 1940. The original, which is now submitted to the Tribunal, shows the very wide distribution of this letter. There is provision in the distribution list for 467 copies. This letter of Raeder’s is a letter both of self-justification and of apology. The extracts read:

“The most outstanding of the numerous subjects of discussion in
the Officers Corps are, for the time being, the torpedo
positions and the problem whether the naval building program, up
to autumn 1939, envisaged the possibility of the outbreak of war
as early as 1939, or whether the emphasis ought not to have been
laid, from the first, on the construction of U-boats. . . .

“If the opinion is voiced in the Officers Corps that the entire
naval building program has been wrongly directed and if, from
the first, the emphasis should have been on the U-boat weapon
and after its consolidation on the large ships, I must emphasize
the following matters:

“The building up of the fleet was directed according to the
political demands, which were decided by the Führer. The Führer
hoped, until the last moment, to be able to put off the
threatening conflict with England until 1944-45. At that time
the Navy would have had available a fleet with a powerful U-boat
superiority and a much more favorable ratio as regards strength
in all other types of ships, particularly those designed for
warfare on the High Seas.

“The development of events forced the Navy, contrary to the
expectation even of the Führer, into a war which it had to
accept while still in the initial stage of its rearmament. The
result is that those who represent the opinion that the emphasis
should have been laid from the start on the building of the
U-boat arm appear to be right. I leave undiscussed how far this
development, quite apart from difficulties of personnel,
training, and dockyards, could have been appreciably improved in
any way in view of the political limits of the Anglo-German
Naval Treaty. I leave also undiscussed, how the early and
necessary creation of an effective air force slowed down the
desirable development of the other branches of the forces. I
indicate, however, with pride, the admirable and, in spite of
the political restraints in the years of the Weimar Republic,
far-reaching preparation for U-boat construction, which made the
immensely rapid construction of the U-boat arm, both as regards
equipment and personnel, possible immediately after the
assumption of power. . . .”